SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 23–191
_________________
NANCY WILLIAMS, et al., PETITIONERS
v. GREG REED, SECRETARY, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
alabama
[February 21, 2025]
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito,
Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Barrett join as to Part II,
dissenting.
Alabama law requires claimants seeking
unemployment benefits to exhaust their administrative remedies
before suing over those benefits in state court. Petitioners, the
claimants here, failed to complete that process before they sued
under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. The Alabama
Supreme Court accordingly held that it lacked jurisdiction over the
suit. That holding was plainly permissible. As a matter of first
principles, States have unfettered discretion over whether to
provide a forum for §1983 claims in their courts. And, Alabama’s
exhaustion rule does not transgress the limitations that our
precedents have recognized. The Court concludes otherwise by
endorsing an as-applied theory of futility that is both forfeited
and meritless, moving our jurisprudence even further off course. I
respectfully dissent.
I
This case is straightforward under first
principles. Our federal system gives States “plenary authority to
decide whether their local courts will have subject-matter
jurisdiction over federal causes of action.”
Haywood v.
Drown,
556 U.S.
729, 743 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Constitution
allows States to hear federal claims in their courts, but it does
“not impose a duty on state courts to do so.”
Id., at 747.
Thus, “[o]nce a State exercises its sovereign prerogative to
deprive its courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over a federal
cause of action, it is the end of the matter as far as the
Constitution is concerned.”
Id., at 749.
The only potential constraint that the
Constitution places on a State’s jurisdictional discretion is the
possibility that a federal statute may preempt state law. The
Supremacy Clause makes the “Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
. . . the supreme Law of the Land.” Art. VI,
cl. 2. Accordingly, “[f]ederal law must prevail when Congress
validly enacts a statute that expressly supersedes state law, or
when the state law conflicts with a federal statute.”
Haywood, 556 U. S., at 764 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). This preemption rule raises the “difficult
question” whether Congress can “require state courts to entertain a
federal cause of action.”
Ibid., n. 8.
We need not answer that question here because
§1983 does not raise any preemption issue. By its text, the
provision does not “command” States to provide a forum for §1983
plaintiffs.
Id., at 765. Instead, it merely “addresses who
may sue and be sued for violations of federal law.”
Ibid.;
see §1983 (deeming “liable” state officials who deny “any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof . . . any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws”). Nor does Alabama’s
exhaustion bar, which regulates state-court litigation, create any
implicit conflict with §1983. Plaintiffs who do not exhaust state
remedies are always free to bring their claims in a federal forum.
Id., at 766; see also
Felder v.
Casey, 487
U. S 131, 160 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Every
[§1983] plaintiff has the option of proceeding in federal court,
and the [state] statute has not the slightest effect on that
right”). Preemption analysis requires nothing further.
This Court’s precedents err to the extent they
recognize a broader form of conflict preemption for “state-court
procedural rules that are perceived to ‘burde[n] the exercise of
the federal right’ in state court.”
Haywood, 556 U. S.,
at 766 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Felder, 487
U. S., at 141). This form of conflict preemption targets
state-law rules that constitute an obstacle to the “goals” embodied
in federal law.
Id., at 138. But, only federal law itself
can support preemption under the Supremacy Clause. Extratextual
speculation about Congress’s purposes cannot. See
Wyeth v.
Levine,
555 U.S.
555, 603–604 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
Our precedents also err in establishing the
requirement at issue here—that state jurisdictional rules be
“neutral,” even in the absence of a directly conflicting federal
law. See
infra, at 5. The Supremacy Clause does not of its
own force “constrai[n] the States’ authority to define the subject-
matter jurisdiction of their own courts.”
Haywood, 556
U. S., at 750 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Rather, in making the
Constitution and federal law supreme, “it provides only a rule of
decision that the state court must follow if it adjudicates the
claim.”
Id., at 751. I would therefore disregard our further
limitation as “demonstrably erroneous.” See
Gamble v.
