1. Claimants under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, of
March 12,1863, are not deprived of the benefits of that act because
of aid and comfort not voluntarily given by them to the
rebellion.
2. But voluntarily executing as surety, through motives of
personal friendship to the principals, the official bonds of
persons acting as quartermasters or as assistant commissaries in
the rebel army was giving aid and comfort to the rebellion,
although the principals, by their appointment to the offices named,
escaped active military service and were enabled to remain at home
in the discharge of their offices respectively.
3. Taking possession of a city by the national forces was not,
of itself, and without some actual seizure of it in obedience to
the orders of the commanding general, a capture within the meaning
of the act of the cotton which happened to be in the city at the
time of the entry of the forces.
4. Hence, where, prior to any such seizure an owner of cotton,
who, though opposed to the rebellion, had given aid and comfort to
it to the extent above-mentioned, but was not within any of the
classes excepted by the President's proclamation of December 8,
1863, and in regard to whose property in the cotton no rights of
third persons had intervened -- took the oath prescribed by that
act and kept it --
held, after a seizure and sale of the
cotton by the government, that he was entitled to the net proceeds
as given to loyal owners under the Abandoned and Captured Property
Act. Having been pardoned, his offense, in executing the bonds,
could not be imputed to him.
That among the citizens of Georgia during the late rebellion was
one Edward Padelford. That he never gave any
voluntary aid
or comfort to the late rebellion or to persons engaged therein; but
"consistently adhered to the United States," unless the matter of
certain special facts constituted in law such aid and comfort. The
special facts were these:
"In April, 1861, after the breaking out of the rebellion, a
subscription for a loan of $15,000,000 to the Confederate
government was opened in the City of Savannah, and all
Page 76 U. S. 532
persons were expected and required to subscribe to it who were
able to do so, and declarations and threats were publicly made,
that all who did not subscribe voluntarily should be made to
subscribe. These threats were openly made at the place of
subscription, and by persons influential with the populace.
Padelford's name was mentioned, his absence was remarked upon, and
inquiries were made as to where he was, and it was publicly
threatened that if the Marine Bank, of which he was a director, did
not subscribe liberally, it should be pulled down. Padelford was
informed of these things, and advised to subscribe to the loan
because of them, by friends, loyal as well as rebel; and under
these threats and the pressure of circumstances stated, he
subscribed $5,000 to the loan, and declared he did it unwillingly
and because of the public excitement, and he sold out the stock he
had subscribed for in two weeks after."
"The Marine Bank of the City of Savannah was, in 1861, under the
direction of Northern men, and Padelford was one of its most
influential directors and largest stockholders. When the other
banks of Savannah increased their capital stock and lent their
funds to the aid of the Confederacy by exchanging them for
Confederate notes and securities, the Marine Bank objected to doing
so, and instead contracted its business for its own security. This
conduct and the known loyalty of many of the directors of the bank
subjected it to public odium, and it was nicknamed the Yankee Bank.
At the time the subscription to the loan was opened in Savannah,
the political excitement was at its highest point, and it was, as
has been stated, publicly threatened that if the bank did not
subscribe liberally, it should be pulled down. Under these threats
and the pressure of the circumstances stated, the bank subscribed
$100,000 to the Confederate loan. This was the least it could
subscribe according to its capital, and its refusal to subscribe
would have endangered the bank and its directors; but Padelford
opposed the loan made, and from that time absented himself for the
most part from the meetings of the directors, on the ground that
the course of the bank was controlled by outside pressure. "
Page 76 U. S. 533
In addition to these facts, the Court of Claims found that
Padelford, during the rebellion and prior to October, 1863,
"voluntarily executed" as surety three different bonds, conditioned
for the performance by the different principals of their duties --
one as commissary of the rebel army, one as assistant commissary,
and one as assistant quartermaster; that all the principals in
these bonds were, and for some years had been, respectively,
intimate personal friends of Padelford; that two of the principals
were within the terms of the conscription acts pending or in force
at the time of the execution of their several bonds, and that by
their appointment to office they escaped active military service in
the field, and were enabled to remain at their homes in office
respectively; and that Padelford was induced to execute the bonds
by motives of personal friendship and regard for the several
principals.
So far the findings of the court as to the loyalty of
Padelford.
