1. When a vessel is regularly registered in the port to which
she belongs, that is to say, "in the port nearest to which her
owner, husband, or acting and managing owner usually resides,"
registered,
ex. gr., at New York, the fact that she may be
temporarily in a port of a state, as
ex. gr., Mobile, in
Alabama, other than that where her home port is and engaged in
lawful commerce -- one of a daily line of steamers -- between
Page 83 U. S. 472
that port and the port of a yet third state, as
ex.
gr., New Orleans in Louisiana, does not cause her to become
incorporated into the personal property of the State of Alabama,
and no state but that in which her home port is has dominion over
her for the purpose of taxation.
2. The fact that the vessel was enrolled by her master as a
coaster at Mobile, Alabama, and that her license as a coaster was
renewed from year to year does not affect her registry in New York
or her ownership there. It accordingly does not change the
rule.
The Constitution ordains that
"Congress shall have power to regulate commerce between the
states."
An act of Congress passed December 31, 1792, [
Footnote 1] enacts that
"Every ship or vessel shall be registered by the collector of
the district in which such ship or vessel shall belong at the time
of her registry, and her port shall be that nearest to which her
owner, husband, or acting and managing owner usually resides, and
the name of the vessel and the port to which she shall so belong
shall be painted on her stern, on a black ground in white letters,
not less than three inches in length."
The omission to designate the name "and
port to which she
belongs" is made penal.
An Act of February 18, 1793, [
Footnote 2] for enrolling and licensing vessels employed
in the coasting trade, enacts thus:
"SECTION 3. That it shall and may be lawful for the collectors
of the several districts to
enrol and license any ship or
vessel that may be
registered, upon such registry being
given up, or to register any ship or vessel that may be enrolled
upon such enrolment and license being given up. And when any ship
shall be in any other district than the one to which she belongs
the collector of such district, on the application of the master or
commander thereof, and upon his taking an oath or affirmation that
according to his best knowledge and belief the property
Page 83 U. S. 473
remains as expressed in the register or enrolment proposed to be
given up &c., shall make the exchanges aforesaid; but in every
such case the collector, to whom the register or enrolment and
license may be given up, shall transmit the same to the Register of
the Treasury, and the register, or enrolment and license granted in
lieu thereof, shall within ten days after the arrival of such ship
or vessel within the district to which she belongs, be delivered to
the collector of the said district, and be by him cancelled."
This provision of the Constitution, and these acts being in
force, the steamer
Frances was assessed in the years 1866
and 1867 as personal property in the City of Mobile, belonging to
one Morgan. A tax was laid upon the vessel, and remaining unpaid,
the same was seized by the collector of the City of Mobile. The
owner, Morgan, brought an action of trespass in the court below
against the collector for such seizure, and the collector justified
by virtue of his tax warrant.
The facts upon which the question of the liability to taxation
of the vessel depended, were these:
The
Frances was brought to Mobile in 1865, and from
that time until the trial in 1870 had been employed as a coasting
steamer between Mobile and New Orleans. Before being brought to
Mobile, the vessel was duly registered at the port of New York
under the ownership of the plaintiff, and the name of the vessel
and her port of New York were then painted on her stern, according
to the acts of Congress, and the same had ever since so remained.
The plaintiff then was and since had remained a citizen of New
York. The vessel then was the property of the plaintiff, and had
continued to be his property from that time to the day of the
trial.
In January, 1867, the vessel was regularly enrolled at the
custom house in Mobile by her master, as a coaster, and her license
as a coasting vessel was renewed in the several years 1868 and
1869, and with other similar vessels constituted one of a daily
line of steamers plying between Mobile and New Orleans. During this
term, the captain of the vessel
Page 83 U. S. 474
had been a resident of Mobile, and the agent conducting the
business of the vessels at Mobile was resident there, occupied an
office there for such business, and employed and paid the persons
who assisted him therein, but such agent was under the control of a
superior agent residing in New Orleans, who employed and paid the
captain and other officers of the vessel. A wharf and office in
Mobile were occupied for the use of these vessels. The vessels were
built at Wilmington for the domestic trade. They transported the
mails, freight, and passengers between Mobile and New Orleans, and
this business was extensive and profitable. Upon these facts the
question arose, was this vessel subject to taxation as personal
property under the laws of the state of Alabama?
