1. Under the statute of Oregon which provides that any person
in possession of real property may maintain a suit in
equity against another who claims an estate or interest therein
adverse to him for the purpose of determining such claim, estate,
or interest, a bill will not lie on a possession without some
right, legal or equitable, first shown.
2. Under the Act of Congress of September 27, 1850, "to create
the office of Surveyor General of the Public Lands of Oregon" (the
act commonly known as "The Oregon Donation Act," and stated fully
in the case), the right of the claimant to a patent became
perfected when the certificate of the Surveyor General, and
accompanying proofs, were received by the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, and he found no valid objection thereto.
3. The Act of August 14, 1848, organizing the Territory of
Oregon, which declared that all laws of the United States should be
in force in the territory,
"so far as the same, or any
provision thereof, may be applicable," did not extend over the
country any portion either of the general Preemption Act of
September, 1841, or of the Act of May 23, 1844, commonly known as
the "Town Site Act."
4. The right to a patent, once vested, is equivalent, as
respects the government dealing with the public lands, to a patent
issued. When issued, the patent, so far its may be necessary to cut
off intervening claimants, relates back to the inception of the
right of the patentee.
5. A patent issued to the corporate authorities of the City of
Portland, in Oregon, in December, 1850, upon an entry made under
the Town Site Act of May 23, 1844, passed no title to the land
covered by the donation claim of a person whose right to a patent
was perfected previously to such entry, and whose claim was
surveyed previously to the Act of July 17, 1854; by which the Town
Site Act was extended, though with qualifications, to Oregon
Territory.
A. and L. Starr, asserting themselves to be owners in possession
of certain parcels of land
in the City of Portland,
Oregon, and derived by title from that city, filed a bill in equity
in one of the state courts of Oregon to quiet their title to the
land against an ownership set up to it by one Stark, and to have a
patent for it which had issued to Stark surrendered.
Page 73 U. S. 403
The bill was founded on a statute of Oregon which provides
that
"Any person in possession of real property may maintain a suit
in equity against another who claims an estate or interest therein
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such claim, estate,
or interest."
The title which the bill asserted to be void, and which it
sought to have declared so, arose as follows:
Previously to the Treaty with Great Britain of June 15, 1846, by
which the boundary line between the possessions of that country and
the United States west of the Rocky Mountains was established, the
region known as Oregon was claimed by both countries, and the
emigrants there from the United States and from Great Britain held
joint possession of the country under the treaty between the two
nations, of October 20, 1818, which was continued in force by the
convention of August 6, 1827.
In 1845, the inhabitants of this territory established a
provisional government for purposes of mutual protection and to
secure peace and prosperity among themselves, and they adopted laws
and regulations for their government until such time as the United
States should extend their jurisdiction over them.
Under the provisional government, each settler was entitled to
claim 640 acres of land, upon complying with certain conditions of
improvement &c.
In 1848, Congress established the territorial government of
Oregon. [
Footnote 1] The
fourteenth section of the act which did this, recognized and
continued in force the laws adopted by the provisional government,
and declared that the laws of the United States were extended over
the territory,
"so far as the same, or any provision thereof,
may be applicable;" but all laws granting or affecting lands
were declared to be void. And Congress itself soon afterwards
passed an act on the subject of titles. The Act of September 27,
1850, commonly called the Donation Act of Oregon, [
Footnote 2] provided (§ 4), that there
should be granted to settlers or occupants of the
Page 73 U. S. 404
public lands, then residing in the said territory, or who should
become residents thereof on or before the first day of December,
1850, and who should have resided upon and cultivated the same for
four consecutive years, and should otherwise conform to the
provisions of the act, one-half section, or 320 acres of land, if a
single man, and if married, or becoming married within one year
from December 1st, 1850, one section, or 640 acres;
provided, however, the donation should embrace the land
actually occupied and cultivated by the settler on it.
