A state legislature passed in 1862 an act "in relation to the
duties of railroad companies," enacting:
1st. That each railroad company should annually, in a month
named by the act, fix its rates for the transportation of
passengers and of freights of different kinds;
2d. That it should, on the first day of the next month, cause a
printed copy of such rates to be put up at all its stations and
depots, and cause a copy to remain posted during the year;
3d. That a failure to fulfill these requirements, or the
charging of a higher rate than was posted, should subject the
offending company to the payment of certain penalties
prescribed.
Congress, afterwards (in 1866), by an act whose title was "An
act to
facilitate commercial, postal, and military
communication between the several states," and which recited that
"the Constitution of the United States confers upon Congress, in
express terms, the power to regulate commerce among the several
states," and goes on "
Therefore, be it enacted," &c.,
enacted
"That every railroad company in the united states, whose road is
operated by steam . . . be, and hereby is authorized to carry upon
and over its road, boats, bridges, ferries, all passengers, troops,
government supplies, mails, freights, and other property on their
way from any state to another state,
and to receive
compensation therefor."
And enacted further, "That Congress may at any time, alter,
amend, or repeal this act."
Held, in the case of a
railroad running through several states, including that where the
state enactment above mentioned had been made, that the state
enactment was but a police law, and therefore constitutional.
A statute of Iowa "in relation to the duties of railroad
companies," passed in 1862, [
Footnote 1] thus enacts:
"In the month of September annually, each railroad company shall
fix its rates of fare for passengers, and freights for
transportation of timber, wood, and coal, per ton, cord, or
thousand feet, per mile, also, its fare and freight per mile, for
transporting merchandise and articles of the first, second, third,
and fourth grades of freight."
"And on the 1st day of October following, shall put up at
Page 84 U. S. 561
all the stations and depots on its road, a printed copy of such
fare and freight, and cause a copy to remain posted during the
year."
"For willfully neglecting so to do, or for receiving higher
rates of fares or freight than those posted, the company shall
forfeit not less than $100 nor more than $200 to any person injured
thereby and suing therefor."
On the 15th of June, 1866, [
Footnote 2] Congress passed an act thus:
"
An Act to facilitate Commercial, Postal, and
Military"
"
Communication among the several states"
"Whereas, the Constitution of the United States confers upon
Congress, in express terms, the power to regulate commerce among
the several states, to establish post-roads and to raise and
support armies,
therefore:"
"SECTION 1.
Be it enacted that every railroad company
in the United States whose road is operated by steam, its
successors and assigns, be and is hereby authorized to carry upon
and over its road, boats, bridges, and ferries, all passengers,
troops, government supplies, mails, freight, and property on their
way from any state to another state, and to
receive
compensation therefor, . . . provided &c."
"SECTION 2.
Be it further enacted that Congress may at
any time, alter, amend, or repeal this act."
These two enactments, of the state and of the United States,
being on the statute books, the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad
Company, a corporation chartered by Illinois and having its
principal place of business at Chicago in that state and working a
continuous line of railway from the said Chicago through Illinois,
Iowa, and other states (by the legislatures of which, of course,
the different parts of its road were authorized), having posted
their rates of freight and put up a schedule of them in their
office, in the station, was transporting, in pursuance of the
request of one Fuller, certain goods of his from the said Chicago
in Illinois to a place called Marshalltown, in Iowa. Having charged
and received from Fuller, as he alleged, a higher
Page 84 U. S. 562
rate of freight than that posted, Fuller sued them in one of the
district courts of Iowa to recover the penalty which the Iowa
enactment purported to give in such a case. The company set up,
among other defenses, that the said enactment was in violation of
that clause of the Constitution [
Footnote 3] which ordains that:
"Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states."
The court in which the suit was brought and the supreme court of
the state on appeal from it held that the enactment of Iowa was but
a "police regulation," and accordingly that it was valid. Judgment
going accordingly the case was now brought here.
Page 84 U. S. 566
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case lies within a narrow compass, and presents but a single
question for our consideration. That question is not difficult of
solution. The second section, chapter 169, of the laws of the ninth
General Assembly of Iowa is as follows:
"In the month of September annually, each railroad company shall
fix its rates of fare for passengers and freight, for
transportation of timber, wood, and coal per ton, cord, or thousand
feet, per mile; also, its fare and freight per mile for
transporting merchandise and articles of the first, second, third,
and fourth grades of freight; and on the first day of October
following shall put up at all stations and depots on its road a
printed copy of such fare and freight, and cause a copy to remain
posted during the year. For willfully neglecting so to do or for
receiving higher rates of fare or freight than those posted, the
company shall forfeit not less than one hundred dollars nor more
than two hundred dollars to any person injured thereby and suing
therefor."
The plaintiff in error was sued in the proper district court of
the state for violations of these provisions. Among other defenses
interposed, the company plead that the statute was in conflict with
the commercial clause of the Constitution
Page 84 U. S. 567
of the United States. Fuller demurred to the plea. The court
sustained the demurrer and the company excepted. The case was
afterwards submitted to a jury. The company prayed the court to
instruct them that the act was invalid by reason of the conflict
before mentioned. The court refused, and the company again
excepted. A verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff.
The company removed the case to the supreme court of the state, and
there insisted upon these exceptions as errors. That court affirmed
the judgment of the district court, and the company thereupon
prosecuted this writ of error. Was there error in this ruling?
The Constitution gives to Congress the power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes."
