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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 22–982
_________________
RYAN THORNELL, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, PETITIONER
v. DANNY LEE JONES
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[May 30, 2024]
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the
Court.
In this case, we review a decision of the Ninth
Circuit ordering the resentencing of a defendant who, in order to
steal a gun collection, committed three gruesome killings,
including the cold-blooded murder of a 7-year-old girl. The Ninth
Circuit held that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel was violated during the sentencing
phase of his capital trial. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit substantially departed from the well-established standard
articulated by this Court in
Strickland v.
Washington,
466 U.S.
668 (1984). Among other things, the Ninth Circuit all but
ignored the strong aggravating circumstances in this case. As a
result, we must reverse the judgment below.
I
A
Thirty-two years ago, Danny Lee Jones murdered
Robert Weaver, his 7-year-old daughter Tisha Weaver, and his
grandmother Katherine Gumina. Jones knew that Robert owned a $2,000
gun collection, and after spending a day drinking and talking with
Robert, Jones decided he wanted to steal the guns. He grabbed a
baseball bat, beat Robert into unconsciousness, and headed indoors
to find the collection.
Once inside, Jones encountered Gumina, who was
watching television, and Tisha, who was coloring in a workbook
before heading to bed. Jones struck Gumina hard enough to crack her
skull, leaving her unconscious on the living room floor. Tisha
apparently watched Jones attack her great-grandmother and ran to
hide under her parents’ bed. Marks on the carpet show that Jones
dragged the girl out from under the bed before beating her hard
enough “to create a wound several inches wide, extending from her
left ear to her left cheek.”
State v.
Jones, 185
Ariz. 471, 489,
917 P.2d 200, 218 (1996). Jones then asphyxiated Tisha with a
pillow.
Jones next began loading Robert’s guns into
Gumina’s car. At that point, Robert regained consciousness. “Blood
smears at the scene showed that [Robert] attempted to run from”
Jones, but Jones “struck [him] in the head several more times. The
last blow . . . was delivered while [Robert] knelt
helplessly on the floor of the garage.” 9 Appellant’s Excerpts of
Record in No. 18–99005 (CA9), p. 2449 (Record). Jones then skipped
town with the guns, using them to pay for a trip to Las Vegas.
A short time later, Robert’s wife came home from
work and discovered the gruesome scene. She called 911, but the
first responders found that Robert and Tisha were already dead.
Gumina lived for 17 months before succumbing to her injuries.
Before Gumina died, Jones was charged with two counts of
premeditated first-degree murder and one count of attempted
premeditated first-degree murder, and a jury found him guilty on
all three charges.[
1]
B
After Jones was convicted, the trial court
proceeded to sentencing. Under Arizona law at the time, the court
was required to “impose a sentence of death” if it found “one or
more” statutorily enumerated “aggravating circumstances” and “no
mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–703(E) (1993).
The trial court found three aggravating
circumstances that applied to both Robert’s and Tisha’s murders.
First, Jones committed multiple homicides “during the commission of
the offense.” §13–703(F)(8). Second, he was motivated by
“pecuniary” gain, namely, Robert’s guns. §13–703(F)(5). And third,
the murders were “especially heinous, cruel or depraved.”
§13–703(F)(6). With respect to Tisha’s murder, the court found an
additional aggravating circumstance: She was a young child.
§13–703(F)(9).
The trial court also heard mitigating evidence.
The presentence report noted that Jones was abused as a child,
began using drugs and alcohol at age 13, suffered brain trauma at
ages 9 and 18, and had received “psychiatric treatments” as a
child. 4 Record 1086–1088. Jones’s second stepfather, Randy,
described Jones’s troubled personal life. He testified that Jones’s
father and first stepfather were physically abusive, that Jones’s
grandfather and uncle had introduced him to drugs as a preteen, and
that Jones had suffered several head injuries that left him with
“constan[t]” headaches. 9
id., at 2522–2526.
Jones’s counsel also submitted a report by and
solicited testimony from Dr. Jack Potts, a court-appointed forensic
psychiatrist who was later described by counsel as essentially
“part of the defense team.” 7
id., at 1831. Dr. Potts
identified several “mitigating factors” that he thought warranted
leniency. 4
id., at 1070–1071. First, he noted that Jones
“was reared in a chaotic and at times grossly hostile environment
where physical abuse was too prevalent.”
