SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 21–806
_________________
HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION
COUNTY, et al., PETITIONERS
v. IVANKA TALEVSKI, as
personal representative of the ESTATE OF GORGI TALEVSKI,
DECEASED
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the seventh circuit
[June 8, 2023]
Justice Thomas, dissenting.
I agree with Justice Alito that the Federal
Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA) cannot be enforced through Rev.
Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, under
Gonzaga
Univ. v.
Doe,
536 U.S.
273 (2002). I write separately to highlight another and more
fundamental reason why FNHRA cannot be enforced under §1983.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action to redress only “the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.” But legislation enacted pursuant to
Congress’ spending power, like FNHRA, does not “secure” rights by
“law.”
For nearly all of our Nation’s history, it was
understood that there is a fundamental difference between the
exercise of Congress’ sovereign legislative powers, on the one
hand, and the exercise of its power to spend money and to attach
conditions to the receipt of that money, on the other. Only the
former sort of legislation, which imposes obligations on regulated
parties with the force of law, directly secures by law the rights
corresponding to those obligations. By contrast, an exercise of
Congress’ spending power, whether it comes from the so-called
Spending Clause or elsewhere in the Constitution, is no more than a
disposition of funds. As such, a
conditional exercise of the
spending power is nothing more than a contractual offer; any
“rights” that may flow from that offer are “secured” only by the
offeree’s acceptance and implementation, not federal law
itself.
Since
Maine v.
Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1
(1980), however, this Court has ignored that fundamental
distinction, permitting third parties who benefit from spending
conditions to enforce them in §1983 suits against state actors. In
doing so, it has created a constitutional quandary: If spending
conditions that benefit third parties are laws and secure rights in
the same manner as ordinary lawmaking under Congress’ sovereign
legislative powers, then such conditions would contradict the
bedrock constitutional prohibition against federal commandeering of
the States. We escape this quandary only by recognizing spending
conditions, not as rights-securing laws, but as the terms of
possible contracts that secure rights only by virtue of an
offeree’s acceptance—the very conclusion compelled by the
traditional understanding of the spending power. The choice between
these alternatives is stark and unavoidable: Either spending
conditions in statutes like FNHRA are not laws that secure rights
cognizable under §1983, or they are unconstitutional direct
regulations of States. The Court must, at some point, revisit its
understanding of the spending power and its relation to §1983.
I
This case arises from a §1983 suit to enforce
FNHRA’s spending conditions against a county-owned nursing home
that receives federal funding. Enacted under Congress’ spending
power, FNHRA conditions the receipt of federal Medicaid funding by
States and nursing facilities on compliance with a broad range of
requirements.
These conditions largely consist of requirements
that funding recipients protect certain “rights” of nursing-home
residents. In a subsection entitled “[r]equirements relating to
residents’ rights,” the Act requires recipients to “protect and
promote the rights of each resident,” including “[t]he right to
choose a personal attending physician” and make informed medical
decisions; “[t]he right to be free from physical or mental abuse,
corporal punishment, involuntary seclusion, and any [medically
unnecessary] physical or chemical restraints”; and “[t]he right[s]
to privacy” and “confidentiality.” 42 U. S. C.
§§1396r(c)(1)(A)(i)–(iv). The Act further provides that funding
recipients “must permit each resident to remain in the facility and
must not transfer or discharge the resident” without cause.
§1396r(c)(2)(A). Recipients must also adopt procedures for
residents to assert these “rights” and to otherwise “voice
grievances with respect to [their] treatment or care.”
§1396r(c)(1)(A)(vi).
The Act also imposes many requirements directly
and uniquely upon participating States, including in a subsection
entitled “State requirements relating to nursing facility
requirements.” §1396r(e). For instance, States must establish
procedures for residents to challenge transfer and discharge
decisions and an appeals process for other determinations.
§§1396r(e)(3) and (e)(7)(F). States are also required to certify
non-state-run facilities’ compliance with the Act’s provisions by
conducting annual surveys using protocols developed by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services. §1396r(g)(2)(A). If a State
finds that a facility is not providing adequate care, it must
conduct an extended survey. §1396r(g)(2)(B). The Act also requires
States to investigate resident complaints and perform onsite
monitoring at previously noncompliant or potentially noncompliant
facilities. §1396r(g)(4)(B). And, if it finds a violation that
“jeopardize[s] the health or safety of [a facility’s] residents,
the State shall take immediate action to remove the jeopardy and
correct the deficiencies.” §1396r(h)(1)(A).[
1]
FNHRA’s scheme is illustrative of many modern
federal spending programs, which often impose obligations directly
on States as a condition of funding. For example, as a condition on
highway funding, the Clean Air Act requires States to draft “State
implementation plans” if their metropolitan areas fail to satisfy
national ambient air quality standards. 42 U. S. C.
§§7410 and 7509(a)–(b). Among other requirements, these plans must
include emission limitations, compliance timetables, source
monitoring, permitting systems, enforcement programs, and public
participation. See §7410(a)(2). Other examples, spanning virtually
every domain of national and state policy, abound.
