1. In an action of ejectment where both parties claim the
premises in controversy under patents of the United States issued
upon a confirmation of grants of land in California made by the
former Mexican government, both of which patents cover the
premises, the inquiry of the court must extend to the character of
the original grants, and the controversy can only be settled by
determining which of these two gave the better right to the
premises.
2. In determining such controversy, a grant of land identified
by specific boundaries or having such descriptive features as to
render its identification a mattes of absolute certainty gives a
better right to the premises than a floating grant although such
floating grant be first surveyed and patented.
3.
Semble that as between two floating grants of
quantity within the same general tract which is sufficiently large
to satisfy both, where neither grantee had received official
delivery of possession under the former government and where, as a
consequence, there was no measurement or severance of the claim of
either front the public domain, the party whose claim is first
surveyed and patented will hold the better right to the land
covered by his patent, and that the other party will be compelled
to have his claim located outside of that patent.
4. The present case distinguished from cases in this Court and
in the Supreme Court of California in which imperfect or equitable
claims or interests arising since the acquisition of the country
were set up against the legal title held under patents.
5. A survey under a grant approved by the district court of the
United States under the Act of June 14, 1860, is conclusive as
against adverse claimants under floating grants.
6. Whilst proceedings are pending before the tribunals of the
United States for the confirmation of claims to land under grants
of the former Mexican government, the statute of limitations of
California does not run against the right of the claimants to the
land subsequently confirmed to them. That statute only begins to
run against the title perfected under the legislation of Congress
from the date of its consummation.
7. For the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel
such as will prevent a party from asserting his legal rights to
property, there must be some intended deception in the conduct or
declarations of the party to be estopped or such gross negligence
on his part as to amount to constructive fraud. Accordingly, when a
claimant under a Mexican grant located his claim on land different
front that which was finally surveyed and patented to him, and
announced to others that his claim covered the land thus selected,
but the government interfered and located the claim elsewhere,
held that he was not estopped from asserting a right to
the premises surveyed and patented to him.
Page 85 U. S. 256
Bissell brought ejectment in the court below against Henshaw and
others to recover one league square of land situated in the County
of Butte in the State of California. The action was commenced May
15, 1857, and was tried by the court without a jury by stipulation
of the parties. The material facts of the case were as follows:
On the 24th of March, 1852, one Larkin, pursuant to the
provisions of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1851, entitled "An
act to ascertain and settle private land claims in the State of
California," filed a petition with the board of land commissioners
created under the act praying a confirmation of a claim made by him
to a tract of land containing four square leagues of land, situated
in the County of Butte, in the State of California, his claim being
founded on a Mexican grant made by Governor Micheltorena to Charles
William Flugge on the 21st day of February, A.D. 1844, upon his
petition bearing date on the 22d of December, A.D. 1843. Flugge, in
his petition, described the land solicited as
"situated on the western side of Feather River, and stretching
along (
'sobre') the said river from 39�33'45'
northern latitude, to 39�48'45', and forming on this line a
square one league in breadth. It is called Boga, as it is rendered
manifest by the adjoining sketch."
The grant described the land granted as
"consisting of five
sitios ganado mayor [square
leagues], situate on the westerly side of Feather River, in the
center of which there is a piece of land called Boga, the first
boundary of the said land beginning at 39�33'45'
degrees north latitude, as appears from the corresponding
plan."
The grant was made subject to the approval of the Departmental
Assembly, and was approved by that body June 13, 1845. The map
accompanying the petition, called "sketch" or "plan" in the
translation, in the record, lays down the line of latitude intended
as the first boundary of the tract and designates it by the degree
of latitude specified in the petition and grant. The designation of
this line turned out to be inaccurate, the degree of latitude
mentioned being several leagues farther north. There was,
Page 85 U. S. 257
however, no difficulty in fixing the line intended on the
surface of the earth by measurement, from the junction of the two
rivers Sacramento and Feather, which was several leagues south, and
which junction was marked by a line designated by a degree of
latitude containing a similar error.
