1. Where a Maryland railroad corporation whose charter
contemplated the extension of the road beyond the limits of
Maryland was allowed by act of the Legislature of Virginia --
reenacting the Maryland charter in words -- to continue its road
through that State and was also allowed by act of Congress to
extend into the District of Columbia, a lateral road in connection
with the road through Maryland and Virginia,
held (the
unity of the road being unchanged in name, locality, election and
power of officers, mode of declaring dividends, and doing all its
business)
First. That no new corporations were created either in
the District or in Virginia, but only that the old one was
exercising its faculties in them with their permission, and that,
as related to responsibility for damages, there was a unity of
ownership throughout.
Second. That in view of such unity, the corporation was
amenable to the courts of the District for injuries done in
Virginia on its road.
Third. That this responsibility was not changed by a
traveler's receiving tickets in "coupons" or different parts,
announcing that "Responsibility for safety of person or loss of
baggage on each portion of the route is confined to the proprietors
of that portion alone."
2. The principle of pleading that a demurrer, after several
pleadings, reaches back to a defective declaration has no
application where the defect is one of form simply.
Page 79 U. S. 66
3. A plea in bar waives all pleas in abatement.
4. A defective declaration may be cured by sufficient averments
in a replication demurred to.
On the 28th February, 1827, the State of Maryland incorporated a
company known as the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. It was,
of course, a Maryland corporation, with capacity to sue and be
sued, to take and condemn lands, subject to certain restrictions,
and with the ordinary powers, rights, and privileges of
corporations in that State and elsewhere. The place where the board
of directors was to meet was Baltimore. There its dividends from
the company's earnings were to be declared, and there was to be the
seat of its government generally. It had power to make lateral
roads. But the principal and declared purpose of the charter of the
company, a purpose indicated by the company's name, was "the
construction of a railroad from the City of Baltimore to some
suitable point on the Ohio River" -- a matter to do which, in a
line at all direct, it was necessary to have some action of the
Legislature of Virginia. Accordingly the Legislature of Virginia,
within eight days after the Legislature of Maryland had passed its
act of incorporation, passed an act to "confirm" the same. The
Virginia act reads thus:
"Whereas, an act has passed the Legislature of Maryland,
entitled 'An act to incorporate the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Company, in the following words and figures,'
viz.:
(setting out the Maryland acts). Therefore be it enacted by the
General Assembly that the same rights and privileges shall be and
are hereby granted to the aforesaid company, within the territory
of Virginia as are granted to them within the territory of
Maryland. The said company shall be subject to the same pains,
penalties, and obligations as are imposed by said act, and the same
rights, privileges, and immunities which are reserved to the State
of Maryland or to the citizens thereof are hereby reserved to the
State of Virginia and her citizens, except as to making lateral
roads, and that the road shall not strike the
Page 79 U. S. 67
Ohio at a point below the mouth of the Little Kanawha; that the
words 'other property' in the 17th section of the Maryland act
shall not be construed to extend to any property other than
materials necessary for the road, works, and buildings, and that in
procuring land and materials for the road, they shall pursue the
course pointed out by the Virginia laws."
Under these acts, a railroad was accordingly made between
Baltimore and the Ohio River.
Subsequently to this date -- that is to say, on the 22d
February, 1831, the Legislature of Maryland gave the company
authority to build a lateral road from the main road between
Baltimore to the Ohio, to the line of the District of Columbia. In
immediate sequence, Congress passed a law by which a connection
with the Capital was opened through the District. The act of
Congress, which was approved March 2, 1831, entitled "An act to
authorize the extension, construction, and use of a lateral branch
of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, into and within the District
of Columbia," ran thus:
"Whereas it is represented to this present Congress that the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, incorporated by the General
Assembly of the State of Maryland, by an act passed the 28th day of
February, 1827, are desirous under the powers which they claim to
be vested in them by virtue of the provisions of the
before-mentioned act, to construct a lateral branch from the said
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad to the District of Columbia,
therefore,"
"Be it enacted &c. that the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Company, incorporated by the said act of the General Assembly of
the State of Maryland, shall be, and they are hereby authorized to
extend into and within the District of Columbia, a lateral railroad
such as the said company shall construct or cause to be constructed
in a direction towards the said District in connection with the
road they have located and are constructing from the City of
Baltimore to the Ohio River in pursuance of said act of
incorporation. And the said Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company
are hereby authorized to exercise the same powers, rights, and
privileges, and shall be subject to the same restrictions
in
the construction and extension of the said lateral
Page 79 U. S. 68
road into and within the said District as they may
exercise or be subject to under or by virtue of the said act of
incorporation in the extension and construction of any railroad
within the State of Maryland, and shall be entitled to the same
rights, benefits, and immunities in the use of said road and in
regard thereto as are provided in the said charter, except the
right to construct any lateral road or roads in said District from
said lateral road."
