1. The Supreme Court of Indiana having decided in this case that
the moneys arising from section 16 in each congressional township
of that state, all of which are to be paid into the county treasury
by the school trustee, form
a part of the school fund which the county auditor is required
to distribute to the various townships in the county, and that in
so doing, he is bound by the proviso in the Act of March 4, 1855,
"that in no case shall the congressional township fund be
diminished by such distribution, and diverted to any other
township," this Court affirms the decision.
2. This Court adheres to the ruling in
Springfield
Township v. Quick, 22 How. 56, that the right of
the inhabitants of the several congressional townships in that
state to such moneys for the use of schools in the township where
section 16 lies is sufficiently protected by that proviso.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Congress of the United States, in the act admitting Indiana
as a state, declared that every sixteenth section of a
Page 94 U. S. 793
township, according to the legal subdivisions of the public
lands lying within that state, should be appropriated for the use
of schools within the township.
An act of the legislature of the state, prior to 1854, directed
that the money derived from these sixteenth sections should be
mingled with school moneys, derived from taxation and various other
sources, into a common fund, and should be apportioned among the
counties of the state, according to an enumeration of the pupils in
each county. As this might have resulted in the diversion of some
of the money derived from the congressional grant to the schools of
other townships than that in which the land lay, it was, in a
proper suit, declared by the supreme court of the state to be
invalid.
State v. Springfield Township, 6 Ind. 83.
An act was accordingly passed, in March, 1855, providing anew
for the distribution of this common fund, which contained this
proviso: "That in no case shall the congressional township fund be
diminished by such distribution, and diverted to any other
township."
Under this act, while the whole fund derived from the interest
on the proceeds of the sale of these lands, or the rent of them if
unsold, could not be diminished or diverted to schools in other
townships, the common fund arising from other sources was so
distributed as to equalize the whole among the schools of all the
counties -- that is, if a township had an ascertained sum arising
from the sixteenth section, it received none of the school fund
derived from other sources until all other townships had received
from those other sources an amount which made them equal to that
sum, having regard to the number of pupils, as ascertained by the
legal census.
The same Township of Springfield brought another suit to test
the validity of this act, and the Supreme Court of Indiana having
affirmed it, 7 Ind. 636, the township brought the case to this
Court on the ground that the act of the legislature was in conflict
with the act of Congress. This Court, while holding that it was the
intent of the act of Congress that the money arising from the
sixteenth section should be used only for schools within the
congressional townships where the section lay, was of opinion that
the proviso we have cited from the
Page 94 U. S. 794
Indiana statute sufficiently protected the right of the people
of the township, and that it was competent for the Legislature of
Indiana to place the people of other townships on an equality with
them in regard to educational means, out of funds of the state
derived from other sources, and that in so doing they did not
violate the conditions of the trust on which the state received
those lands.
Springfield Township v.
Quick, 22 How. 56.
There seems to have been no further trouble in this matter
until, by an act of the legislature of 1873, the school trustee,
who was treasurer of the township and who had previously collected
and distributed the money arising from this school section, was
directed to pay all the money so received by him into the treasury
of the county. The present plaintiff in error refused to do this,
and, being sued by the proper county officers for the money in his
hands, set up in defense that the act requiring him to do so was
void.
The ground on which this proposition is supported by counsel is
that there is no provision of law in Indiana by which this money,
when paid into the county treasury, can be withdrawn, or if
withdrawn, can be applied to the use of schools in the proper
congressional township.
It is not contended by counsel that the Legislature of Indiana
could not provide as it might deem best for the custody of this
money, nor is it argued that a similar power could not be exercised
as to the proper officer to make distribution of it, and direct its
expenditure. The whole argument rests on the assumed results of the
Indiana statutes that while the school trustee, who is treasurer of
the school board, was by the law, as it stood prior to 1873,
authorized to collect and distribute the fund, he is now directed
to pay it into a treasury where it cannot, by law, be distributed
as the act of Congress requires. It is therefore argued that this
amendatory law is void and that the trustee has still the right to
collect and distribute the money, and cannot be made to pay it into
the county treasury.
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in the opinion, which is a part of
the record in this case, have decided that the school laws of that
state do authorize the auditor of each county to distribute the
school fund in the county treasury to the different townships in
the county, and that in doing so he is bound by
Page 94 U. S. 795
the proviso we have already cited, which preserves to each
congressional township the funds arising from the sale of the
sixteenth section; and they also decide that the money paid into
the county treasury by the school trustee, arising from that
section, is a part of the fund which the auditor is to apportion,
subject to that proviso. That court, as it will be seen, construes
the statute of its own state in a manner which this Court has
already decided to be in harmony with the act of Congress, and we
are asked by counsel to decide that the Supreme Court of Indiana,
in thus construing the statute, is in error, and to make a
construction of it by which it will conflict with the act of
Congress, and be therefore void, merely that one officer may have
distribution of the fund instead of another.
Our convictions should be very clear before we do this, even if
we have the right to do it, which may admit of some question.
Fortunately, we concur in the view of these laws taken by that
court.
The school laws of the state are voluminous and complex, and are
all referred to in the briefs. A full examination of them is
unnecessary here.
Sec. 118 provides that:
"The auditor of each county shall, on, &c., make
apportionment of the school revenue to which his county may be
entitled, to the several townships, towns, and cities of his
county, which apportionment shall be paid to the school treasurer
of each township and incorporated city or town by the county
treasurer, and in making the apportionment and distribution
thereof, the auditor shall ascertain the amount of the
congressional township school revenue belonging to each city, town,
and township, and shall so apportion the other school revenue for
tuition to each city, town, and township, as near as may be,
according to the enumeration of children therein,
provided,
however, that in no case shall the income of the congressional
township fund, belonging to any congressional township, or part of
such township, be diminished by such apportionment, or diverted or
distributed to any other township, and report the amount
apportioned to the state superintendent of public instructions,
verified by affidavit."
We have here the proper authority for the apportionment and
distribution of the school fund in the county treasury which
Page 94 U. S. 796
shall be paid to the school treasurer of each township. This
school treasurer is the very officer who has collected and paid
this fund into the treasury of the county under the amendment of
1873.
The argument is that this section only applied to the school
fund from other sources, and could not apply to this, because it
was not payable into the county treasury when the section was
enacted.
But let us suppose that the legislature had by statute increased
the fund in the county treasury from other sources, as by giving to
it some penalty for violation of a new statute, would it require an
express provision to authorize the auditor to apportion that with
what the treasurer was receiving before? The question answers
itself. The fund -- the whole fund in the county treasury devoted
to the use of schools -- was to be apportioned, and if the fund
arising from the sixteenth section becomes a part of it, it must be
distributed. And the statute carefully provides that in making that
distribution, the appropriation of the sixteenth section to the
schools of the township shall be strictly observed.
It is unnecessary to protract the argument, for we fully concur
with the opinion of the Supreme Court of Indiana construing their
own statute.
Judgment affirmed.