The natural objects indicated on the map -- Feather River, which
was the eastern boundary, and a creek called Honcut, emptying into
Feather River, and three conspicuous peaks in the immediate
neighborhood called "The Three Buttes" -- rendered the
identification of the tract a matter easy to any surveyor.
Notwithstanding these natural objects, Larkin, the claimant, who
had acquired the interest of the grantee, contended that the
parallel of latitude designated should govern the location of the
land, and accordingly he selected the land he desired under the
grant several leagues farther north than the line actually intended
and finally adopted by the government. The Surveyor General of
California made a survey of the tract for the information of the
land commission before confirmation, and in that survey he
committed a similar error. Subsequent to the confirmation, he made
another survey following substantially the preliminary one. With
both the surveys thus made Larkin was satisfied, and he stated to
persons inquiring that his claim under the grant covered the land
selected by him and thus surveyed. The grant was confirmed by the
board on the 17th of July, 1855, and an appeal from its decree
having been taken by the United States, the Attorney General gave
notice that the appeal would not be prosecuted, and on the 9th of
February, 1857, the appeal was dismissed by the district court and
the claimant allowed to proceed upon the decree of the board as
upon a final decree.
The survey of the tract made by the Surveyor General of
California, as above stated, under this decree, was set aside by
the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and a new survey
ordered. A new survey was accordingly made, and, being objected to,
was ordered into the district court for
Page 85 U. S. 258
examination under the Act of June 14, 1860. [
Footnote 1] This act authorizes the court "to make
an order requiring any survey of a private land claim . . . to be
returned into it for examination and adjudication," and makes it
"the duty of the surveyor general to transmit said survey and plat
forthwith to said court." It requires
"That before proceeding to take the testimony or to determine on
the validity of any objection so made to the survey and location as
aforesaid, the said courts shall cause notice to be given by public
advertisement, or in some other form to be prescribed by their
rules,
to all parties in interest, that objection has been
made to such survey and location,
and admonishing all parties
in interest to intervene for the protection of such
interest."
It enacts further that
"On hearing the allegations and proofs, the court shall render
judgment thereon, and if in its opinion the location and survey are
erroneous, it is hereby authorized to set aside and annul the same,
or correct and modify it, and it is hereby made the duty of the
surveyor general, on being served with a certified copy of the
decree of said court, forthwith to cause a new survey and location
to be made or to correct and reform the survey already made so as
to conform to the decree of the district court, to which it shall
be returned for confirmation and approval."
An appeal is given to the Supreme Court.
Under this act, such proceedings were had that on the 15th of
January, 1863, a new survey was approved by decree of the district
court, which became final June 26, 1865, by dismissal of an appeal
taken therefrom. A patent of the United States was issued for the
land, in accordance with this survey, to the claimant October 5,
1865. The plaintiff deraigned by due conveyances from the heirs of
the patentee an undivided three-fourths interest in the premises
patented, which include the land in controversy.
On the 19th of March, 1852, Dionisio Fernandez, Maximo
Fernandez, J. Beeden, and W. R. Basham, filed a petition
Page 85 U. S. 259
under the Act of 1851 with the board of land commissioners
praying a confirmation of a claim made by them to a tract
containing four square leagues of land situated in the County of
Butte and State of California, their claim being founded on a
Mexican grant made by Pio Pico, Governor of California, to Maximo
and Dionisio Fernandez, on the 12th day of June, A.D. 1846. The
grant describes the land granted as
"a tract of unoccupied land in the vicinity of the River
Sacramento bounded on the north by the slopes [
faldas] of
the Sierra Nevada; on the south by John A. Sutter's lands, and on
the east by Feather River,"
consisting of four square leagues, and refers to a plan or map
accompanying the petition of the grantees. This map represents the
land as lying on Feather River, with its northern boundary resting
on the
faldas of the Sierra Nevada mountains, but with no
other descriptive features to indicate its northern or southern
boundary. The grant was subject to the approval of the Departmental
Assembly, but never received such approval. The country passed into
the possession of the United States in the following month, July 7,
1846. Between the slopes or base of the mountains and the line of
Sutter's land many leagues intervened.
