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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 23–217
_________________
E.M.D. SALES, INC., et al., PETITIONERS
v. FAUSTINO SANCHEZ CARRERA, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fourth circuit
[January 15, 2025]
Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 requires
employers to pay their employees a minimum wage and overtime
compensation. But the Act also exempts many categories of employees
from the minimum-wage and overtime-compensation requirements. The
dispute here concerns the standard of proof that an employer must
satisfy to show that an employee is exempt. The usual standard of
proof in civil litigation is preponderance of the evidence. A more
demanding standard, such as clear and convincing evidence, applies
only when a statute or the Constitution requires a heightened
standard or in certain other rare cases, such as “when the
government seeks to take unusual coercive action—action more
dramatic than entering an award of money damages or other
conventional relief—against an individual.”
Price Waterhouse
v.
Hopkins,
490
U.S. 228, 253 (1989) (plurality opinion). None of those
exceptions applies to this case. Therefore, the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard governs when an employer
attempts to demonstrate that an employee is exempt.
I
A
In 1938, Congress passed and President
Franklin Roosevelt signed the Fair Labor Standards Act. 52Stat.
1060. The Act guarantees covered workers a federal minimum wage.
See 29 U. S. C. §206(a)(1). The Act also generally
requires overtime pay when a covered employee works more than 40
hours per week. See §207(a)(1).
But Congress recognized that a minimum wage and
overtime pay would be impractical or inappropriate for some jobs.
So the Act exempts many categories of employees from the
minimum-wage requirement and exempts many more from the
overtime-pay requirement. See §§213(a)–(b). Exempt employees can
range from baseball players to seamen to maple-syrup processors to
software engineers to firefighters, and so on. See §§213(a)(12),
(17), (19), (b)(15), (20). The law places the burden on the
employer to show that an exemption applies. See
Corning Glass
Works v.
Brennan,
417 U.S.
188, 196–197 (1974).
The exemption relevant here encompasses anyone
employed “in the capacity of outside salesman.” §213(a)(1). An
“outside salesman” primarily makes sales and regularly works away
from the employer’s place of business. See
Christopher v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
567 U.S.
142, 148 (2012); 29 CFR §541.500(a) (2023).
B
EMD distributes international food products in
the Washington, D. C., metropolitan area. EMD employs sales
representatives who manage inventory and take orders at grocery
stores that stock EMD products.
Several EMD sales representatives sued the
company in the U. S. District Court for the District of
Maryland. They alleged that EMD violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act by failing to pay them overtime. EMD did not deny that the
employees worked more than 40 hours per week without receiving
overtime pay. But EMD argued that the employees fell within the
Act’s outside-salesman exemption.
Following a bench trial, the District Court
concluded that EMD failed to prove “by clear and convincing
evidence” that the employees qualified as outside salesmen. Civ.
No. 17–3066 (D Md., Mar. 19, 2021), App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a. The
court found that the employees primarily executed the terms of
sales already made rather than making new sales themselves. The
court therefore ordered EMD to pay overtime wages and liquidated
damages.
On appeal, EMD contended that the District Court
should have applied the less stringent
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard rather than the
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. The U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the judgment
of the District Court. 75 F. 4th 345 (2023). The Court of Appeals
followed Circuit precedent requiring employers to prove the
applicability of Fair Labor Standards Act exemptions by clear and
convincing evidence.
Id., at 351–352. Although the
three-judge panel suggested that the full court might want to
reconsider that precedent en banc, the court later denied en banc
review.
Id., at 353.
The Fourth Circuit stands alone in requiring
employers to prove the applicability of Fair Labor Standards Act
exemptions by clear and convincing evidence. Every other Court of
Appeals to address the issue has held that the preponderance
standard applies. See
Faludi v.
U. S. Shale
Solutions, L.L.C., 950 F.3d 269, 273 (CA5 2020);
Renfro
v.
Indiana Mich. Power Co., 497 F.3d 573, 576 (CA6 2007);
Yi v.
