1. An action for damages does not lie against a judge of a court
of general jurisdiction for removing, whilst bolding court, an
attorney-at-law, from the bar for malpractice and misconduct in his
office, the court being empowered by statute to remove attorneys
for "any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct," and
having heard the attorney removed in explanation of his conduct in
the transaction which was the subject of complaint. And such action
will not lie against the judge even if the court, in making the
removal, exceeds its jurisdiction, unless perhaps in the case where
the act is done maliciously or corruptly.
2. All judicial officers are exempt from liability in a civil
action for their judicial acts done within their jurisdiction, and
judges of superior or general authority are exempt from such
liability even when their judicial acts are in excess of their
jurisdiction, unless perhaps where the acts in excess of their
jurisdiction are done maliciously or corruptly.
3. Formal allegations making specific charges of malpractice or
unprofessional conduct are not essential as a foundation for
proceedings against attorneys. All that is requisite to their
validity is that when not taken for matters occurring in open court
in the presence of the judges, notice should be given to the
attorney of the charges made and opportunity afforded him for
explanation and defense. The manner in which the proceeding shall
be conducted, so that it be without oppression or injustice is a
matter of judicial regulation.
4. The construction given to a provision of the constitution of
a state by the highest court of that state, not called in question
by any conflicting decision of that court, is conclusive upon this
Court.
This action was brought by the plaintiff, who was formerly an
attorney and counselor-at-law in Massachusetts,
Page 74 U. S. 524
against the defendant, who was one of the justices of the
superior court of that state, for an alleged wrongful removal by
him of the plaintiff from the bar.
The substantial facts, as established by the evidence produced
by the plaintiff and by the records of the state court, introduced
by consent, upon which the removal was made were these:
In August, 1864, one Leighton was arrested upon a charge of
larceny, and confined in jail in Boston to await the action of the
grand jury in the superior court upon his failure to give a
recognizance with sureties in four hundred dollars, required for
his appearance. While thus confined, he retained the plaintiff as
his attorney, to whom he expressed a willingness to enlist in the
army or navy of the United States if the prosecution could be
discontinued. The plaintiff thereupon proposed to the district
attorney to dispose of the prosecution in this way. That officer
declined to accede to the proposition at that time, but encouraged
the plaintiff to expect that he would not object to such an
arrangement in court if the presiding judge approved of it when the
indictment was presented.
The plaintiff and his father, without any further arrangement
with the district attorney, thereupon became sureties for Leighton,
who, upon his release, proceeded to the office of the plaintiff and
there signed with his mark -- he not being able to write -- an
agreement to enlist as a substitute for one Brown, of Lowell, for
four hundred dollars, which sum was to be retained by the
plaintiff, without any subsequent claim upon him, as indemnity for
his becoming surety on the recognizance, and also to pay the
plaintiff four hundred dollars for furnishing bail.
Leighton subsequently enlisted in the naval service as a
substitute for Brown, who paid the plaintiff, for the enlistment,
eight hundred and thirty dollars. Of this sum, the plaintiff gave
Leighton, when the latter went on board the vessel to which he was
assigned, the sum of ten dollars. Subsequently he paid one hundred
dollars to Leighton's order. The balance he retained.
Page 74 U. S. 525
Some weeks afterwards, Leighton wrote a letter to the captain of
his vessel stating that he was promised four hundred dollars for
his enlistment by his lawyer, the plaintiff, that he had only
received ten dollars, and that when he applied to the plaintiff for
settlement, evasive answers were all he obtained. He referred in
the letter to the fact that he had a wife and two children
dependent upon him for support, and he appealed to the captain to
see that justice was done him. This letter was shown to the
plaintiff, who replied that he had paid Leighton all he had agreed
to, and should not pay him another cent. The wife of Leighton also
applied to the plaintiff for a portion of the bounty of her husband
in his hands, stating that the destitution of herself and children
was such that she should be obliged to give them up to the city, to
whom he replied by advising her to do so, and gave her nothing.
The captain then sent the letter to the grand jury of the
county, at the time sitting upon Leighton's case. The jury, of
course, could not act upon the letter, and its foreman requested
the prosecuting officer to bring it before the court. This was
accordingly done, the defendant being at the time the presiding
justice. The plaintiff was thereupon sent for, and, in open court,
his attention was called to the letter, and it was notified to him
that on the following Wednesday, then five days distant, his
professional conduct and standing at the bar would be
considered.