The court held that the vessel was taxable under those laws, and
gave judgment for the defendant. To review that judgment the
present suit was brought.
MR. JUSTICE HUNT delivered the opinion of the Court.
The fact that the vessel was physically within the limits of the
City of Mobile at the time the tax was levied does not decide the
question. Thus, if a traveler on that day had been passing through
that city in his private carriage, or an emigrant with his worldly
goods on a wagon, it is not contended that the property of either
of these persons would
Page 83 U. S. 475
be subject to taxation as property within the city. It is
conceded by the respective counsel that it would not have been.
On the other hand, this vessel, although a vehicle of commerce,
was not exempt from taxation on that score. A steamboat or a post
coach engaged in a local business within a state may be subject to
local taxation, although it carry the mail of the United States.
The commerce between the states may not be interfered with by
taxation or other interruption, but its instruments and vehicles
may be. [
Footnote 3] It is not,
therefore, upon this principle that we are to decide the case. Nor
does it fall within that range of cases of which
The Steamship
Company v. Port Wardens, [
Footnote 4] and
Gibbons v. Ogden, [
Footnote 5] furnish illustrations. In each of
those cases, the taxation was upon a subject directly connected
with the navigation of the public waters and with the commerce of
the country. In the first case, a statute had been passed requiring
every vessel entering the harbor of New Orleans to pay five dollars
to the port wardens, in addition to other fees, whether any service
were performed or not. In the second case, vessels navigating the
waters of the Hudson River were required to take a license for that
purpose from the State of New York. The imposition in this class of
cases was a tax upon the use of the public waters of the country,
and tended immediately to interfere with and to obstruct the
commerce between the states. In the instance before us, the tax was
upon a vessel at the wharf. It was in this respect as if a tax had
been laid upon lumber or cotton lying on the dock at Mobile.
This vessel was owned by and employed in the service of a
resident of the State of New York. It was primarily and
presumptively taxable under the authority of that state, and of
that state only. It is urged that her status or condition was
affected by what was done, or neglected in regard to her register
and enrolment. In
Blanchard v. Martha Washington,
[
Footnote 6] the law on this
subject is thus explained:
"Ships or vessels are required to be registered [
Footnote 7] by the collector of the
Page 83 U. S. 476
district in which shall be comprehended the port to which the
same shall belong at the time of the registry, which port shall be
deemed to be that at, or nearest to which, the owner, if there be
but one, or, if more than one, the husband and acting manager
usually resides."
Permanent registry, therefore, as appears by this provision, is
required to be made at the home port of the vessel, and what is
meant by the home port is clearly and plainly defined. Registry
must be made at her home port, and the same section provides that
the name of the vessel, and the port to which she shall so belong,
shall be painted on her stern, on a black ground, in white letters
of not less than three inches in length. All persons therefore have
the means of ascertaining the name of the vessel and her home port,
and her shipping papers, which include a copy of her register or
enrolment, are by law required to furnish the same information. The
Act of February 18, 1793, prescribes the terms and shows the effect
of enrolment in another port. In substance, the permanent register
is given up to the collector of that port, and a certificate is
issued showing the name of the vessel, the port to which she
belongs, and that to which she is destined. This certificate is
temporary in its character, and is based upon the proposition that
the vessel belongs, or has her home port, at a different place from
that at which she receives this certificate. [
Footnote 8]
There was nothing, therefore, in her enrolment in the port of
Mobile that affected her registry in New York or her ownership in
that place, or that tended to subject her to the taxation of the
State of Alabama under the circumstances stated.