The sixth section of this act required that the settler should
notify to the Surveyor General the tract claimed under the law
within three months after the survey had been made, and the seventh
section provided, that within twelve months after the surveys had
been made each person claiming a donation right under the act
should
prove to the satisfaction of the Surveyor General,
the commencement of the settlement and cultivation required, and
after the expiration of the four years from the date of such
settlement, should prove,
in like manner, by two
disinterested witnesses, the continued residence and cultivation
required by the fourth section of this act. The act went on:
"Upon such proof being made, the Surveyor General, or other
officer appointed by law for that purpose, shall issue
certificates, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, setting forth the facts in
the case, and specifying the land. . . . And the Surveyor General
shall return the proof so taken, to the office of the Commissioner
of the General Land Office, and if the said commissioner shall find
no valid objection thereto, patents shall issue for the land,
according to the certificates aforesaid, upon the surrender
thereof."
In professed accordance with these provisions, and the
regulations made by the General Land Office, the defendant, in May,
1852, within three months after the survey of the land had been
made, gave to the Surveyor General notice of the tract claimed by
him, and within twelve months after the
Page 73 U. S. 405
survey proved,
to the satisfaction of the Surveyor
General, that the settlement and cultivation had been
commenced on the 1st of September, 1849, and afterwards on the 10th
of September, 1853, proved, in like manner, by two disinterested
witnesses, the fact of his continued residence and cultivation for
four years, which had previously expired; this having been done in
the form and manner usual in the department.
In September, 1853, the Surveyor General issued to the party a
donation certificate, reciting the claim of a donation right made
by him to a tract of land described; that proof had been made to
his satisfaction that the settlement was commenced on the 1st of
September, 1849, four years previous to the date thereof, and that
the fact of his continued residence and cultivation since that
period had been established by two disinterested witnesses; and he
forwarded the certificate to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, accompanied by the proof of the facts recited, in order
that a patent might issue to the claimant for the tract described,
provided he found no valid objection thereto. No objection was
found by the commissioner except a supposed application to the
tract in question of an act of Congress of May 23, 1844, commonly
known as the Town Site Act, the nature of which will appear further
on in stating the title on the other side, and which was relied on
as in part making that title. The evidence of settlement &c.,
was by him considered ample, and the certificate satisfactory; and
a patent was issued thereon to Stark, the defendant.
Such was the title -- a documentary one -- sought to be put
aside.
The documentary title of the Starrs, alleged by their bill to be
superior to it, will be stated directly. Their bill not only,
however, set up title in themselves, alleging it superior to the
documentary title as presented by the other side, but it alleged
that Stark had not made in point of fact any such settlement and
cultivation as he had brought persons to swear to before the
commissioner, and that the certificate on which he got this patent,
was false, and his patent
Page 73 U. S. 406
consequently void. This was a question of fact on which evidence
was taken. The answer denied the allegations thus made.
The documentary case of the Starrs was thus:
An act of Congress passed September 4, 1841, [
Footnote 3] provides that every person who
shall have made a settlement on the public lands "which have been
or shall have been surveyed prior thereto" shall be authorized to
enter any number of acres, not exceeding one hundred and sixty,
upon paying the minimum price.
An act of May 23, 1844, entitled "An act for the relief of the
citizens of
towns upon the lands of the United States
under certain circumstances" [
Footnote 4] (the act already mentioned as the Town Site
Act) provides as follows:
"Whenever any portion of the
surveyed public lands has
been or shall be settled upon and occupied as a town site, and
therefore not subject to entry under the existing preemption laws,
it shall be lawful, in case such town shall be incorporated, for
the corporate authorities . . . to enter at the proper land office
and at the minimum price, the land so settled and occupied,"
&c.
On the 17th of July, 1854, Congress enacted that donations
thereafter to be surveyed in Oregon Territory, claimed
under the Donation Act of September 27, 1850, should in no case
include a town site or lands settled upon for purposes of business
or trade and not for agriculture, and that all legal subdivisions
included in whole or in part in such town sites or settled upon for
purposes of business or trade and not for agriculture, should be
subject to the operations of the Town Site Act of May 23, 1844;
whether such settlements were made before or after the surveys.
