1. The second section of the Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 14 Stat. at
Large 385, "to amend" the Judiciary Act of 1789, operates as a
repeal of the twenty-fifth section of that act, and the Act of
1867, as it is now found in the Revised Statutes of the United
States, § 709, is the sole law governing the removal of causes
from state courts to this Court for review, and has been since its
enactment in 1867.
2. Congress did not intend, by omitting in this statute the
restrictive clause at the close of the twenty-fifth section of the
Act of 1789 (limiting the Supreme Court to the consideration of
federal questions in cases so removed) to enact affirmatively that
the Court
should consider all other questions involved in
the case that might be necessary to a final judgment or decree.
3. Nor does the language of the statute, that
"The judgment may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed on a
writ of error . . . in the same manner and under the same
regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect as if the
judgment or decree complained of had been rendered or passed in a
court of the United States"
require the examination of any other than questions of federal
law.
4. The phrase above quoted has reference to the manner of
issuing the writ, its return with the record of the case, its
effect in removing the case to this Court, and the general rules of
practice which govern the progress of such cases to final judgment,
and is not intended to prescribe the considerations which should
govern this Court in forming that judgment.
5. But the language of the statute in making the jurisdiction of
this Court dependent on the decision of certain questions by the
state court against the right set up under federal law or
authority, conveys the strongest implication that these questions
alone are to be considered when the case is brought here for
revision.
6. This view is confirmed by the course of decisions in this
Court for eighty years, by the policy of Congress, as shown in
numerous statutes, conferring the jurisdiction of this class of
cases in courts of original jurisdiction,
viz., the
district and circuit courts, whether originally or by removal from
state courts, when it intends the whole case to be tried, and by
the manifest purpose which caused the passage of the law.
Page 87 U. S. 591
7. In construing the act of 1867 as compared with the act of
1789, the Court declares itself to be of opinion that it is not so
closely restricted to the face of the record in determining whether
one of the questions mentioned in it has been decided in the state
court, and that it may, under this statute, look to the properly
certified opinion of the state courts when any has been delivered
in the case.
8. And it holds the following propositions as governing its
examination and its judgments and decrees in this class of cases
under the statute as now found in the recent revision of the acts
of Congress:
1. That it is essential to the jurisdiction of this Court over
the judgment or decree of a state court that it shall appear that
one of the questions mentioned in the statute must have been raised
and presented to the state court; that it must have been decided by
the state court against the right claimed or asserted by the
plaintiff in error under the Constitution, treaties, laws, or
authority of the United States, or that such a decision was
necessary to the judgment or decree rendered in the case.
2. These things appearing, this Court has jurisdiction, and must
examine the judgment so far as to enable it to decide whether this
claim of right was correctly adjudicated by the state court.
3. If it finds that it was rightly decided, the judgment must be
affirmed.
4. If it was erroneously decided, then the court must further
inquire whether there is any other matter or issue adjudged by the
state court sufficiently broad to maintain the judgment,
notwithstanding the error in the decision of the federal question.
If this be found to be the case, the judgment must be affirmed
without examination into the soundness of the decision of such
other matter or issue.
5. But if it be found that the issue raised by the question of
federal law must control the whole case, or that there has been no
decision by the state court of any other matter which is sufficient
of itself to maintain the judgment, then this Court will reverse
that judgment and will either render such judgment here as the
state court should have rendered, or will remand the case to that
court for further proceedings, as the circumstances of the case may
require.
Where an act of Congress calls into operative effect a provision
in a deed, in virtue of which provision thus called into effect, a
party claims title and right in such a way that confessedly, but
for the act, no suit would lie, the party to claiming claims a
"title" and "right" "under" a statute of the United States within
the meaning of the Act of February 5, 1867, and if the decision is
against the title and right thus set up and claimed, jurisdiction
exists here to reexamine.
The Constitution of the United States, after vesting the
judicial power of the United States "in one Supreme Court, and in
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish," ordains as follows:
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made under their authority,"
&c.
Page 87 U. S. 592
On the 24th of September, 1789, at the first Congress of the
United States, after the adoption of the Constitution, Congress
passed the "act to establish the judicial courts of the United
States," [
Footnote 1] the great
act commonly called the Judiciary Act. The twenty-fifth section of
it gave to this Court whatever power was given in the act at all to
reexamine, reverse, or affirm the final judgments or decrees in
suits in the highest courts of law or equity of the states.
On the 5th of Feb., 1867, after the late rebellion had been
suppressed -- and just before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, which declares that "No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States" -- but while
more or less disorganization of things remained in the Southern
states, Congress passed an act entitled "An act to
amend
an act to establish the judicial courts of the United States."
[
Footnote 2] This act was in
two sections. The first section gives to the courts of the United
States, and the several judges thereof, within their respective
jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already conferred by
law, power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any
person may be restrained of liberty in violation of the
Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.
The second -- the one alone much concerning this case -- was on
the same subject as the twenty-fifth section of the old act.
The twenty-fifth section of the old act and the second section
of the new one are here juxtaposited verbatim
seriatim.
"
THE TWENTY-FIFTH SECTION OF THE ACT OF 1789"
"That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest
court
of law or equity of a state in which a decision in
the suit could be had where is drawn in question the validity of a
treaty or statute of or an authority exercised under the United
States and the decision is against their validity, or where is
drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority
exercised under any state on the ground of their being repugnant to
the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States and the
decision is in favor of such their validity,
or where is drawn
in question the construction of any clause of the Constitution
or of a treaty or statute of or commission held under the United
States and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or
exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under such
clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute, or commission,
may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of
the United States upon a writ of error, the citation being signed
by the chief justice or judge or chancellor of the court rendering
or passing the judgment or decree complained of or by a justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same manner and
under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect
as if the judgment or decree complained of had been rendered or
passed in a
circuit court, and the proceeding upon the
reversal shall also be the same, except that the Supreme Court,
instead of remanding the cause for a final decision, as before
provided, may at their discretion, if the cause shall have been
once remanded before, proceed to a final decision of the same and
award execution. But no other error shall be assigned or regarded
as a ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid than such as
appears on the face of the record and immediately respects the
before-mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said
Constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in
dispute."
THE SECOND SECTION OF THE ACT OF 1867
"That a final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest
court of a state in which a decision in the suit could be had,
where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of
or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision
is against their validity, or where is drawn in question the
validity of a statute of or an authority exercised under any state,
on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States and the decision is in favor
of such their validity, or where any title, right, privilege, or
immunity is claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty
or statute of, or commission held, or
authority exercised,
under the United States and the decision is against the title,
right, privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed by either
party under such Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or
authority, may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in
the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error, the
citation being signed by the chief justice, or judge, or chancellor
of the court rendering or passing the judgment or decree complained
of or by a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
same manner and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have
the same effect as if the judgment or decree complained of had been
rendered or passed
in a court of the United States, and
the proceeding upon the reversal shall also be the same,
except
that the Supreme Court may, at their discretion, proceed to a final
decision of the same, and award execution or remand the same to an
inferior court. "
Page 87 U. S. 594
The published proceedings of the two houses of Congress show
that the bill, which subsequently became a law, was reported by a
committee which had been instructed
"to inquire and report what legislation was necessary to enable
the courts of the United States to enforce the freedom of the wives
and children of soldiers of the United States, under the joint
resolution of Congress of March 3, 1865, and the liberty of all
persons under the operation of the constitutional amendment
abolishing slavery."