It is the opinion of the Court that the State of Alabama had no
jurisdiction over this vessel for the purpose of taxation for the
reason that it had not become incorporated into the personal
property of that state, but was there temporarily only, and that it
was engaged in lawful commerce between the states with its situs at
the home port of New
Page 83 U. S. 477
York, where it belonged and where its owner was liable to be
taxed for its value. The case of
Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship
Company, [
Footnote 9] is
decisive of the case before us. In that case, all the stockholders
in the vessel sought to be taxed resided in New York, but had
agencies in Panama and San Francisco, and a naval dock and yard at
Benicia, in that state, for the purpose of repairing and furnishing
supplies. On arriving at San Francisco, the vessel usually remained
a day only to unload her freight and passengers, and proceeded to
Benicia for repairs and refitting for the next voyage, and usually
remained there ten or twelve days. The vessels were part of a line
plying in connection between New York and San Francisco, carrying
freight and passengers, were all ocean ships and all registered in
New York, and taxes were assessed upon them in that state. This
route and this mode of proceeding was the permanent, regular, and
continued business of the ships in question. Taxes for the years
1851 and 1852 were assessed upon the vessels under authority of the
State of California, paid under protest, and suit brought to
recover back the taxes so paid. A recovery was had below, and this
Court sustained the judgment in an able opinion delivered by my
learned predecessor, Mr. Justice Nelson. The ships, it was held,
were engaged in the business and commerce of the country upon the
great highway of nations, touching at such ports and places as
their interests demanded. He said,
"So far as respects the ports and harbors within the United
States, they are entered and cargoes discharged or laden on board,
independently of any control over them except as it respects such
municipal and sanitary regulations of the local authorities as are
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the general
government, to which belongs the regulation of commerce with
foreign nations and between the states. . . . But whether [he
proceeds] the vessel leaving her home port for trade and commerce
visits, in the course of her voyage or business, several ports or
confines her operations in the carrying trade to one,
Page 83 U. S. 478
are questions that will depend on the profitable returns of the
business, and will furnish no more evidence that she has become a
part of the personal property within the state and liable to
taxation at one port more than the other. She is within the
jurisdiction of all or any one of them temporarily and for a
purpose wholly excluding the idea of permanently abiding in the
state or changing her home port. Our merchant vessels are not
unfrequently absent for years in the foreign carrying trade,
seeking cargo, carrying it and unlading it from port to port during
all the time absent; but they neither lose their national character
nor their home port, as inscribed upon their stern."
This vessel, the
Frances, remained the property of the
plaintiff, with her home port at New York, and had never become
blended with the commerce and property of the state of Alabama,
within the principle of
People v. Commissioners. [
Footnote 10] The vessel touches
tri-weekly or daily at Mobile, and the same at New Orleans. If her
regular route were from New Orleans to Mobile, thence to St.
Augustine, thence to Savannah, thence to Charleston, and returning
by the same course, the case would be no different. She would be
engaged in interstate commerce, with her home port still remaining
unchanged, and the property continuing unmixed with the permanent
property of either state. Her right to trade at each of those
ports, without molestation by either of these states, is secured by
the Constitution of the United States. The federal authority has
been exerted by the passage of the navigation laws and the issuing
of a coasting license to this vessel. All state interference is
thereby excluded.
Whether the steamer
Frances was actually taxed in New
York during the years 1866 and 1867 is not shown by the case. It is
not important. She was liable to taxation there. That state alone
had dominion over her for that purpose. Alabama had no more power
to tax her or her owner than had Louisiana, or than Florida,
Georgia, and South Carolina would have had in the case I have
supposed.
The jurisdiction of this Court over the present case, as in
Page 83 U. S. 479
the case of
Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Company,
[
Footnote 11] arises from
the facts, first that the property had not become blended with the
business and commerce of Alabama, but remained legally of and as in
New York; and secondly, that the vessel was lawfully engaged in the
interstate trade, over the public waters. It is in law as if the
vessel had never before or after that day been within the port of
Mobile, but touching there on a single occasion when engaged in the
interstate trade, had been subjected to a tax as personal property
of that city. Within the authorities it is an interference with the
commerce of the country not permitted to the states.
Judgment reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 3d; 1 Stat. at Large 56, 288.
[
Footnote 2]
Ib., 306.
[
Footnote 3]
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1;
Passenger
Cases, 7 How. 283.
[
Footnote 4]
73 U. S. 6 Wall.
31.
[
Footnote 5]
22 U. S. 9 Wheat.
210.
[
Footnote 6]
1 Clifford 466.
[
Footnote 7]
1 Stat. at Large 288.
[
Footnote 8]
Branchard v. Martha Washington, supra; 74 U.
S. Smith, 7 Wall. 646.
[
Footnote 9]
58 U. S. 17 How.
596.
[
Footnote 10]
23 N.Y. 224.
[
Footnote 11]
Supra.