On the 1st of February, 1858, and while the claim of Stark was
pending before the Commissioner, the corporate authorities of the
City of Portland made an entry under the Town Site Act of May 23,
1844, of lands within the city limits to the extent of 307 49/100
acres, which included the premises in
Page 73 U. S. 407
controversy, in trust for the several use and benefit of the
occupants thereof, and presented to the commissioner a certificate
of the register of the land office, in Oregon, of their having made
full payment for the same. The commissioner accordingly issued a
patent to
them.
The patent to the city authorities was dated 7 December, 1860,
that to Stark the day following, it having been intended that they
should be issued on the same day. Each contained reciprocal
reservations in favor of the rights conveyed by the other.
The court in which the bill was filed, granted the relief prayed
for, and the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon having affirmed
their decree, the case was now here under the twenty-fifth section
of the Judiciary Act.
Page 73 U. S. 409
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit in equity to quite the title of the plaintiff to
certain parcels of land situated in the City of Portland, in the
State of Oregon. It is founded upon a statute of that state which
provides that
"Any person in possession of real property may maintain a suit
in equity against another who claims an estate or interest therein
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such claim, estate,
or interest."
This statute confers a jurisdiction beyond that ordinarily
exercised by courts of equity to afford relief in the quieting of
title and possession of real property. By the ordinary jurisdiction
of those courts, a suit would not lie for that purpose unless the
possession of the plaintiff had been previously disturbed by legal
proceedings on the part of the defendant and the right of the
plaintiff had been sustained by successive judgments in his favor.
[
Footnote 5]
The equity asserted in such cases had its origin in the
prolonged litigation which the action of ejectment permitted. That
action being founded upon a fictitious demise between fictitious
parties, a recovery therein constituted no bar to a second similar
action, or to any number of similar actions for the same premises.
With slight changes in these fictions, a new action might be
instituted and conducted as though no previous action had ever been
commenced. Thus the party in possession, though successful in every
case, might
Page 73 U. S. 410
be harassed if not ruined by the continued litigation. To
prevent such litigation after one or more trials and to secure
peace to the party in possession, courts of equity interposed upon
proper application and terminated the controversy.
By the statute in question, it is unnecessary in order to obtain
this interposition of equity for the party in possession to delay
his suit until his possession has been disturbed by legal
proceedings and judgment in those proceedings has passed in his
favor. It is sufficient that a party out of possession claims an
estate or interest in the property adverse to him. He can then at
once commence his suit, and require the nature and character of
such adverse estate or interest to be set forth and subjected to
judicial investigation and determination, and that the right of
possession as between him and the claimant shall be forever
quieted.
We do not, however, understand that the mere naked possession of
the plaintiff is sufficient to authorize him to institute the suit
and require an exhibition of the estate of the adverse claimant,
though the language of the statute is that "any person in
possession, by himself or his tenant, may maintain" the suit. His
possession must be accompanied with a claim of right -- that is,
must be founded upon title, legal or equitable, and such claim or
title must be exhibited by the proofs, and perhaps in the pleadings
also, before the adverse claimant can be required to produce the
evidence upon which he rests his claim of an adverse estate or
interest.