United States, 587 U.S. 678, 717–718 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).[
1]
Taken together, this case should begin and end
with Alabama’s plenary authority to decide which federal matters
its state courts will have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear.
Alabama exercised that authority to create an exhaustion
requirement, and we should respect its decision.
II
This Court should affirm even under existing
precedents. Alabama’s exhaustion requirement does not run afoul of
the limitations that this Court has identified on a State’s
authority to restrict federal causes of action from proceeding in
state court. Petitioners misread our precedents in arguing
otherwise, and the majority’s theory likewise cannot pass
muster.
A
Although this Court has held that there are
limits on a State’s discretion in regulating state-court
jurisdiction over federal causes of action, our precedents
emphasize that state authority predominates. “The general rule
‘bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of
state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state
courts as it finds them.’ ”
Howlett v.
Rose,
496 U.S.
356, 372 (1990) (quoting H. Hart, The Relations Between State
and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 508 (1954)). Each
State thus has “great latitude to establish the structure and
jurisdiction of [its] own courts.”
Howlett, 496 U. S.,
at 372. This latitude allows States to decide which federal claims
their courts can hear.
Ibid.
As relevant here, our precedents establish that
States must exercise this jurisdictional latitude only through
“neutral” rules that do not embody any “policy disagreement” with
federal law.
Haywood, 556 U. S., at 735–737. Based on
this principle, we have identified two narrow exceptions to a
State’s ordinary discretion. First, a State may not refuse to hear
a federal claim “solely because [it] is brought under a federal
law.”
McKnett v.
St. Louis & San Francisco R.
Co.,
292 U.S.
230, 233–234 (1934). Second, a State may not deprive its courts
of jurisdiction over a “disfavored” federal claim, even if it
simultaneously denies jurisdiction to an “identical state claim,”
where doing so would “undermine federal law.”
Haywood, 556
U. S., at 737–739.
For good reason, no one suggests that the first
exception applies. Alabama’s exhaustion requirement by its terms
does “not discriminate against rights arising under federal laws.”
See
McKnett, 292 U. S., at 234. Instead, it imposes a
generally applicable exhaustion process “for the making of
determinations with respect to claims for unemployment compensation
benefits.” Ala. Code §25–4–96 (2016). State and federal claims
regarding unemployment benefits are equally subject to this
process, including as to “procedural” challenges like the one here.
Johnson v.
Washington, 387 So. 3d 138, 143 (Ala.
2023).
The second exception does not apply either.
Alabama’s exhaustion requirement is nothing like the statute in
Haywood that this Court viewed as “disfavor[ing]” federal
law. 556 U. S., at 738. That statute deprived New York courts
of jurisdiction over “damages suits filed by prisoners against
state correction officers,” based on the State’s belief that they
were “by and large frivolous and vexatious.”
Id., at 733
(discussing N. Y. Correc. Law Ann. §24 (West 1987)). This
Court deemed New York’s rule “effectively an immunity statute
cloaked in jurisdictional garb,” which protected correction
officers from a subset of disfavored §1983 claims even as New York
courts continued to hear most §1983 actions. 556 U. S., at
741–742. According to the
Haywood majority, that
policy-driven denial could not be squared with the supremacy of
§1983’s countervailing policy.
Id., at 740.
Alabama’s decision to create an exhaustion
requirement for all unemployment-benefits-related claims does not
embody any comparable policy judgment. Rather, this requirement,
which has existed since 1939, is an ordinary jurisdictional rule
reflecting the Alabama Department of Labor’s comparative
“competence over the subject matter” of unemployment benefits.
Howlett, 496 U. S., at 381; see 1939 Ala. Acts no. 497,
pp. 737–741. The exhaustion process serves all the useful functions
that this Court has recognized: It allows the agency with
subject-matter expertise to retain primary responsibility over the
area; it avoids unnecessary litigation; and it creates a record in
case judicial review is necessary.
McCarthy v.
