Where the plaintiffs in ejectment showed a legal title to land
in California under a patent from the United States and a survey
under their authority, it was proper in the court below to refuse
to admit testimony offered by the defendants to show that the
survey was incorrect, the defendants claiming under a merely
equitable title.
Where the defendants pleaded severally the general issue, it was
proper for the court below to instruct the jury to bring in a
general verdict against all those who had not shown that they were
in possession of separate parcels.
The mode of proceeding by petition does not alter the law of
ejectment under the old system of pleading.
Page 65 U. S. 269
It was an action of ejectment brought, by way of petition, by
the defendants in error against Greer and twenty-nine other
persons. The plaintiffs below represented the interests of
Arguello, whose title was confirmed by this Court in
59 U. S. 18 How.
539, to that portion of the land described in the petition, bounded
as follows,
viz., on the south by the Arroyo or Creek of
San Francisquito, on the north by the Creek San Mateo, on the east
by the estuary or waters of the Bay of San Francisco, and on the
west by the eastern borders of the valley known as Canada de
Raymundo, said land being of the extent of four leagues in length
and one in breadth, be the same more or less.
A survey of this land was made by John C. Hays, United States
Surveyor General for California, who returned the field notes with
a map to the Commissioner of the General Land Office on the 19th of
December, 1856. This survey and map included 35,240 acres.
A patent was issued on the 2d of October, 1857, which followed
the field notes, and granted the land as follows:
To Maria de la Solidad Ortega de Arguello, one equal undivided
half.
To Jose Ramon Arguello, one equal undivided fourth part.
To Luis Antonio Arguello, one equal undivided tenth part.
To S. M. Mezes, three equal undivided twentieth parts thereof,
but with the stipulation that in virtue of the fifteenth section of
3 March, 1851, the confirmation of this said claim and this patent
shall not affect the rights of third persons.
At July Term, 1858, of the Circuit Court of the United States
for the Districts of California, in and for the Northern District,
this ejectment was brought, at first in the name of Mezes alone,
the bill having been filed on March 16, 1858. Pleas were put in to
the jurisdiction upon the ground that Mezes was not an alien nor a
subject of the Queen of Spain, as he had alleged. Afterwards, in
October, 1858, an amended bill was filed, making parties of those
persons who are named as defendants in
Page 65 U. S. 270
error in the caption of this report, Luis Antonio Arguello
having conveyed his interest to Mezes.
In November, 1858, the cause came on for trial. The principal
points in that court and in this arose upon the rulings of the
court upon the admission of evidence, under the following
circumstances:
John Greer, the principal defendant, had married Maria Louisa,
the widow of John Coppinger, and in behalf of his wife and of
Manuela Coppinger, an infant child of John, had petitioned for the
confirmation of a grant alleged to have been made to John Coppinger
by Alvarado on 3d of August, 1840, containing twenty-seven square
miles of territory.
On 23 November, 1853, the board of commissioners decided that
the claim was valid and decreed that it should be confirmed.
On the 8th of January, 1855, Mr. Cushing, Attorney General,
filed a notice that the United States would appeal to the District
Court of the United States for the Northern District of
California.
On the 14th January, 1856, the district judge, Ogden Hoffman,
decreed that said decision be and the same is hereby affirmed. And
it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the claim of the
appellees be confirmed to the tract of land known as "Canada de
Raymundo," being the same now occupied by the said appellees, and
bounded and described as follows,
viz., bordering to the
west on the Sierra Morena, to the east on the rancho de las Pulgas,
to the south on the rancho of Maximo Martinez, and to the north on
the Great Lagune. Reference for further description to be had to a
map, which is made a part of document marked C, and filed in this
case.
In November, 1856, in consequence of a notice by the Attorney
General that no appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
would be taken, judge Hoffman decreed that the claimants have leave
to proceed under the decree of that court heretofore rendered in
their favor as on final decree.
What other steps were taken by Greer, the record did not show.
As his title stood at the time of the trial, it appeared to be an
equitable title only, the decision of the board of
commissioners
Page 65 U. S. 271
not passing the legal title, and there having been no subsequent
survey and patent.
Upon the trial below, the plaintiffs made out their title by the
patent and map, and proved that some of the defendants were
residing upon the land.
The defendants then offered to prove that the grant to
Coppinger, and the confirmation thereof, embraced all the land in
controversy in this suit, and that all the defendants at the time
of the institution of this suit were in possession of such portions
of the premises as were occupied by them under the grant to
Coppinger, and deriving title therefrom.