Sterling Collision Centers, Inc., 480 F.3d 505,
506–508 (CA7 2007);
Coast Van Lines, Inc. v.
Armstrong, 167 F.2d 705, 707 (CA9 1948);
Lederman v.
Frontier Fire Protection, Inc., 685 F.3d 1151, 1158 (CA10
2012);
Dybach v.
Florida Dept. of Corrections, 942
F.2d 1562, 1566, n. 5 (CA11 1991). This Court granted
certiorari to resolve that conflict. 602 U. S. ___ (2024).
II
A
In 1938, when Congress enacted the Fair Labor
Standards Act, the established default standard of proof in
American civil litigation was the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard. The Court’s cases pre-dating the Act recognized as much.
See
United States v.
Regan,
232 U.S.
37, 48 (1914);
Lilienthal’s Tobacco v.
United
States,
97 U.S.
237, 266 (1878). As did prominent treatises. See 4 J. Wigmore,
Evidence in Trials at Common Law §2498, pp. 3545–3546 (1905);
3 S. Greenleaf, Law of Evidence §29, p. 28 (8th ed. 1867).
Since then, the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard has remained the default standard of proof in American
civil litigation. That default makes sense: The preponderance
standard allows both parties in the mine-run civil case to “share
the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.”
Herman &
MacLean v.
Huddleston,
459 U.S.
375, 390 (1983) (quotation marks omitted).
In civil litigation, this Court has deviated
from the preponderance standard in three main circumstances.
First, courts must apply a heightened
standard of proof if a statute establishes one. For example,
various provisions of the U. S. Code, including some involving
labor and employment, designate clear and convincing evidence as
the applicable standard of proof. See,
e.
g., 29
U. S. C. §218c(b)(1) (whistleblower-retaliation claims
under the Fair Labor Standards Act); §464(c) (validity of
union-established trusteeships); §722(a)(3)(A)(ii) (ineligibility
for vocational rehabilitation services). The same can be true when
Congress uses a term with a settled common-law meaning that itself
required a heightened standard of proof. See,
e.
g.,
Microsoft Corp. v.
i4i L. P.,
564 U.S.
91, 102 (2011).
Second, courts likewise must apply a
heightened standard of proof when the Constitution requires one.
For example, the Court has mandated a clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard in certain First Amendment cases. See,
e.
g.,
New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,
376 U.S.
254, 285–286 (1964);
Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S.
323, 342 (1974). The Court has also held that the Due Process
Clause necessitates a heightened standard in some cases. In
Addington v.
Texas, for example, the Court ruled that
involuntary civil commitment constitutes such a “significant
deprivation of liberty” by the government that “due process
requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial
than a mere preponderance of the evidence.”
441
U.S. 418, 425–427 (1979). And in
Santosky v.
Kramer, the Court held the same with respect to the
government’s termination of parental rights: “Before a State may
sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their
natural child, due process requires that the State support its
allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”
455 U.S.
745, 747–748 (1982).
Third, under this Court’s precedents, a
heightened standard of proof may be appropriate in certain other
“uncommon” cases.
Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,
490
U.S. 228, 253 (1989) (plurality opinion). These cases
“ordinarily” arise “when the government seeks to take unusual
coercive action—action more dramatic than entering an award of
money damages or other conventional relief—against an individual.”
Ibid. For example, the Court has held that the government
must satisfy a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard in order to
take away a person’s citizenship. See
Nishikawa v.
Dulles,
356 U.S.
129, 137–138 (1958) (expatriation);
Schneiderman v.
United States,
320 U.S.
118, 122–123 (1943) (denaturalization).
Importantly, the Court has not otherwise used a
heightened standard in civil matters. See
Halo Electronics,
Inc. v.
Pulse Electronics, Inc., 579 U.S. 93, 107 (2016)
(treble damages under the Patent Act);
Grogan v.