At the time designated, he appeared and showed that, after his
citation, he had paid to Leighton the balance of the four hundred
dollars which Leighton claimed he was entitled to receive. This
right of Leighton was never admitted until after the attention of
the court had been directed to the matter.
The court being of opinion that the plaintiff took advantage of
the situation of Leighton and obtained from him an agreement,
which, under the circumstances, was unconscionable and extortionate
and therefore grossly unprofessional; that he had induced Leighton
to enlist by making him believe that his release from the
prosecution would be accomplished
Page 74 U. S. 526
by his enlistment, and that the money obtained by the enlistment
subsequently paid to Leighton was paid only in consequence of the
inquiry instituted into the professional conduct of the plaintiff,
he having previously denied that he was bound to pay anything,
found that he had violated his oath of office as an
attorney-at-law, and was guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct
in his office, and consequently ordered that he be removed from his
office as an attorney-at-law within the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. Thereupon, the plaintiff brought this suit. The
declaration charged the removal to have been made without lawful
authority and wantonly, arbitrarily, and oppressively.
Upon the evidence produced, the court below instructed the jury
that the action could not be maintained and that their verdict
should be for the defendant. Such verdict was accordingly rendered,
and the plaintiff brought the case here.
The general statutes of Massachusetts [
Footnote 1] provide that "an attorney may be removed by
the Supreme Judicial Court or superior court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct," and also that "a person
admitted in any court may practice in every other court in the
state, and there shall be no distinction of counselors and
attorneys."
The oath required of attorneys on their admission is as
follows:
"You solemnly swear that you will do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; you will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any false, groundless, or unlawful suit, nor give
aid or consent to the same; you will delay no man for lucre or
malice; but you will conduct yourself in the office of an attorney,
within the courts, according to the best of your knowledge and
discretion, and with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
your clients. So help you God."
The superior court of Massachusetts is a court of general
jurisdiction. Indeed, its jurisdiction is the most general of any
court in Massachusetts. [
Footnote
2]
Page 74 U. S. 535
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion
of the Court, as follows:
The superior court of Massachusetts is a court of general
jurisdiction, and is empowered by statute to admit attorneys and
counselors to practice in the courts of the state, upon evidence of
their possessing good moral character, and of having devoted a
prescribed number of years to the study of the law, in the office
of some attorney in the state, and to remove them "for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct."
Both the admission and the removal of attorneys are judicial
acts. It has been so decided in repeated instances. It was declared
in
Ex Parte Secombe, [
Footnote 3] and was affirmed in
Ex Parte Garland.
[
Footnote 4]
Now it is a general principle applicable to all judicial
officers that they are not liable to a civil action for any
judicial act done within their jurisdiction. In reference to judges
of limited and inferior authority, it has been held
Page 74 U. S. 536
that they are protected only when they act within their
jurisdiction. If this be the case with respect to them, no such
limitation exists with respect to judges of superior or general
authority. They are not liable to civil actions for their judicial
acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction,
unless perhaps where the acts in excess of jurisdiction are done
maliciously or corruptly. This doctrine is as old as the law, and
its maintenance is essential to the impartial administration of
justice. Any other doctrine would necessarily lead to the
degradation of the judicial authority and the destruction of its
usefulness. Unless judges, in administering justice, are
uninfluenced by considerations personal to themselves, they can
afford little protection to the citizen in his person or property.
And uninfluenced by such considerations they cannot be if, whenever
they err in judgment as to their jurisdiction, upon the nature and
extent of which they are constantly required to pass, they may be
subjected to prosecution at the instance of every party imagining
himself aggrieved, and be called upon in a civil action in another
tribunal, and perhaps before an inferior judge, to vindicate their
acts.
This exemption from civil action is for the sake of the public,
and not merely for the protection of the judge. And it has been
maintained by a uniform course of decisions in England for
centuries, and in this country ever since its settlement.
In England, the superior judges are the delegates of the King.
Through them he administers justice, and to him alone are they
accountable for the performance of their trust. And it was said as
long ago as 1608, as reported by Lord Coke in
Floyd and
Barker's Case, [
Footnote
5] that insomuch as the judges of the realm have the
administration of justice, under the King, to all his subjects,
they ought not to be called in question for any judicial
proceedings by them, except before the King himself, "for this
would tend to the scandal and subversion of all justice; and those
who are most sincere would not be free from continual
calumniations."
