By a special dispatch from the Minister of the Interior, under
the order of the Mexican President dated 20 July, 1838, the
Governor of California, with the concurrence of the departmental
assembly, was authorized to grant the islands near the coast.
See the case of the
United States v. Osio,
reported in this volume.
On the same day, another special dispatch was sent, reserving
out of the general grant such island as Castillero might select and
directing a grant to be made to him for it, which was done.
All the signatures being proved to be genuine, and the index of
the concession being found in its proper place amongst the Mexican
archives, the claim of the grantee must be confirmed.
There was no necessity in this case for the concurrence of the
departmental assembly.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
The claim was confirmed by the board of commissioners, and
likewise by the district court. The United States appealed to this
Court, where it was argued by Mr. Stanton for the appellants.
Page 64 U. S. 465
MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a decree of the District Court of the
United States for the Southern District of California affirming a
decree of the commissioners appointed under the Act of the third of
March, 1851, to ascertain and settle private land claims.
Pursuant to the eighth section of that act, the appellee in this
case presented his petition to the commissioners, claiming title to
the Island of Santa Cruz, situated in the County of Santa Barbara
in the State of California, by virtue of an original grant from
governor Alvarado. All of the documentary evidences of title
produced in the case are duly certified copies of originals found
in the Mexican archives, as appears by the certificate of the
Surveyor General, which makes a part of the record. They consist of
a special dispatch from the Minister of the Interior of the
Republic of Mexico, addressed to Governor Alvarado, the petition of
the claimant to the same, and the original grant to the petitioner,
which purports to be signed by the governor and to be duly
countersigned by the secretary of the department. Certain other
documents were also introduced, to which it will be necessary to
refer, as a part of the proceedings that led to the grant.
Islands situated on the coast, it seems, were never granted by
the governors of California or any of her authorities, under the
colonization law of 1824, or the regulations of 1828. From all that
has been exhibited in cases of this description, the better opinion
is that the power to grant the lands of the islands was neither
claimed nor exercised by the authorities of the department prior to
the twentieth day of July, 1838, as was satisfactorily shown in one
or more cases heretofore considered and decided by this Court.
On that day, the Minister of the Interior, by the order of the
Mexican president, addressed a communication to Governor Alvarado
authorizing him, in concurrence with the departmental assembly, to
grant and distribute the lands of the desert islands adjacent to
that department to the citizens of the nation who might solicit the
same. That dispatch bears date at a period when the president was
in the exercise of
Page 64 U. S. 466
extraordinary powers, and was issued, as appears by its
recitals, with a view to promote the settlement of the unoccupied
islands on the coast and to prevent those exposed positions from
becoming places of rendezvous and shelter for foreign adventurers
who might desire to invade that remote department. Grants made by
the governor under the power conferred by that dispatch, without
the concurrence of the departmental assembly, were simply void for
the reason that the power, being a special one, could only be
exercised in the manner therein prescribed. It was so held by this
Court in
United States v. Osio, decided at the present
term, and we are satisfied that the decision was correct.
But the grant in this case was not made under the general
authority conferred by that dispatch. In addition to what was
exhibited in the former case, it now appears that another dispatch
of a special character was addressed by the same cabinet minister
to the governor on the same day. Like the other, it bears date at
the City of Mexico, on the twentieth day of July, 1838, and is
signed by the Minister of the Interior. By the terms of the
communication, the governor is informed that the president,
regarding the services rendered by this claimant to the nation and
to that department as worthy of great consideration and full
recompense, has directed the minister to recommend strongly to the
governor and the departmental assembly that one of the islands,
such as the claimant might select, near where he ought to reside
with the troops under his command, be assigned to him, before they
proceed to grant and distribute such lands, under the general
authority conferred by the previous dispatch.
Beyond question, the legal effect of that second communication
was to withdraw such one of the islands as should thus be selected
by the claimant from the operation of the previous order, and to
direct that it be assigned to this claimant. His attorney,
accordingly, on the fifth day of March, 1839, presented his
petition to the governor, asking for a grant of the Island of Santa
Catalina, which is situated in front of the roadstead of San Pedro,
and requested that the expediente might pass through the usual
forms.
Page 64 U. S. 467
In conformity to the prayer of the petition, the governor, on
the same day, made a decree that a title of concession should
issue, and that the expediente should be perfected in the usual
way. Accompanying the order of concession there is also a form of a
grant of the island to the claimant, but it is without any
signatures, and does not appear ever to have been completed.
