1. Aliens domiciled in the United States in 1862 were engaged in
manufacturing saltpeter in Alabama and in selling that article to
the Confederate States, knowing that it was to be used by them in
the manufacture of gunpowder for the prosecution of the war of the
rebellion.
Held that they thus gave aid and comfort to the
rebellion.
2. The doctrine of
Hanauer v.
Doane, 12 Wall. 342, that
"he who, being bound by his allegiance to a government, sells
goods to the agent
Page 83 U. S. 148
of an armed combination to overthrow that government, knowing
that the purchaser buys them for that treasonable purpose, is
himself guilty of treason or a misprision thereof"
repeated and affirmed.
3. Aliens domiciled in the United States owe a local and
temporary allegiance to the government of the United States; they
are bound to obey all the laws of the country not immediately
relating to citizenship during their residence in it, and are
equally amenable with citizens for any infraction of those laws.
Those aliens who, being domiciled in the country prior to the
rebellion, gave aid and comfort to the rebellion were therefore
subject to be prosecuted for violation of the laws of the United
States against treason and for giving aid and comfort to the
rebellion.
4. The proclamation of the President of the United States dated
December 25, 1868, granting
"unconditionally and without reservation to all and to every
person who directly or indirectly participated in the late
insurrection or rebellion a full pardon and amnesty for the offense
of treason against the United States or of adhering to their
enemies during the late civil war, with restoration o� all
rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the
laws which have been made in pursuance thereof,"
includes aliens domiciled in the country who gave aid and
comfort to the rebellion.
5. The pardon and amnesty thus granted relieve claimants
prosecuting in the Court of Claims for the proceeds of captured and
abandoned property under the Act of Congress of March 12, 1863,
from the consequences of participation in the rebellion and the
necessity of establishing their loyalty in order to prosecute their
claims which would otherwise be indispensable to a recovery.
6. By the proceeding known as a "petition of right," the
government of Great Britain accords to citizens of the United
States the right to prosecute claims against that government in its
courts, and therefore British subjects, if otherwise entitled, may,
under the Act of Congress of July 27, 1868, prosecute claims
against the United States in the Court of Claims.
This was an appeal from the Court of Claims. The claimants there
were subjects of the Queen of Great Britain, but had been residents
within the United States prior to the war of the rebellion and
during its continuance. In 1864, they were the owners of sixty-five
bales of cotton stored on a plantation in Alabama. This cotton was
seized during that year by naval officers of the United States and
turned over to an agent of the Treasury Department, by whom the
cotton was sold and the proceeds paid into the Treasury. The
present action was brought in the Court of Claims under the Act of
Congress of March 12, 1863, known as
Page 83 U. S. 149
the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, to recover these
proceeds.
The court found that the claimants were the owners of the cotton
and that it was seized and sold as stated, and that the net
proceeds, amounting to $43,232, were paid into the Treasury.
The court also found that the government of Great Britain
accords to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute
claims against that government in its own courts, but that the
claimants were engaged in 1862 in manufacturing saltpeter in
Alabama and selling that article to the Confederate States, and
that they thus gave aid and comfort to the rebellion, and for that
reason were not entitled to recover the proceeds of the cotton
seized. Their petition was accordingly dismissed. The facts
connected with the manufacture and sale of the saltpeter are thus
stated by the court in its findings:
"From having, in 1860 and 1861, been engaged in the business of
railroad contractors, they began in December, 1861, the manufacture
of saltpeter at Santa Cave, Alabama, and continued engaged therein
until the following April, when, owing to the presence of United
States troops in the vicinity, they left the cave and remained
absent therefrom until the following October, when, immediately
after the evacuation of Huntsville, Alabama, by the United States
forces, they resumed work in making saltpeter at said cave and
continued it about two months. Their right to make saltpeter there
was under a contract of lease between the owners of the cave and
other parties, which had been transferred to the claimants, by whom
it was, in May, 1863, sold and transferred to the so-called
'Confederate States of America' for $34,600. On the 28th of March,
1862, the claimants sold to the said Confederate States of America
2,480 lbs. of saltpeter at 75 cents per pound, in all, $1,860, and
received payment therefor at Richmond, Virginia, on the 27th of
June, 1862, from a rebel captain of artillery, and on the 30th of
November, 1862, they sold to the said 'Confederate States' 4m209
lbs. of niter at 75 cents per pound, in all $3,156.75,
Page 83 U. S. 150
and in the bill of the same, which the claimants receipted, it
was expressed that the said niter was 'for manufacture of
gunpowder,' and the amount of said bill was paid at Larkinsville,
Alabama, on the 24th of December, 1862, by the rebel
'superintendent of niter and mining district No. 9,' and the
claimants hired to the said 'Confederate States' wagons to
transport the said niter from Santa Cave to Rome, Georgia."