Page 74 U. S. 537
In the United States, judicial power is vested exclusively in
the courts. The judges administer justice therein for the people,
and are responsible to the people alone for the manner in which
they perform their duties. If faithless, if corrupt, if dishonest,
if partial, if oppressive or arbitrary, they may be called to
account by impeachment and removed from office. In some states, and
Massachusetts is one of them, they may be removed upon the address
of both houses of the legislature. But responsible they are not to
private parties in civil actions for their judicial acts, however
injurious may be those acts and however much they may deserve
condemnation, unless perhaps where the acts are palpably in excess
of the jurisdiction of the judges and are done maliciously or
corruptly.
In
Taaffe v. Downes, [
Footnote 6] this subject was most elaborately and
learnedly considered, and all the English authorities commented
upon, by the Court of Common Pleas of Ireland in 1813. The
defendant was Chief Justice of the King's Bench in Ireland, and had
issued a warrant at chambers for the arrest of the plaintiff for a
breach of the peace. The plaintiff was accordingly arrested and
held to bail, and he afterwards brought an action against the chief
justice for assault and false imprisonment. It was urged in
argument that it was not lawful or defensible for a judge, without
any offense committed, or charge made upon oath of crime, or
suspicion of crime committed, to imprison a subject. But it was
held that the action would not lie against the judge for acts
judicially done by him. "Liability," said Mr. Justice Mayne, one of
the justices of the court,
"to every man's action, for every judicial act a judge is called
upon to do, is the degradation of the judge, and cannot be the
object of any true patriot or honest subject. It is to render the
judges slaves in every court that holds plea, to every sheriff,
juror, attorney, and plaintiff. If you once break down the barrier
of their dignity and subject them to an action, you let in upon the
judicial authority a wide, wasting, and harassing
Page 74 U. S. 538
persecution, and establish its weakness in a degrading
responsibility."
And the justice observed that no action of the kind was ever
sustained, and save one in London and one in Ireland, none was ever
attempted. The one mentioned as arising in Ireland was not against
any judges, but against the governor of the country, and may
perhaps be subject to other considerations. In the case in London,
[
Footnote 7] the action was
against the recorder, who, as one of the judges of oyer and
terminer, had fined and imprisoned a petit jury for rendering a
verdict against the direction of the court and the evidence. This
act was declared illegal by the Court of Common Pleas in discussing
the case on habeas corpus. [
Footnote 8] Upon that decision, the action was brought by
one of the jurors, but the court held that the action would not
lie, and were of opinion
"that the bringing of the action was a greater offense than the
fining of the plaintiff and committing of him for nonpayment, and
that it was a bold attempt both against the government and justice
in general."
Mr. Justice Fox, in the case of
Taaffe v. Downes,
conceded that the act of the chief justice was illegal, but held
that he was not responsible in the action, and observed that
without the existence of the principle that a judge administering
justice shall not be liable for acts judicially done by action or
prosecution, it was utterly impossible that there should be such a
dispensation of justice as would have the effect of protecting the
lives or property of the subject. "There is something," he
said,
"so monstrous in the contrary doctrine that it would poison the
very source of justice and introduce a system of servility utterly
inconsistent with the constitutional independence of the judges, an
independence which it has been the work of ages to establish, and
would be utterly inconsistent with the preservation of the rights
and liberties of the subject."
The same subject was considered very elaborately in the case of
Yates v. Lansing [
Footnote
9] in the supreme court and in the
Page 74 U. S. 539
Court of Errors of New York. Lansing was chancellor of the
state, and had committed Yates, one of the officers in chancery,
for malpractice and contempt. A judge of the supreme court
discharged him, and thereupon the chancellor ordered him to be
recommitted. He then brought an action to recover a statute penalty
for the recommittent. It was held that the action would not lie,
Mr. Chief Justice Kent observing that the chancellor may have erred
in judgment in calling an act a contempt which did not amount to
one and in regarding a discharge as null when it was binding, and
that the supreme court may have erred in the same way, but still it
was but an error of judgment for which neither the chancellor nor
the judges were or could be responsible in a civil action, and that
such responsibility would be an anomaly in jurisprudence.
