1. Since the decision (A.D. 1851) in the
Genesee
Chief, 12 How. 443, which decided that admiralty
jurisdiction was not limited in this country to tide waters, but
extended to the lakes and the waters connecting them, the previous
act of 1845, 5 Stat. at Large 726, entitled "An act extending the
jurisdiction of the district courts to certain cases upon the lakes
and navigable waters connecting the same," and which went on the
assumption (declared in the
Genesee Chief to be a false
one) that the jurisdiction of the admiralty was limited to tide
waters, has become inoperative and ineffectual, with the exception
of the clause which gives to either party the right of trial by
jury when requested. The district courts, upon whom the admiralty
jurisdiction was exclusively conferred by the Judiciary Act of
1789, can therefore take cognizance of all civil causes of
admiralty jurisdiction upon the lakes and waters connecting them
the same as upon the high seas, bays, and rivers navigable from the
sea.
2. The Court observes also that from the reasons given why the
act of 1845 has become inoperative, the clause (italicized in the
lines below of this paragraph) in the ninth section of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which confers exclusive original cognizance
of all civil causes of admiralty jurisdiction upon the district
courts,
"
including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation, or
trade of the United States, where the seizures are made on waters
which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons
burden, within their respective districts, as well as upon the high
seas,"
is equally inoperative.
Page 75 U. S. 16
1. The Constitution declares that the power of the federal
courts shall extend to "all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction." And the Judiciary Act of 1789 gives to
all
the district courts
"
exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures
under laws of impost, navigation, or trade of the United States,
where the seizures are made on waters which are navigable from the
sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden, within their respective
districts as well as upon the high seas."
At the time when this act of 1789 was passed, admiralty
jurisdiction, according to the ideas then generally entertained by
both courts and bar, could be exercised only upon waters within the
ebb and flow of the tide. [
Footnote
1] Accordingly, in 1845, Congress, by a statute [
Footnote 2] entitled "An act
extending the jurisdiction of the district courts to
certain cases upon the lakes and navigable waters
connecting the same," enacted thus:
The district courts of the United States shall have, possess,
and exercise the same jurisdiction in
"matters of
contract and
tort, arising in,
upon, or concerning steamboats and other vessels of twenty tons
burden and upwards, enrolled and licensed for the
coasting
trade, and employed in the business of commerce and navigation
between ports and places in
divers states and territories,
upon the lakes and the navigable waters connecting the same as is
now possessed and exercised by the said courts in cases of the like
steamboats and other vessels employed in navigation and commerce on
the high seas."
About six years after this statute was passed, the case of
The Genesee Chief [
Footnote 3] came before this Court. And in that case it
was decided that the impression that admiralty jurisdiction in this
country was limited to tide waters was a mistake,
Page 75 U. S. 17
and that the lakes and waters connecting them were within
it.
After this decision, the language of certain cases [
Footnote 4] seemed to indicate that the
act of 1845 was to be regarded as
limiting the exercise of
this jurisdiction to those cases in which the act had meant, by way
of extending the jurisdiction, to
grant it.
In this state of statutory law and of judicial remark upon it,
the tug
Eagle, in September, 1864, was towing a brig and a
barge from the head of the St. Clair River through the Detroit
River, the brig being on her way from Saginaw, in Michigan, to
Buffalo, in New York. The tug, getting a mile or so over the line
which separates the British side of the river from ours, and out of
the usual course of navigation, was sailing in shoal water when the
brig grounded and the barge, which was attached to her, ran into
her stern and seriously damaged her. Thereupon the owners of the
brig filed a libel in the district court for Eastern Michigan, "in
a cause of collision" against both tug and barge. It set forth that
the brig was
"a vessel of twenty tons and upwards, duly enrolled and licensed
at the port of Buffalo, State of New York, and used in navigating
the waters of the northwestern lakes and the rivers connecting said
lakes, and engaged in the business of commerce and navigation
thereupon."
And also that the tug and barge were also both
"vessels of more than twenty tons burden, enrolled and licensed
for the coasting trade, and used in navigating the waters of this
state and the adjoining states, and now lying, or soon will be, at
the port of Detroit, and within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of this Court."
The answers denied knowledge of these facts stated about the
brig and called for proof, but admitted the tug and barge to be
enrolled and licensed.
The answer for the barge further laid the whole blame on the
tug, asserting that the sole cause of the disaster was
Page 75 U. S. 18
her going out of the proper course of navigation, while the
answer for the tug stated there was no fault with her, and denied
that the libellants had any claim "enforceable in this Court
sitting in admiralty for said alleged damage."