In this case, the plaintiff asserts title to the premises in
dispute under a patent of the United States bearing date on the 7th
day of December, 1860, purporting to be issued to the corporate
authorities of the City of Portland, under the Town Site Act of
Congress of May 23, 1844, entitled "An act for the relief of the
citizens of towns upon the lands of the United States under certain
circumstances," [
Footnote 6]
and the defendant claims title to the premises under a patent of
the United States bearing date on the 8th day of December, 1860,
purporting to be issued to him under the Donation Act
Page 73 U. S. 411
of September 27, 1850, entitled
"An act to create the office of Surveyor General of the Public
Lands of Oregon and to provide for the survey and to make donations
to the settlers of the said public lands. [
Footnote 7]"
By the fourth section of this Donation Act, a grant was made to
every white settler or occupant of public land in Oregon above the
age of eighteen years -- who was a citizen of the United States or
had made a declaration according to law of his intention to become
a citizen or should make such declaration on or before the 1st day
of December, 1851, and who was at the time a resident of the
territory or might become a resident on or before the 1st of
December, 1850, and who should reside upon and cultivate the land
for four consecutive years, and otherwise conform to the provisions
of the act -- of three hundred and twenty acres of land, if a
single man, or if a married man or if he should become married
within a year from the 1st of said December, then six hundred and
forty acres, one-half to himself and the other half to his wife, to
be held by her in her own right, the donation in all cases to
embrace the land actually occupied and cultivated by the
settler.
By the sixth section, the settler was required, within three
months after the survey of the land was made, to notify to the
Surveyor General of the United States the tract claimed by him
under the act. By the seventh section, any person claiming a
donation right was required, within twelve months after the survey
was made or where the survey was made before the settlement, then
within that period after the settlement commenced, "to prove to the
satisfaction of the Surveyor General" or of such other officer as
might be appointed by law for that purpose the commencement of the
settlement and cultivation required by the act, and after the
expiration of four years from the date of such settlement, to prove
in like manner, by two disinterested witnesses, the continued
residence and cultivation required by the fourth section. And the
act declared that upon such proof's being made, the
Page 73 U. S. 412
Surveyor General or other officer appointed by law for that
purpose should issue certificates, under such rules and regulations
as might be prescribed by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, setting forth the facts and specifying the land to which
the parties were entitled, and that the Surveyor General should
return the proof thus taken to the office of the Commissioner of
the General Land Office, and if the Commissioner should find no
valid objection thereto, patents should issue for the land
according to the certificates, upon their surrender.
In pursuance of these provisions, and the regulations made by
the General Land Office to carry the act into effect, the
defendant, in May, 1852, within three months after the survey of
the land had been made, gave to the Surveyor General notice of the
tract claimed by him, and within twelve months after the survey
proved, to the satisfaction of the Surveyor General, that the
settlement and cultivation had been commenced on the 1st of
September, 1849, and afterwards on the 10th of September, 1853,
proved by two disinterested witnesses the fact of his continued
residence upon and cultivation of the same for four consecutive
years, which had then expired.
On the completion of this latter proof, on the 10th of
September, 1853, the Surveyor General issued the required
certificate, reciting therein the claim of a donation right made by
Stark to a certain described tract of land; that proof had been
made to his satisfaction that the settlement of Stark was commenced
on the 1st of September, 1849, four years previous to the date
thereof, and that the fact of his continued residence and
cultivation since that period had been established by two
disinterested witnesses; and he forwarded the certificate to the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, accompanied by the proof
of the facts recited, in order that a patent might issue to the
claimant for the tract described, if he found no valid objection
thereto. No objection was found by him except such as arose from
the supposed application to the tract in question of the Town Site
Act of May 23, 1844, which we shall presently examine. The evidence
was considered
Page 73 U. S. 413
ample and the certificate satisfactory; and on the 8th of
December, 1860, a patent was issued thereon to the defendant.
At the outset, however, the commissioner objected to the issue
of this patent upon the ground that the land was brought under the
operation of the Town Site Act by the organic law of August 14,
1848, establishing the territorial government of Oregon, and was
not subject to disposition under the Donation Act of 1850. And
whilst the claim of Stark for a patent was pending before him, the
corporate authorities of the City of Portland made an entry of the
lands within the city limits to the extent of three hundred and
seven acres and forty-nine hundredths of an acre, which included
the premises in controversy, in trust for the several use and
benefit of the occupants thereof, and presented to the commissioner
a certificate of the register of the land office in Oregon of their
having made full payment for the same. The commissioner accordingly
issued a patent to them bearing date on the 7th of December, 1860,
reserving, however, from its operation, any valid claims which
might exist in virtue of the several donations to Stark and
others.
