1. By a policy upon the life of A., for the benefit of his wife,
an insurance company promised to pay her a certain sum,
"for her sole and separate use and benefit, ninety days after
due notice and satisfactory evidence of the death of the said A.,
and of the just claim of the assured (or proof of interest, if
assigned or held as security), under this policy, has been received
and approved by the company."
Held, that the words "just claim of the assured" have reference
to her claim or title to the policy, and not to the justness of her
cause of action thereon.
2. A fact, disclosed by the proofs of the death of the insured
furnished to the company, which might be set up as a defense to a
suit on the policy, does not derogate from their sufficiency, nor
bar the bringing of such suit.
3. Where a policy provides that it shall be void if the insured
shall "die by his own hand," the court should not take from the
jury, as insufficient to sustain a recovery, evidence tending to
show that he was insane when he committed the act which caused his
death. The weight of the evidence is for the jury to pass upon,
although the court may, in its discretion, express its opinion
thereon.
4. The testimony of ordinary persons as to the conduct, manner,
and appearance of the insured, and to the impressions thereby made
upon them, is competent to go to the jury upon the question of his
insanity.
5. The charge of the court below upon that question, being in
the language sanctioned and approved in
Life
Insurance Company v. Terry, 16 Wall. 580, was not
erroneous.
Page 95 U. S. 233
This was an action on a policy, issued by the Charter Oak Life
Insurance Company, upon the life of Emil G. Rodel, for the benefit
of his wife, the plaintiff below. The policy was dated June 25,
1873, and contained a promise to pay to the plaintiff,
"for her sole and separate use and benefit, ninety days after
due notice and satisfactory evidence of the death of the said Emil
G. Rodel and of the just claim of the assured (or proof of
interest, if assigned or held as security), under this policy, has
been received and approved by the company."
It further contained, among other conditions, the following:
that, in case the said Emil G. Rodel should "die by his own hand,"
the policy should be void. It was conceded that he died on the
fifth day of December, 1873, from the effects of poison
administered by his own hand, and this fact was set up in the
answer, by way of defense: but the plaintiff in her replication
averred that he was insane at the time, and not in possession of
his mental faculties, and not responsible, in consequence, for his
act, and denied that he committed suicide or died by his own hand,
within the meaning and intention of the policy. Whether the
deceased was insane or not when he took the poison was the
principal issue in the cause. The company, however, in its answer,
made another issue, by denying that it had ever received due notice
and satisfactory evidence of the death of Rodel and of the just
claim of the plaintiff under the policy; averring that the only
proof and notice it had received from the plaintiff of Rodel's
death, and of her claim under the policy, had been and was to the
effect that
"said Emil G. Rodel committed suicide at about 6.35 o'clock,
P.M., Friday, Dec. 5, 1873, in a saloon on northeast corner of
Eleventh and Market Streets, in the City and County of St. Louis.,
Mo., by taking poison,"
as appeared from the certificate of the coroner accompanying and
making part of said notice and proof received by the company,
without any other proof of the death or of the circumstances
thereof. The plaintiff in her replication averred, as she had done
in her petition, that due notice and proof of his death and of her
claim had been given, according to the terms of the policy.
Page 95 U. S. 234
On the trial, the plaintiff first put in evidence the policy,
and the proofs of death which had been served on the company. The
latter were in the usual form, but accompanied by the coroner's
certificate, stating the cause of death as alleged in the answer.
They were objected to as insufficient, the company contending that,
by the policy itself, satisfactory notice and proof of death and of
the just claim of the assured was a condition precedent to the
right of demanding payment, and consequently to the right of
bringing suit on the policy.
The court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence, and
the company excepted.
There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $5,130,
whereupon the company brought the case here.
The other facts in the case, and the instruction given and those
refused, are set forth in the opinion of the court.
Page 95 U. S. 237
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, after stating the case, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
We think there was no error in the ruling of the court below
admitting evidence of the proofs of death, which had been served on
the defendant. Of course, the company could not justly contend that
it might arbitrarily object to the sufficiency of the proofs; but
it had an undoubted right to demand and insist upon such proofs as
the law would adjudge to be reasonable and satisfactory. The
objection to those furnished was that, whilst otherwise sufficient
as proofs of the death of the insured, they disclosed at the same
time a cause of death which exempted the company from liability,
and hence could not be said to be sufficient proof of "the just
claim of the assured" as well as of the death of Rodel. It requires
but a moment's inspection of the policy to perceive that the clause
in question, so far as it requires notice "of the just claim of the
assured," had reference to her claim or title to the policy, and
not to the justness of her cause of action thereon. This is the
fair and natural interpretation of the words, but it is placed
beyond question by the superadded words which follow in
parenthesis.