Two questions were thus raised -- the first of merits; the
second of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the libel as
to the barge and condemned the tug. This decree being confirmed by
the circuit court, the case came here on appeal, where the question
of merits was briefly urged, the point of jurisdiction being really
the only question. It was admitted that by the law of Canada, where
this damage was done, no lien or any action exists against a
wrongdoing vessel or any right or lien
in rem.
Page 75 U. S. 19
MR. JUSTICE NELSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the question of merits, we concur with the conclusion of the
courts below. We shall only examine the questions of law.
The summary of them as stated by the learned counsel
Page 75 U. S. 20
is
(1) There is no law in force in the Province of Canada, the
place where the tort was committed, that gives a lien upon the
vessel for the alleged damages;
(2) The laws of the United States have no extraterritorial force
in a foreign territory to create a lien; and
(3) The admiralty lien is a right in the thing --
jus in
re, and not
jus ad rem -- and the lien must depend
upon the law of the place where the alleged right occurred.
It is apparent from the grounds upon which the learned counsel
has placed his claim to a reversal of the decree below that he has
entirely misapprehended the scope and effect of the decision of
this Court in the case of
The Genesee Chief, [
Footnote 5] and the several cases
following it. [
Footnote 6]
The leading case obliterated the limit that had been previously
adopted and enforced in the jurisdiction in admiralty to
tidewaters, and held that according to the true construction of the
grant in the Constitution, it extended to all public navigable
waters, whether influenced by the tide or not. The Chief Justice,
in delivering the opinion, observes:
"It is evident that a definition [of the grant in the
Constitution] that would at this day limit public rivers in this
country to tidewater rivers is utterly inadmissible. We have
thousands of miles of public navigable waters, including lakes and
rivers, in which there is no tide, and certainly there can be no
reason for admiralty power over a public tidewater which does not
apply with equal force to any other public waters used for
commercial purposes and foreign trade.
The lakes and the waters
connecting them, he observes, are undoubtedly public waters,
and we think are within the grant of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction in the Constitution of the United States."
It follows as a necessary consequence of this interpretation of
the grant in that instrument, the district courts, upon whom the
admiralty jurisdiction was exclusively conferred by the Judiciary
Act of 1789, can take cognizance of
Page 75 U. S. 21
all civil causes of admiralty jurisdiction upon the lakes and
waters connecting them the same as upon the high seas, bays, and
rivers navigable from the sea. These waters fall within the same
category, and are subject to the same jurisdiction, and hence the
circumstance that a portion of them lie within the limits of
another sovereignty constitutes no objection to the exercise of
this power. Before the limit of tidewater was removed by the
judgment in the case of
The Genesee Chief, this
jurisdiction was constantly exercised in cases of marine torts upon
the high seas, bays, and rivers in which the tide ebbed and flowed,
occurring in any part of the world, and, in respect to which an
American ship was concerned, and, since that judgment, occurring
upon any bay or public river as far as navigable, irrespective of
the tide.
Since the recent acts of Parliament in England removing the
ancient restrictions by the common law courts upon the admiralty
jurisdiction, it seems to be exercised as freely and broadly as in
this country. The case of
The Diana [
Footnote 7] arose out of a collision on the great
Holland Canal in 1862. An exception was taken to that jurisdiction
founded upon the old objection, but was overruled by Dr.
Lushington. So in the case of
The Courier, [
Footnote 8] which was a collision on the Rio
Grande, in foreign waters. And
The Griefswald the same.
[
Footnote 9]
It is insisted, however, that if the court will take
jurisdiction for a collision occurring on foreign waters and within
foreign territory,
the local law of the place of collision
should govern, and hence the law of Canada in the present case, and
Smith v. Conary, in this Court, is cited as an authority
for the doctrine. The collision in that case occurred in the port
of Liverpool, while the vessel of the defendant was coming out. The
defendant set up in defense that by the statute law of England, he
was compulsorily obliged to take on board of his ship a Liverpool
pilot, which he did, that she was exclusively in his charge when
the accident occurred, and that this law, as construed by the
courts of England,
Page 75 U. S. 22
excused the owner and master of the vessel, and this was agreed
to by the court and applied to the case, the Chief Justice giving
the opinion. All vessels entering into or departing from a domestic
or foreign port are bound to obey the laws and well known usages of
the port and are subject to seizure and penalties for disobedience,
and when submitting to them, they are entitled to all the
protection which the afford. The same question was recently before
Dr. Lushington in the case of a collision between the American ship
Annapolis and a Prussian barque at the same port, and the
American ship was discharged on the ground as in the case above
cited. [
Footnote 10] These
are exceptional cases, and furnished no rule to the court below for
the trial of the collision in question. It was tried there as it
should have been tried, according to the practice and principles of
the courts of admiralty in this country, wholly irrespective of any
local law.