Madigan,
503 U.S.
140, 145 (1992). In short, Alabama’s exhaustion requirement is
a procedural step that “promotes judicial efficiency,”
ibid., in contrast to the statute in
Haywood, which
created a
de facto “immunity” shielding a class of
claims from judicial review, 556 U. S., at 742. We have no
authority to interfere with Alabama’s choice.
B
Petitioners try to evade Alabama’s exhaustion
requirement by arguing for a different exception. On their view,
our decisions in
Patsy v.
Board of Regents of Fla.,
457 U.S.
496 (1982), and
Felder establish that States are
categorically precluded from imposing exhaustion requirements in
the §1983 context. But, petitioners badly misread both
decisions.
Patsy addressed whether
federal
courts can impose an exhaustion requirement for §1983 cases in
the absence of a congressional directive to do so. See 457
U. S., at 501. The Court held that they cannot, reasoning that
federal courts may create exhaustion requirements only where doing
so is consistent with congressional intent, because “Congress is
vested with the power to prescribe the basic procedural scheme
under which claims may be heard in federal courts.”
Id., at
501–502, 516. That analysis has no relevance to the question here:
whether States have authority “to establish the structure and
jurisdiction of their own courts.”
Howlett, 496 U. S.,
at 372.
Felder too is inapposite. That decision
held that §1983 preempted a Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute that
effectively altered the scope of §1983 liability on the merits. See
487 U. S., at 153. That is, the statute subjected state-court
plaintiffs to a dismissal with prejudice if they did not first
submit their claims against the State or its officers to the
government for an advance merits determination.
Id., at
136–137, and n. 2; see
Haywood, 556 U. S., at
773–774, n. 11 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Failure to exhaust
under that statute operated as a state-created merits defense to
§1983 liability. But, the impermissibility of such a merits defense
says nothing about a State’s discretion to create true
jurisdictional rules, which speak only to the judiciary’s
“ ‘power’ ” to “ ‘proceed at all.’ ”
Steel
Co. v.
Citizens for Better Environment,
523 U.S.
83, 94 (1998) (quoting
Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506,
514 (1869)).
Felder would remain inapposite even if it
had involved a purportedly jurisdictional rule compelling dismissal
without prejudice. In that event, the Wisconsin statute would
simply have raised the problem that this Court later confronted in
Haywood, where the State singled out a “disfavored” category
of claims for second-class treatment. 556 U. S., at 738. The
notice-of-claim statute in
Felder existed to “further the
State’s interest in minimizing liability and the expenses
associated with it.” 487 U. S., at 143. And, although
Felder noted that the statute “impose[d] an exhaustion
requirement,” it treated that fact as one of multiple
“interrelated” factors that caused the Wisconsin statute to
“burden” §1983 claimants.
Id., at 141, 146. The exhaustion
requirement was not an independently fatal problem, so
Felder’s language on exhaustion should not be overread. See
Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821)
(“[G]eneral expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in
connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If
they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to
control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is
presented for decision”).
C
The majority rules for petitioners on narrower
grounds, but its holding is equally unpersuasive. The majority does
not dispute that, as a general matter, Alabama is entitled to apply
its exhaustion requirement to §1983 claims. See
ante, at 5,
n. 2. It instead holds that, under
Haywood, Alabama’s
discretion cannot extend to the specific claims here, which
challenge delays in the exhaustion process itself.
Ante, at
5. On the majority’s view, maintaining the exhaustion requirement
for such claims would mean that petitioners will never be able to
advance to state court, leaving the State essentially “immun[e]”
from challenges to its exhaustion process.
Ante, at 7. This
theory of futility is both forfeited and meritless.
1
“[T]his Court has almost unfailingly refused
to consider any federal-law challenge to a state-court decision
unless the federal claim ‘was either addressed by or properly
presented to the state court that rendered the decision we have
been asked to review.’ ”
Howell v.
Mississippi,
543 U.S.
440, 443 (2005) (
per curiam) (quoting
Adams v.