The bill, so far as the point now under consideration is
concerned, was not the subject of special comment. The effect of it
was declared by the member of the House of Representatives who
reported it from the committee, to be "to enlarge the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus." [
Footnote 3] In the Senate, an inquiry was made "whether
the second section was drawn
on the same principle as the
twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789." The reply was,
"It is a little broader than the Judiciary Act. It is of a similar
character." [
Footnote 4]
Thus, apparently it happened that the fact that Congress had
passed the Act of 1867, was hardly noted for some time within the
precincts of this bar -- where the venerable Judiciary Act of 1789
was in some sort regarded as only less sacred than the
Constitution, and most unlikely to be wished to be altered -- and
that the less studious observers considered that the new section
was but a careless transcript of the old one. However, the more
careful readers were early awakened by possibilities of meanings in
the second section of the new act which would have far-reaching
effects. Mr. Phillips in his work on Practice, [
Footnote 5] in this Court, early observed that the
new act "in some of its provisions and omissions seems to have been
intended to work a change in the exercise of the jurisdiction of
the court." So in the case of
Stewart v. Kahn, [
Footnote 6] the difference between the
two acts was enforced by Mr. S. M. Johnson, counsel, on one side of
the case who claimed for it vast effects.
Page 87 U. S. 595
A careful reading of the act shows, indeed, to everyone certain
verbal changes. Thus:
1st. By the old act, this Court could not proceed to final
judgment and award execution, except in cases where the cause "had
been once remanded before."
By the new act, this limitation is omitted, and the court is
authorized in all cases at their discretion, to render judgment and
award execution.
2d. By the old law the jurisdiction is vested in cases where is
drawn in question the
construction of any clause of the
Constitution, or treaty, or statute, or commission.
In the new, we have the use of these other words, "or where any
right, title, privilege, or immunity is claimed," under the
Constitution &c.
3d. By the old law it was required that what is called "the
federal question" must "appear on the face of the record."
In the new, the words making this requisition are omitted.
4th. By the old law,
"No other error could be assigned or regarded as ground of
reversal, than such as immediately related to the validity or
construction of the Constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions,
or authorities in dispute."
In the new, the words putting this limitation on the
jurisdiction disappear, and makes an argument plausible that
Congress or the draughtsman of the act had meant to say that if a
federal question once existed in the case, and this Court so got
jurisdiction of the case, then it was bound to go on and decide
every question in it, though these questions were questions of
local law, and such as, in numberless cases, the court had decided
that, under the old section and in consequence of the now omitted
language at the close of it, could not be passed on here.
Referring to this last change, its operation seemed so important
and its bearing on the twenty-fifth section so direct,
Page 87 U. S. 596
in a matter oftener discussed and decided by this Court than any
question ever submitted to it; that it was difficult for some
persons to conclude that the legislator who drew the bill, and the
legislature that adopted it, did not comprehend that the bill was
effecting a radical change in the exercise of the jurisdiction of
the court.
However, it was obvious that as long as in the cases brought up
here, either,
1st. No federal question at all existed in the case, OR,
2d. The federal question, where one did exist, had been
wrongly decided in the court below -- and there was no
local question on which the case might have been disposed of:
There was no necessity to pass upon the effect of the concluding
sentences of the new section. The case would come within both the
old and new. The necessity to consider the effect of the new act
would, however, arise on the first occasion when some case should
come before the court, in which (1st), there was a federal
question, (2d) where that question had been rightly decided, and
(3d) where there were, besides, local questions which would dispose
of the case, and which the plaintiff in error alleged had been
wrongly adjudged below. Such a case now seemed to be here.
The case was thus:
Murdock filed a bill in one of the courts of chancery of
Tennessee, against the City of Memphis, in that state. The bill and
its exhibits made this case:
In July, 1844 -- Congress having just previously authorized the
establishment of a naval depot in that city, and appropriated a
considerable sum of money for the purpose -- the ancestors of
Murdock -- by ordinary deed of bargain and sale, without any
covenants or declaration of trust on which the land was to be held
by the city, but referring to the fact of "the location of the
naval depot lately established by the United States at said town"
-- conveyed to the city certain land described in and near its
limits "for the location of the naval depot aforesaid."
Page 87 U. S. 597
By the same instrument (a quadripartite one), both the grantors
and the city conveyed the same land to one Wheatley, in fee, in
trust for the grantors and their heirs, "in case the same shall not
be appropriated by the United States for that purpose."
On the 14th of September, 1844, the City of Memphis, in
consideration of the sum of $20,000 paid by the United States,
conveyed the said land to the United States with covenant of
general warranty; there being, however, in this deed to the United
States no designation of any purpose to which the land was to be
applied, nor any conditions precedent or subsequent, or of any kind
whatsoever.
The United States took possession of the land for the purpose of
the erection of a naval depot upon it, erected buildings, and made
various expenditures and improvements for the said purpose; but in
about ten years after, by an Act of August 5, 1854, [
Footnote 7] transferred the land back to the
city. The act was in these words:
"All the grounds and appurtenances thereunto belonging, known as
the Memphis Navy Yard, in Shelby County, Tennessee, be, and the
same is hereby, ceded to the mayor and aldermen of the City of
Memphis,
for the use and benefit of said city."
There was no allegation in the bill that the city was in any way
instrumental in procuring this transfer or the abandonment of the
site as a naval depot; on the contrary, it is averred that the city
authorities endeavored to prevent both.
The bill charged that by the failure of the United States to
appropriate the land for a naval depot, and the final abandonment
by the United States of any intention to do so, the land came
within the clause of the deed of July, 1844, conveying it to
Wheatley in trust, or if not, that it was held by the city in trust
for the original grantors, and the prayer sought to subject it to
said trusts.
The answer, denying the construction put upon the deed of 1844,
which established a trust, asserted that the land had been
appropriated by the United States as a naval depot
Page 87 U. S. 598
within the meaning and intent of the deed of July, 1844, and
that the subsequent perpetual occupation of it was not a condition
subsequent, and consequently that the abandonment of it as a naval
depot was not a breach of a condition such as divested the title so
conveyed by the deed.
It pleaded the statute of limitations. It also demurred to the
bill as seeking to enforce a forfeiture for breach of condition
subsequent.
The court sustained the demurrer, and also decreed that the city
had a perfect title to the property against the complainants both
under the act of Congress and the statute of limitations, and
dismissed the bill. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed this
decree.
That court was also of opinion, and so declared itself to be,
that the act of Congress
"cedes the property in controversy in this cause to the Mayor
and Aldermen of the City of Memphis, for the use of the city only,
and not in trust for the complainant, and that the complainant
takes no benefit under the said act."
The complainant thereupon sued out a writ of error to this
Court.
The case was first argued January 21, 1873.
Page 87 U. S. 614
MR. JUSTICE MILLER (now, January 11, 1875) delivered the opinion
of the Court.
In the year 1867, Congress passed an Act, approved February 5th,
entitled an act to amend "An act to establish the judicial courts
of the United States, approved September the 24th, 1789." [
Footnote 8] This act consisted of two
sections, the first of which conferred upon the federal courts and
upon the judges of those courts additional power in regard to writs
of habeas corpus, and regulated appeals and other proceedings in
that class of cases. The second section was a reproduction, with
some changes, of the twenty-fifth section of the Act of 1789, to
which, by its title, the Act of 1867 was an amendment, and it
related to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court over judgments
and decrees of state courts.
The difference between the twenty-fifth section of the Act of
1789 and the second section of the Act of 1867 did not attract much
attention, if any, for some time after the passage of the latter.
Occasional allusions to its effect upon the principles long
established by this Court under the former began at length to make
their appearance in the briefs and oral arguments of counsel, but
were not found to be so important as to require any decision of
this Court on the subject.