An objection is also taken that the case was not brought within
the requirements of the act of 1845, so as to give the district
court jurisdiction -- that is, it was not shown that the vessels
were of the burden of twenty tons and upwards or enrolled and
licensed for the coasting trade or employed at the time in the
business of commerce and navigation between ports and places in
different states.
These facts were substantially set forth in the libel, and the
answers did not set up any specific exception on this ground, nor
does it seem to have been taken by the respondents at all in the
progress of the trial below. The objection, we think,
untenable.
This act of 1845, as is apparent from several of the cases
before the district courts whose districts lie contiguous to the
lakes, has occasioned a good deal of embarrassment in administering
their admiralty jurisdiction since the decision in the case of
The Genesee Chief. It is quite clear, under this decision,
in the absence of that act, the district courts would possess
general jurisdiction in admiralty over the
Page 75 U. S. 23
lakes, and the waters connecting them, and hence there would be
no more difficulty in the administration of the law than in cases
upon the high seas or bays or rivers navigable from the sea.
At the time it was passed, tidewater was the limit of admiralty
jurisdiction, and the act was intended to remove this restriction
upon the court as it respected these lakes and to extend the
jurisdiction to them, thereby making these waters an exception as
to the tidewater limit. The power conferred by the act, however,
was not that of general admiralty jurisdiction, but was limited to
cases of
"contract and tort, arising in, upon, or concerning steamboats,
and other vessels, of twenty tons burden and upwards, enrolled and
licensed for the coasting trade, and at the time employed in the
business of commerce and navigation between ports and places of
different states."
The better opinion, we think, is that the act does not embrace,
but necessarily excludes, cases of prize. These are neither cases
of contract or tort, and the vessels engaged in making the seizure,
as prize of war, which are ships of the navy, or privateers, are
not employed at the time, in the business of commerce and
navigation. We think it also a matter of grave doubt if the act
confers jurisdiction in cases of salvage, jettison, or general
average. These are not matters of contract, according to the most
eminent commentators on the subject, [
Footnote 11] and they certainly are not cases of
tort.
One question, and a very important one, is whether, since the
decision of
The Genesee Chief, which opens the lakes and
the waters connecting them to the general jurisdiction of the
district courts in admiralty, they can entertain this jurisdiction
in cases outside of that conferred by this act. If the affirmative
of this question should be sustained, although the system would be
disjointed and incongruous, yet it would in its result remedy most
of the difficulties and inconveniences now existing. But the
opinions of the judges of this Court, as expressed in several
cases, though the question
Page 75 U. S. 24
has never been directly before the Court for decision, are that
the act should be regarded as restrictive of the general
jurisdiction of these courts. This was the opinion expressed by the
Chief Justice in the case of
The Genesee Chief, and has
been followed by other Justices in this Court who have had occasion
to express any opinion in the subject. The history and operation of
this act of 1845 are peculiar.
It is "an act extending the jurisdiction of the district courts
to certain cases upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting the
same." At the time it was enacted, it had the effect expressed and
intended, and so continued for some seven years, when the case of
The Genesee Chief was decided. From that time, its effect
ceased as an enabling act, and has been no longer regarded as such.
It is no longer considered by this Court as conferring any
jurisdiction in admiralty upon the district courts over the lakes
or the waters connecting them. That is regarded as having been
conferred by the grant of general admiralty jurisdiction by the
ninth section of the act of 1789 to these courts. The original
purpose of the act therefore has ceased, and is of no effect, and
in order to give it any, instead of construing it as extending the
jurisdiction in admiralty, it must be construed as limiting it --
the very reverse of its object and intent, as expressed on its
face.