On the seventeenth day of March, 1839, his attorney in fact
presented another petition to the governor, asking for a grant of
the Island of Santa Cruz, which, as he represents, is situated in
front of Santa Barbara, on the coast of that department.
Both of these petitions are based upon the special dispatch
addressed to the governor, and in the one last presented, the
claimant represents that the island previously offered is wholly
unfit either for agricultural improvement or the raising of stock,
and for that reason prays, in effect, that the order of concession
may be so changed as to conform to his last-mentioned request. For
aught that appears to the contrary, his request was acceded to
without hesitation, for, on the twenty-second day of May, 1839, the
governor made the grant, basing it upon the special dispatch
referred to in the petition.
To prove the authenticity of the dispatch and the genuineness of
the grant, the petitioner called and examined Governor Alvarado. He
testified that he was acquainted with the handwriting of Joaquin
Pesado, the Minister of the Interior, and also with that of Manuel
Jimeno, the secretary of the department, who countersigned the
grant. Both of these signatures, as well as his own, he testified
were genuine; and he also stated that he recognized the document as
a genuine instrument, and intended it at the time as a perfect and
complete title in the claimant. His testimony finds support in this
case, to some extent, by the fact that all the documentary
evidences of title, including the grant, were found in the Mexican
archives; but much stronger confirmation of his statements is
derived from the record evidence which those archives are found to
contain.
At the argument, we were very properly furnished by the counsel
of the appellants with a copy of an index of concessions,
Page 64 U. S. 468
prepared by the secretary of the department. That index covers
the period from the tenth day of May, 1833, to the twenty-fourth
day of December, 1844. It contains a list of four hundred and
forty-three concessions, and among the number is the one set up by
the claimant in this case. Its description in the index corresponds
in all particulars with the grant produced, except as to the date.
As there given, it is dated the fifth day of March, 1839, which is
the true date of the concession, under the first petition.
Considering that the name of the grantee and the description of
the premises agree with the grant produced in the case, we think it
a reasonable presumption that the error of date is in the index,
and not in the grant. For these reasons, we think the genuineness
of the documentary evidence of title is satisfactorily proved.
Having come to this conclusion, the only remaining question is
whether the grant was made by competent authority. Direction was
given to the governor and the departmental assembly in the special
dispatch on which this grant was issued, that one of the islands,
situated along the coast of the department, should be assigned to
this claimant before they proceeded to grant and distribute such
lands under the general order. Those communications were of the
same date, but it is obvious from the language of the special
dispatch that it was issued subsequently to the other
communication, and must be regarded as qualifying the latter so far
as their terms are repugnant. Had the claimant petitioned for a
grant of this description, under the general order, his application
would have been addressed to the discretion of the governor and of
the departmental assembly, and unless both had concurred in
granting the prayer, his application would have been defeated, for
the reason that such a title could only be adjudicated by their
concurrent action. Power to refuse such applications was vested in
the assembly as well as in the governor, but when both concurred
and the adjudication had been made, the title papers were properly
to be issued by the governor as an executive act. As the assembly
was a constituent part of the granting power under the general
order, it was doubtless thought proper that the withdrawal of
Page 64 U. S. 469
one of the islands from its operation, and the disposal of it in
another way, should be notified to the assembly as well as to the
governor. They were accordingly directed not to proceed to make
adjudications under that order until the assignment of the title to
this claimant was perfected, but they were not required to make the
assignment or to cause it to be made. To accomplish that purpose
and carry into effect the command of the president, two things only
were necessary to be done: one was to be performed by the claimant,
and the other was a mere ministerial act. It was the claimant who
was to make the selection, and if it was a proper one, near the
place where he was stationed with his troops, nothing remained to
be done but to make the assignment as described in the dispatch.
Emanating as the dispatch did from the supreme power of the nation,
it operated of itself to adjudicate the title to the claimant,
leaving no discretion to be exercised by the authorities of the
department. Neither the governor nor the assembly nor both combined
could withhold the grant after a proper selection without
disobeying the express command of the supreme government. Nothing,
therefore, remained to be done, after the selection by the
claimant, but to issue the title papers, and that was the proper
duty of the governor, as the executive organ of the department. No
doubt appears to have been entertained of the justice of the claim,
either by the commissioners or the district court, and in view of
all the circumstances, we think their respective decisions were
correct. The decree of the district court is therefore
Affirmed.