An Act of July 17, 1862, [
Footnote 1] having by its thirteenth section authorized
the President at any time thereafter, by proclamation, to extend to
persons who might have participated in the rebellion, pardon and
amnesty, with such exceptions and at such time, and on such
conditions as he might deem expedient for the public welfare,
President Lincoln did, by proclamation dated December 8, 1863,
[
Footnote 2] make known to all
persons who had directly or by implication, thus participated, with
some exceptions specified, that on their taking a certain oath, the
form of which his proclamation set forth, and thenceforth keeping
and maintaining it inviolate,
"a full pardon was thereby granted to them and each of them,
with restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves,
and in property cases where rights of third parties shall have
intervened."
About a year after this proclamation -- that is to say, on the
21st December, 1864, the City of Savannah was captured by the
government forces under General Sherman; Padelford
Page 76 U. S. 534
and one Mott being owners, at the time, of a large amount of
cotton in store there. On the 18th of January, 1865, and, as the
Court of Claims found, before any actual seizure or taking
possession of the property in question by the military, otherwise
than by the capture of the city, Padelford, in due form of law,
took and subscribed the oath of amnesty and allegiance to the
United States government prescribed by the President's proclamation
issued in pursuance of the act; he not having been, as to his
person or property, within the exceptions of the proclamation; and
he thenceforth complied with all the requirements and conditions
named in the act and proclamation, and kept and maintained his oath
of allegiance and amnesty inviolate. After Padelford thus took the
oath, the cotton was taken possession of by the military
authorities, and by them turned over to the proper agents of the
United States Treasury, under whose direction it was transported to
New York and sold, and the net proceeds, amounting to $246,277,
paid into the Treasury of the United States. Padelford and Mott,
now, March, 1866, filed a petition in the Court of Claims to have
these proceeds, their petition being founded on the act of March
12, 1863 [
Footnote 3] --
entitled "An act to provide for the collection of abandoned
property &c., in insurrectionary districts within the United
States," and which provided as follows:
"Any person claiming to have been the owner of any such
abandoned or captured property may, at any time within two years
after the suppression of the rebellion, prefer his claim to the
proceeds thereof in the Court of Claims; and on proof to the
satisfaction of said court (1) of his ownership of said property,
(2) of his right to the proceeds thereof, and (3) that he has never
given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion, receive the
residue of such proceeds, after the deduction of any purchase money
which may have been paid, together with the expense of
transportation and sale of said property, and any other lawful
expenses attending the disposition thereof."
After the petitioners had filed their claim, Congress, by an
Page 76 U. S. 535
act of June 25, 1868, [
Footnote
4] enacted
"That whenever it shall be material in any suit or claim before
any court to ascertain whether any person did or did not give any
aid or comfort to the late rebellion, the claimant or party
asserting the loyalty or such person to the United States, during
such rebellion, shall be required to
prove affirmatively
that such person did, during said rebellion, constantly adhere to
the United States, and did give no aid or comfort to persons
engaged in said rebellion."
The petitioner were permitted to sever in their claim, and to
sue severally for their respective interests. And in the suit of
Padelford, judgment was rendered in his favor for one-half
($123,138) of the net proceeds of the cotton. From this judgment
the United States appealed.
The view of the court was, as matter of law, that Padelford's
conduct prior to the capture of the city did not constitute the
giving of aid or comfort to the rebellion or to persons engaged in
the rebellion within the provisions of the Acts of March 12, 1863,
and June 25, 1868, and did not bar him from recovering in this
action the net proceeds of the property in question. And apparently
that if it had, he was entitled to recover, having taken the oath
and been loyal afterwards.
Page 76 U. S. 537
THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Captured and Abandoned Property Act of March 12, 1863, under
which the claim in this case was made,
Page 76 U. S. 538
has been frequently under the consideration of the Court. In the
several cases decided during this term, and especially in the case
of
United States v. Anderson, [
Footnote 5] it has been held to be remedial in its nature,
requiring such a liberal construction as will gave effect to the
beneficent intention of Congress. That intention was that all
property captured or found abandoned during the war after the date
of the law should be turned into money under the direction of the
Treasury Department, and that the proceeds should be placed in the
Treasury, subject to the right of any person preferring a claim
against any portion of the property, to have the net proceeds
restored to him on proof of his ownership, of his right to the
proceeds, and that he never gave any aid or comfort to the
rebellion.
A later act, passed since the petition of Padelford was filed in
the Court of Claims, requires every claimant under the original act
to prove affirmatively that he constantly adhered to the United
States during the rebellion and gave no aid or comfort to persons
engaged in it. We do not think that this act changed essentially
the nature of the proof required of claimants by the former act.
The particular description of proof required by the later act seems
to be included in the more general description of the earlier.
Questions arising under the act of 1868 therefore need not be
further considered in this connection.
