Under several acts of Congress, the register and receiver of the
land office were authorized to grant a certificate to every person
who should appear to be entitled to land in the section of country
east of the Mississippi River and west of the Perdido River.
Under these acts, Robert Yair received a certificate in 1824 for
the land now in controversy.
In 1848, the register and receiver decided that Nancy Tate had
settled upon this land at a very early day. They annulled the
former certificate and granted an order of survey, by means of
which a patent was issued in 1853 to the representatives of Nancy
Tate. The patent reserves the right of Robert Yair.
The decision of the register and receiver upon this question of
title is not conclusive. They have power only to decide how the
lands confirmed shall be surveyed and located. They had no
authority to overthrow the decision of the register and receiver
that had been made more than twenty years before, which had been
followed by possession, and as to which there had intervened the
claims of
bona fide purchasers.
This case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of
Louisiana, holding sessions for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
being issued under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary
Act.
The headnote has given an outline of the case so that the reader
can understand it, and the opinion of the Court contains a full
statement.
Tate was sued in the court below, and disclaimed title otherwise
than as one of the heirs of Nancy Tate, whose other heirs then
intervened.
Page 65 U. S. 358
Carney and the others claimed under Yair's title.
The Supreme court of Louisiana rejected the claim of the heirs
of Nancy Tate, who brought the case up to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This cause comes before this Court by a writ of error to the
Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, under the 25th section of
the Judiciary Act of September, 1789. The defendant in error Carney
commenced a suit in the District Court of the 8th Judicial District
of Louisiana, in which he asserted that he had purchased, in the
year 1844, at the probate sale of the succession of Sarah Cohern,
deceased, five hundred and sixty acres of land on Cool Creek in
that district, and that Charles Tate had disturbed his possession
and denied his title. He summoned Charles Tate to exhibit his claim
to the land, and required the representatives of Sarah Cohern,
deceased, to maintain the title they had warranted to him or to
refund the purchase money he had paid. The result of various
proceedings in the district court was the forming of an issue
between the defendant in error and the plaintiffs in error relative
to their respective rights in the said parcel of land. It is
situated in the section of country east of the Mississippi River
and the Island of New Orleans and west of the Perdido River which
was claimed by the United States under the Treaty of Paris of 1803
for the cession of Louisiana, and which was adversely claimed and
possessed by Spain as a portion of West Florida until 1812-1813.
The act of Congress for ascertaining the titles and claims to lands
in that part of Louisiana which lies east of the Mississippi River
and Island of New Orleans, approved 25 April, 1812, is the first of
the series of acts that apply to this district. 2 Stat. 713. The
8th section requires the commissioners to be appointed under the
act to collect and report to Congress, at their next session, a
list of all the actual settlers on land in said districts,
respectively, who have no
Page 65 U. S. 359
claims to land derived either from the French, British, or
Spanish governments, and the time at which such settlements were
made. The reports made by the commissioners appointed under the act
of 1812 were submitted to Congress, and are the subject of the act
of the 3 March, 1819, for adjusting the claims to land, and
establishing land offices in the district east of the Island of New
Orleans. 3 Stat. 528.
The third section of this act provides
"That every person whose claim is comprised in the lists or
register of claims reported by the said commissioners, and the
persons embraced in the list of actual settlers not having any
written evidence of claim reported as aforesaid, shall, when it
appears by the said reports or by the said lists that the land
claimed or settled on had been actually inhabited or cultivated by
such person or persons in whose right he claims, on or before the
fifteenth of April, 1813, be entitled to a grant for the land so
claimed or settled on as a donation; provided that not more than
one tract shall be thus granted to anyone person, and the same
shall not contain more than six hundred and forty acres. By the 9th
section of this act, the register and receiver of the land offices
in that district were authorized to make additions to the list of
settlers, noting the time of their settlement, and to report the
same to Congress. These, with other reports, were disposed of in
the supplementary act for adjusting land claims in that district,
adopted 8 May, 1822. 3 Stat. 707. The third section of the act of
1822 is in the same language as the corresponding section in the
act of 1819 before cited. The sixth section of this act requires
the register and receiver to grant a certificate to every person
who shall appear to be entitled to a tract of land under the third
section of the act, setting forth the nature of the claim and the
quantity allowed. In 1820, Robert Yair made proof in the land
office that in the year 1805 he had settled upon a parcel of land
in the district, and had occupied and cultivated it from that time
until the date of his application and proof. His claim was reported
to Congress, and in 1824 a certificate issued to him for that land,
which is the land in controversy. Robert Yair continued to occupy
the land until his death, in 1825 or 1826, when it passed
Page 65 U. S. 360
to his widow and heirs. The defendant in error Carney traces his
title to these heirs. The claim of the plaintiffs in error is
traced to Nancy Tate, their ancestress, who made a settlement in
the same district in 1811, and whose claim was reported under the
act of 1812, before cited."