The grant was confirmed by the board of land commissioners July
17, 1855, and its decree was affirmed by the district court on
appeal March 2, 1857. The Attorney General having given notice that
no further appeal would be prosecuted, the district court entered
an order, on the ninth of the same month, that the claimants be
allowed to proceed under the decree of March 2 as a final
decree.
A survey of the tract confirmed was made under the directions of
the surveyor general, and was approved by him on the 29th of May,
1857. This survey was also approved by the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, and on the 14th of October, 1857, a patent of
the United States in accordance with it was issued to the
claimants. This patent covers the premises in controversy, and the
defendants have acquired the interests of the patentees, and have
been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession
of
Page 85 U. S. 260
the premises since 1852, claiming title under the Mexican grant,
proceedings for confirmation, and patent of the United States.
The statute of limitations of California, passed in 1863,
enacted that no action for the recovery of real property or its
possession should be maintained, unless the plaintiff, his
ancestor, predecessor, or grantor was seized or possessed of the
premises within five years before the commencement of the action,
with a proviso in substance to the effect that parties claiming
real property under title derived from the Spanish or Mexican
governments or the authorities thereof which had not been finally
confirmed by the United States or its legally constituted
authorities should be limited to five years after its passage,
within which to bring an action for the recovery of the property or
its possession, but if the title had been thus finally confirmed,
the parties should be subject to the same limitations as though
they derived their title from any other source -- that is, they
should have five years from such final confirmation. The statute in
another section declared that by final confirmation was meant the
patent of the United States or the final determination of the
official survey of the land under the Act of Congress of June 14,
1860. The proviso has since then been repealed, but before the
repeal, the present action was brought.
The circuit court gave judgment for the plaintiff for the
premises, and the defendants brought the case to this Court on writ
of error for review.
Page 85 U. S. 261
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action of ejectment for the possession of certain
real property situated in the County of Butte, in the State of
California. Both parties claim the demanded premises under patents
of the United States issued upon a confirmation of grants made by
the Mexican government. The plaintiff claims under the junior
patent issued upon the earlier grant; the defendants claim under
the senior patent issued upon the later grant. Both patents cover
the premises in controversy, one square league of land, and the
main question in the case, as in all cases where patents founded
upon previously existing concessions overlap, is which of the two
original concessions carried the better right to the premises.
The question, as here presented, arising upon conflicting
Page 85 U. S. 262
patents issued upon confirmed Mexican grants, has not been
heretofore before this Court for consideration, but the principles
which must govern its determination are neither new nor
difficult.
The grant to Flugge, upon the confirmation of which the patent
was issued from which the plaintiff deraigns his title, was made by
the Governor of California in February, 1844, and was approved by
the Departmental Assembly in June, 1845. It in terms ceded to the
grantee, subject to such approval and other conditions, five square
leagues of land situated on the westerly side of Feather River, as
represented on a map which accompanied the petition of the grantee,
and designated as the first boundary of the tract a certain degree
of north latitude. This designation afterwards proved to be
erroneous, but the line intended was susceptible of being
accurately traced by measurement from the junction of Feather and
Sacramento Rivers, which was marked on the same map by a degree of
latitude containing a similar error. The map represented a tract
stated in the petition, and the statement was accepted and acted
upon by the governor as correct, to be one league in breadth, and
indicated natural objects of such marked character as to make the
identification of the land a matter perfectly easy to any surveyor.
Feather River, which constitutes the eastern boundary, with its
meanderings, is traced; the position of Honcut Creek entering the
river is given, and the point on the river where the erroneously
designated line of latitude crosses, constituting the commencement
of the boundary, is plainly shown by the bend of the river. With
the breadth of the tract stated, the quantity limited, the southern
and eastern lines designated, all the elements are given essential
to the complete identification of the land. A grant of land thus
identified or having such descriptive features as to render its
identification a matter of absolute certainty entitled the grantee
to the specific tract named. His title, it is true, was imperfect
in its character and subject to various conditions, but when
approved by the Departmental Assembly, it became, in the language
of the regulations of 1828, "definitively
Page 85 U. S. 263
valid," and the estate granted was not afterwards liable to be
divested except by regular proceedings on denouncement. [
Footnote 2] The power of the governor
over it had ceased. He could neither revoke the grant nor impair
the interest of the grantee by any attempted transfer to
others.