A supplementary act of the Legislature of Maryland, passed March
14, 1832, provided that the stock issued by the company to complete
this lateral road "shall, united, form the capital upon which the
net profits derived from the use of said road shall be
apportioned."
Under this act of Congress and the act of Maryland authorizing a
lateral road, a road was made from Washington to a point on the
main road called the Washington Junction, not far from Baltimore,
and so a complete road by rail opened from Washington to the Ohio
River. At this point, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad terminated.
From Belair, in Ohio, opposite this point of termination, began
another road (the Ohio Central), running to Columbus. While,
however, the road from Washington to the Ohio River was thus made
up of two parts, one from Washington to the Junction and one from
the Junction to the Ohio River, each part, as the reader will have
observed, was made in virtue of two different enactments -- the
former, from Washington to the Junction, by the act of Congress and
the act of Maryland; the latter, or main branch, by the act of
Maryland and the act of Virginia.
In this state of things, one Harris bought, at an office which
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company had established in
Washington, a ticket with which to go to Columbus, Ohio. This
ticket was made up of three coupons, one for travel between
Washington City and the Washington Junction; another for travel
between Washington Junction and the Ohio River, over the line of
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad; and the third and last, for
travel from Belair, in Ohio, opposite the terminus of the Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad, to Columbus, in Ohio, over the line of the
Central
Page 79 U. S. 69
Ohio Railroad, already mentioned as confessedly disconnected
with the Baltimore & Ohio one except in the matter of running
junction. [
Footnote 1]
Over the first coupon was a memorandum thus:
"Responsibility for safety of person or loss of baggage on each
portion of the route is confined to the proprietors of that portion
alone."
And each coupon had printed on it:
"CONDITIONED AS ABOVE."
While traveling on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, at
Mannington, in the State of Virginia, Harris was severely
injured by a collision between the train in which he was so
traveling and another train of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
Company. He accordingly brought suit against the railroad in the
Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia for the injury
he had suffered. The writ was served on the president of the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company. At the time that the writ
was thus served, there was no act of Congress authorizing suits
against foreign corporations doing business in the District. Some
time afterwards -- that is to say, on the 22d of February, 1867,
[
Footnote 2] Congress
enacted:
"That in actions against foreign corporations doing business in
the District of Columbia, all process may be served on the agent of
such corporation or person conducting its business aforesaid, or in
case he is absent and cannot be found, by leaving a copy thereof at
the principal place of business of, in the District, and such
service shall be effectual to bring the corporation before the
court."
The declaration was against the company, describing it not as a
citizen, or resident, or inhabitant of the District, or of
Page 79 U. S. 70
any State, but as
"a corporation duly and legally established by law, having and
professing
a legal and recognized existence, within the limits
of the District of Columbia, and exercising therein corporate
powers, rights, and privileges, in the making of the
contracts, receiving freight and passengers, for
transportation in and along their said railroad, from the City of
Washington to the Ohio River,"
and it relied on the purchase of the ticket, and a contract in
virtue thereof, to carry the plaintiff safely to the Ohio River,
and the breach of the contract in what had occurred.
The company pleaded in abatement,
1st. That the company was not an inhabitant of the District of
Columbia when the writ was served.
2d. That the company was not found in the District of Columbia
when the writ was served.
The view of the company in their pleas apparently was that no
new corporation had been created by the act of Congress of 1831
within the District, and so made an inhabitant of it; that the old
corporation, by virtue of that act, did not become such an
inhabitant or found within the District, and that the court in
which the action was brought had succeeded but to the jurisdiction
of the circuit court of the District; a court in regard to whose
jurisdiction it was provided by the 6th section of an Act of
February 27, 1801, [
Footnote 3]
identical, so far as this suit was concerned, with the 11th section
of the Judiciary Act of 1789:
"That no action or suit shall be brought before said court by
any original process against any person who shall not be an
inhabitant of or found within said District at the time of
serving the writ."
