The jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by sec. 847 of the
Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia was taken
away by the Act of Congress approved Feb. 25, 1579, which enacts
that a judgment or a decree of the Supreme Court of that District
may be reexamined here "where the matter in dispute, exclusive of
costs, exceeds the value of $2,500." This Court therefore dismisses
a writ of error sued out Dec. 6, 1875, to reverse a final judgment
of that court where the matter in dispute is of the value of
$2,250.
This is a writ of error sued out by the Baltimore and Potomac
Railroad Company, the defendant below, on the 6th of December,
1875, to reverse a judgment rendered against it for $2,250 by the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. At that time secs. 846
and 847 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of
Columbia, defining the jurisdiction of this Court in that class of
cases, were in force.
Page 98 U. S. 399
They are as follows:
"SEC. 846. Any final judgment, order, or decree of the Supreme
Court of the District may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in
the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of error or appeal
in the same cases and in like manner as provided by law in
reference to the final judgments, orders, and decrees of the
circuit courts of the United States."
"SEC. 847. No cause shall be removed from the Supreme Court of
the District to the Supreme Court of the United States by appeal or
writ of error unless the matter in dispute in such cause shall be
of the value of $1,000 or upward, exclusive of costs, except in the
cases provided for in the following section."
On the 25th of February, 1879, Congress passed
"An Act to create an additional Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia, and for the better
administration of justice in said District,"
secs. 4 and 5 of which are as follows:
"SEC. 4. The final judgment or decree of the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia in any case where the matter in dispute,
exclusive of costs, exceeds the value of $2,500, may be reexamined
and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States
upon writ of error or appeal in the same manner and under the same
regulations as are provided in cases of writs of error on judgments
or appeals from decrees rendered in a circuit court."
"SEC. 5. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the
provisions of this act are hereby repealed."
The defendant in error now moves to dismiss the writ of error on
the ground that the jurisdiction of this Court has been taken
away.
Page 98 U. S. 400
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The single question presented by this motion is whether
Page 98 U. S. 401
there is any law now in force which gives us authority to
reexamine, reverse, or affirm the judgment in this case. Nearly
seventy years ago, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said, in
Durusseau v. United
States, 6 Cranch 307, that this
"Court implies a legislative exception from its constitutional
appellate power in the legislative affirmative description of those
powers. Thus a writ of error lies to the judgment of a circuit
court where the matter in controversy exceeds the value of $2,000.
There is no express declaration that it will not lie where the
matter in controversy shall be of less value. But the Court
considers this affirmative description as manifesting the intent of
the legislature to except from its appellate jurisdiction all cases
decided in the circuits where the matter in controversy is of less
value and implies negative words."
There has been no departure from this rule, and it has
universally been held that our appellate jurisdiction can only be
exercised in cases where authority for that purpose is given by
Congress.
It is equally well settled that if a law conferring jurisdiction
is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all such
cases fall with the law.
United States v. Boisdore's
Heirs, 8 How. 113;
McNulty v.
Batty, 10 How. 72;
Norris v.
Crocker, 13 How. 429;
Insurance
Company v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541;
Ex
parte McArdle, 7 Wall. 514;
Assessor
v. Osbornes, 9 Wall. 567;
United
States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88.
Sec. 847 of the Revised Statutes, relating to the District of
Columbia, is in irreconcilable conflict with the act of 1879. The
one gives us jurisdiction when the amount in dispute is $1,000 or
more; the other in effect says we shall not have jurisdiction
unless the amount exceeds $2,500. It is clear, therefore, that the
repealing clause in the act of 1879 covers this section of the
Revised Statutes.
The act of 1879 is undoubtedly prospective in its operation. It
does not vacate or annul what has been done under the old law. It
destroys no vested rights. It does not set aside any judgment
already rendered by this Court under the jurisdiction conferred by
the Revised Statutes when in force. But a party to a suit has no
vested right to an appeal or a writ of error from one court to
another. Such a privilege once granted may
Page 98 U. S. 402
be taken away, and if taken away, pending proceedings in the
appellate court stop just where the rescinding act finds them
unless special provision is made to the contrary. The Revised
Statutes gave parties the right to remove their causes to this
Court by writ of error and appeal, and gave us the authority to
reexamine, reverse, or affirm judgments or decrees thus brought up.
The repeal of that law does not vacate or annul an appeal or a writ
already taken or sued out, but it takes away our right to hear and
determine the cause if the matter in dispute is less than the
present jurisdictional amount. The appeal or the writ remains in
full force, but we dismiss the suit, because our jurisdiction is
gone.
It is claimed, however, that, taking the whole of the act of
1879 together, the intention of Congress not to interfere with our
jurisdiction in pending cases is manifest. There is certainly
nothing in the act which in express terms indicates any such
intention. Usually where a limited repeal only is intended, it is
so expressly declared. Thus, in the act of 1875, 18 Stat. 316,
raising the jurisdictional amount in cases brought here for review
from the circuit courts, it was expressly provided that it should
apply only to judgments thereafter rendered, and in the act of
1874,
id. 27, regulating appeals to this Court from the
supreme courts of the territories, the phrase is, "that this act
shall not apply to cases now pending in the Supreme Court of the
United States where the record has already been filed." Indeed, so
common is it, when a limited repeal only is intended, to insert
some clause to that express effect in the repealing act that if
nothing of the kind is found, the presumption is always strong
against continuing the old law in force for any purpose. We think
it will not be claimed that an appeal may now be taken or a writ of
error sued out upon a decree or a judgment rendered before the act
of 1879 took effect if the matter in dispute is not more than
$2,500, but it seems to us there is just as much authority for
bringing up new cases under the old law as for hearing old ones.
There is nothing in the statute which indicates any intention to
make a difference between suits begun and those not begun. If, as
is contended, the object of Congress was to raise our
jurisdictional amount because of the increase of the judicial force
in the District, we
Page 98 U. S. 403
see no good reason why those who had commenced their proceedings
for review of old judgments should be entitled to more
consideration than those who had not. No declaration of any such
object on the part of Congress is found in the law, and when, if it
had been the intention to confine the operation of what was done to
judgments thereafter rendered or to cases not pending, it would
have been so easy to have said so, we must presume that Congress
meant the language employed should have its usual and ordinary
signification and that the old law should be unconditionally
repealed.
Without more, we conclude that our jurisdiction in the class of
cases of which this is one has been taken away, and the writ will
accordingly be dismissed, each party to pay his own costs, and it
is
So ordered.