The defendants further offered to prove that the survey and
patent given in evidence by the plaintiffs were erroneous in
respect to the location of the western line of the Las Pulgas
ranch, and that if said line was properly located, according to the
grant to Luis Arguello's heirs, or according to the decree of the
Supreme Court of the United States confirming said claim, it would
not embrace any of the land occupied by the defendants, or either
of them.
The defendants further offered to prove that the western line of
the Las Pulgas ranch, as established by the patent and survey given
in evidence by the plaintiffs, does not stop at the eastern borders
of the Canada de Raymundo, but embraces a large portion of the
level valley land of the said canada, occupied and held by the
defendants, or some of them, under the grant to Coppinger.
All of which proof, both oral and documentary, was objected to
by the plaintiffs, and ruled out by the court as incompetent, to
which ruling the defendants duly excepted at the time.
The statement of this case has occupied so much room that but
little space is left for the arguments of counsel in this
Court.
Page 65 U. S. 273
MR. JUSTICE GRIER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendants in error are the owners of the tract of land
called Las Pulgas, the title to which was confirmed to the heirs of
Arguello by this Court,
59 U. S. 18 How.
539. This action of ejectment was brought by them against Greer and
a number of others, now plaintiffs in error. The defendants
pleaded
Page 65 U. S. 274
severally the general issue, but no one of them took defense
specially for any definite part of the land claimed in the writ, or
made a disclaimer as to any portion of it. The plaintiffs gave in
evidence the survey and patent of the Las Pulgas tract, and proved
the defendants to be in possession within its boundaries. Their
Mexican title was dated in 1835, and had the approbation of the
departmental assembly, preceded and followed by possession.
Their grant, as confirmed by this Court, is bounded on the north
by the arroyo of San Francisquito, on the south by that of St.
Mateo, on the east by the estuary, and on the west by the canada or
valley of Raymundo, "being four leagues in length and
one in
breadth." The plaintiffs having shown a complete legal title
to the land in dispute, were entitled to a verdict, unless the
defendants could show a better.
They claimed under a grant to Juan Coppinger, dated in 1840, for
the valley of Raymundo, specifying nothing as to quantity, but
describing it was bounded on the east by the rancho of Las Pulgas,
and on the west by the Sierra Morena, south by rancho of Martinez,
and north by the lagune. The espediente provides, that "the judge
who shall deliver possession of the land shall have it measured
according to the ordinance, specifying the amount of sitios it
contains."
This grant had never received the sanction of the departmental
assembly, nor had possession ever been delivered, or any precise
boundaries ascertained by survey, and although confirmed as a
valid, equitable claim by the district court of California, it has
never been surveyed, nor had a patent been issued for it under the
decree of confirmation. The claim of defendants to the land is
therefore not yet completed into a legal title. Its boundaries and
quantity still remain uncertain and undefined. The Sierra Morena
may be sufficiently definite as the boundary of a state or kingdom,
or of a valley, but is certainly a very vague and uncertain line
for a survey of land. The eastern boundary called also for the
rancho of Las Pulgas; this was also uncertain till the western line
of Las Pulgas was correctly surveyed. Coppinger's grant, calling
for land outside of the Pulgas grant, and to be bounded by
Page 65 U. S. 275
it, could have no possible interference or claim to land within
it. Hence, the defendants could resort to no other defense than to
offer proof that the survey and patent of Las Pulgas were erroneous
as regarded the location of the western line, because it embraces a
portion of the level land in the canada or valley Raymundo, which
is the call of its western boundary.
It is the refusal of the court to admit testimony for that
purpose which is now alleged as error.
The testimony offered might well have been rejected as
irrelevant, for it does not follow, that if the western line of Las
Pulgas, as run by the surveyor general, included level land in the
valley, that it was at all incorrect. The western boundary line of
Las Pulgas, as adjudged by the decree of this Court, had two
several points of description to fix its location; one uncertain
and vague, the other admitting of mathematical certainty. The call
of the Canada Raymundo on the west is as vague as that for the
Sierra Morena, a chain of mountains. But the breadth of one league
from the estuary or bay was a certain and definite boundary on the
east, and showed conclusively the precise location of the line. Las
Pulgas could claim to extend but a league west, whether that
reached to the hills on the east of the valley or not, and was
entitled to have the league in breadth, whether it carried the
western line over the hills or not. Coppinger's grant can claim
only what is left after satisfying Las Pulgas, which calls for a
certain quantity and a certain boundary. There was no offer to
prove that the survey of Las Pulgas was extended beyond such
limit.