To the first of the above-mentioned pleas Harris replied that
the company was an inhabitant of the District of Columbia by virtue
of the act of Congress already mentioned, the date and title of
which he set forth, and that they had accepted its provisions, and
constructed their roads under the
Page 79 U. S. 71
act, availing themselves of the privileges thus conferred and
doing business under it in the District of Columbia.
To the second, that the company was found within the District of
Columbia when the writ was served and was within the jurisdiction
of the court by virtue of the acts of Congress mentioned in the
first replication, and that due and legal service of the writ was
made upon the person of the president within the District,
&c.
The company demurred to these replications, adding to the
demurrer an admission of the service on the president but denying
that such service was a legal service or service on the company.
The demurrers were overruled. The company thereupon filed the
general issue of Not Guilty. Upon the trial, the counsel of the
company asked the court to instruct the jury that upon the evidence
before them, the plaintiff could not recover.
The court refused to give the instruction, and the jury having
found $8,250 damages for the plaintiff, the company brought the
case here.
It was argued at the last term, when a reargument was directed
upon one of the points raised in the first argument, to-wit:
"Whether the acts of Congress and the statutes of West Virginia
relating to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company created a new
and distinct corporation under that name in the said state and
District of Columbia, respectively, or whether they are only
enabling acts, as respected the corporation under that name,
created by the State of Maryland. "
Page 79 U. S. 77
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia.
Harris sued the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company for
injuries which he received by a collision. The declaration sets out
that the company is a corporation established by law by the name of
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, having a legal and
recognized existence within the limits of the District of Columbia
and exercising there their corporate rights and privileges in the
making of contracts and receiving freight and passengers for
transportation upon their roads from the City of Washington to the
Ohio River; that at the City of Washington, on the 23d of October,
1864, the plaintiff, wishing to be transported by the company over
their roads to the Ohio River and towards the city of Columbus in
the State of Ohio, for the sum of fifteen
Page 79 U. S. 78
dollars paid to the company, purchased of them a ticket for a
seat and passage in their cars, to be transported along their roads
from the City of Washington to the Ohio River and towards the City
of Columbus; that in pursuance of this contract, he took his seat
in one of the cars of the company; that the company, in
consideration of the money so paid, undertook and promised to
transport him safely to the Ohio River; that the company managed
their trains so negligently and carelessly that two trains, running
in opposite directions, came in collision near Mannington, in the
State of Virginia, whereby the plaintiff received the injuries
complained of.
The company pleaded two pleas in abatement.
(1) That the company was not an inhabitant of the District of
Columbia when the writ was served. (2) That the company was not
found in the District of Columbia when the writ was served.
To the first plea Harris replied that the company was an
inhabitant of the District of Columbia by virtue of certain acts of
Congress, the dates and titles of which are set forth, and that
they had accepted the provisions of those acts and constructed
their roads under them, availing themselves of the privileges thus
conferred and doing business under them in the District of
Columbia. To the second plea he replied that the company was found
within the District of Columbia when the writ was served, and was
within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of the acts of
Congress mentioned in the first replication.
The company demurred to these replications. The demurrers were
overruled. The company thereupon filed the general issue of not
guilty. The cause was tried by a jury and a verdict found for the
plaintiff, upon which judgment was entered.
Upon the trial, the counsel for the company prayed the court to
instruct the jury that upon the evidence before them, the plaintiff
was not entitled to recover. The court refused to give this
instruction, and the company excepted. Other exceptions appear by
the record to have been taken, but they were not embodied in a bill
of exceptions and we cannot
Page 79 U. S. 79
therefore consider them. The errors insisted upon here, at the
first argument of the case, were:
The overruling of the demurrers to the replications to the pleas
in abatement.
The refusal of the court to give the instruction above set
forth.
And that the declaration is fatally defective, wherefore the
judgment should have been arrested and must now be reversed.
When the case was first considered by this Court in conference,
it was found that while all the judges were of opinion that the
judgment should be affirmed, there was a difference of opinion upon
the question whether the acts of Congress and the statutes of
Virginia relating to the company created a new and distinct
corporation in the District of Columbia and in the State of
Virginia, respectively, or whether they were only enabling acts in
respect to the corporation under the name of the "Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Company," as originally created by the State of
Maryland. Subsequently the question was ordered to stand for
reargument, and it has been reargued by the counsel on both sides.
As the solution of this question must determine, to a large extent,
the grounds upon which the judgment of the court is to be placed,
it is necessary carefully to consider the subject.