In the year 1847, her heirs applied to the register and receiver
of the land office in that district for an order of survey, in
which application they represented that Nancy Tate was entitled to
a section of land under the acts of Congress aforesaid; that she
had settled upon public land in an adjoining section, forty-one;
that John Tate was settled upon the same section; and that both
could not have their complement of land, from their proximity, out
of land contiguous to their settlement. But that there was vacant
land to the east and northeast, not claimed by any person,
sufficient to make up the quantity she had been entitled to, and
prayed for the order, as one that could not injure any other
person. The register and receiver caused a notice to be served on
the defendant in error to show cause why the order should not be
granted. There is no evidence that he appeared on this notice.
In February, 1848, the register and receiver made a decision in
which they declared that Nancy Tate had settled upon this land,
that they were satisfied that Robert Yair, at the time of the
confirmation to him, was the holder of another donation for one
thousand arpents, and that he was not entitled to this under the
act of 1822, for that reason. They annulled the certificate that
had been issued to him and granted the order of survey as applied
for. The survey was made to include this land, and a patent was
issued in favor of the representatives of Nancy Tate in 1853. This
patent describes the land as covered by the claim of Robert Yair,
and releases the land, subject to any valid right, if such exists,
in virtue of the confirmed claim of Robert Yair or of any other
person claiming from the United States, the French, British, or
Spanish governments. The Supreme Court of Louisiana have found from
the testimony that Nancy Tate was not an occupant of this land, and
that the settlement of Robert Yair and his representatives had been
continuous for some forty years. The
Page 65 U. S. 361
question for the consideration of this Court is whether the
decision of the register and receiver of the land office in favor
of the plaintiffs in error is conclusive of the controversy. The
Supreme Court decided that it was not, and we concur in that
opinion.
In
Doe v. Eslava,
9 How. 421, the defendant in error relied upon a decision of the
register and receiver of a land office in the same district, with
the same powers as were confirmed upon these, as conclusive in his
favor. This Court answered:
"We do not consider that the act of May 8, 1822, and that of the
same date, which is connected with it, and referred to as
in
pari materia, for a guide, meant to confer the adjudication of
titles of land on registers and receivers. Sometimes, as in the
case of preemptioners, they are authorized to decide on the fact of
cultivation or not; and here, from the words used, no less than
their character, they must be considered as empowered to decide on
the true location of grants or confirmations, but not on the legal
and often complicated questions of title, involving, also, the
whole interests of the parties, and yet allowing no appeal or
revision elsewhere. The power given to them is, to decide only how
the lands confirmed shall be located and surveyed. The further
power to decide on conflicting and interfering claims should apply
only to the location and survey of such claims, which are the
subject matter of their cognizance; and on resorting to the
reference made to the second act of Congress, that act appears also
to relate to decisions on intrusions upon possessions and other
kindred matters."
The case of
Cousin v.
Blanc, 19 How. 203, involved a question of the
effect and binding operation of a decision of the register and
receiver of the land office upon a location and survey of a claim
confirmed under the act of 1822, and refers to the Act of the 3
March, 1831, as showing that the decisions of the register and
receiver were not to be considered as precluding a legal
investigation and decision by the proper judicial tribunals between
the parties to interfering claims. 4 Stat. 492.
It furnishes no support of the argument that the decision
Page 65 U. S. 362
of the register and receiver in such a case as this is
conclusive of the title. There is no dispute in this case upon the
subject of the location of the claim of Yair. The whole case shows
that it had been identified and was actually possessed by Yair and
his heirs. The patent of the defendants in error acknowledges that
its location had been made, and that the new survey for the claim
of Mrs. Tate covered this location. The decision of the register
and receiver does not proceed upon any assumption of a conflict of
location, but of a denial of the right of Yair. They had no
authority to overthrow the decision of the register and receiver
that had been made more than twenty years before, which had been
followed by possession, and as to which there had intervened the
claims of
bona fide purchasers. It further appears that
Mrs. Tate did not settle upon this parcel of land, and that the
decision of the register and receiver in her favor is not supported
by testimony. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana does
not contain any error within the scope of the revising jurisdiction
of this Court, and it is consequently
Affirmed.