1. The equity jurisdiction and remedies conferred by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States cannot be limited or
restrained by state legislation, and are uniform throughout the
different states of the Union. Hence the circuit court for any
district embracing a particular state will have jurisdiction of an
equity proceeding against an administrator (if according to the
received principles of equity a case for equitable relief is
stated), notwithstanding that by a peculiar structure of the state
probate system such a proceeding could not be maintained in any
court of the state.
2. In a bill in equity in the circuit court, by one distributee
of an intestate's estate against an administrator, it is not
indispensable that such distributes make the other distributees
parties if the court is able to proceed to a decree, either through
a reference to a master or some other proper way, to do justice to
the parties before it without injury to absent parties equally
interested.
3. The sureties of an administrator on his official bond may
properly be joined with him in an equity proceeding for an
erroneous and fraudulent administration of the estate by him, and
where, if a balance should be found against the administrator,
those sureties would be liable.
Page 74 U. S. 426
4. A bill involving but a single matter and affecting all
defendants alike is not multifarious, although it may seek both to
open settlements and to cancel receipts as fraudulent
Ann Payne, a citizen of Virginia, exhibited her bill in the
Circuit Court of the United States for Missouri against Zadoc Hook,
Public Administrator of Calloway County in that state, and his
sureties on his official bond, all citizens of Missouri, to obtain
her distributive share in the estate of her brother, Fielding
Curtis, who died intestate in 1861 and whose estate was committed
to the charge of the public administrator by order of the County
Court of Calloway County. It appeared that Curtis never married and
that his nearest of kin were entitled to distribution of his
estate. The bill, without mentioning of what state they were
citizens and without making them complainants, set forth the names
of the distributees, brothers or sisters, like the complainant, of
the intestate, or their children. The bill charged gross misconduct
on the part of the administrator; that he had made false
settlements with the Court of Probate; withheld a true inventory of
the property in his hands; used the money of the estate for his
private gain; and obtained from the claimant, by fraudulent
representations, a receipt in full for her share of the estate, on
the payment of a less sum than she was entitled to receive. The
object of the bill was to obtain relief against these fraudulent
proceedings and to compel a true account of administration in order
that the real condition of the estate can be ascertained and the
complainant paid what justly belongs to her. It appeared from the
bill that Hook had not yet made his final settlement.
The defendant demurred generally, and without assigning any
specific grounds for the demurrer. On the argument of the demurrer
below, the demurrer was endeavored to be supported,
1. Because, in Missouri, exclusive jurisdiction over all
disputes concerning the duties or accounts of administrators, until
final settlement, is given to the local county court, which is the
court of probate, and because, as the administration complained of
was still in progress in the County
Page 74 U. S. 427
Court of Calloway County, resort was to be had to that court to
correct the accounts of the administrator, if fraudulent or
erroneous.
2. Because the other distributees were not made parties, and so
that the case was without proper parties.
3. Because the sureties of the administrator were joined in the
proceeding.
4. Because the bill was multifarious.
The court below sustained the demurrer, and the complainant
electing to abide by her pleading, the bill was dismissed, and the
case brought here by appeal.
Page 74 U. S. 429
MR. JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for Missouri to hear this
cause is denied because in that state, exclusive jurisdiction over
all disputes concerning the duties or accounts of administrators
until final settlement is given to the local county court, which is
the court of probate, and as the administration complained of is
still in progress in the County Court of Calloway County, resort
must be had to that court to correct the errors and frauds in the
accounts of the administrator.
The theory of the position is this, that a federal court of
chancery sitting in Missouri will not enforce demands against an
administrator or executor if the court of the state having general
chancery powers could not enforce similar demands. In other words,
as the complainant, were she a citizen of Missouri, could obtain a
redress of her grievances only through the local court of probate,
she has no better or different rights because she happens to be a
citizen of Virginia.
If this position could be maintained, an important part of the
jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts by the Constitution
and laws of Congress would be abrogated. As the citizen of one
state has the constitutional right to sue a citizen of another
state in the courts of the United States instead of resorting to a
state tribunal, of what value would that right be if the court in
which the suit is instituted
Page 74 U. S. 430
could not proceed to judgment and afford a suitable measure of
redress? The right would be worth nothing to the party entitled to
its enjoyment, as it could not produce any beneficial results. But
this objection to the jurisdiction of the federal tribunals has
been heretofore presented to this Court and overruled.
We have repeatedly held
"that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over
controversies between citizens of different states cannot be
impaired by the laws of the states which prescribe the modes of
redress in their courts or which regulate the distribution of their
judicial power. [
Footnote
1]"
If legal remedies are sometimes modified to suit the changes in
the laws of the states, and the practice of their courts, it is not
so with equitable. The equity jurisdiction conferred on the federal
courts is the same that the High Court of Chancery in England
possesses, is subject to neither limitation or restraint by state
legislation, and is uniform throughout the different states of the
Union. [
Footnote 2]
The Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Missouri, therefore, had jurisdiction to hear and determine this
controversy, notwithstanding the peculiar structure of the Missouri
probate system, and was bound to exercise it, if the bill,
according to the received principles of equity, states a case for
equitable relief. The absence of a complete and adequate remedy at
law, is the only test of equity jurisdiction, and the application
of this principle to a particular case must depend on the character
of the case, as disclosed in the pleadings. [
Footnote 3]
"It is not enough that there is a remedy at law. It must be
plain and adequate, or, in other words, as practical and efficient
to the ends of justice, and its prompt administration, as the
remedy in equity. [
Footnote 4]
"
Page 74 U. S. 431
It is very evident that an action at common law, on the bond of
the administrator, would not give to the complainant a practical
and efficient remedy for the wrongs which, she says, she has
suffered. A proceeding at law is not flexible enough to reach the
fraudulent conduct of the administrator, which is the ground work
of this bill, nor to furnish proper relief against it. It is,
however, well settled that a court of chancery, as an incident to
its power to enforce trusts, and make those holding a fiduciary
relation account, has jurisdiction to compel executors and
administrators to account and distribute the assets in their hands.