From the decree dismissing the petition the claimants appealed
to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The circumstances attending the manufacture and sale of the
saltpeter, as disclosed in the findings of the court, plainly show
that the claimants knew that the saltpeter was to be used by the
Confederates in the manufacture of gunpowder for the prosecution of
the war of the rebellion, and there is little doubt that the sale
was made in order to aid the Confederates in accomplishing their
treasonable purposes. By thus furnishing materials for the
prosecution of the war whilst they were domiciled in the country,
knowing the uses to which the materials were to be applied, the
claimants became participators in the treason of the Confederates
equally as if they had been original conspirators with them. The
Court of Claims therefore did not err in its conclusion that the
Act of the claimants in selling the saltpeter to the Confederates,
under these circumstances, was an act of aid and comfort to the
rebellion. We have already held in
Hanauer v. Doane,
[
Footnote 1] and we repeat and
reaffirm what we there said, that
"he who, being bound by his allegiance to a government, sells
goods to the agent of an armed combination to overthrow that
government, knowing that the purchaser buys them for that
treasonable purpose, is himself guilty of
Page 83 U. S. 151
treason or a misprision thereof. He voluntarily aids the
treason. He cannot be permitted to stand on the nice metaphysical
distinction that although he knows that the purchaser buys the
goods for the purpose of aiding the rebellion, he does not sell
them for that purpose. The consequences of his acts are too serious
and enormous to admit of such a plea. He must be taken to intend
the consequences of his own voluntary act."
But the aid and comfort thus given to the rebellion by the
claimants did not justify a denial of their right to recover the
proceeds of their property in the Treasury of the United States
after the proclamation of pardon and amnesty made by the President
on the 25th of December, 1868, unless their character as aliens
excludes them from the benefit of that proclamation, a question
which we shall presently consider. Assuming that they are within
the terms of the proclamation, the pardon and amnesty granted
relieve them from the legal consequences of their participation in
the rebellion and from the necessity of proving that they had not
thus participated, which otherwise would have been indispensable to
a recovery. It is true, the pardon and amnesty do not and cannot
alter the actual fact that aid and comfort were given by the
claimants, but they forever close the eyes of the court to the
perception of that fact as an element in its judgment, no rights of
third parties having intervened.
There has been some difference of opinion among the members of
the Court as to cases covered by the pardon of the President, but
there has been none as to the effect and operation of a pardon in
cases where it applies. All have agreed that the pardon not merely
releases the offender from the punishment prescribed for the
offense, but that it obliterates in legal contemplation the offense
itself.
When, therefore, in
Padelford's Case, [
Footnote 2] a claimant under the Captured and
Abandoned Property Act, who had given aid and comfort to the
rebellion, appeared in the Court of Claims, asking for a
restoration of the proceeds of his property,
Page 83 U. S. 152
and showing that he had taken the oath prescribed by the
proclamation of President Lincoln, of December 8, 1863, and had
since then kept the oath inviolate, and was thereby by force of the
proclamation pardoned, this Court held that after the pardon thus
granted no offense connected with the rebellion could be imputed to
him; that if in other respects he made the proof which under the
act entitled him to a decree for the proceeds of his property, the
law made the proof of pardon a complete substitute for proof that
he had given no aid or comfort to the rebellion; and that a
different construction would defeat the manifest intent of the
proclamation and of the Act of Congress which authorized it.