The patent to Stark bearing date on the following day contains a
reservation of a similar character in favor of the City of
Portland. It grants the land subject to such rights as might exist
in virtue of the entry by the city.
It was the intention of the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, and it was so directed by him, that the two patents should
bear even date and be issued simultaneously. The omission to comply
with his direction in this particular is, however, immaterial, for
if the Town Site Act was not in force in Oregon before the right of
Stark to a patent of his donation claim became perfected, the
reservation of the patent was inoperative and void. That right
became perfected when the certificate of the Surveyor General and
accompanying proof were received by the commissioner of the general
and office, and he found no valid objection to them. That is to
say, if the Donation Act of 1850 was applicable to the lands, his
right to a patent became perfect
Page 73 U. S. 414
when the certificate of the surveyor and accompanying proof
showed, in the judgment of the commissioner, a compliance with its
requirements. That they were satisfactory to his judgment in this
respect follows from the subsequent issue by him of the patent. His
objection to the patent, as we have already said, arose not from
any defect in the certificate or proof, but from an opinion that
the lands were subject to the provisions of the Town Site Act of
1844. That he was mistaken in this opinion we are entirely
satisfied. The act of 1844 is only a part of the general land
system of the United States, and is supplementary to the General
Preemption Act of September, 1841. The act of 1841 confers the
right of preemption upon individual settlers, reserving, however,
from entry by them all lands selected as town sites; the act of
1844 allows the entry of lands thus selected to be made, if the
town is incorporated, by the corporate authorities, and if not
incorporated, by the judges of the county in which the town is
situated, the entry to be made in trust for the several use and
benefit of the occupants. Both acts limit the right of entry to
surveyed lands. Neither individual nor city could claim
this right with respect to any lands until they had been surveyed
by the officers of the government. Every person, says the act of
1841, who shall make a settlement on the public lands "which have
been, or shall have been
surveyed prior thereto," shall be
authorized to enter any number of acres, not exceeding one hundred
and sixty, upon paying the minimum price.
"Whenever any portion of the
surveyed public lands,"
read the act of 1844,
"has been or shall be settled upon and occupied as a town site,
and therefore not subject to entry under the existing preemption
laws, it shall be lawful, in case such town shall be incorporated,
for the corporate authorities, and if not incorporated, for the
judges of the county in which such town may be situated, to enter
at the proper land office and at the minimum price, the land so
settled and occupied,"
&c.
It is not pretended that any public surveys had been extended
over Oregon previous to the act of 1850, or were ever
Page 73 U. S. 415
authorized by the government. There were, therefore, no surveyed
lands of which any entry could be made either by an individual or
by any corporate authorities. The laws of Congress relating to
preemption by individuals or entries by municipal authorities had,
therefore, no application to the condition of things in Oregon at
that time. The Act of August 14, 1848, organizing the Territory of
Oregon, which declared that all laws of the United States should be
in force in the territory,
"so far as the same, or any
provision thereof, may be applicable," did not extend over the
country any portion either of the act of 1841 or of the act of
1844. [
Footnote 8]
"It is well known," says Mr. Justice Deady of the United States
District Court of Oregon in considering this subject in
Lownsdale v. City of Portland,
"that at the time of the organization of Oregon Territory, an
anomalous state of things existed here. The country was extensively
settled, and the people were living under an independent government
established by themselves. They were a community, in the full sense
of the word, engaged in agriculture, trade, commerce, and the
mechanic arts; had built towns, opened and improved farms,
established highways, passed revenue laws and collected taxes, made
war and concluded peace. As a necessity of their condition and the
cornerstone of their government and social fabric, they had
established a 'land law' regulating the possession and occupation
of the soil among themselves. That all this was well known to
Congress at the time of the passage of the act of 1848 would be
highly probable from its historic importance, and is certain to
have been so from the language of the act itself. [
Footnote 9]"
"The leading feature of the land law of the provisional
government was that which provided that every male inhabitant of