But in several cases argued within the last two or three years,
the proposition has been urged upon the court that the latter act
worked a total repeal of the twenty-fifth section of the former,
and introduced a rule for the action of this Court in the class of
cases to which they both referred, of such extended operation and
so variant from that which had governed it heretofore that the
subject received the serious consideration of the court. It will at
once be perceived that the question raised was entitled to the most
careful examination and to all the wisdom and learning, and the
exercise of the best judgment which the court could bring to bear
upon its solution, when it is fairly stated.
The proposition is that by a fair construction of the act of
Page 87 U. S. 615
1867 this Court must, when it obtains jurisdiction of a case
decided in a state court, by reason of one of the questions stated
in the act, proceed to decide every other question which the case
presents which may be found necessary to a final judgment on the
whole merits. To this has been added the further suggestion that in
determining whether the question on which the jurisdiction of this
Court depends, has been raised in any given case, we are not
limited to the record which comes to us from the state court -- the
record proper of the case as understood at common law -- but we may
resort to any such method of ascertaining what was really done in
the state court as this Court may think proper, even to
ex
parte affidavits.
When the case standing at the head of this opinion came on to be
argued, it was insisted by counsel for defendants in error that
none of the questions were involved in the case necessary to give
jurisdiction to this Court, either under the Act of 1789 or of
1867, and that if they were, there were other questions exclusively
of state court cognizance which were sufficient to dispose of the
case, and that therefore the writ of error should be dismissed.
Counsel for plaintiffs in error, on the other hand, argued that
not only was there a question in the case decided against them
which authorized the writ of error from this Court under either
act, but that this Court having for this reason obtained
jurisdiction of the case, should reexamine all the questions found
in the record, though some of them might be questions of general
common law or equity, or raised by state statutes, unaffected by
any principle of federal law, constitutional or otherwise.
When, after argument, the court came to consider the case in
consultation, it was found that it could not be disposed of without
ignoring or deciding some of these propositions, and it became
apparent that the time had arrived when the court must decide upon
the effect of the Act of 1867 on the jurisdiction of this Court as
it had been supposed to be established by the twenty-fifth section
of the Act of 1789.
Page 87 U. S. 616
That we might have all the aid which could be had from
discussion of counsel, the court ordered a reargument of the case
on three distinct questions which it propounded, and invited
argument, both oral and written, from any counsel interested in
them. This reargument was had, and the court was fortunate in
obtaining the assistance of very eminent and very able jurists. The
importance of the proposition under discussion justified us in
delaying a decision until the present term, giving the judges the
benefit of ample time for its most mature examination.
With all the aid we have had from counsel, and with the fullest
consideration we have been able to give the subject, we are free to
confess that its difficulties are many and embarrassing, and in the
results we are about to announce we have not been able to arrive at
entire harmony of opinion.
The questions propounded by the court for discussion by counsel
were these:
1. Does the second section of the Act of February 5, 1867,
repeal all or any part of the twenty-fifth section of the act of
1789, commonly called the Judiciary Act?
2. Is it the true intent and meaning of the Act of 1867, above
referred to, that when this Court has jurisdiction of a case, by
reason of any of the questions therein mentioned, it shall proceed
to decide all the questions presented by the record which are
necessary to a final judgment or decree?
3. If this question be answered affirmatively, does the
Constitution of the United States authorize Congress to confer such
a jurisdiction on this Court?
1. The act of 1867 has no repealing clause nor any express words
of repeal. If there is any repeal, therefore, it is one of
implication. The differences between the two sections are of two
classes, namely, the change or substitution of a few words or
phrases in the latter for those used in the former, with very
slight, if any, change of meaning, and the omission in the latter
of two important provisions found in the former. It will be
perceived by this statement that there is no repeal by positive new
enactments inconsistent
Page 87 U. S. 617
in terms with the old law. It is the words that are wholly
omitted in the new statute which constitute the important feature
in the questions thus propounded for discussion.
A careful comparison of these two sections (set forth
supra, -- REP.) can leave no doubt that it was the
intention of Congress, by the latter statute, to revise the entire
matter to which they both had reference, to make such changes in
the law as it stood as they thought best, and to substitute their
will in that regard entirely for the old law upon the subject. We
are of opinion that it was their intention to make a new law so as
the present law differed from the former, and that the new law
embracing all that was intended to be preserved of the old,
omitting what was not so intended, became complete in itself and
repealed all other law on the subject embraced within it. The
authorities on this subject are clear and uniform. [
Footnote 9]
The result of this reasoning is that the twenty-fifth section of
the act of 1789 is technically repealed, and that the second
section of the act of 1867 has taken its place. What of the statute
of 1789 is embraced in that of 1867 is of course the law now and
has been ever since it was first made so. What is changed or
modified is the law as thus changed or modified. That which is
omitted ceased to have any effect from the day that the substituted
statute was approved.
This view is strongly supported by the consideration that the
revision of the laws of Congress passed at the last session, based
upon the idea that no change in the existing law should be made,
has incorporated with the Revised Statutes nothing but the second
section of the Act of 1867. Whatever might have been our abstract
views of the effect of the Act of 1867, we are, as to all the
future cases, bound by the law as found in the Revised Statutes by
the express language of Congress on that subject, and it would be
labor lost to consider any other view of the question.
Page 87 U. S. 618
2. The affirmative of the second question propounded above is
founded upon the effect of the omission of repeal of the last
sentence of the twenty-fifth section of the Act of 1789. That
clause in express terms limited the power of the Supreme Court in
reversing the judgment of a state court, to errors apparent on the
face of the record and which respected questions, that for the sake
of brevity, though not with strict verbal accuracy, we shall call
federal questions, namely those in regard to the validity of
construction of the Constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions,
or authority of the federal government.
The argument may be thus stated:
1. That the Constitution declares that the judicial power of the
United States shall extend to cases of a character which includes
the questions described in the section, and that by the word case,
is to be understood all of the case in which such a question
arises.
2. That by the fair construction of the Act of 1789 in regard to
removing those cases to this Court, the power and the duty of
reexamining the whole case would have been devolved on the court,
but for the restriction of the clause omitted in the Act of 1867,
and that the same language is used in the latter act regulating the
removal, but omitting the restrictive clause.
And, 3. that by reenacting the statute in the same terms as to
the removal of cases from the state courts, without the restrictive
clause, Congress is to be understood as conferring the power which
that clause prohibited.
We will consider the last proposition first.
What were the precise motives which induced the omission of this
clause it is impossible to ascertain with any degree of
satisfaction. In a legislative body like Congress, it is reasonable
to suppose that among those who considered this matter at all,
there were varying reasons for consenting to the change. No doubt
there were those who, believing that the Constitution gave no right
to the federal judiciary to go beyond the line marked by the
omitted clause, thought its presence or absence immaterial, and in
a revision of the statute it was wise to leave it out, because its
presence implied
Page 87 U. S. 619
that such a power was within the competency of Congress to
bestow. There were also, no doubt, those who believed that the
section standing without that clause did not confer the power which
it prohibited, and that it was therefore better omitted. It may
also have been within the thought of a few that all that is now
claimed would follow the repeal of the clause. But if Congress, or
the framers of the bill, had a clear purpose to enact affirmatively
that the court
should consider the class of errors which
that clause forbid, nothing hindered that they should say so in
positive terms, and in reversing the policy of the government from
its foundation in one of the most important subjects on which that
body could act, it is reasonably to be expected that Congress would
use plain, unmistakable language in giving expression to such
intention.
There is therefore no sufficient reason for holding that
Congress, by repealing or omitting this restrictive clause,
intended to enact affirmatively the thing which that clause had
prohibited.
We are thus brought to the examination of the section as it was
passed by the Congress of 1867, and as it now stands, as part of
the revised statutes of the United States.
Before we proceed to any criticism of the language of the
section, it may be as well to revert for a moment to the
constitutional provisions which are supposed to, and which do, bear
upon the subject. The second section of the third article, already
adverted to, declares that
"the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made or which shall be made, under their authority."