In
Klein's Case, [
Footnote 3] which subsequently came before the Court, an
act of Congress designed to deny to the pardon of the President the
effect and operation which the Court had thus adjudged to it, and
which declared that an acceptance of pardon without disclaimer
should be conclusive evidence of the acts pardoned, and be
inoperative as evidence of the rights conferred by it in the Court
of Claims and in this Court, was held to be unconstitutional and
void.
In
Mrs. Armstrong's Case, [
Footnote 4] which was here at the last term, the Court
declined to consider whether the evidence was sufficient to prove
that the claimant had given aid and comfort to the rebellion, and
held that the proclamation of pardon and amnesty issued by the
President on the 25th of December, 1868, entitled her to the
proceeds of her captured and abandoned property in the Treasury,
without proof that she never gave such aid and comfort; that the
proclamation granting pardon unconditionally and without
reservation was a public act of which all courts of the United
States were bound to take notice, and to which all courts were
bound to give effect.
In
Pargoud's Case, [
Footnote 5] also here at the last term, the claimant
stated in his petition that he was guilty of participating in the
rebellion, but that he had been pardoned by the President,
Page 83 U. S. 153
by special act, in January, 1866, and also by operation of the
President's general proclamation. The Court of Claims decided
against the claimant on the ground that his petition did not aver
that he had not given any aid or comfort to the rebellion, and did
not sufficiently aver a pardon by the President. This Court
reversed the judgment, following the decision in
Mrs.
Armstrong's Case, and holding that the President's
proclamation of December 25, 1868, relieved claimants of captured
and abandoned property from proof of adhesion to the United States
during the civil war.
After these repeated adjudications, it must be regarded as
settled in this Court that the pardon of the President, whether
granted by special letters or by general proclamation, relieves
claimants of the proceeds of captured and abandoned property from
the consequences of participation in the rebellion and from the
necessity of establishing their loyalty in order to prosecute their
claims. This result follows whether we regard the pardon as
effacing the offense, blotting it out, in the language of the
cases, as though it had never existed, or regard persons pardoned
as necessarily excepted from the general language of the act which
requires claimants to make proof of their adhesion, during the
rebellion, to the United States. It is not to be supposed that
Congress intended by the general language of the act to encroach
upon any of the prerogatives of the President, and especially that
benign prerogative of mercy which lies in the pardoning power. It
is more reasonable to conclude that claimants restored to their
rights of property by the pardon of the President were not in
contemplation of Congress in passing the act, and were not intended
to be embraced by the requirement in question. All general terms in
statutes should be limited in their application, so as not to lead
to injustice, oppression, or any unconstitutional operation, if
that be possible. It will be presumed that exceptions were intended
which would avoid results of that nature. [
Footnote 6]
Such being the general effect of pardon and amnesty
Page 83 U. S. 154
granted by the President, it only remains to consider whether
the proclamation of December 25, 1868, embraces the claimants who
were aliens domiciled in the country within its provisions. And
upon this point we entertain no doubt. The claimants were residents
in the United States prior to the commencement of the rebellion.
They so allege in their petition; they were therefore bound to obey
all the laws of the country not immediately relating to citizenship
during their sojourn in it, and they were equally amenable with
citizens for any infraction of those laws. "The rights of
sovereignty," says Wildman in his Institutes on International Law,
[
Footnote 7]
"extend to all persons and things not privileged that are within
the territory. They extend to all strangers therein, not only to
those who are naturalized and to those who are domiciled therein,
having taken up their abode with the intention of permanent
residence, but also to those whose residence is transitory. All
strangers are under the protection of the sovereign while they are
within his territories, and owe a temporary allegiance in return
for that protection."