The entire clause is,
"due notice and satisfactory evidence of the death of the said
Emil G. Rodel, and of the just claim of the assured (or proof of
interest, if assigned or held as security)."
As the question of interest in the policy is not now at issue,
it only remains to inquire whether the proofs were sufficient in
regard to the death of the insured. Of this, it seems to us, there
can be no doubt. Proof of death was all that was required. This was
given, and does not appear to have been objected to. If the proofs
also disclosed facts of which the defendant could avail itself as a
defense to an action on the policy, this would not derogate from
the sufficiency of the proofs as proofs of death. But whilst the
disclosure of such
Page 95 U. S. 238
facts might well suggest to the company the propriety of
refusing payment and standing suit, it would be no bar to the
bringing of a suit; otherwise, no suit could ever be brought until
the parties had gone through an extrajudicial investigation
resulting favorably to the assured.
The plaintiff next proceeded to examine witnesses respecting the
condition of the deceased's mind at the time of his death; and the
evidence is all spread upon the record. When the plaintiff rested,
the defendant moved that the jury be instructed to render a verdict
for the defendant on the ground that the evidence of the plaintiff
was insufficient to sustain a recovery. This motion was also
overruled, and an exception was taken. It is hardly necessary to
say that if there was any evidence tending to prove that the
deceased was insane when he took the poison which caused his death,
the judge was not bound to, and indeed could not properly, take the
evidence from the jury. The weight of the evidence is for them, and
not for the judge, to pass upon. The judge may express his opinion
on the subject, and in cases where the jury are likely to be
influenced by their prejudices, it is well for him to do so; but it
is entirely in his discretion.
Drakely v.
Gregg, 8 Wall. 242;
Hickman v.
Jones, 9 Wall. 197;
Barney v.
Schmeider,, 9 Wall. 248;
Brown v.
Lozalere, 44 Mo. 383;
Roustong v. Railroad Company,
45
id. 236;
McFarland v. Bellows, 49
id.
311;
Consequa's Case, Pet.C.C. 225;
M'Lanahan
v. Universal Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 170;
Tracy v.
Swartwout, 10 Pet. 80;
Gaines v.
Dunn, 14 Pet. 322;
Mitchell v.
Harmony, 13 How. 131;
34 U. S. 9 Pet.
541;
27 U. S. 2 Pet.
137.
Whatever may be our opinion as to the weight of the evidence
given by the plaintiff in this case, it cannot be disputed that
there was at least some evidence of Rodel's insanity. Besides the
tedious and painful details of his conduct, manner, and looks given
by his wife and others, evincing great strangeness and total change
in his manner, there is this positive testimony of his
sister-in-law, Emma Millentz. To the question put to her by the
court, "How did he look and act the last week?" she answered,
"Well, I thought he looked like he was insane." The court asked her
what she meant by that, why she thought so, to which she
replied,
"Because he used always to be so kind; when a person came, he
would get up; he was
Page 95 U. S. 239
always gallant and polite, and toward the last he looked
straight before him -- staring straight before him; before, he was
very pleasant and polite, but towards the last he would not notice
anybody when they came in at all; also, he walked entirely
different. He looked as if confused in his mind. He did not seem to
know what to answer if any person asked him a question."
And on cross-examination she said:
"I mean by insane that he was crazy, and that he always looked
straight before him, staring, and before that he had always been
happy and joyful. I do not know what to say that I mean by 'crazy.'
The other symptoms of being insane or crazy which he manifested
were that his whole appearance seemed to be changed, and in his
personal habits he seemed to neglect himself. His hair was unkempt,
standing on end, and in his attire he was untidy, whereas before he
was very accurate in everything. These are the only reasons I have
for supposing that he was not in his right mind, and because he
always looked so straight before him, staring."
Lewis Baum, another witness, a notary public, who saw Rodel
almost every day, testifies that he came into his office about two
o'clock of the day on which he died, and he adds:
"The very moment he stepped in, I was surprised in seeing him,
having known him long before, and knowing that he had always been a
very jovial and lively young man; good associate in company. He
came in like he was in a great state of excitement. I did not know
what it was, though. He had a little business with me, and then he
left. Well, he looked to me a different man altogether; he was in a
great state of excitement. His eyes looked -- well, I cannot
describe it now exactly, but he looked like a man who is out of his
mind altogether."