The record exhibits the findings of fact by the Court of Claims
and its conclusions of law. Among these findings is one that the
petitioner "never gave any voluntary aid or comfort to the late
rebellion," unless certain facts, also found, constitute in law
such aid and comfort. On the part of the government it is objected
to this finding that it is insufficient because the statute
authorizes relief only on proof that no aid or comfort was given.
But we think otherwise. It would violate the soundest maxims of
interpretation if we were to construe the act so as to deprive
claimants of the benefits intended to be given by it because of aid
and comfort to the rebellion not voluntarily given.
Page 76 U. S. 539
But the court also find that the petitioner executed as surety
three official bonds, two of commissaries and one of a
quartermaster in the military service of the so-called Confederate
states, from motives of personal friendship to the principals. No
compulsion is alleged. On the contrary, these acts are found to
have been voluntary. We cannot doubt that these facts did
constitute aid and comfort to the rebellion within the meaning of
the act. The finding of the court, qualified as it was, is a
virtual finding that the petitioner did give such aid and comfort.
The general facts found of opposition to the rebellion, so far as
opposition would be tolerated, and of earnest good will to the
national cause, establish, doubtless, a strong claim upon the
favorable consideration of Congress, but do not warrant the courts
in relaxing, by a forced interpretation a rule which Congress has
established for the guidance of the Court of Claims in passing upon
claims to the proceeds of abandoned or captured property.
But in our judgment, it was not necessary to determine this
point in this case.
The Court of Claims, in addition to the facts already referred
to, found that the cotton was stored in Savannah at the time of its
capture on the 21st of December, 1864; that one-half belonged to
the claimant, and that
"afterwards, on the 18th of January, 1865, before any actual
seizure or taking possession of the property in question by the
military authorities, otherwise than by the capture of the city,
the claimant did in due form of law take and subscribe the oath of
amnesty and allegiance to the United States government prescribed
by the President's proclamation of December 8, 1863, issued in
pursuance of the 13th section of the Act of Congress, approved July
17, 1862; that he was not, as to his person or property, within the
exceptions of the said proclamation; and that he thenceforth
complied with all the requirements and conditions named in the said
act and proclamation and kept and maintained said oath of
allegiance and amnesty inviolate."
Upon this finding several questions arise.
Page 76 U. S. 540
And first, was the property of the petitioner captured within
the meaning of the act before it was actually seized and taken into
military possession?
As early as the 3d of July, 1863, the Secretary of the Treasury,
in a circular letter of instructions [
Footnote 6] addressed to the supervising special agents of
the department, charged with the duty of collecting abandoned and
captured property under the Act of March 12, 1863, defined captured
property as property "which had been seized or taken from hostile
possession by the military and naval forces of the United States."
This definition must be taken as the interpretation practically
given to the act by the department of the government charged with
its execution, and we think it correct. In the case of Mrs.
Alexander's Cotton, [
Footnote
7] it was determined that cotton, though private property, was
a proper subject of capture by the national forces during the
recent civil war. The Court regarded this particular species of
property as excepted, by its peculiar character and by
circumstances, from the general rule of international law which
condemns the seizure of the property of private persons not engaged
in actual hostilities, though residing in a hostile territory or
region. But the case contains no intimation that such property can
be considered as captured before actual seizure. The rule, we
think, is otherwise. Rights of possession in private property are
not disturbed by the capture of a district of country, or of a city
or town, until the captor signifies by some declaration or act,
and, generally, by actual seizure, his determination to regard a
particular description of property as not entitled to the immunity
usually conceded in conformity with the humane maxims of public
law.
Rights of possession in public property belonging to the hostile
organization, or used in actual hostilities, depend on different
principles. Such rights are transferred at once to the captor upon
the capture of the place in which the property may be.
The principles just stated in respect to private property
Page 76 U. S. 541
may be further illustrated by reference to the case of
The
Venice. [
Footnote 8] That
vessel, with a cargo of cotton, was lying in Lake Ponchartrain at
the time of the capture of New Orleans, and was doubtless, within
the discretion of the captors, subject to seizure though private
property. But Flag Officer Farragut and Major General Butler,
commanding respectively the naval and military forces of the Union,
thought proper to give distinct assurances, before and after
surrender, of safety and protection to the rights of persons and
property. And this Court held that these assurances expressed the
general policy of the government to respect and enforce those
rights whenever, in any part of the insurgent country, the
authority of the national government should be fully reestablished.
In accordance with these principles, the
Venice and her
cargo, which were seized some days after the capture of the city by
a ship of war of the United States, were restored, by the decree of
this Court, to their private owner.
