The personal acquisitions of a wife, in Georgia, being by
statute of that state not subject to the debts of her husband, her
separate earnings from her individual labor and business, carried
on with his consent, cannot be reached by his assignees in
bankruptcy.
Glenn and another, assignees in bankruptcy of George Johnson
who, in 1868, in proceedings instituted on his own petition, had
been declared a bankrupt by the District Court of Georgia, filed a
bill in the court below against the said George, his wife, and a
certain Flynn, trustee of the wife, to reach certain real property
situated in the City of Atlanta, standing in the name of Flynn, as
such trustee, and to subject it to the payment of his debts.
The court below dismissed the bill, and the assignees of the
bankrupt took this appeal.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD stated the facts of the case, and delivered
the opinion of the Court as follows:
It appears that in July, 1863, one Thomas S. Powell conveyed to
the trustee the property in question for the alleged consideration
of four thousand dollars, and that subsequently, in 1867, buildings
and other improvements were placed upon the property to the value
of two thousand dollars. The deed recites that the consideration
was paid by Mrs. Johnson and declares that the property is conveyed
to the trustee in trust for her sole and separate use, and is not
to be liable for the debts or contracts of her husband.
The bill alleges, upon the belief of the complainants, that the
consideration was paid, and the improvements were made, out of the
funds of the husband, who, at the time the
Page 85 U. S. 477
property was purchased, was greatly embarrassed by debts, and at
the time the improvements were made was wholly insolvent. It
therefore charges that the conveyance to the wife and the
improvements upon the property were made in fraud of the creditors
of the husband, and prays that the conveyance may be declared
fraudulent and the property decreed to be sold and the proceeds
administered by the complainants under the provisions of the
Bankrupt Act, or, if the conveyance be not thus declared
fraudulent, that the property be sold and the proceeds, to the
extent of the value of the improvements, be thus administered.
The husband, the wife, and the trustee separately answered the
bill, and all averred, the husband and wife positively and the
trustee upon information and belief, that the consideration of the
conveyance and the cost of the improvements were paid out of the
earnings of the wife from her individual labor and business carried
on with the consent of her husband. The answers are under oath, and
their averments in this particular were subsequently sustained by
the testimony of the parties as well as by the testimony of other
persons.
The position of the complainants that this fact constitutes no
defense to the suit would be a sound one if the case were to be
determined independently of the statute of Georgia. At common law,
an agreement after marriage between husband and wife that the
latter may carry on business on her own account and retain her
earnings is invalid as against his creditors unless founded upon a
valuable consideration; a voluntary agreement to that effect is
only good as against him. [
Footnote
1]
But the statute of Georgia comes to the aid of the wife and
protects her separate earnings from his creditors. Section 1702, of
the code of that state, whilst providing that all property given to
the wife during the coverture or acquired by her shall vest in the
husband, declares that
"Any words
Page 85 U. S. 478
in the gift or bequest indicating a wish for the personal
enjoyment thereof by the wife, such as a gift to the wife by name,
shall create a separate estate therein for her, and in no case
shall the personal acquisitions of the wife be subject to the debts
of the husband. [
Footnote
2]"
The earnings of the wife are thus placed beyond the reach of his
creditors, and of course of his assignees in bankruptcy.
Decree affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
2 Story's Equity §§ 1385-1387.
[
Footnote 2]
Code of Georgia in force in 1863, p. 338, §§ 1701-1702.