Robertson,
520 U.S.
83, 86 (1997) (
per curiam)). In fact, the Court’s
historical practice has generally been to treat this preservation
requirement as jurisdictional, although our more recent cases have
expressed uncertainty on this issue.
Howell, 543 U. S.,
at 445–446. In view of petitioners’ preservation obligation, we
should reject as forfeited their newfound theory of futility, which
was neither presented nor addressed below.
Until seeking certiorari, petitioners litigated
this case as a facial challenge, arguing solely that §1983
“categorically” preempted States from applying exhaustion
requirements in the §1983 context. Reply Brief for Appellant in
Johnson v.
Washington, No. SC–2022–0897 (Ala. Sup.
Ct.), p. 16. The Alabama Supreme Court accordingly understood
that this facial challenge was petitioners’ “only” argument for
federal preemption. 387 So. 3d, at 143–144. Petitioners
belatedly contend that they also raised a futility-based argument,
but the briefing they cite merely addressed how the futility of
waiting for exhaustion affected the proper timing of their facial
challenge. See Reply Brief 24, n. 3 (citing Reply Brief for
Appellant in No. SC–2022–0897, at 16–17).
Because petitioners raised only a facial
challenge below, they cannot press an as-applied challenge here.
“[F]acial” and “as-applied” claims are distinct and must be
individually preserved. See
United States v.
Stevens,
559 U.S.
460, 473, n. 3 (2010); see also,
e.
g.,
Moody v.
NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 723 (2024)
(“NetChoice chose to litigate these cases as facial challenges, and
that decision comes at a cost”). So, petitioners cannot now argue
that Alabama’s exhaustion requirement is impermissible in the
specific circumstance where exhaustion would be futile.
There is no reason to treat this case as the
“very rare exceptio[n]” in which petitioners’ forfeiture might be
overlooked.
Adams, 520 U. S., at 86 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The majority, which ignores that petitioners needed
to raise their as-applied objection specifically, certainly
provides no justification. See
ante, at 10. Instead, its
analysis only highlights why we should not decide petitioners’
as-applied challenge in the first instance.
The majority’s futility theory depends on the
assumption that petitioners will never have their day in court if
we leave Alabama’s exhaustion requirement intact. See
ante,
at 7. But, petitioners’ failure to raise their as-applied claim
below means that we have no way of knowing whether this assumption
is true. It may be the case that the exhaustion requirement here
contains an implicit futility exception. Cf.
Graysville v.
Glenn, 46 So. 3d 925, 929 (Ala. 2010) (identifying futility
as a “recognized exceptio[n]” to the
“exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine” generally). Or, it
may be the case that petitioners may obtain mandamus relief, as the
dissent below suggested and the State underscored. See 387
So. 3d, at 146 (Cook, J., dissenting); Tr. of Oral Arg. 54–56.
As a federal court assessing petitioners’ objection in the first
instance, we have no way to assess the viability of these or any
other mechanisms.
The majority’s attempts to disregard this
uncertainty are unpersuasive. The majority concludes that the
uncertainty should count against the State, and expresses doubt
about the availability of mandamus based on the Alabama Supreme
Court’s failure to address that form of relief.
Ante, at 9.
But, that court had no reason to opine on the alternative pathways
available to petitioners, given that petitioners failed to raise an
as-applied challenge. We should not reward petitioners for their
own mistake. Likewise, the majority’s assertion that mandamus would
be irrelevant even if it were available is puzzling.
Ante,
at 9–10
. If petitioners can secure completion of the
exhaustion process through mandamus, then by definition they will
not be in a “catch-22” that “prevents [them] from obtaining a
merits resolution of their §1983 claims in state court.”
Ante, at 7.
2
In any event, petitioners’ as-applied
challenge fails on the merits. Unlike the New York statute in
Haywood, Alabama’s exhaustion requirement is not “ ‘an
immunity statute cloaked in jurisdictional garb.’ ” Contra,
ante, at 9 (quoting
Haywood, 556 U. S., at
742).