The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company was incorporated by an
Act of the Legislature of Maryland passed on the 28th of February,
1827. On the 8th of March following, the Legislature of Virginia
passed an act whereby, after reciting the Maryland act, it was
declared
"that the same rights and privileges shall be, and are hereby,
granted to the aforesaid company within the territory of Virginia,
and the said company shall be subject to the same pains, penalties,
and obligations as are imposed by said act, and the same rights,
privileges, and immunities which are reserved to the State of
Maryland or to the citizens thereof are hereby reserved to the
State of Virginia and her citizens."
Several other statutes relating to the company were subsequently
passed in Virginia, but they do not materially
Page 79 U. S. 80
affect the question under consideration, and need not be more
particularly adverted to. By an Act of the Legislature of Maryland
of the 22d of February, 1831, the company was authorized to build a
lateral road to the line of the District of Columbia. On the 2d of
March, 1831, Congress passed an act which, after reciting by a
preamble the original act of incorporation, enacted
"That the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, incorporated by
the said act of the General Assembly of the State of Maryland,
shall be, and they are hereby, authorized to extend into and within
the District of Columbia a lateral railroad. . . . And the said
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company are hereby authorized to
exercise the same powers, rights, and privileges, and shall be
subject to the same restrictions in the construction and extension
of the said lateral road into and within the said District as they
may exercise or be subject to under or by virtue of the said act of
incorporation in the extension and construction of any railroad
within the State of Maryland, and shall be entitled to the same
rights, benefits, and immunities in the use of said road and in
regard thereto as are provided in the said charter, except the
right to construct any lateral road or roads in said District from
said lateral road."
A number of local regulations follow which are not material to
be considered. A supplementary Act of the Legislature of Maryland,
passed March 14th, 1832, provided that the stock issued by the
company to complete this lateral road "shall, united, form the
capital upon which the net profits derived from the use of said
road shall be apportioned," &c.
The Act of Congress of February 26, 1834, and of March 3, 1835,
are confined to matters of detail, and may be laid out of view.
When the case was reargued as directed by this Court, the
counsel for the company admitted that the acts of Congress in
question were only enabling acts, and that they did not create a
new corporation, but they insisted that the acts of Virginia were
of a different character, and that they worked that result.
Page 79 U. S. 81
As regards the point under consideration, we find no substantial
difference. In both, the original Maryland act of incorporation is
referred to, but neither expressly or by implication create a new
corporation. The company was chartered to construct a road in
Virginia as well as in Maryland. The latter could not be done
without the consent of Virginia. That consent was given upon the
terms which she thought proper to prescribe. With a few exceptions
not material to the question before us, they were the same as to
powers, privileges, obligations, restrictions, and liabilities as
those contained in the original charter. The permission was broad
and comprehensive in its scope, but it was a license, and nothing
more. It was given to the Maryland corporation as such, and that
body was the same in all its elements and in its identity
afterwards as before. In its name, locality, capital stock, the
election and power of its officers, in the mode of declaring
dividends, and doing all its business, its unity was unchanged.
Only the sphere of its operations was enlarged.
In what it does in Virginia, the same principle is involved as
in the transactions of the Georgia corporation in Alabama, which
came under the consideration of this Court in
Bank of Augusta
v. Earle. [
Footnote 4] The
distinction is that here the assent of the foreign authority is
express, while there it was implied. A corporation is, in law, for
civil purposes, deemed a person. It may sue and be sued, grant and
receive, and do all other acts not
ultra vires which a
natural person could do. The chief point of difference between the
natural and the artificial person is that the former may do
whatever is not forbidden by law; the latter can do only what is
authorized by its charter. It cannot migrate, but may exercise its
authority in a foreign territory upon such conditions as may be
prescribed by the law of the place. One of these conditions may be
that it shall consent to be sued there. If it do business there, it
will be presumed to have assented, and will be bound accordingly.
[
Footnote 5] For the
Page 79 U. S. 82
purposes of federal jurisdiction, it is regarded as if it were a
citizen of the state where it was created, and no averment or proof
as to the citizenship of its members elsewhere will be permitted.
There is a presumption of law which is conclusive. [
Footnote 6]
We see no reason why several states cannot, by competent
legislation, unite in creating the same corporation or in combining
several preexisting corporations into a single one. The
Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company is one of
the latter description. In the case of that company against
Maryland, [
Footnote 7] Chief
Justice Taney, in delivering the opinion of this Court, said:
"The plaintiff in error is a corporation composed of several
railroad companies, which had been previously chartered by the
States of Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, and which, by
corresponding laws of the respective states, were united together
and form one corporation under the name and style of The
Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Company. The road
of this corporation extends from Philadelphia to Baltimore."