Id., at 1069. “The
years he had of a relatively ‘normal’ childhood,” Dr. Potts opined,
were “too late . . . to counter the earlier abuse.”
Id., at 1070. Second, Dr. Potts suggested that Jones’s
“serious head trauma” potentially “contribut[ed] to his behavior.”
Id., at 1068, 1071. Third, he concluded with a “reasonable
degree of medical certainty” that Jones “suffers from a major
mental illness,” likely a “form of Bipolar Affective Disorder.”
Id., at 1070; 10
id., at 2567. Fourth, he thought
Jones was “genetic[ally]” predisposed to “substance abuse” and
speculated that Jones would not have murdered had he been sober. 4
id., at 1070. Fifth, Dr. Potts believed that Jones felt
“remorse and responsibility” and that he had the “potential for
rehabilitation.”
Id., at 1070–1071.
From this evidence, the trial court concluded
that Jones had established four mitigating circumstances: (1) Jones
suffered from long-term substance abuse; (2) that problem may be
caused by genetic factors and head trauma; (3) he was under the
influence of alcohol and drugs at the time of the murders; and (4)
he was abused as a child. 9
id., at 2465. The court
concluded that these circumstances were “not sufficiently
substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,” so it
sentenced Jones to death.
Ibid. The Arizona Supreme Court
affirmed after “review[ing] the entire record” and “independently
weighing all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented.”
Jones, 185 Ariz., at 492, 917 P. 2d, at 221.
C
Jones sought state postconviction review on
the theory that defense counsel was ineffective. Jones argued that
his attorney should have retained an independent neuropsychologist,
rather than relying on Dr. Potts. The state court denied this claim
because it “remember[ed]” that Dr. Potts “was a very good expert”
at trial and “was defense oriented.” 7 Record 1950. Jones also
claimed that trial counsel failed to make a timely request for
neurological or neuropsychological testing. But after holding an
evidentiary hearing on this claim, the state court rejected it on
the merits. Jones then unsuccessfully sought review in the Arizona
Supreme Court. Order in
State v.
Jones, No.
CR–00–0512–PC (Feb. 15, 2001); 1 Record 186.
D
Jones next filed a habeas petition in Federal
District Court and reasserted his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims. See 28 U. S. C. §2254. The District Court held an
evidentiary hearing but ultimately concluded that Jones could not
show prejudice because the additional information he presented
“ ‘barely . . . alter[ed] the sentencing profile
presented to the sentencing judge.’ ”
Jones v.
Schriro, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1043 (Ariz. 2006) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U. S., at 700). The court reached this
conclusion based on its assessment of “the credibility of the
parties’ witnesses,” including witnesses introduced by the State to
undercut Jones’s claims. 450 F. Supp. 2d, at 1038. The Ninth
Circuit reversed. See
Jones v.
Ryan, 583 F.3d 626
(2009). But this Court vacated that judgment and remanded for the
Ninth Circuit to determine whether, in light of
Cullen v.
Pinholster,
563 U.S.
170 (2011), it had been proper to consider the new evidence
presented at the federal evidentiary hearing. See
Ryan v.
Jones, 563 U.S. 932 (2011).
On reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit again
granted habeas relief. The panel held that it was permissible to
consider the new evidence [
2] and concluded that there was a “reasonable probability”
that “Jones would not have received a death sentence” if that
evidence had been presented at sentencing.
Jones v.
Ryan, 1 F. 4th 1179, 1196, 1204 (CA9 2021). The panel’s
lengthy opinion made no mention of the aggravating factors, and it
did not consider the State’s rebuttal evidence.
Arizona sought en banc review. The Ninth Circuit
denied the State’s petition, but the panel amended its opinion to
mention the aggravating circumstances and to rebuke the District
Court for “weigh[ing] the testimony of [competing] experts against
each other.”
Jones v.
Ryan, 52 F. 4th 1104, 1128
(2022).