The bill under review has this object, and nothing more. It seeks
to compel the defendant, Hook, to account and pay over to Mrs.
Payne her rightful share in the estate of her brother; and in case
he should not do it, to fix the liability of the sureties on his
bond.
But it is said the proper parties for a decree are not before
the Court, as the bill shows there are other distributees besides
the complainant. It is undoubtedly true that all persons materially
interested in the subject matter of the suit should be made parties
to it; but this rule, like all general rules, being founded in
convenience, will yield, whenever it is necessary that it should
yield, in order to accomplish the ends of justice. It will yield,
if the court is able to proceed to a decree, and do justice to the
parties before it, without injury to absent persons, equally
interested in the litigation, but who cannot conveniently be made
parties to the suit. [
Footnote
5]
The necessity for the relaxation of the rule is more especially
apparent in the courts of the United States, where, oftentimes, the
enforcement of the rule would oust them of their jurisdiction, and
deprive parties entitled to the interposition of a court of equity
of any remedy whatever. [
Footnote
6]
The present case affords an ample illustration of this
necessity. The complainant sues as one of the next of kin,
Page 74 U. S. 432
and names the other distributees, who have the same common
interest, without stating of what particular state they are
citizens. It is fair to presume, in the absence of any averments to
the contrary, that they are citizens of Missouri. If so, they could
not be joined as plaintiffs, for that would take away the
jurisdiction of the court, and why make them defendants when the
controversy is not with them, but the administrator and his
sureties? It can never be indispensable to make defendants of those
against whom nothing is alleged and from whom no relief is asked. A
court of equity adapts its decrees to the necessities of each case,
and should the present suit terminate in a decree against the
defendants, it is easy to do substantial justice to all the parties
in interest, and prevent a multiplicity of suits, by allowing the
other distributees, either through a reference to a master, or by
some other proper proceeding, to come in and share in the benefit
of the litigation. [
Footnote
7]
The next objection which we have to consider is that the
sureties of the administrator are not proper parties to this suit.
Their liability on the bond in an action at law is not denied, but
it is insisted they cannot be sued in equity. If this doctrine were
to prevail, a court of chancery, in the exercise of its power to
compel an administrator to account for the property of his
intestate, would be unable to do complete justice, for if, on
settlement of the accounts, a balance should be found due the
estate, the parties in interest, in case the administrator should
fail to pay, would be turned over to a court of law, to renew the
litigation with his sureties. A court of equity does not act in
this way. It disposes of a case so as to end litigation, not to
foster it; to diminish suits, not to multiply them. Having power to
determine the liability of the administrator for his misconduct, it
necessarily has an equal power, in order to meet the possible
exigency of the administrator's inability to satisfy the decree, to
settle the amount which the sureties on the bond, in that event,
would have to pay.
Page 74 U. S. 433
Besides, it is for the interest of the sureties that they should
be joined in the suit with their principal, as it enables them to
see that the accounts are correctly settled, and the
administrator's liability fixed on a proper basis. If they were not
made parties, considering the nature and extent of their
obligation, they would have just cause of complaint.
It is said the bill is multifarious, but we cannot see any
ground for such an objection. A bill cannot be said to be
multifarious unless it embraces distinct matters which do not
affect all the defendants alike. This case involves but a single
matter, and that is the true condition of the estate of Fielding
Curtis which, when ascertained, will determine the rights of the
next of kin. In this investigation all the defendants are jointly
interested. It is true the bill seeks to open the settlements with
the probate court as fraudulent, and to cancel the receipt and
transfer from the complainant to the administrator, because
obtained by false representations, but the determination of these
questions is necessary to arrive at the proper value of the estate,
and in their determination the sureties are concerned, for the very
object of the bond which they gave was to protect the estate
against frauds which the administrator might commit to its
prejudice.
The decree of the circuit court for the District of Missouri
is reversed and this cause is remanded to that court with
instructions to proceed in conformity with this opinion.
[
Footnote 1]
Hyde v.
Stone, 20 How. 175;
Suydam v.
Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67;
Union Bank
v. Jolly's Administrators, 18 How. 503.
[
Footnote 2]
Green's Administratrix v.
Creighton, 23 How. 90;
Robinson
v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212;
United
States v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 108;
Pratt v.
Northam, 5 Mason 95.
[
Footnote 3]
Watson v.
Sutherland, 5 Wall. 78.
[
Footnote 4]
Boyce's Executors v.
Grundy, 3 Pet. 210.
[
Footnote 5]
Cooper's Equity Pleading 35.
[
Footnote 6]
West v. Randall, 2 Mason 181; Story's Equity Pleading
§ 89 and sequentia.
[
Footnote 7]
West v. Randall, supra; Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 317;
Story's Equity Pleading,
supra.