The grant to the Fernandez, upon the confirmation of which the
patent was issued from which the defendants trace their title, was
made by the Governor of California in June, 1846, but was not
submitted to the Departmental Assembly for approval, although made
subject to that condition. The country passed under the control of
the United States a few weeks afterwards, and the authority of that
body ceased. The grant is for four square leagues of land, which it
designates as unoccupied land in the vicinity of the River
Sacramento, and as bounded on the north by the
faldas of
the Sierra Nevada, a term which is sometimes translated slope and
sometimes base of the mountains, on the south by the lands of John
A. Sutter, and on the east by Feather River. As thus appears, there
was no certainty or precision in the boundaries designated. The
term "slope" or "base" of the mountains, whichever may be the
correct translation, is of the vaguest import. The point where the
mountains of the Sierra Nevada may be said to commence was then,
and always must be, one of great uncertainty. No two persons would
ever agree as to the precise point where their slope commenced or
ended. Between the base or any supposed slope and the line of
Sutter's land many leagues intervened, and no western boundary of
the tract is given. If we look at the map to which the grant
refers, we find the land represented as lying on Feather River,
with its northern boundary on the
"faldas" of the Sierra,
with no other descriptive features to indicate either its northern
or southern line. It is clear that no specific tract was intended
by the governor, but only that the quantity designated should be
selected on Feather River at the base or along the side of the
mountains, the precise line of which was to
Page 85 U. S. 264
be determined by the magistrate delivering possession to the
grantees. As a grant of quantity, it required, under the Mexican
laws, such delivery of possession to attach it to any particular
tract, called, in the language of the country, juridical
possession, and that proceeding was never had. But it is immaterial
for the disposition of the present case whether the grant to the
Fernandez be treated as one of specific boundaries or of quantity;
it could not interfere with and displace a prior grant of defined
boundaries.
On the argument, great stress was placed by counsel upon the
fact that the claim under the Fernandez grant, though later in
date, was first surveyed and patented. But this fact is not a
matter of any weight in this case. Both parties holding under
patents have a standing in a court of law, and the court is thus
compelled to look beyond the patents to the original source of
title and to the character of that title as it existed under the
former government. The protection which by the treaty the United
States promised to the grantees extended to rights which they then
held. The confirmation established the validity of the claims of
the parties as they then existed -- that is, it determined that
their claims were founded upon concessions of the former government
which were genuine and entitled to recognition so far as they did
not interfere with previously existing rights of others, which the
government was also bound to respect. Confirmation established
nothing more; it did not change the character of the grant to
Flugge as one of specific boundaries, nor that to the Fernandez as
one of quantity. The surveyor, in surveying the claim upon the
first grant, was still under as great obligations to follow the
boundaries which it specified, repeated in the decree of
confirmation, as though the second grant had never been issued or
confirmed.
It is true, as stated by counsel, that the whole subject of
surveys is under the control of the political department of the
government, and is not subject to the supervision of the courts
except in those cases arising under the Act of 1860, to which we
shall presently refer. The courts must, however,
Page 85 U. S. 265
determine, whenever the question arises, whether prior rights of
other parties have been interfered with by the survey of a
confirmed claim upon which a patent has issued. They cannot, in the
action of ejectment, correct the survey made, but they can
determine its inconclusiveness to the extent essential to the
protection of the prior rights of other parties. And whenever two
surveys covering the same tract are approved by the political
department, and a legal controversy arises respecting the land
between claimants under the different surveys, the question which
of the two surveys appropriates the premises in dispute is
necessarily transferred to the judiciary. The fact that two surveys
embrace the same land is itself proof that either one of the
original concessions was improvidently issued and to the extent of
its interference with the other was inoperative, or that error has
intervened in one of the surveys.