Ten judges dissented from the denial of en banc
review. Judge Ikuta, joined by two other judges, argued that the
panel should have deferred to the state postconviction review court
on the
Strickland prejudice inquiry. Judge Bennett, joined
by eight others, assumed without deciding that the panel could
consider the new evidence. But he asserted that the panel flouted
Strickland by crediting “questionable, weak, and cumulative
mitigation evidence” as “enough to overcome . . .
weight[y] . . . aggravating circumstances.” 52
F. 4th, at 1155 (dissenting opinion). If not corrected, Judge
Bennett wrote, the panel’s errors would enable “courts to
improperly grant sentencing relief to capital defendants who have
been convicted of the most horrific crimes.”
Id., at
1137.
We granted certiorari to review the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation and application of
Strickland. 601
U. S. ___ (2023).
II
Jones claims that his Sixth Amendment right to
the effective assistance of counsel was violated during the
sentencing phase of his capital trial. To succeed on such a claim,
a defendant must show that counsel provided a “deficient”
performance that “prejudiced” him.
Strickland, 466
U. S., at 687. When an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
is based on counsel’s performance at the sentencing phase of a
capital case, a defendant is prejudiced only if “there is a
reasonable probability that, absent [counsel’s] errors, the
sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.”
Id., at 695. “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. That requires a
substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different
result.”
Pinholster, 563 U. S., at 189 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). This standard does not require a
defendant to show that it is more likely than not that adequate
representation would have led to a better result, but “[t]he
difference” should matter “only in the rarest case.”
Strickland, 466 U. S., at 697. To determine whether a
prisoner satisfies this standard, a court must “consider the
totality of the evidence before the judge or jury”—both mitigating
and aggravating.
Id., at 695.
The Ninth Circuit departed from these
well-established rules in at least three ways. First, it failed
adequately to take into account the weighty aggravating
circumstances in this case. As noted, the panel’s initial opinion
did not mention those circumstances at all. After the State
petitioned for rehearing and 10 judges voted to grant the petition,
the panel issued an amended opinion that at least mentioned the
aggravating circumstances, but it failed to give them the weight
that they would almost certainly be accorded by an Arizona
sentencing judge.
Second, the Ninth Circuit applied a strange
Circuit rule that prohibits a court in a
Strickland case
from assessing the relative strength of expert witness testimony.
See 52 F. 4th, at 1128–1129. This rule is clearly unsound.
Determining whether a defense expert’s report or testimony would
have created a reasonable probability of a different result if it
had been offered at trial necessarily requires an evaluation of the
strength of that report or testimony. And where a prosecution
expert has expressed a contrary opinion, it is hard to see how a
court could decide how much weight to give the defense expert
without making a comparative analysis.
Third, the Ninth Circuit held that the District
Court erred by attaching diminished persuasive value to Jones’s
mental health conditions because it saw no link between those
conditions and Jones’s conduct when he committed the three murders.
See
id., at 1129. The Ninth Circuit seemed to suggest that
this conclusion was supported by
Eddings v.
Oklahoma,
455 U.S.
104 (1982), but that is not so.
Eddings held that a
sentencer may not “refuse to consider . . . any relevant
mitigating evidence.”
Id., at 114
. It did not hold
that a sentencer cannot find mitigating evidence unpersuasive. See
id., at 114–115 (emphasizing that “[t]he sentencer
. . . may determine the weight to be given relevant
mitigating evidence”).
Picking up what he takes to be the implications
of these three features of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, Jones
argues that a habeas petitioner is entitled to relief whenever he
or she “presents substantial evidence of the kind that a reasonable
sentencer might deem relevant to the defendant’s moral
culpability.” Brief for Respondent 14. Whether or not this rule
represents a fair extrapolation of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning,
it is squarely at odds with the established understanding of
prejudice, which requires a “reasonable probability” of a different
result. Imagine a defendant with the worst possible aggravating
circumstances, say, multiple, vulnerable victims; torture; a
lengthy record of violent crime; no remorse; and a vow to kill
again if given the chance. According to Jones, if the defense is
able to show that trial counsel failed to produce any mitigating
evidence that can be characterized as “substantial,” the defendant
must be resentenced. But in such a case, where the aggravating
factors greatly outweigh the mitigating evidence, there may be no
“reasonable probability” of a different result. Thus, Jones’s
argument is squarely inconsistent with
Strickland.