the country over a certain age should hold and possess 640 acres of
land. The uses that the land might be put to were immaterial. The
occupant might cultivate, pasture it, or, if the possessed a good
site and had the thrift and
Page 73 U. S. 416
enterprise, he might build a town upon it. In the disposition of
the public lands, this state of things called for peculiar
legislation different
in toto from that required in an
unsettled country. Under these circumstances it is to be presumed
that the act of 1844 -- an obscure and special provision of the
then existing land system of the United States -- was extended over
this country and the general provisions of the same contained in
the Preemption Act of 1841 left behind? Nothing can be more
unreasonable. It would tax the ingenuity of man to find a provision
in the land system of the United States, as it stood in 1848, less
applicable to the condition of the country or that would have
worked greater hardship, confusion and injustice than the act of
1844. [
Footnote 10]"
The Act of Congress of September 28, 1850, "to provide for
extending the laws and the judicial system of the United States to
the state of California" declared, "that all the laws of the United
States not locally inapplicable" should have the same force and
effect within that state as elsewhere in the United States, yet it
was never supposed that this provision had the effect of extending
over the state any portion of the land system of the United States
in advance of the public surveys upon which that system rested and
without which, as the law then stood, that system was inoperative.
[
Footnote 11] But, on the
contrary, on the 3d of March, 1853, Congress, by special act,
provided for the survey of the public lands in that state, and made
them, so far as individual preemption was concerned, with some
exceptions, subject to the act of 1841, and when occupied as towns
or villages, except when located on or near mineral lands, subject
to the provisions of the act of 1944. [
Footnote 12] This special legislation, with the
exception of a few particulars, would have been unnecessary had
those laws been extended over the state by force of the Act of
September 28, 1850. So too, the acts organizing the Territories of
New Mexico, Kansas, and Nebraska contained similar provisions, and
extended the laws of the United States over them so far as
Page 73 U. S. 417
they were not locally inapplicable; yet subsequent special
legislation was deemed necessary to extend any portion of the
public land system over them. [
Footnote 13]
The Donation Act of 1850 is of itself evidence that Congress did
not then consider the acts of 1841 or 1844 applicable to Oregon.
That law established no system of preemption, nor recognized any
such system as having been previously in existence in the
territory. It substantially gave to every settler, upon certain
conditions, the land which he occupied, excepting only mineral and
saline lands, and such parcels as might be reserved by the
President for forts, arsenals, and other public uses. The law, as
well observes Mr. Justice Deady in the able opinion from which we
have already cited, "was a system complete within itself, and
admirably adapted to the condition of the people and the country as
it found them," and was "a practical recognition and confirmation
of the land law of the provisional government."
A similar view of the subject was taken by the supreme court of
the state, after full examination, in the case of
Marlin v.
T'Vault. [
Footnote 14]
That court concludes a well considered opinion by stating that the
people of the state had universally acted upon the belief that the
act of 1844 was not in force there, and that the effect of a
contrary rule would be to unsettle rights, and strike a blow at the
prosperity of nearly every town in Oregon.
We are clear that the Town Site Act of 1844 was not extended to
Oregon until the 17th of July, 1854, and even then that it only
operated to exclude lands occupied as town sites or settled upon
for purposes of business or trade from a donation claim which had
not been previously surveyed. [
Footnote 15] Before the passage of this act, the claim of
the defendant Stark had been surveyed and the required proof of his
settlement and continued occupation and residence made, and such
steps had been taken as to perfect his right to a patent.
Page 73 U. S. 418
The lands embraced by his claim had then ceased to be the
subject of purchase from the United States by any person, natural
or artificial. The right to a patent once vested is treated by the
government, when dealing with the public lands, as equivalent to a
patent issued. When, in fact, the patent does issue, it relates
back to the inception of the right of the patentee, so far as it
may be necessary, to cut off intervening claimants.
It follows from the views expressed that the plaintiff derived
no title or estate in the premises in dispute by force of the
patent to the corporate authorities of the City of Portland.