Waiving for the present the question whether the power thus
conferred extends to all questions, in all cases, where only one of
the questions involved arises under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, we find that this judicial power is by the
Constitution vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as Congress may establish. Of these courts the Constitution
defines the jurisdiction of none but the Supreme Court. Of that
court it is said, after giving
Page 87 U. S. 620
it a very limited original jurisdiction, that
"in all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such
exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress may
prescribe."
This latter clause has been the subject of construction in this
Court many times, and the uniform and established doctrine is, that
Congress having by the Act of 1789 defined and regulated this
jurisdiction in certain classes of cases, this affirmative
expression of the will of that body is to be taken as excepting all
other cases to which the judicial power of the United States
extends, than those enumerated. [
Footnote 10]
It is also to be remembered that the exercise of judicial power
over cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States, may be original as well as appellate, and may be
conferred by Congress on other courts than the Supreme Court, as it
has done in several classes of cases which will be hereafter
referred to. We are under no necessity, then, of supposing that
Congress, in the section we are considering, intended to confer on
the Supreme Court the whole power which, by the Constitution, it
was competent for Congress to confer in the class of cases embraced
in that section.
Omitting for the moment that part of the section which
characterizes the questions necessary to the jurisdiction
conferred, the enactment is, that a final judgment or decree in any
suit in the highest court of a state in which a decision in the
suit can be had (when one of these questions is decided), may be
reexamined, and reversed or affirmed, in the Supreme Court of the
United States, upon a writ of error . . . in the same manner, and
under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect
as if the judgment or decree complained of had been passed or
rendered in a court of the United States.
It is strenuously maintained that as the office of a writ of
error at the common law, and as it is used in relation to the
Page 87 U. S. 621
inferior courts of the United States when issued from this
Court, is to remove the whole case to this Court for revision upon
its merits, or at least upon all the errors found in the record of
the case so removed, and as this statute enacts that these cases
shall be reexamined in the same manner, and under the same
regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect as in those
cases, therefore
all the errors found in a record so
removed from a
state court must be reviewed so far as they
are essential to a correct final judgment on the whole case.
The proposition as thus stated has great force, and is entitled
to our most careful consideration. If the invariable effect of a
writ of error to a circuit court of the United States is to require
of this Court to examine and pass upon all the errors of the
inferior court, and if reexamination of the judgment of the court
in the same manner and under the same regulations, means that in
the reexamination, everything is to be considered which could be
considered in inference to the circuit court, and nothing else,
then the inference a writ which is drawn from these premises would
seem to be correct.
But let us consider this.
There are two principal methods known to English jurisprudence,
and to the jurisprudence of the federal courts, by which cases may
be removed from an inferior to an appellate court for review. These
are the writ of error and the appeal. There may be, and there are,
other exceptional modes, such as the writ of certiorari at common
law and a certificate of division of opinion under the acts of
Congress. The appeal, which is the only mode by which a decree in
chancery or in admiralty can be brought from an inferior federal
court to this Court,
does bring up the whole case for
reexamination on all the merits, whether of law or fact, and for
consideration on these, as though no decree had ever been rendered.
The writ of error is used to bring up for review all other cases,
and when thus brought here the cases are not open for reexamination
on their whole merits, but every controverted question of fact is
excluded from consideration, and only
Page 87 U. S. 622
such errors as this Court can see that the inferior court
committed, and not all of these, can be the subject of this Court's
corrective power.
Now, one of the first things apparent on the face of this
statute is that decrees in chancery, and in admiralty also, if a
state court shall entertain jurisdiction of a case essentially of
admiralty cognizance, are to be removed into this Court from the
state courts by this writ of error as well as judgments at law. And
such has been the unquestioned practice under the Act of 1789 from
its passage until now. But this writ cannot bring a decree in
chancery or admiralty from the circuit court to this Court for
review. It has no such effect, and we dismiss every day cases
brought here by writ of error to a circuit court, because they can
only be brought here by appeal, and the writ of error does not
extend to them. [
Footnote
11]
Unless, therefore, we have been wholly wrong for eighty years,
under the Act of 1789, and unless we are prepared to exclude
chancery cases decided in the state courts from the effect of this
writ, it cannot, literally, have the same effect as in cases from a
court of the United States; and if we could hold that the writ
would have the same effect in removing the case, which is probably
all that is meant, still the case when removed cannot literally be
examined in the same manner, if by manner is meant the principle on
which the judgment of the court must rest. For chancery cases, when
brought here from the circuit courts, are brought for a trial
de novo on all the evidence and pleadings in the case.
It is therefore too obvious to need comment, that this statute
was designed to bring equity suits to this Court from the state
courts by writ of error, as well as law cases, and that it was not
intended that they should be reexamined in the same manner as if
brought here from a court of the United States, in the sense of the
proposition we are considering.
But passing from this consideration, what has been the manner in
which this Court reexamines the judgments of
Page 87 U. S. 623
the circuit courts on writs of error, as touching the errors
into which it will look for reversal? For it is this manner which
is supposed to require an examination of all errors, whether of
federal law or otherwise under this statute. It requires but slight
examination of the reports of the decisions or familiarity with the
practice of this Court to know that it does not examine into or
decide all the errors, or matter assigned for error, of the most of
the cases before them. Many of these are found to be immaterial,
the case being reversed or affirmed on some important point which
requires of itself a judgment without regard to other matters.
There are errors also which may be sufficiently manifest of which
the appellate court has no jurisdiction, as in regard to a motion
for a new trial, or to quash an indictment, or for a continuance,
or amendment of pleadings, or some other matter which, however
important to the merits of the case, is within the exclusive
discretion of the inferior court.
Nor does it seem to us that the phrase "in the same manner and
under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same
effect" is intended to furnish the rule by which the court shall be
guided in the considerations which should enter into the judgment
that it shall render. That the writ of error shall have the same
effect as if directed to a circuit court can mean no more than that
it shall transfer the case to the Supreme Court, and with it the
record of the proceedings in the court below. This is the effect of
the writ and its function and purpose. When the court comes to
consider the case it may be limited by the nature of the writ, but
what it shall review, and what it shall not, must depend upon the
jurisdiction of the court in that class of cases as fixed by the
law governing that jurisdiction.
So the regulations here spoken of are manifestly the rules under
which the writ is issued, served, and returned, the notice to be
given to the adverse party, and time fixed for appearance, argument
&c. Another important effect of the writ and of the regulations
governing it is that when accompanied by a proper bond, given and
approved within the prescribed time, it operates as a supersedeas
to further proceedings
Page 87 U. S. 624
in the inferior court. The word manner also much more
appropriately expresses the general mode of proceeding with the
case, after the writ has been allowed, the means by which the
exigency of the writ is enforced, as by rule on the clerk, or
mandamus to the court, and the progress of the case in the
appellate court; as filing the record, docketing the case, time of
hearing, order of the argument, and such other matters as are
merely incident to final decision by the court. In short, the whole
phrase is one eminently appropriate to the expression of the idea
that these cases, though coming from state instead of federal
tribunals, shall be conducted in their progress through the court,
in the matter of the general course of procedure, by the same rules
of practice that prevail in cases brought under writs of error to
the courts of the United States.
This is a different thing, however, from laying down rules of
decision, or enacting the fundamental principles on which the court
must decide this class of cases. It differs widely from an attempt
to say that the court in coming to a judgment must consider this
matter and disregard that. It is by no means the language in which
a legislative body would undertake to establish the principles on
which a court of last resort must form its judgment.
There is an instance of the use of very similar language by
Congress in reference to the removal of causes into this Court for
review which has uniformly received the construction which we now
place upon this.