III
With the proper understanding of
Strickland in mind, we turn to the prejudice issue in this
case. Most of the mitigating evidence Jones presented at the
federal evidentiary hearing was not new, and what was new would not
carry much weight in Arizona courts. Conversely, the aggravating
factors present here are extremely weighty. As a result, there is
no reasonable probability that the evidence on which Jones relies
would have altered the outcome at sentencing.
A
We begin with the mitigating evidence. In the
District Court, Jones introduced evidence of (1) mental
illness, (2) cognitive impairment caused by a history of head
trauma, (3) childhood abuse, and (4) substance abuse.
Jones claims that this evidence requires resentencing, but as the
District Court aptly observed, this evidence “would barely have
altered the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge,”
and it is insufficient to show prejudice.
Strickland, 466
U. S., at 699–700.
1
Jones claims that his newly proffered evidence
shows that he suffers from “PTSD, AD/HD, mood disorder, [and]
bipolar depressive disorder.” Brief for Respondent 45. But it is
not reasonably likely that this evidence would have resulted in a
different sentence.
Arizona courts had already received testimony
that Jones “suffers from a major mental illness,” likely a “form of
Bipolar Affective Disorder.” 4 Record 1070; 10
id., at 2567.
Yet they declined to give this evidence much weight because Jones
did not “establish a causal connection between his alleged mental
illness and his conduct on the night of the murders.”
Jones,
185 Ariz., at 492, 917 P. 2d, at 221; accord,
State v.
Prince, 226 Ariz. 516, 542, 250 P.3d 1145, 1171 (2011)
(discounting poor mental health when no “expert could establish
[the defendant’s] mental state on the night of the shootings”);
State v.
Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 343, 185 P.3d 111, 129
(2008) (same).
Jones’s new evidence did not fix that problem.
One of Jones’s experts reiterated that Jones has a mood disorder,
but he did not express an opinion on whether that disorder affected
Jones on the night of the murders. 4 Record 823–825. Two experts
diagnosed Jones with PTSD, but neither testified that he
experienced such symptoms at the time of the murders. 2
id.,
at 506–508;
id., at 451–453. Likewise, no expert linked
Jones’s AD/HD to the murders; indeed, one of the State’s witnesses
testified that there is no link between that disorder and violence.
Id., at 459. Because none of Jones’s experts provided a real
link between Jones’s disorders and the murders, their testimony
would have done him little good in the Arizona courts. See
State v.
Poyson, 250 Ariz. 48, 53, 58, 475 P.3d 293,
298, 303 (2020) (failure to link mitigating evidence to the crime
may diminish its weight);
State v.
Stuard, 176 Ariz.
589, 608, n. 12,
863 P.2d 881, 900, n. 12 (1993) (“[E]vidence of causation
is required before mental impairment can be considered a
significant mitigating factor”).
2
Next, Jones introduced evidence that he
suffers from cognitive impairment caused by physical trauma that he
suffered during his mother’s pregnancy, at birth, and later in
life. Brief for Respondent 44. But there is no reason to think that
this evidence would have meaningfully changed how the state court
viewed the case.
Arizona courts had already heard extensive
evidence about Jones’s head trauma and cognitive impairment. For
instance, the sentencing court learned that Jones’s biological
father knocked his mother down stairs when she was pregnant with
him, 4 Record 1067, 9
id., 2523, that his birth was
traumatic,
ibid., and that he was physically abused by his
first stepfather, 4
id., at 1067. The sentencing court knew
that Jones had been knocked unconscious as the result of three
falls during childhood and adolescence and a mugging in his late
teens.
Id., at 1068, 1087; 9
id., at 2526, 2528–2529;
10
id., at 2556–2557, 2569, 2580. It also heard from Dr.
Potts that Jones’s head trauma potentially contributed to his
behavior. 4
id., at 1068, 1071. Yet it did not find this
evidence sufficient to warrant leniency. And after reviewing the
same evidence, the Arizona Supreme Court concurred.