Garner,
498 U.S.
279, 286–287 (1991) (bankruptcy discharges);
Herman &
MacLean, 459 U. S., at 389–390 (securities fraud);
Regan, 232 U. S., at 48–49 (civil-penalty suit under
the Alien Immigration Act). Most relevant here, the Court has
applied a preponderance standard in Title VII
employment-discrimination cases. See
Price Waterhouse, 490
U. S., at 253–254 (plurality opinion);
id., at 260
(White, J., concurring in judgment);
id., at 261 (O’Connor,
J., concurring in judgment).
B
We conclude that the default preponderance
standard governs when an employer seeks to prove that an employee
is exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
First, as the employees acknowledge, the
Fair Labor Standards Act does not specify a standard of proof for
the Act’s exemptions. Faced with silence, courts usually apply the
default preponderance standard. Statutory silence is generally
“inconsistent with the view that Congress intended to require a
special, heightened standard of proof.”
Grogan, 498
U. S., at 286.
Second, as the employees recognize, this
case does not implicate any constitutional rights that might
require a heightened standard.
Third, this is not a case where the
government otherwise seeks to take “unusual coercive action”
against an individual.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U. S., at
253 (plurality opinion). Cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act
are more akin to the Title VII cases where the Court has held that
a preponderance standard applies. If clear and convincing evidence
is not required in Title VII cases, it is hard to see why it would
be required in Fair Labor Standards Act cases.
III
We are not persuaded by the employees’
policy-laden arguments for a heightened standard when an employer
seeks to show that an employee is exempt. The employees contend
that the Act focuses not on the individual’s interest in damages,
but rather on the public’s interest in a well-functioning economy
where workers are guaranteed a fair wage. But that premise, even if
accepted, does not demand a heightened standard. After all, other
workplace protections that vindicate important public interests
remain subject to the preponderance standard. Eradicating
discrimination from the workplace is undoubtedly important. Yet as
explained above, this Court has held that a preponderance standard
is appropriate for Title VII cases. See
Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,
490
U.S. 228, 253–254 (1989) (plurality opinion).
In addition, the public interest in Fair Labor
Standards Act cases does not fall entirely on the side of
employees. Most legislation reflects a balance of competing
interests. So it is here. Rather than choose sides in a policy
debate, this Court must apply the statute as written and as
informed by the longstanding default rule regarding the standard of
proof.
Next, the employees contend that the
minimum-wage and overtime-pay rights conferred by the Fair Labor
Standards Act are not waivable and are therefore distinct from
other rights subject to a preponderance standard. But the
waivability (or lack thereof ) of a right does not dictate the
applicable standard of proof. Consider the criminal process. Even
though the prosecution must meet a high standard of proof—beyond a
reasonable doubt—criminal defendants may waive their right to trial
by pleading guilty. At the same time, some rights that are not
waivable are subject to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
For example, certain rights conferred by the National Labor
Relations Act are not waivable. See
National Licorice Co. v.
NLRB,
309 U.S.
350, 360–361 (1940);
McLaren Macomb, 372
N. L. R. B. No. 58, pp. 5–6 (2023). Yet employers
may prove affirmative defenses to those rights by a preponderance.
See
NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp.,
462 U.S.
393, 400, 403 (1983).
As those cases illustrate, the waivability of a
right and the standard of proof are two distinct inquiries.
Therefore, although at least some Fair Labor Standards Act rights
are not waivable, it does not follow that a heightened standard of
proof must apply when an employer attempts to show that an employee
is exempt.
Finally, the employees assert that a heightened
standard should govern in Fair Labor Standards Act cases because
the employer controls much of the evidence relevant to establishing
a violation and because plaintiffs in those cases may have low
incomes. But in Title VII cases too, employers control “most of the
cards,” and plaintiffs may be low-income.
Murray v.
UBS
Securities, LLC, 601 U.S. 23, 36 (2024) (quotation marks
omitted). Yet the preponderance standard applies in those cases. So
too here.
* * *
We hold that the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard applies when an employer seeks to show that an employee is
exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. The employees argue that we should still
affirm because they would not qualify as outside salesmen even
under a preponderance standard. But our usual practice is to leave
matters of that sort for remand. We see no persuasive reason to
stray from that usual practice here. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