By the Judiciary Act of 1789, there was no
appeal, in
the judicial sense of that word, to this Court in any case. Decrees
in suits in equity and admiralty were brought up by writ of error
only, until the act of 1803, and as this writ could not bring up a
case to be tried on its controverted questions of fact, the
nineteenth section of the Act of 1789 required the inferior courts
to make a finding of facts which should be accepted as true by the
appellate court. But by the Act of March 3, 1803, [
Footnote 12] these cases were to be
brought
Page 87 U. S. 625
to this Court by appeal, and to give this appeal full effect the
nineteenth section of the Act of 1789 was repealed, and upon such
appeal the court below was directed to send to this Court all the
pleadings, depositions, testimony, and proceedings. In this manner
the court obtained that full possession and control of the case
which the nature of an appeal implies. And it is worthy of
observation that Congress did not rely upon the mere legal
operation of the word appeal to effect this, but provided in
express terms the means necessary to insure this object.
But to avoid the necessity of many words as to the mode in which
the case should be brought to this Court and conducted when here,
it was enacted "that such appeals shall be subject to the same
rules, regulations, and restrictions as are prescribed in law in
case of writs of error." Here is language quite as strong as that
we have had under consideration, and strikingly similar both in its
purport and in the purpose to be served by it. Yet no one ever
supposed that when the court came to consider the judgment which it
should render on such an appeal it was to be governed by the
principles applicable to writs of error at common law. It was even
thought for a moment, notwithstanding the use of the word
"restrictions," that the court was limited to questions of law
apparent on the record; but the uniform course has been to consider
it as a case to be tried
de novo on all the considerations
of law and of fact applicable to it. There are many decisions of
this Court showing that these words have been held to apply alone
to the course of procedure, to matters of mere practice, and not at
all affording a rule for decision of the case on its merits in the
conference-room. [
Footnote
13]
There is therefore nothing in the language of the act, as far as
we have criticized it, which in express terms defines the extent of
the reexamination which this Court shall give to such cases.
But we have not yet considered the most important part
Page 87 U. S. 626
of the statute, namely, that which declares that it is only upon
the existence of certain questions in the case that this Court can
entertain jurisdiction at all. Nor is the mere existence of such a
question in the case sufficient to give jurisdiction -- the
question must have been
decided in the state court. Nor is
it sufficient that such a question was raised and was decided. It
must have been decided in a certain way, that is, against the right
set up under the Constitution, laws, treaties, or authority of the
United States. The federal question may have been erroneously
decided. It may be quite apparent to this Court that a wrong
construction has been given to the federal law, but if the right
claimed under it by plaintiff in error has been conceded to him,
this Court cannot entertain jurisdiction of the case, so very
careful is the statute, both of 1789 and of 1867, to narrow, to
limit, and define the jurisdiction which this Court exercises over
the judgments of the state courts. Is it consistent with this
extreme caution to suppose that Congress intended, when those cases
came here, that this Court should not only examine
those
questions, but all others found in the record? -- questions of
common law, of state statutes, of controverted facts, and
conflicting evidence. Or is it the more reasonable inference that
Congress intended that the cases should be brought here that those
questions might be decided and finally decided by the court
established by the Constitution of the Union, and the court which
has always been supposed to be not only the most appropriate but
the only proper tribunal for their final decision? No such reason
nor any necessity exists for the decision by this Court of other
questions in those cases. The jurisdiction has been exercised for
nearly a century without serious inconvenience to the due
administration of justice. The state courts are the appropriate
tribunals, as this Court has repeatedly held, for the decision of
questions arising under their local law, whether statutory or
otherwise. And it is not lightly to be presumed that Congress acted
upon a principle which implies a distrust of their integrity or of
their ability to construe those laws correctly.
Page 87 U. S. 627
Let us look for a moment into the effect of the proposition
contended for upon the cases as they come up for consideration in
the conference room. If it is found that no such question is raised
or decided in the court below, then all will concede that it must
be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. But if it is found that the
federal question was raised and was decided against the plaintiff
in error, then the first duty of the court obviously is to
determine whether it was correctly decided by the state court. Let
us suppose that we find that the court below was right in its
decision on that question. What, then, are we to do? Was it the
intention of Congress to say that while you can only bring the case
here on account of this question, yet when it is here, though it
may turn out that the plaintiff in error was wrong on that
question, and the judgment of the court below was right, though he
has wrongfully dragged the defendant into this Court by the
allegation of an error which did not exist, and without which the
case could not rightfully be here, he can still insist on an
inquiry into all the other matters which were litigated in the
case? This is neither reasonable nor just.
In such case both the nature of the jurisdiction conferred and
the nature and fitness of things demand that, no error being found
in the matter which authorized the reexamination, the judgment of
the state court should be affirmed, and the case remitted to that
court for its further enforcement.
The whole argument we are combating, however, goes upon the
assumption that when it is found that the record shows that one of
the questions mentioned has been decided against the claim of the
plaintiff in error, this Court has jurisdiction, and that
jurisdiction extends to the whole case. If it extends to the whole
case then the court must reexamine the whole case, and if it
reexamines it must decide the whole case. It is difficult to escape
the logic of the argument if the first premise be conceded. But it
is here the error lies. We are of opinion that upon a fair
construction of the whole language of the section the jurisdiction
conferred
Page 87 U. S. 628
is limited to the decision of the questions mentioned in the
statute, and, as a necessary consequence of this, to the exercise
of such powers as may be necessary to cause the judgment in that
decision to be respected.
We will now advert to one or two considerations apart from the
mere language of the statute, which seem to us to give additional
force to this conclusion.
It has been many times decided by this Court, on motions to
dismiss this class of cases for want of jurisdiction, that if it
appears from the record that the plaintiff in error raised and
presented to the court by pleadings, prayer for instruction, or
other appropriate method, one of the questions specified in the
statute, and the court ruled against him, the jurisdiction of this
Court attached, and we must hear the case on its merits. [
Footnote 14] Heretofore these merits
have been held to be to determine whether the proposition of law
involved in the specific federal question were rightly decided, and
if not, did the
case of plaintiff in error, on the
pleadings and evidence, come within the principle ruled by this
Court. This has always been held to be the exercise of the
jurisdiction and reexamination of the case provided by the statute.
But if when we once get jurisdiction, everything in the case is
open to reexamination, it follows that every case tried in any
state court, from that of a justice of the peace to the highest
court of the state, may be brought to this Court for final decision
on all the points involved in it.
That this is no exaggeration let us look a moment.
Suppose a party is sued before a justice of the peace for
assault and battery. He pleads that he was a deputy marshal of the
United States, and in severing a warrant of arrest on plaintiff he
gently laid his hands on him and used no more force than was
necessary. He also pleads the general issue. We will suppose that
to the special plea some response is made which finally leads to a
decision against the defendant on that plea. And judgment is
rendered against
Page 87 U. S. 629
him on the general issue also. He never was a deputy marshal. He
never had a writ from a United States court; but he insists on that
plea through all the courts up to this, and when he gets here the
record shows a federal question decided against him, and this Court
must reexamine the whole case, though there was not a particle of
truth in his plea, and it was a mere device to get the case into
this Court. Very many cases are brought here now of that character.