He gives the history of the legislation by which this result was
produced. No question was raised on the subject, but the opinion
assumes the valid existence of the corporation thus created. The
case was brought into this Court under the 25th section Of the
Judiciary Act of 1789. The jurisdictional effect of the existence
of such a corporation, as regards the federal courts, is the same
as that of a copartnership of individual citizens residing in
different states. Nor do we see any reason why one state may not
make a corporation of another state, as there organized and
conducted, a corporation of its own,
quo ad hoc any
property within its territorial jurisdiction. That this may be done
was distinctly held in
Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co. v.
Wheeler. [
Footnote 8] It
is well settled that corporations of one state may exercise their
faculties in another
Page 79 U. S. 83
so far and on such terms and to such extent as may be permitted
by the latter. [
Footnote 9] We
hold that the case before us is within this latter category. The
question is always one of legislative intent, and not of
legislative power or legal possibility. So far as there is anything
in the language of the Court in the case of
Ohio &
Mississippi Railroad Co. v. Wheeler in conflict with what has
been here said, it is intended to be restrained and qualified by
this opinion. We will add, however, that as the case appears in the
report, we think the judgment of the Court was correctly given. It
was the case of an Indiana railroad company licensed by Ohio, suing
a citizen of Indiana in the Federal court of that state.
In
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Gallahue's
Administrator, 12 Grattan, [
Footnote 10] it was held by the Court of Appeals of
Virginia that the company was suable in that state. In this we
concur. We think this condition is clearly implied in the license,
and that the company, by constructing its road there, assented to
it. The authority of that case was recognized by the Court of
Appeals of West Virginia in
Goshorn v. The Supervisors,
[
Footnote 11] and in
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. The Supervisors.
[
Footnote 12] Here the
question is whether the company was suable in the District of
Columbia. In the case reported in Grattan, it was said:
"It would be a startling proposition if in all such cases
citizens of Virginia and others should be denied all remedy in her
courts for causes of action arising under contracts and acts
entered into or done within her territory, and should be turned
over to the courts and laws of a sister state to seek redress."
The same considerations apply to the case before us. When this
suit was commenced, if the theory maintained by the counsel for the
plaintiff in error be correct, however large or small the cause of
action, and whether it were a proper one for legal or equitable
cognizance, there could be no legal redress short of the seat of
the company in another
Page 79 U. S. 84
state. In many instances, the cost of the remedy would have
largely exceeded the value of its fruits. In suits local in their
character, both at law and in equity, there could be no relief. The
result would be, to a large extent, immunity from all legal
responsibility. It is not to be supposed that Congress intended
that the important powers and privileges granted should be followed
by such results.
But, turning our attention from this view of the subject and
looking at the statute alone and reading it by its own light, we
entertain no doubt that it made the company liable to suit where
this suit was brought in all respects as if it had been an
independent corporation of the same locality.
We will now consider specifically the several objections to the
judgment relied upon by the plaintiffs in error. The pleas in
abatement were bad. The demurrers reached back to the first error
in the pleadings, and judgment was properly given against the party
who committed it. If the replications were bad, bad replications
were sufficient answers to bad pleas. But it is said the
declaration was bad, and that the demurrers brought the defect in
that pleading under review. The principle has no application where
the defect is one of form, and not of substance. [
Footnote 13]
The alleged defect in the declaration will be considered in
connection with the error assigned relating to that subject. But if
the court decided erroneously, the company waived the error by
pleading over in bar. If it were desired to bring up the judgment
upon the pleadings for examination by this Court, the company
should have stood by the demurrers. In the proper order of pleading
which is obligatory, a plea in bar waives all pleas, and the right
to plead, in abatement. [
Footnote 14]
The bill of exceptions which brought upon the record the refusal
of the court to instruct the jury that the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover exhibits, among others, the following facts:
Harris contracted, paid his money, and received his
Page 79 U. S. 85
tickets at the City of Washington. The tickets consisted of
three coupons -- one for his passage from Baltimore to Columbus,
Ohio, another for his passage from Washington Junction to
Baltimore, and the third for his passage from Washington City to
Washington Junction. It is necessary to consider only the two last
mentioned. They are both headed "Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,"
and signed "L. M. Cole, general ticket agent." Above the coupon
first mentioned is this memorandum:
"
Responsibility for safely of person or loss of baggage, on
each portion of the route is confined to the proprietors of that
portion alone."