There is nothing in the language of this Court or of the Supreme
Court of California in the several cases cited by counsel which
conflicts with this view. [
Footnote
3] Those cases were all actions of ejectment, in which
imperfect or equitable claims, or interests arising since the
acquisition of the country, were set up against the legal title
held under patents, and the subjects there considered were the
effect of the patent as a conveyance of the government, and as
evidence of the validity of the patentee's claim, and of its
confirmation and survey, as against parties having such imperfect
or mere equitable claims, or subsequently acquired interests. The
patent, treated merely as the deed of the government, is held in
those cases to have the operation of a quitclaim, or rather of a
conveyance of such interest as the United States possessed in the
land, and to take effect by relation at the time when proceedings
were instituted before the board of land commissioners. The patent
is also held in those cases to be record evidence of the action of
the government upon the claim of the patentee under the Mexican
grant,
Page 85 U. S. 266
establishing without other proof the validity of the claim and
its rightful location as against all parties asserting, in the
action of ejectment, merely imperfect or equitable titles or
interests acquired since the country passed under the jurisdiction
of the United States. Actions of ejectment are founded upon the
legal title, and parties contesting the title of the patentee in a
court of law, it is there said, must show a superior legal
title.
But in this case, both parties stand upon patents; both have in
these instruments the conveyance of the government and a
recognition of their respective concessions under the former
government. In a controversy founded upon either patent as against
imperfect or equitable claims or interests obtained since the
acquisition of the country, the same language might be repeated
which is used in the cases cited. But in the present controversy
between parties claiming under two patents, each of which reserves
the rights of other parties, the inquiry must extend to the
character of the original concessions. The controversy can only be
settled by determining which of these two gave the better right to
the demanded premises.
As between two floating grants of quantity within the same
general tract, which is sufficiently large to satisfy both, where
neither grantee had received official delivery of possession under
the former government, and where, as a consequence, there was no
measurement or severance of the claim of either from the public
domain, it may be that the party whose claim is first surveyed and
patented will hold the better right to the land covered by his
patent, and that the other party will be compelled to have his
claim located outside of that patent. There would be great
difficulty in finding any legal reason for invalidating the action
of the government in locating the claim of the patentee in such
case in any part of the general tract it might deem proper.
The language of this Court in
Fremont's Case would seem
to justify the conclusion that the floating claim first surveyed,
and thus severed from the public domain, would carry the title to
the premises. The grant to Alvarado, which was
Page 85 U. S. 267
then under consideration, was for ten leagues lying within
exterior boundaries embracing several times the quantity
designated, and the Court, whilst holding that, as between the
government and the grantee, the grant passed to the latter a right
to the quantity of land designated, to be laid off by official
authority in the territory described, said:
"It is true that if any other person within the limits where the
quantity granted to Alvarado was to be located had afterwards
obtained a grant from the government by specific boundaries before
Alvarado had made his survey, the title of the latter grantee could
not be impaired by any subsequent survey of Alvarado. As between
the individual claimants from the government, the title of the
party who had obtained a grant for the specific land would be the
superior and better one. For by the general grant to Alvarado, the
government did not bind itself to make no other grant within the
territory described until after he had made his survey. [
Footnote 4]"
A second floating grant, the claim under which is first surveyed
and patented, and thus severed from the public domain, would seem
to stand, with reference to an earlier floating grant within the
same general limits, in the position which the subsequent grant
with specific boundaries mentioned in the citation would have stood
to the general grant to Alvarado. [
Footnote 5]
But it is unnecessary to decide definitely this point now. The
present is not a case of conflicting patents issued upon a
confirmation of two floating grants within exterior boundaries
embracing land capable of satisfying both. It is a case where one
of the grants upon which a patent has issued, and that the earlier
one has specific boundaries or such descriptive features as to
render its limits easily ascertainable. With the right of the
grantee to the land thus designated the claim of the donee of the
second and floating grant could not interfere.