The statute complained of provides:
That each railroad company shall, in the month of September,
annually, fix its rates for the transportation of passengers and of
freights of different kinds;
That it shall cause a printed copy of such rates to be put up at
all its stations and depots, and cause a copy to remain posted
during the year;
That a failure to fulfill these requirements or the charging of
a higher rate than is posted shall subject the offending company to
the payment of the penalty prescribed.
In all other respects there is no interference. No other
constraint is imposed. Except in these particulars, the company may
exercise all its faculties as it shall deem proper. No
discrimination is made between local and interstate freights and no
attempt is made to control the rates that may be charged. It is
only required that the rates shall be fixed, made public, and
honestly adhered to. In this there is nothing unreasonable or
onerous. The public welfare is promoted without wrong or injury to
the company. The statute was doubtless deemed to be called for by
the interests of the community to be affected by it, and it rests
upon a solid foundation of reason and justice.
Page 84 U. S. 568
It is not, in the sense of the Constitution, in any wise a
regulation of commerce. It is a police regulation, and as such
forms
"a portion of the immense mass of legislation which embraces
everything within the Territory of a state not surrendered to the
general government, all which can be most advantageously exercised
by the states themselves. [
Footnote
4]"
This case presents a striking analogy to a prominent feature in
the case of The Brig James Gray v. Ship John Fraser. [
Footnote 5] There, the city authorities of
Charleston had passed an ordinance prescribing where a vessel
should lie in the harbor, what light she should show at night, and
making other similar regulations. It was objected that these
requirements were regulations of commerce, and therefore void. This
Court affirmed the validity of the ordinance.
In the complex system of polity which exists in this country,
the powers of government may be divided into four classes:
Those which belong exclusively to the states.
Those which belong exclusively to the National Government.
Those which may be exercised concurrently and independently by
both.
And those which may be exercised by the states but only until
Congress shall see fit to act upon the subject.
The authority of the state then retires and lies in abeyance
until the occasion for its exercise shall recur. [
Footnote 6]
Commerce is traffic, but it is much more. It embraces also
transportation by land and water, and all the means and appliances
necessarily employed in carrying it on. [
Footnote 7]
The authority to regulate commerce, lodged by the Constitution
in Congress, is in part within the last division of the powers of
government above mentioned. Some of the rules prescribed in the
exercise of that power must from the nature of things be uniform
throughout the country. To
Page 84 U. S. 569
that extent the authority itself must necessarily be exclusive,
as much so as if it had been declared so to be by the Constitution
in express terms.
Others may well vary with the varying circumstances of different
localities. Where a stream navigable for the purposes of foreign or
interstate commerce is obstructed by the authority of a state, such
exercise of authority may be valid until Congress shall see fit to
intervene. The authority of Congress in such cases is paramount and
absolute, and it may compel the abatement of the obstruction
whenever it shall deem it proper to do so. A few of the cases
illustrating these views will be adverted to.
In
Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Company, [
Footnote 8] under a law of the state of
Delaware, a dam had been erected across the creek. This Court held
that the dam was a lawful structure because not in conflict with
any law of Congress.
In
Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, [
Footnote 9] the State of Pennsylvania had
authorized the erection of a bridge over the Schuylkill River in
the City of Philadelphia. This Court refused to interpose, because
there was no legislation by Congress affecting the river. The
authority of Congress over the subject was affirmed in the
strongest terms.
In
The Wheeling Bridge Case, [
Footnote 10] the bridge was decreed to be a nuisance
because Congress "had regulated the Ohio River, and had thereby
secured to the public the free and unobstructed use of the same."
Congress subsequently legalized the bridge, and this Court held the
case to be thereby terminated.
In
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, [
Footnote 11] the validity of a state law
establishing certain pilotage regulations was drawn in question. It
was admitted by this Court that the regulations were regulations of
commerce, but it was held that they were valid and would continue
to be so until superseded by the action of Congress.
In
Ex Parte McNiel, [
Footnote 12] the same question arose, and the doctrine of
the preceding case was reaffirmed.
Page 84 U. S. 570
In
The James Gray v. John Fraser, [
Footnote 13] stress was laid upon the fact that
there was no act of Congress in conflict with the city ordinance in
question. See also in this connection
Osborne v. City of
Mobile. [
Footnote
14]
If the requirements of the statute here in question were, as
contended by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, regulations of
commerce, the question would arise whether, regarded in the light
of the authorities referred to and of reason and principle, they
are not regulations of such a character as to be valid until
superseded by the paramount action of Congress. But as we are
unanimously of the opinion that they are merely police regulations,
it is unnecessary to pursue the subject.
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Laws of the Ninth General Assembly of the State of Iowa, second
section, chapter 169.
[
Footnote 2]
14 Stat. at Large 66.
[
Footnote 3]
Article I, Sec. 8.
[
Footnote 4]
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1.
[
Footnote 5]
62 U. S. 21 How.
184.
[
Footnote 6]
Ex Parte
McNiel, 13 Wall. 240.
[
Footnote 7]
2 Story on the Constitution §§ 1061, 1062.
[
Footnote 8]
27 U. S. 2 Pet.
250.
[
Footnote 9]
70 U. S. 3
Wall. 728.
[
Footnote 10]
59 U. S. 18
How. 430.
[
Footnote 11]
53 U. S. 12
How. 319.
[
Footnote 12]
Supra.
[
Footnote 13]
62 U. S. 21 How.
184.
[
Footnote 14]
83 U. S. 16 Wall.
479.