Each coupon has printed on its face the words "Conditioned as
above." The coupon last mentioned gave Harris the right of passage
over the lateral branch both in the District of Columbia and in
Maryland. The second coupon gave him the same right in respect to
the main stem both in Maryland and in Virginia.
The instruction asked for assumed erroneously that there were
two corporations under the same name, one of them in Virginia, and
that the latter was liable, and alone liable, to the plaintiff. The
attempted limitation of responsibility by the memoranda at the head
and on the face of the coupons proceeded upon the same erroneous
assumption as to the duality of the corporate ownership of the
roads.
These views are sufficiently answered by what has been already
said upon the subject. But if we concurred with the counsel for the
plaintiff in error, we should then hold that the agent who issued
the coupons was the agent of both corporations; that the contract
was a joint one; and that it involved a joint liability, unless the
knowledge of the memoranda on the coupons and the assent of the
plaintiff were clearly brought home to him. [
Footnote 15] In all such cases, the burden of
proof rests upon the carrier. [
Footnote 16] The bill of exceptions does
Page 79 U. S. 86
not show that any testimony was given upon that subject. The
court was asked to assume that the limitation on the face of
coupons was itself conclusive, and to instruct the jury
accordingly. But having held the unity of the corporation, of the
proprietorship of the roads, and of the contract, it is needless
further to consider the case in this aspect. The instruction asked
for was properly refused.
The jurisdiction of the court was not governed by the 11th
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. It did not depend upon the
citizenship of the parties. It was controlled by acts of Congress
local to the district. A citizen of the district cannot sue in the
circuit courts of a state. [
Footnote 17] If a corporation appear and defend in a
foreign state, it is bound by the judgment. [
Footnote 18] If the declaration were
insufficient, the additional averments in the replications,
admitted by the demurrer to be true, cured the defect. [
Footnote 19]
Judgment affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The division of the ticket is described in a slightly different
way in the opinion,
infra, p. <|79 U.S. 85|>85. The
Reporter describes it as he himself, perhaps erroneously,
understood it. The matter is not important.
[
Footnote 2]
14 Stat. at Large 404.
[
Footnote 3]
2 Stat. at Large 106.
[
Footnote 4]
<|13 Pet. 558|>13 Pet. 558.
[
Footnote 5]
<|18 How. 405|>Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18
How. 405.
[
Footnote 6]
<|2 How. 497|>Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston
Railroad Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497 ;
<|16 How.
329|>Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 16 How.
329;
<|1 Black 297|>Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co.
v. Wheeler, 1 Black 297.
[
Footnote 7]
<|10 How. 393|>10 How. 393.
[
Footnote 8]
<|1 Black 297|>1 Black 297.
[
Footnote 9]
Blackstone Manufacturing Co. v. Inhabitants, 13 Gray,
489;
<|13 Pet. 588|>Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13
Pet. 588.
[
Footnote 10]
Page 658.
[
Footnote 11]
1 W.V. 308.
[
Footnote 12]
3
id. 319.
[
Footnote 13]
<|7 Wall. 82|>Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall.
82.
[
Footnote 14]
<|8 Wall. 354|>Young v. Martin, 8 Wall. 354;
<|7 Wall. 82|>Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 82;
<|1 Wall. 42|>Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Wall. 42; 1
Chitty's Pleading 440, 441.
[
Footnote 15]
Bissell v. Michigan S. & Northern Indiana Railroad
Co., 22 N.Y. 258;
Champion v. Bostwick, 18 Wendell
175;
Cary v. Cleveland & Toledo Railroad Co., 29 Barb.
35;
Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N.Y. 306;
Najac v. Boston
& Lowell Railroad Co., 7 Allen 329;
The Great Western
Railway Co. v. Blake, 7 Hurlstone & Norman 987.
[
Footnote 16]
<|6 How. 383|>New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants'
Bank, 6 How. 383;
Brown v. Eastern Railroad Co., 11
Cushing 97;
Bean v. Green, 3 Fairfield 422;
Dorr v.
New Jersey Steam Nav. Co., 4 Sandford 136;
S.C., 1
Kernan 485.
[
Footnote 17]
<|2 Cranch 445|>Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch
445.
[
Footnote 18]
Angel & Ames on Corporations, §§ 404, 405;
Flanders v. AEtna Ins. Co., 3 Mason 158;
Cook v.
Champlain Transportation Co., 1 Denio 98.
[
Footnote 19]
<|18 How. 405|>Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French,
18 How. 405.