Applying the principles above stated to the case before us,
three propositions seem to be established:
(1) That the cotton of the petitioner was, by the general policy
of the government, exempt from capture after the national forces
took possession of Savannah.
(2) That this policy was subject to modification by the
government or by the commanding general in the exercise of his
military discretion.
(3) That the right of possession in private property is not
changed, in general, by capture of the place where it happens to be
except upon actual seizure in obedience to the orders of the
commanding general.
It appears as matter of fact that the property of the petitioner
was not seized until after the 18th of January, 1865. Whether it
was then seized in pursuance of any order, either particular or
general, emanating from competent military authority does not
appear. But we may assume that it was.
And then the next question in this case is to be considered --
namely what was the condition or status of the petitioner
Page 76 U. S. 542
at that time; and how far was the liability of his property to
seizure affected by that status or condition?
The findings of the court show clearly enough that the
petitioner disapproved of the rebellion, opposed it as far as he
thought opposition prudent or safe, and was gratified by the
restoration of the national authority. It appears further that on
the 18th of January, 1865, he testified his adhesion to the
constitutional government of the Union by taking the oath
prescribed by the proclamation of pardon issued by President
Lincoln on the 8th of December, 1863, [
Footnote 9] that he was not within any of the exceptions
of the proclamation, and that he has faithfully kept his oath.
This proclamation, if it needed legislative sanction, was fully
warranted by the Act of July 17, 1862, [
Footnote 10] which authorized the President, at any
time thereafter, to extend pardon and amnesty to persons who had
participated in the rebellion, with such exceptions as he might see
fit to make. That the President had power, if not otherwise yet
with the sanction of Congress, to grant a general conditional
pardon has not been seriously questioned. And this pardon, by its
terms, included restoration of all rights of property except as to
slaves and as against the intervening rights of third persons.
Now we have already seen that at the time when the petitioner
took the prescribed oath, no right of any third party had
intervened, for even if it could be admitted that a right of the
government derived from capture is an intervening right of a third
person within the meaning of the proclamation, it is certain that
no such right accrued to the government until actual seizure, which
was after the pardon had taken full effect. In the case of
Garland, [
Footnote
11] this Court held the effect of a pardon to be such "that in
the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense," and in the case of
Armstrong's
Foundry, [
Footnote 12]
we held that the general pardon granted to him relieved him from
a
Page 76 U. S. 543
penalty which he had incurred to the United States. It follows
that at the time of the seizure of the petitioner's property, he
was purged of whatever offense against the laws of the United
States he had committed by the acts mentioned in the findings, and
relieved from any penalty which he might have incurred. It follows
further the if the property had been seized before the oath was
taken, the faith of the government was pledged to its restoration
upon the taking of the oath in good faith. We cannot doubt that the
petitioner's right to the property in question, at the time of the
seizure, was perfect, and that it remains perfect notwithstanding
the seizure.
But it has been suggested that the property was captured in fact
if not lawfully, and that the proceeds having been paid into the
Treasury of the United States, the petitioner is without remedy in
the Court of Claims unless proof is made that he gave no aid or
comfort to the rebellion. The suggestion is ingenious, but we do
not think it sound. The sufficient answer to it is that after the
pardon, no offense connected with the rebellion can be imputed to
him. If in other respects the petitioner made the proof which,
under the act, entitled him to a decree for the proceeds of his
property, the law makes the proof of pardon a complete substitute
for proof that he gave no aid or comfort to the rebellion. A
different construction would, as it seems to us, defeat the
manifest intent of the proclamation and of the act of Congress
which authorized it. Under the proclamation and the act, the
government is a trustee, holding the proceeds of the petitioner's
property for his benefit, and having been fully reimbursed for all
expenses incurred in that character, loses nothing by the judgment,
which simply awards to the petitioner what is his own.
These views require the affirmance of the judgment of the Court
of Claims, and it is
Accordingly affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
12 Stat. at Large 592.
[
Footnote 2]
13
id. 737.
[
Footnote 3]
12 Stat. at Large 820.
[
Footnote 4]
§ 3, 15 Stat. at Large 75.
[
Footnote 5]
Supra, 76 U. S. 56.
[
Footnote 6]
Acts &c., concerning Commercial Intercourse &c., p.
33.
[
Footnote 7]
69 U. S. 2 Wall.
404.
[
Footnote 8]
69 U. S. 2
Wall. 278.
[
Footnote 9]
13 Stat. at Large 737.
[
Footnote 10]
12 Stat. at Large 592, § 13.
[
Footnote 11]
71 U. S. 4
Wall. 380.
[
Footnote 12]
73 U. S. 6
Wall. 769.