Although there was at the commencement of this suit no legislation
by the State of Oregon for the execution of the trust to which the
act of 1844 contemplates that municipal authorities in receiving a
patent shall be subjected, we have considered the case as though
the trust had been executed, and the plaintiff, as one of the
beneficiaries, had become invested with all the estate and right
the authorities could possibly impart. Those authorities, not
having received any title or estate in the premises in controversy,
could of course impart none to the plaintiff. His position is
therefore reduced to that of a mere possessor without title. Such
possession is entirely insufficient to justify the interposition of
equity for the determination of the defendant's title, even under
the very liberal act of Oregon. The plaintiff must first show in
himself some right, legal or equitable, in the premises before he
can call in question the validity of the title of the
defendant.
This case differs very materially from that of
Garland v.
Wynn, [
Footnote 16] or
that of
Lindsay v. Hawes, [
Footnote 17] and other cases to which the counsel of the
plaintiff has referred. In
Garland v. Wynn, there had been
a conflict between two claimants of a right of preemption to the
same land under different statutes. The register and receiver of
the local land office decided in favor of the assignor of Garland,
and gave him a patent certificate. The Commissioner of the General
Land
Page 73 U. S. 419
Office approved of the decision and issued the patent to
Garland. Wynn, the other claimant, whose entry was the oldest and
had been once allowed, thereupon filed his bill in equity asserting
his prior right to the land and his equitable title to the patent.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas sustained the bill and ordered the
patentee to execute a conveyance of the land to the complainant,
and on appeal this Court affirmed the decision.
In
Lindsay v. Hawes, the ancestor of the complainant
had obtained a preemption right to the land in dispute, and
received a patent certificate for the same. Some years afterwards,
the defendant, Hawes, claimed a like preemption right to the land,
and received a similar certificate, upon which a patent was issued
to him. The suit was brought by the heirs of the first preemptor to
compel a conveyance of the legal title acquired by the patent from
the patentee, and parties claiming under him with notice. This
Court held that the first preemptor had acquired the better right
to the land, and was therefore entitled to a conveyance of the
legal title.
These are only applications of the well established doctrine
that where one party has acquired the legal title to property to
which another has the better right, a court of equity will convert
him into a trustee of the true owner and compel him to convey the
legal title. The same observation will apply to the other cases
cited by counsel. They have no pertinency to the case at bar, for
here no prior or better right to the land in dispute is shown in
the plaintiff.
The view we have taken has rendered it unnecessary to look into
the evidence embodied in the record respecting the original
settlement and residence of the defendant, or to consider how far
it impeaches the proof presented by him to the Surveyor General in
support of his donation claim.
The decree of the Supreme Court of Oregon must be reversed,
and that court instructed to enter a decree directing the circuit
court to dismiss the suit, and it is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
9 Stat. at Large 323.
[
Footnote 2]
9
id. 496.
[
Footnote 3]
§ 10; 5 Stat. at Large 455.
[
Footnote 4]
5
id. 657.
[
Footnote 5]
Shepley v. Rangely, Davies 242;
Devonsher v.
Newenham, 2 Schoales & Lefroy 208;
Curtis v.
Sutter, 15 Cal. 257.
[
Footnote 6]
5 Stat. at Large 657
[
Footnote 7]
9 Stat. at Large 496.
[
Footnote 8]
9 Stat. at Large 323, § 14.
[
Footnote 9]
See sections 14 and 17 of the act of 1848.
[
Footnote 10]
1 Ore. 391.
[
Footnote 11]
9 Stat. at Large 521.
[
Footnote 12]
10
id. 244.
[
Footnote 13]
9 Stat. at Large 452, § 17; 10
id. 277, §
32.
[
Footnote 14]
1 Ore. 77.
[
Footnote 15]
10 Stat. at Large 305, § 1.
[
Footnote 16]
61 U. S. 20 How.
6.
[
Footnote 17]
67 U. S. 2 Black
554.