But there is another view of this case which is equally
Page 85 U. S. 268
conclusive in favor of the plaintiff. We have thus far treated
the survey of the two grants upon which the respective patents were
issued, as made and approved under the Act of March 3, 1851. But
the survey of the claim under the Flugge grant possesses, with
respect to the claim under the Fernandez grant, greater force than
any such approval could give. It has received judicial sanction
under the Act of June 14, 1860, which makes it conclusive as
against all adverse claimants under floating grants. That act
provided that the surveyor general, when he had completed and
plotted the survey of any confirmed claim, should give public
notice of the fact by publication in two newspapers once a week for
the period of four weeks; that during this time, the survey and
plat should be retained in his office subject to inspection; that
upon the application of any party having such an interest in the
survey and location of the land as to make it just and proper that
he should be allowed to intervene for its protection, or on motion
of the United States, the district court should order the survey
and plat to be returned into court for examination and
adjudication; that when thus returned, notice should be given by
public advertisement or in some other form prescribed by rule to
all parties interested that objection had been made to the survey
and location, and admonishing them to intervene for the protection
of their interests; that such parties, having intervened, might
take testimony and contest the survey and location; and that, on
hearing the allegations and proofs, the court should render its
judgment approving the survey, if found to be accurate, and
correcting it or ordering a new survey when found to be erroneous.
The act also provided for an appeal from the decree of the district
court to the Supreme Court.
By the proceedings thus authorized, the approval of the survey
brought before the court had, as against claimants under floating
grants, the force and conclusiveness of a judicial determination in
a suit
in rem, and all such claimants were concluded by
it.
The survey of the claim under the Flugge grant was, under the
act in question, brought before the district court
Page 85 U. S. 269
and there subjected to judicial examination, and finally
received the approval of the court. If the defendants or those
under whom they hold failed to appear and contest the survey, they
cannot now be heard in this action to question its correctness.
[
Footnote 6]
The objection to the authority of the court to pass upon the
survey, because ordered into court before the Act of June 14, 1860,
is untenable. The act in terms applies to surveys which had been
previously returned into court and in relation to which proceedings
were then pending, as well as to surveys subsequently made.
[
Footnote 7]
Nor does it matter that a different survey had been previously
approved by the Surveyor General of California. The whole subject
of surveys is under the control of Congress, and until the patent
issues thereon, any survey may be set aside and a new one ordered
by its authority.
But the defendants, to defeat a recovery by the plaintiff, also
insist that his right of action is barred by the statute of
limitations of California; and also that he is estopped from
asserting a claim to the demanded premises by the conduct and
declarations of his predecessor, the claimant before the land
commission, in claiming land under his grant situated in a
different locality.
The statute of limitations of California, passed in 1863,
provided in substance that no action for the recovery of real
property or its possession should be maintained, unless the
plaintiff his ancestor, predecessor, or grantor was seized or
possessed of the premises within five years before the commencement
of the action, or the property was claimed under title derived from
the Spanish or Mexican governments, which had not been previously
confirmed by the United States or their legally constituted
authorities; in which latter case the parties were allowed five
years after the passage of the act within which to bring their
action. If the title had been thus finally confirmed the parties
were limited to five years after such confirmation. The statute
also declared
Page 85 U. S. 270
that by final confirmation was meant the patent of the United
States, or the final determination of the official survey of the
land under the Act of Congress of June 14, 1860. The provision of
the statute relating to actions where the property is claimed under
title derived from Spanish or Mexican authorities, has since then
been repealed, but before the repeal and within the time designated
after final confirmation of the grant, the present action was
commenced. The repeal could not, however, have any effect upon the
rights of the plaintiff.
