1. Nautical rules require that where a steamship and sailing
vessel are approaching from opposite directions or on intersecting
lines, the steamship, from the moment the sailing vessel is seen,
shall watch with the highest diligence her course and movements, so
as to be able to adopt such timely measures of precaution as will
necessarily prevent the two boats coming in contact.
2. Porting the helm a point, when the light of a sailing vessel
is first observed, and then waiting until a collision is imminent
before doing anything further does not satisfy the requirements of
the law.
3. Fault on the part of the sailing vessel at the moment
preceding collision does not absolve a steamer which has suffered
herself and a sailing vessel to get in such dangerous proximity as
to cause inevitable alarm and confusion and collision as a
consequence. The steamer, as having committed a far greater fault
in allowing such proximity to be brought about, is chargeable with
all the damages resulting from the collision.
This was a case of collision between the schooner
Loon
and the steamer
Carroll which occurred on the waters of
Chesapeake Bay. The collision happened about two o'clock at night;
the night was bright, and the weight of the testimony was that each
vessel was provided with the necessary lookouts and lights. The
schooner was in her proper course down the bay to James River, in
Virginia, while the steamer was on her way from New York to the
port of Baltimore, which the schooner had left the previous
afternoon, and it was certain that the lookout of the steamer saw
the schooner at least fifteen minutes before the accident happened.
There was no dispute about the state of the wind nor of the
respective speed of the boats, and that there was fault by one
vessel or the other was conceded by both parties. The officers of
the steamer charged the fault to the schooner because at the moment
before the collision, she changed her course, while those in
command of the schooner asserted that this change of course was
taken to avoid a greater danger, and only made when a collision was
inevitable, and that if the officers of the steamer had been
attentive to their duty, the misfortune could have been averted.
The only question was, therefore, which vessel was in fault.
The
Page 75 U. S. 303
witnesses on the part of the schooner were her captain, one
Edmonson, and two common seamen, Travis and Henry. The chief ones
for the steamer were Ashcom, her mate, and one Jordan, her lookout.
The testimony of all these witnesses was given at length, and went
chiefly to questions of the exact times when particular maneuvers
were ordered or resorted to, and of the distances of the respective
vessels at those times. Going thus to questions of fact merely, no
sufficient advantage would be gained by setting it out; more
particularly since the important parts of it on both sides are so
largely recapitulated in the opinion of the court as to make
sufficiently intelligible the principles of law meant to be
established by the judgment.
The evidence in the case was limited in extent, and not as
contradictory as the evidence generally is where vessels collide.
As usual, the effort of each boat was to relieve itself and cast
the blame on the other, but there was no good reason to think that
any witness had intentionally sworn falsely.
The court below decided in favor of the schooner, and the owners
of the steamer appealed.
MR. JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The only difficulty in cases of the kind brought by this appeal
before the Court arises out of the almost necessarily conflicting
character of the evidence; but if the Court is able to reconcile
it, or if this cannot be done, can see, notwithstanding this
conflict, how the matter really occurred, then a conclusion is
easily reached, for the rules of navigation which are applicable
have not only been settled by repeated adjudication, but are now
embodied in the statute law of the United States. [
Footnote 1]
If the two vessels in this case were approaching each other in
opposite directions so as to involve risk of collision,
Page 75 U. S. 304
the duty of each was plainly marked out by law. The steamer was
required to keep out of the way, slack her speed, or, if necessary,
stop and reverse, while the schooner was required to maintain her
course, and was not justified in changing it unless obliged to do
so to avoid a danger that immediately threatened her. As the
steamer did not keep out of the way, and as the collision did
occur, the steamer is
prima facie liable, and can only
relieve herself by showing that the accident was inevitable or was
caused by the culpable negligence of the schooner.
It is manifest from those facts which are not disputed that with
proper precautions, these vessels should not have collided, and
that there was blame somewhere.