By allegiance is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience
which the individual owes to the government under which he lives,
or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives. It
may be an absolute and permanent obligation or it may be a
qualified and temporary one. The citizen or subject owes an
absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign,
or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it
and becomes a citizen or subject of another government or another
sovereign. The alien, whilst domiciled in the country, owes a local
and temporary allegiance, which continues during the period of his
residence.
This obligation of temporary allegiance by an alien resident in
a friendly country is everywhere recognized by publicists and
statesmen. In the case of Thrasher, a citizen of the United States
resident in Cuba, who complained of injuries
Page 83 U. S. 155
suffered from the government of that island, Mr. Webster, then
Secretary of state, made, in 1851, a report to the President in
answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives in which he
said:
"Every foreigner born residing in a country owes to that country
allegiance and obedience to its laws so long as he remains in it,
as a duty upon him by the mere fact of his residence and that
temporary protection which he enjoys, and is as much bound to obey
its laws as native subjects or citizens. This is the universal
understanding in all civilized states, and nowhere a more
established doctrine than in this country."
And again:
"Independently of a residence with intention to continue such
residence; independently of any domiciliation; independently of the
taking of any oath of allegiance or of renouncing any former
allegiance, it is well known that by the public law, an alien or a
stranger born, for so long a time as he continues within the
dominions of a foreign government, owes obedience to the laws of
that government and may be punished for treason or other crimes as
a native-born subject might be unless his case is varied by some
treaty stipulation. [
Footnote
8]"
The same doctrine is stated in Hale's Pleas of the Crown,
[
Footnote 9] East's Crown Law,
[
Footnote 10] and Foster's
Discourse upon High Treason, [
Footnote 11] all of which are treatises of approved
merit.
Such being the established doctrine, the claimants here were
amenable to the laws of the United States prescribing punishment
for treason and for giving aid and comfort to the rebellion. They
were, as domiciled aliens in the country prior to the rebellion,
under the obligation of fidelity and obedience to the government of
the United States. They subsequently took their lot with the
insurgents, and would be subject like them to punishment under the
laws they violated but for the proclamation of the President of
December 25, 1868. That proclamation, in its comprehensive terms,
includes them and all others in like situation. It grants
"unconditionally, and without reservation, to all
Page 83 U. S. 156
and to every person who, directly or indirectly, participated in
the late insurrection or rebellion a full pardon and amnesty for
the offense of treason against the United States or of adhering to
their enemies during the late civil war, with restoration of all
rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the
laws which have been made in pursuance thereof."
The Act of Congress of July 27, 1868, [
Footnote 12] authorizes any alien to prosecute claims
against the United States in the Court of Claims, where the
government of which he is a citizen or subject accords to citizens
of the United States the right to prosecute claims against such
government in its courts. In
O'Keefe's Case, [
Footnote 13] it was held that, by
the proceeding known as a "petition of right," the government of
Great Britain accords to citizens of the United States the right to
prosecute claims against that government in its courts, and
therefore that British subjects, if otherwise entitled, may
prosecute claims against the United States in the Court of Claims.
There is therefore no impediment to the recovery by the claimants
in this case of the net proceeds of their cotton paid into the
Treasury.
The judgment of the Court of Claims must therefore be reversed
and that court directed to enter judgment in favor of the claimants
for the amount of such net proceeds, and it is
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
79 U. S. 12
Wall. 347.
[
Footnote 2]
76 U. S. 9 Wall.
531.
[
Footnote 3]
80 U. S. 13 Wall.
128.
[
Footnote 4]
80 U. S. 13 Wall.
154.
[
Footnote 5]
80 U. S. 13 Wall.
156.
[
Footnote 6]
United States v.
Kirby, 7 Wall. 482.
[
Footnote 7]
Wildman, p. 40.
[
Footnote 8]
Webster's Works, vol. vi, p. 526.
[
Footnote 9]
Vol. i, chap. 10.
[
Footnote 10]
Vol. i, chap. 2, sec. 4.
[
Footnote 11]
Sec. 2, p. 185.
[
Footnote 12]
15 Stat. at Large 243.
[
Footnote 13]
78 U. S. 11 Wall.
178.