Whilst proceedings were pending before the tribunals of the
United States for the confirmation of the claim under the Flugge
grant, the statute did not run and could not run against the right
of the claimant to the land in controversy. He was obliged by the
legislation of Congress to present his claim for investigation and
determination under pain of being held to have abandoned it, and
was subjected to numerous and expensive proceedings to establish
its validity. As a result of the proceedings required, the
government in effect promised, in case his claim was found to be
valid, to give him in its patent such evidence of title as would
secure to him the possession and enjoyment of his land. The
legislation of Congress imposing this burden upon the claimant and
promising this benefit to him is not the subject of any
constitutional objection, and it is not, therefore, within the
power of the legislature of a state to defeat its operation. It was
adopted by the government in the discharge of its treaty
obligations, with respect to which its authority is absolute and
supreme. The action of the government thereunder, and the rights
which perfected title insures to its possessor, cannot be impaired
or defeated in any respect by the statute of limitations of the
state. That statute can only begin to run against the title
perfected under the legislation of Congress from the date of its
consummation. [
Footnote 8]
The alleged estoppel of the plaintiffs is asserted from the fact
that Larkin, who prosecuted claim under the
Page 85 U. S. 271
Flugge grant for confirmation, had previously located it on land
selected farther north than the tract finally surveyed and patented
to him, and had announced to others that his claim covered the land
thus selected. It was undoubtedly his desire to have his claim
located where he had placed it. The survey made by the surveyor
general, both preliminary and subsequent to the confirmation,
placed the land in the same locality. Both claimant and surveyor
seem to have acted on the supposition that the erroneously
designated parallels of latitude should govern the location,
instead of the natural boundaries indicated on the map. There does
not appear to have been any intention on the part of Larkin to
mislead anyone as to the nature of his rights. He was satisfied to
keep the land originally selected by him; and he contended, and
those who succeeded to his interests contended for the correctness
of his selection; but the government, through its appropriate
officers, interfered and asserted that another and different
location was required by the grant.
There is therefore no case for the application of the doctrine
of equitable estoppel. For its application there must be some
intended deception in the conduct or declarations of the party to
be estopped, or such gross negligence on his part as to amount to
constructive fraud.
An estoppel
in pais is sometimes said to be a moral
question. Certain it is that to the enforcement of an estoppel of
this character, such as will prevent a party from asserting his
legal rights to property, there must generally be some degree of
turpitude in his conduct which has misled others to their injury.
Conduct or declarations founded upon ignorance of one's rights have
no such ingredient, and seldom work any such result. There are
cases, it is true, where declarations may be made under such
peculiar circumstances, that the party will be estopped from
denying any knowledge of his rights; but these are exceptional, and
do not affect the correctness of the general rule as stated.
[
Footnote 9]
Page 85 U. S. 272
We see no ground for interfering with the judgment of the
circuit court, and it is, therefore,
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
12 Stat. at Large 33.
[
Footnote 2]
Hornsby v. United
States, 10 Wall. 238.
[
Footnote 3]
Beard v.
Federy, 3 Wall. 479;
Waterman v. Smith, 13
Cal. 407;
Moore v. Wilkinson, ib., 488;
Stark v.
Barrett, 15
id. 366;
Teschemacher v.
Thompson, 18
id. 26;
Leese v. Clark, ib.,
537.
[
Footnote 4]
58 U. S. 17
How. 558.
[
Footnote 5]
Ledoux v.
Black, 18 How. 475;
Waterman v. Smith, 13
Cal. 416, 417.
[
Footnote 6]
Rodrigues v. United
States, 1 Wall. 591.
[
Footnote 7]
United States v.
Halleck, 1 Wall. 453.
[
Footnote 8]
Montgomery v. Bevans, 1 Sawyer 680.
[
Footnote 9]
Commonwealth v. Moltz, 10 Pa. 531;
Copeland v.
Copeland, 28 Me. 529;
Whitaker v. Williams, 20 Conn.
104;
Delaplaine v. Hitchcock, 6 Hill 16;
Brewer v.
Boston and Worcester Railroad Company, 5 Metcalf 479;
Biddle Boggs v. Merced Mining Company, 14 Cal. 368;
Davis v. Davis, 26
id. 23.