Also, cases where the moment the federal question is stated by
counsel we all know that there is nothing in it. This has become
such a burden and abuse that we either refuse to hear, or hear only
one side of many such, and stop the argument, and have been
compelled to adopt a rule that when a motion is made to dismiss it
shall only be heard on printed argument. If the temptation to do
this is so strong under the rule of this Court for over eighty
years to hear only the federal question, what are we to expect
when, by merely
raising one of those questions in any
case, the party who does it can bring it here for decision on all
the matters of law and fact involved in it. It is to be remembered
that there is not even a limitation as to the value in controversy
in writs to the state courts as there is to the circuit courts; and
it follows that there is no conceivable case so insignificant in
amount or unimportant in principle that a perverse and obstinate
man may not bring it to this Court by the aid of a sagacious lawyer
raising a federal question in the record -- a point which he may be
wholly unable to support by the facts, or which he may well know
will be decided against him the moment it is stated. But he obtains
his object, if this Court, when the case is once open to
reexamination on account of that question, must decide all the
others that are to be found in the record.
It is impossible to believe that Congress intended this result,
and equally impossible that they did not see that it would follow
if they intended to open the cases that are brought here under this
section to reexamination on all the points involved in them and
necessary to a final judgment on the merits.
Page 87 U. S. 630
The twenty-fifth section of the Act of 1789 has been the subject
of innumerable decisions, some of which are to be found in almost
every volume of the reports from that year down to the present.
These form a system of appellate jurisprudence relating to the
exercise of the appellate power of this Court over the courts of
the states. That system has been based upon the fundamental
principle that this jurisdiction was limited to the correction of
errors relating solely to federal law. And though it may be argued
with some plausibility that the reason of this is to be found in
the restrictive clause of the Act of 1789, which is omitted in the
Act of 1867, yet an examination of the cases will show that it
rested quite as much on the conviction of this Court that without
that clause and on general principles the jurisdiction extended no
further. It requires a very bold reach of thought, and a readiness
to impute to Congress a radical and hazardous change of a policy
vital in its essential nature to the independence of the state
courts, to believe that that body contemplated, or intended, what
is claimed, by the mere omission of a clause in the substituted
statute, which may well be held to have been superfluous, or nearly
so, in the old one.
Another consideration, not without weight in seeking after the
intention of Congress, is found in the fact that where that body
has clearly shown an intention to bring the whole of a case which
arises under the constitutional provision as to its subject matter
under the jurisdiction of a federal court, it has conferred its
cognizance on federal courts of original jurisdiction and not on
the Supreme Court.
It is the same clause and the same language which declares in
the Constitution that the judicial power shall extend to cases
arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States and to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In this
same act of 1789, the jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime cases
is conferred on the district courts of the United States, and is
made exclusive. Congress has in like manner conferred upon the same
court exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases of
bankruptcy.
Page 87 U. S. 631
Upon the circuit court it has conferred jurisdiction with
exclusive reference to matters of federal law, without regard to
citizenship, either originally or by removal from the state courts
in cases of conflicting titles to land under grants from different
states. [
Footnote 15] In
cases arising under the patent laws. [
Footnote 16] In suits against banking associations
organized under the laws of the United States. [
Footnote 17] In suits against individuals
on account of acts done under the revenue laws of the United
States. [
Footnote 18] In
suits for damages for depriving, under color of state laws, any
person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States. [
Footnote 19]
The acts referred to, and perhaps others not enumerated, show
very clearly that when Congress desired a case to be tried on all
the issues involved in it because one of those issues was to be
controlled by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States, it was their policy to vest its cognizance in a court of
original jurisdiction, and not in an appellate tribunal.
And we think it equally clear that it has been the counterpart
of the same policy to vest in the Supreme Court, as a court of
appeal from the state courts, a jurisdiction limited to
the questions of a federal character which might be involved in
such cases.
It is not difficult to discover what the purpose of Congress in
the passage of this law was. In a vast number of cases, the rights
of the people of the Union, as they are administered in the courts
of the states, must depend upon the construction which those courts
gave to the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States.
The highest courts of the states were sufficiently numerous, even
in 1789, to cause it to be feared that, with the purest motives,
this construction
Page 87 U. S. 632
given in different courts would be various and conflicting. It
was desirable, however, that whatever conflict of opinion might
exist in those courts on other subjects, the rights which depended
on the federal laws should be the same everywhere, and that their
construction should be uniform. This could only be done by
conferring upon the Supreme Court of the United States -- the
appellate tribunal established by the Constitution -- the right to
decide these questions finally and in a manner which would be
conclusive on all other courts, state or National. This was the
first purpose of the statute, and it does not require that, in a
case involving a variety of questions, any other should be decided
than those described in the act.
Secondly. It was no doubt the purpose of Congress to secure to
every litigant whose rights depended on any question of federal law
that that question should be decided for him by the highest federal
tribunal if he desired it, when the decisions of the state courts
were against him on that question. That rights of this character,
guaranteed to him by the Constitution and laws of the Union, should
not be left to the exclusive and final control of the state
courts.
There may be some plausibility in the argument that these rights
cannot be protected in all cases unless the Supreme Court has final
control of the whole case. But the experience of eighty-five years
of the administration of the law under the opposite theory would
seem to be a satisfactory answer to the argument. It is not to be
presumed that the state courts, where the rule is clearly laid down
to them on the federal question, and its influence on the case
fully seen, will disregard or overlook it, and this is all that the
rights of the party claiming under it require. Besides, by the very
terms of this statute, when the Supreme Court is of opinion that
the question of federal law is of such relative importance to the
whole case that it should control the final judgment, that court is
authorized to render such judgment and enforce it by its own
process. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that it is in any case
necessary for the security of the rights claimed under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of
Page 87 U. S. 633
the United States that the Supreme Court should examine and
decide other questions not of a federal character.
And we are of opinion that the Act of 1867 does not confer such
a jurisdiction.
This renders unnecessary a decision of the question whether, if
Congress had conferred such authority, the act would have been
constitutional. It will be time enough for this Court to inquire
into the exercise it in language which that body has attempted to
exercise it in language which makes such an intention so clear as
to require it.
The omitted clause of the Act of 1789 declared that no other
error should be regarded as a ground of reversal than such as
appears on the face of the record and immediately respects the
beforementioned questions.
It is probable that in determining whether one of those
questions was actually raised and decided in the state court, this
Court has been inclined to restrict its inquiries too much by this
express limitation of the inquiry "to the face of the record."
[
Footnote 20] What was the
record of a case was pretty well understood as a common law phrase
at the time that statute was enacted. But the statutes of the
states and new modes of proceedings in those courts have changed
and confused the matter very much since that time.
It is in reference to one of the necessities thus brought about
that this Court long since determined to consider as part of the
record the opinions delivered in such cases by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana. [
Footnote 21] And
though we have repeatedly decided that the opinions of other state
courts cannot be looked into to ascertain what was decided, we see
no reason why, since this restriction is removed, we should not so
far examine those opinions, when properly authenticated, as may be
useful in determining that question. We have been in the habit of
receiving the certificate of the court signed by its chief justice
or presiding officer on that point, though not as conclusive, and
these opinions are quite
Page 87 U. S. 634
as satisfactory and may more properly be treated as part of the
record than such certificates.
But after all, the record of the case, its pleadings, bills of
exceptions, judgment, evidence, in short, its record, whether it be
a case in law or equity, must be the chief foundation of the
inquiry; and while we are not prepared to fix any absolute limit to
the sources of the inquiry under the new act, we feel quite sure it
was not intended to open the scope of it to any loose range of
investigation.
It is proper, in this first attempt to construe this important
statute as amended, to say a few words on another point. What shall
be done by this Court when the question has been found to exist in
the record, and to have been decided against the plaintiff in
error, and rightfully decided, we have already seen, and it
presents no difficulties.
But when it appears that the federal question was decided
erroneously against the plaintiff in error, we must then reverse
the case undoubtedly, if there are no other issues decided in it
than that. It often has occurred, however, and will occur again,
that there are other points in the case than those of federal
cognizance, on which the judgment of the court below may stand;
those points being of themselves sufficient to control the
case.