"Whenever," said the learned chief justice,
"we subject the established courts of the land to the
degradation of private prosecution, we subdue their independence
and destroy their authority. Instead of being venerable before the
public, they become contemptible."
The superior court of Massachusetts, as we have already stated,
is a court of general jurisdiction, and is clothed by statute with
authority to admit and to remove attorneys-at-law. The order
removing the plaintiff was made by the court, and not by the judge
in chambers. The inquiry into his conduct was before the court, and
before it he was notified to appear. His claim is that the court
never acquired jurisdiction to act in his case, because there was
not a formal accusation made against him, or statement of grounds
of complaint, and formal citation issued to him to answer them. If
this were so, his case would not be advanced. Under the authorities
cited, he could not seek redress in that event by an action against
the judge of the court, there being no pretense or shadow of ground
that he acted maliciously or corruptly. But the claim of the
plaintiff is not correct. The information imparted by the letter
was sufficient to put in motion the authority of the court, and the
notice to the plaintiff was sufficient to bring him before it to
explain the
Page 74 U. S. 540
transaction to which the letter referred. The informality of the
notice, or of the complaint by the letter, did not touch the
question of jurisdiction. The plaintiff understood from them the
nature of the charge against him, and it is not pretended that the
investigation which followed was not conducted with entire
fairness. He was afforded ample opportunity to explain the
transaction and vindicate his conduct. He introduced testimony upon
the matter, and was sworn himself.
It is not necessary that proceedings against attorneys for
malpractice or any unprofessional conduct should be founded upon
formal allegations against them. Such proceedings are often
instituted upon information developed in the progress of a cause or
from what the court learns of the conduct of the attorney from its
own observation. Sometimes they are moved by third parties upon
affidavit, and sometimes they are taken by the court upon its own
motion. All that is requisite to their validity is that when not
taken for matters occurring in open court in the presence of the
judges, notice should be given to the attorney of the charges made
and opportunity afforded him for explanation and defense. The
manner in which the proceeding shall be conducted, so that it be
without oppression or unfairness, is a matter of judicial
regulation.
The authority of the court over its attorneys and counselors is
of the highest importance. They constitute a profession essential
to society. Their aid is required not merely to represent suitors
before the courts, but in the more difficult transactions of
private life. The highest interests are placed in their hands and
confided to their management. The confidence which they receive and
the responsibilities which they are obliged to assume demand not
only ability of a high order, but the strictest integrity. The
authority which the courts hold over them and the qualifications
required for their admission are intended to secure those
qualities.
The position that the plaintiff has been illegally deprived of
rights which he held under the Constitution of Massachusetts,
Page 74 U. S. 541
which declares that "no subject shall be held to answer for any
crime or offense, until the same is fully and plainly,
substantially and formally, described to him," nor be
"despoiled or deprived of his property, immunities or
privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled or
deprived of his life, liberty or estate, but by the judgment of his
peers or the law of the land [
Footnote 10]"
is answered by the construction which the supreme court of that
state has given to these provisions. It has held that the
proceeding taken for the removal of the plaintiff could not in any
just and proper sense be deemed a criminal procedure, in which a
party has a right to a full, formal, and substantial description of
the offense charged; and that it was not essential to the validity
of the order of removal that it should be founded on legal process
according to the signification of the words
"per legem
terrae" as used in Magna Charta or in the Declaration of
Rights. [
Footnote 11] This
construction of the highest court of the state, not called in
question by any conflicting decision of that court, is conclusive
upon us. [
Footnote 12]
We find no error in the ruling of the circuit court, and its
judgment must therefore be
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
C. 121, § 34.
[
Footnote 2]
General Statutes, c. 114.
[
Footnote 3]
60 U. S. 19 How.
9.
[
Footnote 4]
71 U. S. 4
Wall. 378.
[
Footnote 5]
12 Coke, 25.
[
Footnote 6]
Given in a note in 3 Moore's Privy Council 41.
[
Footnote 7]
Hamond v. Howell, 1 Modern 184; 2
id. 218.
[
Footnote 8]
Bushell's Case, Vaughan, 135.
[
Footnote 9]
5 Johnson 283; 9
id. 395.
[
Footnote 10]
Declaration of Rights, Art. 12.
[
Footnote 11]
Randall, Petitioner for Mandamus, 11 Allen 473.
[
Footnote 12]
Provident Institution v.
Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 630.