Edmonson, captain of the schooner, says, that when opposite
"Point-no-Point" he saw the steamer coming up the bay, about a
quarter of a mile distant. The schooner was steering south by east,
her proper course, and the steamer's bearing from the schooner was
about a point westward from the schooner's course. The schooner
held her course until about the time of the collision, when, as it
seemed inevitable, directions were given to starboard the helm in
order to ease the blow, in consequence of which change the blow of
the steamer was received forward of the fore-rigging instead of in
the middle of the vessel, which would have been the case if the
schooner had continued on her course.
Travis and Henry, seamen on board the schooner, corroborate this
testimony.
It is true they manifestly err when speaking of time and
distance, but they were inexperienced seamen and not very
intelligent men, and there is no good reason for discrediting their
testimony, which in other respects is reliable, because they do not
testify with accuracy about distance on the water, and err in
computations of time. It may well be doubted whether Edmonson was
not mistaken in the distance he said he was from the steamer when
he first saw her, but in view of the testimony furnished from the
steamer, the point is not material.
Ashcom, the mate of the steamer, in command at the
Page 75 U. S. 305
time, and Jordan, the lookout, are the only witnesses on the
part of the steamer who testify as to the state of the case prior
to the collision, and they do not agree in their account of the
transaction. Ashcom says as soon as he made the schooner's light to
be a port light, he gave the order to port the wheel, and it was
done, while Jordan says he saw the schooner about fifteen minutes
before the steamer struck her, and reported the fact to the mate,
and that the course of the steamer was not changed until four or
five minutes before the collision. At the speed the vessels were
then running, they could not have been more than a mile apart, and
Ashcom admits, when he first saw the schooner, she was four or five
miles off.
It is highly probable that Jordan is right as to the point of
time when the change was made, but be this as it may, the steamer
cannot escape condemnation unless she is able to show that there
was no risk of collision or that she adopted suitable measures to
avoid it and that the disaster was the result of misconduct on the
part of the schooner. The fact that the vessels did collide
explodes the theory that there was no risk of collision, and
besides, why did the mate port his helm if in his judgment there
was no risk of it? He says this was done as soon as he saw the
schooner. If so, he believed at the time the relations of the
vessels to each other were such that they might collide, and the
possibility of it is all that is required to charge the steamer
unless she can establish that she was without fault. There is no
evidence to show that the schooner changed her course until the
peril was imminent, but the natural inquiry arises, which boat was
blamable for producing this peril? The schooner was not, because
she was obliged to keep her course. She could not choose, because
the law had chosen for her. It is otherwise with the steamer. She
could go to the right or left, and change as often as there was, in
the apprehension of her officers, a necessity for change.
The steamer is therefore to blame for suffering this peril to
occur, for if it be conceded that the schooner was wrong in
starboarding her helm, this cannot affect her right to
Page 75 U. S. 306
recover, as she was in other respects without fault, because the
steamer, having the right of way, put her in this predicament, and
must answer for the consequences. [
Footnote 2]
It is obvious that the officers of the
Carroll were
either unaware of the nature and extent of the nautical rules which
govern vessels approaching each other in opposite directions or
were unmindful of them. These rules were established in the
interest of commerce -- for the protection of life and property --
and must be observed. They require, where a steamship and sailing
vessel are approaching from opposite directions or on intersecting
lines, that the steamship, from the moment the sailing vessel is
seen, shall watch with the highest diligence her course and
movements, so as to be able to adopt such timely measures of
precaution as will necessarily prevent the two boats coming in
contact. This the
Carroll on this occasion failed to do.
Porting the helm a point, when the light of the schooner was first
observed, and then waiting until the collision was imminent before
doing anything further, does not satisfy the requirements of the
law. The safeguards against danger, in order to be effectual, must
be seasonably employed, and in this case they were not used until
the danger was threatening. If there was fault on the part of the
schooner, the steamer committed a far greater fault in suffering
the vessels to get in such dangerous proximity at the moment
preceding the collision, and as she has furnished no excuse for
this misconduct, is chargeable with all the damages resulting from
this collision.
Decree affirmed, with interest.
MILLER, J., having been absent on the argument, took no part in
the judgment.
[
Footnote 1]
13 Stat. at Large 60-61.
[
Footnote 2]
New York & Liverpool
U.S.M.S. Co. v. Rumball, 21 How. 383.