Or it may be, that there are other issues in the case, but they
are not of such controlling influence on the whole case that they
are alone sufficient to support the judgment.
It may also be found that notwithstanding there are many other
questions in the record of the case, the issue raised by the
federal question is such that its decision must dispose of the
whole case.
In the two latter instances there can be no doubt that the
judgment of the state court must be reversed, and under the new act
this Court can either render the final judgment or decree here, or
remand the case to the state court for that purpose.
But in the other cases supposed, why should a judgment be
reversed for an error in deciding the federal question, if the same
judgment must be rendered on the other points
Page 87 U. S. 635
in the case? And why should this Court reverse a judgment which
is right on the whole record presented to us; or where the same
judgment will be rendered by the court below, after they have
corrected the error in the federal question?
We have already laid down the rule that we are not authorized to
examine these other questions for the purpose of deciding whether
the state court ruled correctly on them or not. We are of opinion
that on these subjects not embraced in the class of questions
stated in the statute, we must receive the decision of the state
courts as conclusive.
But when we find that the state court had decided the federal
question erroneously, then to prevent a useless and profitless
reversal, which can do the plaintiff in error no good, and can only
embarrass and delay the defendant, we must so far look into the
remainder of the record as to see whether the decision of the
federal question alone is sufficient to dispose of the case, or to
require its reversal; or on the other hand, whether there exist
other matters in the record actually decided by the state court
which are sufficient to maintain the judgment of that court,
notwithstanding the error in deciding the federal question. In the
latter case, the court would not be justified in reversing the
judgment of the state court.
But this examination into the points in the record other than
the federal question is not for the purpose of determining whether
they were correctly or erroneously decided, but to ascertain if any
such have been decided, and their sufficiency to maintain the final
judgment, as decided by the state court.
Beyond this we are not at liberty to go, and we can only go this
far to prevent the injustice of reversing a judgment which must in
the end be reaffirmed, even in this Court, if brought here again
from the state court after it has corrected its error in the matter
of federal law.
Finally, we hold the following propositions on this subject as
flowing from the statute as it now stands:
1. That it is essential to the jurisdiction of this Court
over
Page 87 U. S. 636
the judgment of a state court, that it shall appear that one of
the questions mentioned in the act must have been raised, and
presented to the state court.
2. That it must have been decided by the state court, or that
its decision was necessary to the judgment or decree, rendered in
the case.
3. That the decision must have been against the right claimed or
asserted by plaintiff in error under the Constitution, treaties,
laws, or authority of the United States.
4. These things appearing, this Court has jurisdiction and must
examine the judgment so far as to enable it to decide whether this
claim of right was correctly adjudicated by the state court.
5. If it finds that it was rightly decided, the judgment must be
affirmed.
6. If it was erroneously decided against plaintiff in error,
then this Court must further inquire, whether there is any other
matter or issue adjudged by the state court, which is sufficiently
broad to maintain the judgment of that court, notwithstanding the
error in deciding the issue raised by the federal question. If this
is found to be the case, the judgment must be affirmed without
inquiring into the soundness of the decision on such other matter
or issue.
7. But if it be found that the issue raised by the question of
federal law is of such controlling character that its correct
decision is necessary to any final judgment in the case, or that
there has been no decision by the state court of any other matter
or issue which is sufficient to maintain the judgment of that court
without regard to the federal question, then this Court will
reverse the judgment of the state court, and will either render
such judgment here as the state court should have rendered, or
remand the case to that court, as the circumstances of the case may
require.
Applying the principles here laid down to the case now before
the Court, we are of opinion that this Court has jurisdiction, and
that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee must be
affirmed.
The suit was a bill in chancery brought by Murdock and
Page 87 U. S. 637
others against the City of Memphis to have a decree establishing
their right in certain real estate near that city. The United
States having determined to build a navy yard at Memphis, about the
year 1844, or previous thereto, the City of Memphis, on the 14th
day of September of that year, conveyed to the United States the
land in controversy by an ordinary deed of general warranty,
expressing on its face the consideration of $20,000 paid, and
designating no purpose for which the land was conveyed. After
retaining possession of the land for about ten years without
building a navy yard, the United States abandoned that purpose, and
by an Act approved August 5, 1854, ceded the property to the City
of Memphis by its corporate name for the use and benefit of said
city.
The plaintiffs in error, by their bill, allege that the title
was originally conveyed to the City of Memphis, in trust, for
certain purposes, including that of having a navy yard built on it
by the United States; that when the title reverted to the city by
reason of the abandonment of the place as a navy yard by the United
States, and the Act of Congress aforesaid, the city received the
title in trust for the original grantors, who are the plaintiffs,
or who are represented by plaintiffs. A demurrer to the bill was
filed. Also an answer denying the trust and pleading the statute of
limitations. On the hearing, the bill was dismissed, and this
decree was affirmed by the supreme court of the state. The
complainants, in their bill and throughout the case insisted that
the effect of the Act of 1854 was to vest the title in the mayor or
aldermen of the city in trust for them.
It may be very true that it is not easy to see anything in the
deed by which the United States received the title from the city,
or the act by which they ceded it back, which raises such a trust,
but the complainants claimed a right under this act of the United
States, which was decided against them by the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, and this claim gives jurisdiction of that question to
this Court.
But we need not consume many words to prove that neither by the
deed of the city to the United States, which
Page 87 U. S. 638
is an ordinary deed of bargain and sale for a valuable
consideration, nor from anything found in the act of 1854,
[
Footnote 22] is there any
such trust to be inferred. The act, so far from recognizing or
implying any such trust, cedes the property to the mayor and
aldermen
for the use of the city. We are therefore of
opinion that this, the only federal question in the case, was
rightly decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
But conceding this to be true, the plaintiffs in error have
argued that the court having jurisdiction of the case must now
examine it upon all the questions which affect its merits; and they
insist that the conveyance by which the City of Memphis received
the title previous to the deed from the city to the government, and
the circumstances attending the making of the former deed are such,
that when the title reverted to the city, a trust was raised for
the benefit of plaintiffs.
After what has been said in the previous part of this opinion,
we need discuss this matter no further. The claim of right here set
up is one to be determined by the general principles of equity
jurisprudence, and is unaffected by anything found in the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Whether
decided well or otherwise by the state court, we have no authority
to inquire. According to the principles we have laid down as
applicable to this class of cases, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee must be
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
1 Stat. at Large 25.
[
Footnote 2]
14
id. 485.
[
Footnote 3]
Congressional Globe, first session 39th Congress, part 5, page
4151.
[
Footnote 4]
Ib., page 4229.
[
Footnote 5]
Page 128.
[
Footnote 6]
A.D. 1870,
78 U. S. 11
Wall. 500.
[
Footnote 7]
10 Stat. at Large 586.
[
Footnote 8]
14 Stat. at Large 385.
[
Footnote 9]
United States v.
Tynen, 11 Wall. 88;
Henderson
Tobacco, 11 Wall. 652;
Bartlet v. King, 12
Mass. 537;
Cincinnati v. Cody, 10 Pickering 36; Sedgwick
on Statutes 126.
[
Footnote 10]
Wiscart v.
Dauchy, 3 Dall. 321;
Durousseau
v. United States, 6 Cranch 307;
The
Lucy, 8 Wall. 307;
Ex Parte
McCardle, 6 Wall. 318;
S.C. 74 U. S. 7 Wall.
506.
[
Footnote 11]
The San Pedro,
2 Wheat. 132;
McCollum v.
Eager, 2 How. 61;
Minor v.
Tillotson, 2 How. 392;
Benton v.
Lapier, 22 How. 118.
[
Footnote 12]
2 Stat. at Large 244.
[
Footnote 13]
Villabolos v. United
States, 6 How. 81;
Castro v.