Jones,
185 Ariz., at 492, 917 P. 2d, at 221 (crediting Dr. Potts’s
assumption that Jones had brain damage).
Jones added little on this issue at his
evidentiary hearing. He alleged a few additional head injuries from
car accidents and fights, but “there is no medical documentation to
corroborate any of these injuries.”
Jones, 450 F. Supp.
2d, at 1039, and n. 11. And though his experts flagged a
handful of poor test scores and grades, Jones’s IQ and standardized
test scores are mostly average. 2 Record 347, 358–376, 379–399; 3
id., at 798. This vague evidence at most “corroborate[s]”
testimony the Arizona courts already credited.
Jones, 185
Ariz., at 492, 917 P. 2d, at 221. Introducing it “would have
offered an insignificant benefit, if any at all.”
Wong v.
Belmontes,
558 U.S.
15, 23 (2009) (
per curiam).
3
Jones also alleges significant childhood
abuse. Brief for Respondent 44. Again, however, Arizona courts had
heard much on this topic. They knew that Jones’s father abused his
pregnant mother, that his first stepfather beat both of them, and
that his grandfather introduced him to drugs at a young age. And
they received testimony that any period of normalcy during Jones’s
childhood was “too late” and “not strong enough to counter the
earlier abuse.” 4 Record 1069–1070. They nevertheless concluded
that this abuse did not warrant leniency, primarily because it
appeared unconnected to the murders.
Jones, 185 Ariz., at
490–491, 917 P. 2d, at 219–220; 9 Record 2465.
In federal court, Jones added two new
allegations. First, he asserted that the grandfather who introduced
him to alcohol also sexually abused him. Second, he claimed that
his second stepfather, Randy, physically abused him. It is not
likely that these allegations would have moved the state court
either.
The sexual-abuse allegation is entirely
uncorroborated. Jones did not mention it until his federal habeas
proceedings. 2
id., at 503–504. And his mother and second
stepfather explained that they “never saw any indication that
[Jones] may have been sexually abused by anyone, nor were they
aware of any sexual perpetrators in the family.” Record in No.
2:01–cv–00384 (D Ariz., Feb. 13, 2006), ECF Doc. 172–3, p. 49.
Arizona courts would give this self-reported and uncorroborated
evidence “little . . . mitigating weight.”
State
v.
Sharp, 193 Ariz. 414, 425, 973 P.2d 1171, 1182 (1999);
accord,
State v.
Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz. 449, 462,
698 P.2d 694, 707 (1985).
Jones’s physical-abuse allegation against Randy
is not much more helpful. Granted, his sister seconded his
allegation. 4 Record 982–987. But other record evidence contradicts
it. For instance, Jones told Dr. Potts that Randy was “quite stern
and a disciplinarian yet
certainly not physically abusive.”
Id., at 1067–1068 (emphasis added). On another occasion well
before this litigation, Jones said that “[a]s far as I’m
concerned,” Randy “is my real dad[;] he’s the only one that has
treated me good.
He has never hit me or anything.”
Id., at 1020 (emphasis added). Given Jones’s “obvious motive
to fabricate,” Arizona courts would view this abuse allegation with
some “skepticism.”
State v.
Medrano, 185 Ariz. 192,
194,
914 P.2d 225, 227 (1996); see also
Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz.,
at 462, 698 P. 2d, at 707;
State v.
Carriger,
143 Ariz. 142, 153,
692 P.2d 991, 1002 (1984). And even crediting the allegation,
it suffers from the same weakness that led the Arizona courts to
discount Jones’s other abuse allegations: it is not causally
connected to the murders.
4
Finally, Jones points to evidence of substance
abuse, namely, that his grandfather introduced him to drugs and
alcohol when he was “only nine years old.” Brief for Respondent 44.
But Jones’s history of substantive abuse was “well-documented” at
the time of sentencing.
Jones, 185 Ariz., at 491, 917
P. 2d, at 220. The Arizona Supreme Court, for instance,
recounted that “by the time [Jones] was 17 years old, he had used
many types of drugs and was an alcoholic.”
Ibid.; see also 4
Record 1086–1088 (presentencing report noting that Jones began
consuming alcohol and using drugs at 13). And that court gave this
fact “some mitigating weight.”
