1. A contract to pay a certain sum in gold and silver coin is in
substance and legal effect a, contract to deliver a certain weight
of gold and silver of a certain fineness to be ascertained by
count.
2. Whether the contract be for the delivery or payment of coin
or bullion or other property, damages for nonperformance must be
assessed in lawful money -- that is to say, in money declared to be
legal tender in payment, by a law made in pursuance of the
Constitution of the United States.
3. There are, at this time, two descriptions of lawful money in
use under acts of Congress, in either of which (assuming these
acts, in respect to legal tender, to be constitutional) damages for
nonperformance of contracts, whether made before or since the
passage of these acts, may be assessed in the absence of any
different understanding or agreement between the parties.
4. When the intent of the parties as to the medium of payment is
clearly expressed in a contract, damages for the breach of it,
whether made before or since the enactment of these laws, may be
properly assessed so as to give effect to that intent.
5. When, therefore, it appears to be the clear intent of a
contract that payment or satisfaction shall be made in gold and
silver, damages should be assessed in coin, and judgment rendered
accordingly.
Daniel Bowly, on the 18th of February, 1791, leased to Conrad
Orendorf a lot of ground in the City of Baltimore,
Page 74 U. S. 259
for ninety-nine years, renewable forever, reserving rent in the
following words:
"Yielding and paying therefor to the said Daniel Bowly, his
heirs and assigns, the yearly rent or sum of �15, current
money of Maryland, payable in English golden guineas, weighing five
pennyweights and six grains, at thirty-five shillings each, and
other gold and silver at their present established weight and rate
according to act of Assembly, on the 1st day of January in each and
every year during the continuance of the present demise."
On the 1st of January, 1866, one Horwitz was the owner of the
rent and reversion, and a certain Butler of the leasehold interest
in the lot. It being agreed that the �15 was equal to $40 in
gold and silver, Butler tendered to Horwitz the amount of the
annual rent, that is to say $40, then due, in currency, which
Horwitz refused to receive, and brought suit to recover the value
of the gold in currency, which being on the 1st of January, 1866,
at a premium of $1.45, was $58. The court below gave judgment in
favor of Horwitz for that amount with interest, $59.71. The case
was thereupon brought here by Butler for review.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principles which determined the case of
Bronson v.
Rodes, * will govern our
judgment in this case.
The obvious intent of the contract now before us was to secure
payment of a certain rent in gold and silver, and thereby avoid the
fluctuations to which the currency of the country, in the days
which preceded and followed the establishment of our independence,
had been subject, and also all future fluctuations incident to
arbitrary or uncertain measures of value, whether introduced by law
or by usage.
It was agreed in the court below that the rent due upon the
lease, reduced to current gold and silver coin was, on the first
day of January, 1866, forty dollars, and judgment
Page 74 U. S. 260
was rendered on the 27th June, 1866, for fifty-nine dollars and
seventy-one cents.
This judgment was rendered as the legal result of two
propositions:
(1) That the covenant in the lease required the delivery of a
certain amount of gold and silver in payment of rent, and
(2) That damages for nonperformance must be assessed in the
legal tender currency.
The first of these propositions is, in our judgment, correct;
the second is, we think, erroneous.
It is not necessary to go at length into the grounds of this
conclusion. We will only state briefly the general propositions on
which it rests; some of which have been already stated more fully
in
Bronson v. Rodes.
A contract to pay a certain sum in gold and silver coin is, in
substance and legal effect, a contract to deliver a certain weight
of gold and silver of a certain fineness, to be ascertained by
count. Damages for nonperformance of such a contract may be
recovered at law as for nonperformance of a contract to deliver
bullion or other commodity. But whether the contract be for the
delivery or payment of coin or bullion, or other property, damages
for nonperformance must be assessed in lawful money; that is to
say, in money declared to be legal tender in payment, by a law made
in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States.
It was not necessary in the case of
Bronson v. Rodes,
nor is it necessary now, to decide the question, whether the acts
making United States notes legal tender are warranted by the
Constitution? We express no opinion on that point, but assume, for
the present, the constitutionality of those acts. Proceeding upon
this assumption, we find two descriptions of lawful money in use
under acts of Congress, in either of which damages for
nonperformance of contracts, whether made before or since the
passage of the currency acts, may be properly assessed, in the
absence of any different understanding or agreement between
parties. But the obvious intent, in contracts for payment or
delivery of coin or bullion, to provide against fluctuations in the
medium of payment, warrants the inference that it was the
understanding
Page 74 U. S. 261
of the parties that such contracts should be satisfied, whether
before or after judgment, only by tender of coin, while the absence
of any express stipulation, as to description, in contracts for
payment in money generally, warrants the opposite inference of an
understanding between parties that such contracts may be satisfied,
before or after judgment, by the tender of any lawful money.
This inference as to contracts made previous to the passage of
the acts making United States notes a legal tender, is strengthened
by the consideration that those acts not only do not prohibit, but,
by strong implications, sanction contracts made since their passage
for payment of coin, and consequently, taken in connection with the
provision of the act of 1792, concerning money of account, require
that damages upon such contracts be assessed in coin, and judgment
rendered accordingly, leaving the assessment of damages for breach
of other contracts to be made, and judgments rendered in lawful
money. It would be unreasonable to suppose that the legislature
intended a different rule as to contracts prior to the enactment of
the currency laws, from that sanctioned by them in respect to
contracts since. We are of the opinion, therefore, that under the
existing laws, of which, in respect to legal tender, the
constitutionality is, we repeat, in this case, assumed, damages may
be properly assessed and judgments rendered, so as to give full
effect to the intention of parties as to the medium of payment.
When, therefore, it appears to be the clear intent of a contract
that payment or satisfaction shall be made in gold and silver,
damages should be assessed and judgment rendered accordingly.
It follows that in the case before us the judgment was
erroneously entered. The damages should have been assessed at the
sum agreed to be due, with interest, in gold and silver coin, and
judgment should have been entered in coin for that amount, with
costs. The judgment of the court of common pleas must, therefore,
be
Reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.
Page 74 U. S. 262
*
See supra, p. <|74 U.S. 229|>229.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting.
I believe the judgment of the court below was right, because I
understand the original contract to have been an agreement to pay
in English guineas, as a commodity, and their value was therefore
properly computed in the legal tender notes which by law would
satisfy the judgment.
I cannot agree to the opinion, for the reasons given in my
dissent in the case of
Bronson v. Rodes.