United States, 3 Wall. 46;
Mussina v.
Cavazos, 6 How. 355.
[
Footnote 14]
Rector v.
Ashley, 6 Wall. 142;
Bridge
Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116;
Furman v.
Nichol, 8 Wall. 44;
Armstrong
v. Treasurer, 16 Pet. 281;
Crowell v.
Randell, 10 Pet. 368.
[
Footnote 15]
1 Stat. at Large 89.
[
Footnote 16]
16
id. 206, 215.
[
Footnote 17]
13
id. 116.
[
Footnote 18]
Act of March 2, 1833, 4
id. 632, and Act of July 13,
1866, 14
id. 176.
[
Footnote 19]
Act of May 31, 1870, 16
id. 114; and Act of April 20,
1871, 17
id. 13.
See also for removal of cases of
similar character from state courts, Act of March 3, 1863, 12
id. 756; Act of April 9, 1866, 14
id. 46; and Act
of May 31, 1870, 16
id. 144.
[
Footnote 20]
Williams v.
Norris, 12 Wheat. 117;
Rector v.
Ashley, 6 Wall. 142.
[
Footnote 21]
Grand Gulf Railroad Co. v.
Marshall, 12 How. 165;
Consin v.
Blanc's Executor, 19 How. 202.
[
Footnote 22]
10 Stat. at Large 586.
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE,
dissenting:
I dissent from so much of the opinion of the Court as denies the
jurisdiction of this Court to determine the whole case, where it
appears that the record presents a federal question and that the
federal question was erroneously decided to the prejudice of the
plaintiff in error, as in that
Page 87 U. S. 639
state of the record it is, in my judgment, the duty of this
Court, under the recent act of Congress, to decide the whole merits
of the controversy, and to affirm or reverse the judgment of the
state court. Tested by the new law it would seem that it must be
so, as this Court cannot in that state of the record dismiss the
writ of error, nor can the court reverse the judgment without
deciding every question which the record presents.
Where the federal question is rightly decided the judgment of
the state court may be affirmed, upon the ground that the
jurisdiction does not attach to the other questions involved in the
merits of the controversy; but where the federal question is
erroneously decided the whole merits must be decided by this Court,
else the new law, which it is admitted repeals the twenty-fifth
section of the Judiciary Act, is without meaning, operation, or
effect, except to repeal the prior law.
Sufficient proof of the fact that the new law was not intended
to be without meaning and effective operation is found in the fact
that the provision in the old law which restricts the right of the
plaintiff in error or appellant to assign for error any matter
except such as respects one of the federal questions enumerated in
the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, is wholly omitted in
the new law.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, dissenting:
I feel obliged to dissent from the conclusion to which a
majority of the court has come on the public question in this
cause, but shall content myself with stating briefly the grounds of
that dissent, without entering into any prolonged argument on the
subject.
Meantime, however, it is proper to say that I deem it very
doubtful whether the court has any jurisdiction at all over this
particular case. The complainants claim the property in question
under the terms, and what they regard as the true construction, of
the trust deed of July, 1844, whereby the property was conveyed to
the City of Memphis "for the location of the naval depot," and to
Wheatley, trustee for
Page 87 U. S. 640
the grantors, "in case the same shall not be appropriated by the
United States for that purpose." This deed was acknowledged on the
19th of September, 1844, and (probably at the same time) a deed
dated 14th of September, 1844, was executed by the city to the
United States, conveying the land in fee without any conditions or
uses expressed. Operations for erecting and establishing a navy
yard on the premises were commenced and were continued for several
years, but were finally abandoned, and on the 5th of August, 1854,
Congress, by an act, ceded the property to the City of Memphis for
the use and benefit of the city. The defendants, the City of
Memphis, claim both legal and beneficial title to the property
under this act of Congress, and the Supreme Court of Tennessee
sustained the claim -- or at least did not sustain the adverse
claim of the complainants. The claim of the complainants was not
based on this act of Congress, but on the original deed of 1844,
which limited the estate in the lands to their trustee "in case the
same shall not be appropriated by the United States for that
purpose,"
i.e., the purpose of a navy yard. They claim
that by the true construction of this clause a right to the land
accrued to them, as well by an abandonment of the project of a navy
yard as by its never being adopted. The conduct of the government
in relation to the land, it is true, is claimed by them to be such
as calls into operative effect the clause of the deed on which they
rely. They construe that conduct as an abandonment of the
enterprise. The act of cession by Congress to the City of Memphis
is only one fact in a long chain of circumstances which they educe
to show such abandonment.
It seems to me, therefore, that their claim is based entirely on
the deed of 1844; and that the subsequent action of the government,
so far as it has any effect in the case, is merely matter of
evidence on the question of fact of abandonment, and that the
failure of the government, from the beginning, to take any steps
for establishing a navy yard on the land would have been no more a
mere fact
in pais to be proved in order to support the
claim of the complainants, than were all the acts of the government
which did in fact
Page 87 U. S. 641
take place. Proving that the government did not appropriate the
land for a navy yard is a very different thing from setting up a
claim to the land under an act of Congress.
I think, therefore, that in this case there was no title or
right claimed by the appellants under any statute of, or authority
exercised under, the United States, and consequently that there was
no decision against any such title, and therefore that this Court
has no jurisdiction.
But supposing, as the majority of the court holds, that it has
jurisdiction, I cannot concur in the conclusion that we can only
decide the federal question raised by the record. If we have
jurisdiction at all, in my judgment we have jurisdiction of the
case, and not merely of a
question in it. The act
of 1867, and the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act both
provide that a final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest
court of a state, where is drawn in question certain things
relating to the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to
rights or immunities claimed under the United States, and the
decision is adverse to such Constitution, laws, or rights, may be
reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the
United States upon a writ of error. Had the original act stopped
here there could have been no difficulty. This act derives its
authority and is intended to carry into effect, at least in part,
that clause of the Constitution which declares that the judicial
power shall extend to all
cases, in law and equity,
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made under their authority -- not to all
questions, but to all
cases. This word "cases,"
in the residue of the section, has frequently been held to mean
suits, actions, embracing the whole cases, not mere questions in
them; and that is undoubtedly the true construction. The
Constitution, therefore, would have authorized a revision by the
judiciary of the United States of all
cases decided in
state courts in which questions of United States law or federal
rights are necessarily involved. Congress in carrying out that
clause could have so ordained. And the law referred to, had it
Page 87 U. S. 642
stopped at the point to which I have quoted it above, would
clearly have been understood as so ordaining. But the twenty-fifth
section of the Judiciary Act went on to declare that in such cases
no other error should be assigned or regarded as a ground of
reversal than such as immediately respected the question referred
to as the ground of jurisdiction. It having been early decided that
Congress had power to regulate the exercise of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the court has always considered
itself bound by this restriction, and as authorized to reverse
judgments of state courts only for errors in deciding the federal
questions involved therein.
Now, Congress, in the Act of 1867, when revising the
twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, whilst following the
general frame and modes of expression of that section, omitted the
clause above referred to, which restricted the court to a
consideration of the federal questions. This omission cannot be
regarded as having no meaning. The clause by its presence in the
original act meant something, and effected something. It had the
effect of restricting the consideration of the court to a certain
class of question as a ground of reversal, which restriction would
not have existed without it. The omission of the clause, according
to a well settled rule of construction, must necessarily have the
effect of removing the restriction which it effected in the old
law.
In my judgment, therefore, if the court had jurisdiction of the
case, it was bound to consider not only the federal question raised
by the record, but the whole case. As the court, however, has
decided otherwise, it is not proper that I should express any
opinion on the merits.
The case having been reargued, as well as argued originally,
before the appointment of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, he took no part in the
judgment.