Jones, 185 Ariz., at 491, 917
P. 2d, at 220. There is no reasonable chance that those courts
would reach a different result on a second look at essentially the
same evidence.
B
The weakness of Jones’s mitigating evidence
contrasts sharply with the strength of the aggravating
circumstances. These circumstances—multiple homicides, cruelty,
pecuniary motivation, and murder of a child—are given great weight
in Arizona. See
State v.
Garza, 216 Ariz. 56, 72, 163
P.3d 1006, 1022 (2007) (multiple-homicides aggravator gets
“ ‘extraordinary weight’ ”);
Poyson, 250 Ariz., at
57, 475 P. 3d, at 302 (the cruelty and pecuniary-motivation
aggravators are “particularly weighty”);
State v.
Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 406, 132 P.3d 833, 850 (2006) (young
age of the victim is a “compelling aggravating circumstanc[e]” in
favor of the death penalty).
Indeed, in a host of cases, the Arizona Supreme
Court has held that one or more of these aggravating circumstances
outweighed mitigation evidence—even evidence that was “not
insubstantial.”
State v.
Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 185,
140 P.3d 950, 968 (2006) (concluding that the multiple-homicides
aggravator outweighed evidence of a “horrendous childhood”); see
also
Poyson, 250 Ariz., at 57–58, 475 P. 3d, at 302–303
(listing several cases in which the multiple-homicides aggravator
alone outweighed all mitigating circumstances);
State v.
McKinney, 245 Ariz. 225, 227, 426 P.3d 1204, 1206 (2018)
(cruelty and pecuniary-motivation aggravators outweighed evidence
that a defendant had “endured a horrific childhood” and suffered
from mental illness). Conversely, Jones and his
amici
identify
no cases in which the Arizona Supreme Court has
vacated the judgment of death in a case involving multiple
murders—let alone a case involving all of the aggravating
circumstances present here. The absence of such a case strongly
suggests that Jones has no reasonable probability of escaping the
death penalty.
IV
To justify its contrary conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit pointed to “the
Strickland prejudice analysis
conducted by the Supreme Court” in “similar cases.” 52 F. 4th,
at 1131. In these cases, the Ninth Circuit stated, we found
prejudice when counsel failed to present “classic mitigating
evidence,” even though the defendants had committed “brutal
crimes.”
Id., at 1133.
A review of the precedents cited by the Ninth
Circuit shows that they are very different from the case now before
us. In each of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases on which
the Ninth Circuit relied, this Court found that defense counsel
introduced little, if any, mitigating evidence at the original
sentencing. See
Porter v.
McCollum,
558 U.S.
30, 41 (2009) (
per curiam);
Williams v.
Taylor,
529 U.S.
362, 395–398 (2000);
Rompilla v.
Beard,
545 U.S.
374, 378, 393 (2005);
Wiggins v.
Smith,
539 U.S.
510, 515, 534–535 (2003). Jones, by contrast, started with much
more mitigation. And in most of the other cases, the sentencer
found only a few aggravating circumstances. See
Porter, 558
U. S., at 42 (three aggravators, two of which the sentencing
judge thought “were insufficient to warrant death”);
Williams, 529 U. S., at 370, 398 (one aggravator);
Wiggins, 539 U. S., at 537 (one aggravator). That is a
far cry from the weighty aggravating circumstances present here.
Poyson, 250 Ariz., at 57, 475 P. 3d, at 302.
* * *
When a capital defendant claims that he was
prejudiced at sentencing because counsel failed to present
available mitigating evidence, a court must decide whether it is
reasonably likely that the additional evidence would have avoided a
death sentence. This analysis requires an evaluation of the
strength of all the evidence and a comparison of the weight of
aggravating and mitigating factors. The Ninth Circuit did not heed
that instruction; rather, it downplayed the serious aggravating
factors present here and overstated the strength of mitigating
evidence that differed very little from the evidence presented at
sentencing. Had the Ninth Circuit engaged in the analysis required
by
Strickland, it would have had no choice but to affirm the
decision of the District Court denying habeas relief. We therefore
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