And on a rigid cross-examination he adhered to this view: "the
impression he made on me was such that I said to myself -- the
impression on me was that that man was not in his right mind."
Although such testimony from ordinary witnesses may not have
great weight with experts, yet it was competent testimony, and
expressed in an inartificial way the impressions which are usually
made by insane persons upon people of ordinary understanding.
Page 95 U. S. 240
We think there was no error in the refusal of the judge to give
the instruction requested.
When the evidence was closed, the defendant's counsel proposed
various instructions to the jury. We will pass over those which
relate to the alleged insufficiency of notice and proof of death,
which have been already considered, and those which were
substantially adopted by the judge, or on which no errors have been
assigned. The following request and another of substantially the
same purport were refused -- namely that the plaintiff could not
recover if the assured knew that the act which he committed would
result in death, and deliberately did it for that purpose. An
additional request was made to charge that a certain letter,
written evidently under great excitement by Rodel to his wife on
the day of his death, apprising her of his intention to destroy
himself, and his reasons for so doing, based upon his pecuniary
troubles and anticipated exposures, bore evidence of coolness and
deliberation, and of itself afforded presumptive evidence of sanity
at the time when it was written. This request was also refused.
The judge, after stating that the burden of proving the insanity
of the deceased was on the plaintiff, charged the jury as
follows:
"It is not every kind or degree of insanity which will so far
excuse the party taking his own life as to make the company
insuring liable; to do this, the act of self-destruction must have
been the consequence of insanity, and the mind of the deceased must
have been so far deranged as to have made him incapable of using a
rational judgment in regard to the act which he was committing. If
he was impelled to the act by an insane impulse, which the reason
that was left him did not enable him to resist, or if his reasoning
powers were so far overthrown by his mental condition that he could
not exercise his reasoning faculties on the act which he was about
to do, the company is liable. On the other hand, there is no
presumption of law,
prima facie or otherwise, that
self-destruction arises from insanity; and you will remember a
great many jurors were excused from the panel because they thought
the law was otherwise; therefore you will bear in mind that there
is no presumption,
prima facie or otherwise, that
self-destruction arises from insanity, and if you believe from the
evidence that the deceased, although excited or angry or disturbed
in mind, formed a
Page 95 U. S. 241
determination to take his own life, because in the exercise of
his usual reasoning faculties he preferred death to life, then the
company is not liable, because he died by his own hand within the
meaning of the policy."
"If the insured, being in the possession of his ordinary
reasoning faculties, from anger, pride, jealousy, or a desire to
escape from the ills of life, intentionally takes his own life, the
proviso attaches, and there can be no recovery -- that is, he did
die by his own act. If the death is caused by the voluntary act of
the assured, he knowing and intending that his death shall be the
result of his act, and when his reasoning faculties are so far
impaired that he shall not be able to understand the moral
character or the general nature, consequence, and effect of the act
he is about to commit, or when he is impelled thereto by an insane
impulse which he has not the power to resist, such death is not in
the contemplation of the parties to the contract, and the insurer
is liable."
The defendant's counsel excepted to the charge thus given.
This charge is in the very words of the charge sanctioned and
approved by this Court in the case of
Life
Insurance Company v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, including
an explanatory clause of the opinion of the Court in that case. We
see no reason to modify the views expressed by us on that occasion.
We think, therefore, that there was no error in the charge as
given. It follows that the judge properly refused the request to
charge that the plaintiff could not recover if the insured knew
that the act which he committed would result in death, and
deliberately did it for that purpose. Such knowledge and
deliberation are entirely consistent with his being, in the
language of the charge, "impelled by an insane impulse, which the
reason that was left him did not enable him to resist," and are
therefore not conclusive as to his responsibility or power to
control his actions.
The omission to charge as requested, with regard to the letter
written by Rodel, is subject to the same considerations, and may be
dismissed with only this further remark: that persons of most
decided insanity often exhibit consistency of purpose, coolness,
and even great ingenuity in the pursuit of some insane object to
which they are impelled by the diseased condition of mind with
which they are afflicted. An inspection of the letter, however,
shows that it is pervaded by a very abnormal degree of excitement,
and we think the judge did quite right,
Page 95 U. S. 242
even on this ground, to decline the unqualified instruction
which was requested in relation to it.
This disposes of all the errors assigned by the plaintiffs in
error, and our conclusion therefore is that the judgment of the
circuit court must be affirmed. and it is
So ordered.