Properly understood,
Haywood directs our
focus to the challenged statute’s purpose. The Court there viewed
the New York statute as an immunity statute because it was
“designed to shield” correction officers from damages claims
brought by prisoners, “[b]ased on the belief ” that these
claims tended to be “frivolous and vexatious.”
Id., at
741–742. In other words, States cannot implicitly reject the
supremacy of federal law by basing a jurisdictional limitation—even
one that also applies to state claims—on “policy disagreement” with
federal law.
Id., at 737–738.
A focus on statutory purpose makes clear that
Alabama’s exhaustion requirement raises no
Haywood problem.
There is no credible argument that Alabama adopted its exhaustion
requirement
in order to defeat challenges to the exhaustion
process itself. Alabama created its exhaustion scheme in 1939,
decades before the understanding that public benefits give rise to
a due process interest emerged. See
supra, at 3–4, n. And,
the Alabama exhaustion process is by all accounts an ordinary
exhaustion requirement common among public-benefits schemes, which
in the mine-run case serves to facilitate the adjudication of
benefits determinations on the merits. There is no reason to think
that Alabama intended to cause mischief in the rare context of a
§1983 challenge to its procedures.
At most, this case presents a circumstance in
which Alabama’s “neutral jurisdictional rule” has the
effect
of defeating a federal claim. See
Haywood, 556 U. S.,
at 735. But, again, our precedents disallow a State’s
jurisdictional rule only if it is in fact not “neutral”—that is, if
it is “based on a policy disagreement,” and so is intended to “shut
the courthouse door to federal claims that it considers at odds
with its local policy.”
Id., at 737–738, 740.
The majority’s contrary conclusion
misunderstands
Haywood. Ignoring that decision’s
purpose-focused language, the majority asserts that it disallows
any state rule that “operates as an ‘immunity statute’
. . . by wholly barring a ‘particular species’ of §1983
suits in state court.”
Ante, at 10 (quoting 556 U. S.,
at 739, 742). But, in context, that quoted language only reinforces
the majority’s error. Those lines in
Haywood reiterate that
what mattered there was New York’s illicit purpose: A State may not
“dee[m]” “a particular species of suits . . .
inappropriate for its trial courts.”
Id., at 739–740. Nor
may a State effectively create an “immunity statute” “[b]ased on
the belief that [certain claims] are frivolous and vexatious.”
Id., at 742. Nothing in
Haywood suggests that a state
rule could be impermissible just because it has the incidental
effect of disallowing certain federal claims.
The majority also does not grapple with the
possible ripple effects of its reading of
Haywood. It
professes only that its opinion is “narrow” and does nothing more
than “resolv[e] this dispute.”
Ante, at 10. But, the
majority’s protestations do not make it so.
A constraint based on incidental effects is
notably more amorphous than our prior focus on statutory purpose.
After all, to the extent the Supremacy Clause bars States from
enacting nominally jurisdictional rules that “registe[r their]
dissent” from federal policy, States may craft their laws with an
eye toward avoiding conflict.
Haywood, 556 U. S., at
737–738. But, the same is not true for incidental effects. No
statute can be perfectly drafted to anticipate every application
that ultimately arises, so it is inevitable that exhaustion
requirements will occasionally slow or defeat claims that we might
think, as a policy matter, ought to go forward. That happenstance
is not a reason for suspicion, just as we do not malign the many
federal statutes with similarly categorical exhaustion
requirements. See,
e.
g.,
Booth v.
Churner,
532 U.S.
731, 733–734 (2001) (applying the Prison Litigation Reform
Act’s exhaustion requirement even where the exhaustion process
could not provide the prisoner’s requested relief ). Here too,
the Court should not encroach on Alabama’s “latitude to establish
the structure and jurisdiction of [its] own courts.”
Howlett, 496 U. S., at 372.
III
The Court’s decision is irreconcilable with
both first principles and precedent. I respectfully dissent.