The court below refused to admit the testimony, not for its
irrelevancy, but its incompetency, because the defendants, claiming
under a merely equitable title, having neither survey nor patent,
were not in a condition to dispute in a court of law the
correctness of the survey made by the public officer or resist the
plaintiff's perfect legal title.
The fact and the conclusion of the court from it are undoubtedly
correct. It is well settled that both plaintiff and defendant must
produce a strictly legal title, whether it be in fee or as lessee
for years.
Page 65 U. S. 276
The plaintiff had shown a complete legal title; the defendant
had not, for the reasons already stated.
The Act of 3 March, 1851, c. 41, section 13, makes it the duty
of the surveyor general to cause all private claims which shall be
confirmed to be surveyed, and "to decide between the parties with
regard to all such confirmed claims as may conflict or in any
manner interfere." It is true this may not preclude a legal
investigation of the subject by the proper judicial tribunal. In
this case there can be no conflict of title as between Las Pulgas
and the later grant to Coppinger, which calls for it as a boundary.
The survey is conclusive evidence as to the precise location of the
western line of Pulgas, as between these parties in this suit. If
Coppinger and those claiming under him charge that this line has
not been properly established, either by mistake or fraud, they
might have had a remedy under the thirteenth section of the act,
and may possibly yet have it by filing a bill in chancery. But in
this action of ejectment, the defendants cannot call upon a jury at
their discretion to alter a boundary line which has been legally
established by the public officer specially entrusted with this
duty.
The only other exception is, to the following instruction of the
court as to the form of the verdict:
"That they should find a separate verdict against such of the
defendants as were proved to have been in possession, at the
commencement of the suit, of separate distinct parcels of the said
land held in severalty, and that the jury might find a general
verdict against all the other defendants who were proved or
admitted to have been, at the commencement of the suit, in
possession of some portion or portions of the premises in
controversy, the limits or boundaries of whose possessions were not
defined by the proof; and this whether such possessions and
occupation were joint or several."
We can perceive no error in this instruction. Although the
circuit court may have adopted the mode of instituting the action
of ejectment by petition and summons, instead of the old fiction of
lease, entry, and ouster, it is still governed by the principles of
pleading and practice which have been established
Page 65 U. S. 277
by courts of common law. The hybrid mixture of civil and common
law pleadings and practice introduced by state codes cannot be
transplanted into the courts of the United States.
In the action of ejectment, a plaintiff will not be allowed to
join in one suit several and distinct parcels, tenements, or tracts
of land, in possession of several defendants, each claiming for
himself. But he is not bound to bring a separate action against
several trespassers on his single, separate, and distinct tenement
or parcel of land. As to him they are all trespassers, and he
cannot know how they claim, whether jointly or severally; or if
severally, how much each one claims; nor is it necessary to make
such proof in order to support his action. Each defendant has a
right to take defense specially for such portion of the land as he
claims, and by doing so he necessarily disclaims any title to the
residue of the land described in the declaration; and if on the
trial he succeeds in establishing his title to so much of it as he
has taken defense for, and in showing that he was not in possession
of any of the remainder disclaimed, he will be entitled to a
verdict. He may also demand a separate trial, and that his case be
not complicated or impeded by the issues made with others, or
himself made liable for costs unconnected with his separate
litigation.
If he pleads nothing but the general issue, and is found in
possession of any part of the land demanded, he is considered as
taking defense for the whole. How can he call on the plaintiffs to
prove how much he claims, or the jury to find a separate verdict as
to his separate holding, when he will neither by his pleading nor
evidence signify how much he claims? This was a fact known only to
himself, and one with which the plaintiff had no concern and the
jury no knowledge. If a general verdict leaves each one liable for
all the costs, it is a necessary consequence of their own conduct,
and no one has a right to complain.
In the case of
McGarvey v. Little, not yet reported,
when the same objection was made to the charge of the court, the
Supreme court of California overruled it, and held
"that
Page 65 U. S. 278
the defendants being in possession, and there being no proof of
the particular portions which they severally occupied or claimed,
there was no error in refusing to direct the jury to bring in a
separate verdict as to each."
The judgment of the circuit court is therefore affirmed with
costs.