In the case of
The Hine v. Trevor, [
Footnote 12] it is said by the learned
Justice, in delivering the opinion of the Court, that the
jurisdiction in admiralty on the Western rivers did not depend on
the act of 1845, but was given by the original act of 1789, and he
intimated further that the jurisdiction on the lakes was also
founded on this act, though governed in its exercise by the act of
1845. The case then before the Court did not arise on the lakes,
but on the Mississippi River, and the remarks made in respect to
the jurisdiction upon the lakes was in answer to an impression very
general, as is said, among the profession in that section of the
country, and even of the learned judge whose judgment the court
was
Page 75 U. S. 25
reviewing, that the jurisdiction upon the rivers depended on
this act of 1845. That case, not at all involving the question of
jurisdiction upon the lakes, but simply upon the interior rivers,
did not receive that full deliberation in respect to this question
which in the present case is called for. We have now examined it
with care and given to it our best consideration, and are
satisfied, that since the decision of the case of
The Genesee
Chief, the Court must regard the district courts as having
conferred upon them a general jurisdiction in admiralty upon the
lakes and the waters connecting them, by the ninth section of the
original act of 1789, and the enabling act of 1845 therefore has
become inoperative and ineffectual as a grant of jurisdiction; and
as it was an act, on the face of it, and as intended, in its
purpose and effect, to extend the admiralty jurisdiction to these
waters, we cannot, without utterly disregarding this purpose and
intent, give effect to its as a limitation or restriction upon it.
We must therefore regard it as obsolete and of no effect, with the
exception of the clause which gives to either party the right of
trial by jury when requested, which is rather a mode of exercising
jurisdiction than any substantial part of it. The saving clause in
this act, as to the concurrent remedy at common law, is in effect
the same as in the act of 1789, and is therefore of necessity
useless and of no effect. [
Footnote 13]
The ninth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 confers exclusive
original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty jurisdiction
upon the district courts,
"
including all seizures under laws of impost, navigation, or
trade of the United States, where the seizures are made on waters
which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons
burden, within their respective districts, as well as upon the high
seas."
When this clause first came under the consideration of the
courts, there was a good deal of difficulty in determining whether
the words "including all seizures," &c., were intended as being
comprehended within the grant of general admiralty
Page 75 U. S. 26
jurisdiction, or as simply within the cognizance of the district
courts, as the words were ambiguous and might be construed as
either within the cognizance of the district courts or within the
class of cases of general admiralty jurisdiction. The difference
was material, as if not within the general admiralty jurisdiction,
the parties were entitled to a trial by jury; otherwise not. This
question was first decided in the case of the
United States v.
La Vengeance, [
Footnote
14] the Court holding that the cases were included within the
general admiralty jurisdiction. The point was contested in several
subsequent cases, but the Court adhered firmly to its first
decision. [
Footnote 15] The
act, notwithstanding these decisions, was still effectual and
necessary to sustain the general jurisdiction, as the limit of
tidewaters then prevailed in the admiralty courts, and the
jurisdiction given by the act extended to waters which were
navigable from the sea, irrespective of the tide. The seizures
also, in many instances, would be made within the body of a county
--
infra corpus comitatus -- within which the admiralty
jurisdiction was not yet admitted.
Waring v.
Clarke, 5 How. 441.
But since the decision in the case of
The Genesee
Chief, this clause, above recited, is no longer of any force.
The general jurisdiction in admiralty exists without regard to it,
and if any effect should be given, instead of extending, as was
intended, it would restrict it, and for the reason given in respect
to the act of 1845, it has become useless and of no effect.
Decree affirmed with costs and interest.
[
Footnote 1]
The Thomas
Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428;
The
Steamboat Orleans, 11 Pet. 175.
[
Footnote 2]
5 Stat. at Large 726.
[
Footnote 3]
53 U. S. 12 How.
443.
[
Footnote 4]
Ex. gr. 62 U. S.
Newberry, 21 How. 245;
Maguire v.
Card, 21 How. 248;
The
Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 556.
[
Footnote 5]
53 U. S. 12 How.
443.
[
Footnote 6]
Jackson v.
Magnolia, 20 How. 296, and
The Hine
v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555.
[
Footnote 7]
1 Lushington 539.
[
Footnote 8]
Ib., 541.
[
Footnote 9]
Swabia 430.
[
Footnote 10]
1 Lushington 295.
[
Footnote 11]
1 Story's Equity Jurisprudence, § 490; 3 Kent p. 246.
[
Footnote 12]
71 U. S. 4 Wall.
555.
[
Footnote 13]
See The Belfast, 7
Wall. 624,
74 U. S.
644.
[
Footnote 14]
3 U. S. 3 Dall.
297.
[
Footnote 15]
The Sally, 2 Cranch 406 [omitted];
The
Samuel, 1 Wheat. 9; 1 Wheat. 20 [argument of
counsel -- omitted];
The Sarah, 8
Wheat. 391.