The ubiquity of such spending conditions,
combined with the Federal Government’s overwhelming financial heft,
has made Spending Clause legislation an extraordinarily potent
instrument of federal control.[
2] Congress and federal agencies “regularly us[e]
conditions to direct state and local governments in their
regulatory and spending policies.” P. Hamburger, Purchasing
Submission 139 (2021) (Hamburger). As a result, “the priorities and
programs of state and local governments have increasingly come to
reflect federal decisions,” to the point that the States have
virtually become “disaggregated sites of national governance, not
separate sovereigns.”
Id., at 141 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Given the profound consequences of spending conditions
for the Nation’s governance and the fundamental shift that they
have wrought in our federalist system, a sound understanding of
their constitutional basis and permissible legal effects is
essential.
II
This case presents one aspect of that
question: whether spending conditions that impose obligations on
States for the benefit of third parties may be enforced under
§1983. That statute provides a cause of action against any “person
who, under color” of state law, deprives the plaintiff “of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.” Accordingly, for the violation of a federal statutory
provision to give rise to a cognizable §1983 claim, the provision
must confer “rights, privileges, or immunities” that are “secured
by . . . la[w].” This Court’s cases make clear that a
right is secured by law in the relevant sense if, and only if,
federal law imposes a binding obligation on the defendant to
respect a corresponding substantive right that belongs to the
plaintiff.[
3]
In
Thiboutot, the Court held that “the
plain language of [§1983] undoubtedly embraces [a] claim that [the
defendant] violated” a spending-power statute, reasoning that “the
phrase ‘and laws’ . . . means what it says” and is not
“limited to some subset of laws.” 448 U. S., at 4. The Court
unquestioningly follows
Thiboutot’s logic today.
It is obvious, however, that conditional
spending legislation does not function—and, in particular, does not
“secure rights”—like laws enacted under Congress’ enumerated
legislative powers, such as the Commerce Clause. The latter, which
I will refer to as “sovereign legislative” or “regulatory” powers,
include powers to directly impose obligations, duties,
prohibitions, and the like on individuals and entities beyond the
Federal Government, and hence to secure corresponding rights in the
persons and entities to which such obligations are owed. Laws that
Congress enacts pursuant to its regulatory powers are binding on
the regulated parties and pre-empt contrary state law of their own
force. Whatever rights such laws secure, those rights are secured
“by the . . . laws” themselves. §1983.
By contrast, legislation that conditions a
State’s receipt of federal funds on compliance with certain
requirements imposes no obligations and secures no rights of its
own force. The stated conditions simply have no effect and do not
arguably secure any rights (“by law” or otherwise) unless and until
they are freely accepted by the State. Not only that, the Executive
Branch can prevent the conditions from taking effect by rejecting a
State’s application to participate in the spending program, and it
can terminate their effect by cutting off a State’s participation
for noncompliance with the conditions. In addition, States can opt
out of spending programs, completely nullifying whatever force the
spending conditions once had. This alone suggests that spending
conditions do not operate with the force of federal law, as
“Congress’ legislative powers cannot be avoided by simply opting
out.” D. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spending
Power, 52 S. D. L. Rev. 496, 498 (2007) (emphasis
deleted); see also
Townsend v.
Swank,
404 U.S.
282, 292 (1971) (Burger, C. J., concurring in result)
(“[A]dherence to the provisions of [spending statutes] is in no way
mandatory upon the States under the Supremacy Clause”).
Indeed, spending conditions like those in FNHRA
do not function as laws enacted under Congress’ regulatory powers,
and, if they did, they would unconstitutionally commandeer the
States to administer federal programs ranging from welfare, to
healthcare, to air quality, and much more. Such conditions are thus
constitutional, if at all, only if understood as setting forth the
terms of a federal-state contract, rather than as binding federal
law imposing legally enforceable obligations of its own force. In
holding that FNHRA secures rights by federal law, the majority
ignores the contractual understanding of spending conditions and,
by doing so, calls their very constitutionality into question.
A
As noted earlier, a defining characteristic of
modern spending legislation is the imposition of obligations on
States that accept federal funds. Understanding a State’s breach of
such obligations as akin to violating rights secured by federal law
is incompatible with this Court’s anticommandeering doctrine. Under
this bedrock constitutional principle, Congress generally cannot
directly regulate the States or require them to implement federal
programs.
“When the original States declared their
independence, they claimed the powers inherent in sovereignty.”
Murphy v.
National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 584
U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 14) (citing Declaration of
Independence ¶32).[
4] Later, in
ratifying the Constitution, the people of the original States
granted carefully enumerated legislative powers to the new Federal
Congress, while preserving the States’ pre-existing legislative
power. 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15). “[C]onspicuously
absent from” Congress’ enumerated powers was “the power to issue
direct orders to the governments of the States.”
Ibid.
Thus, as this Court has made clear, the
Constitution “confers upon Congress the power to regulate
individuals, not States.”
New York v.
United States,
505 U.S.
144, 166 (1992).[
5] As a
corollary, Congress “may not conscript state governments as its
agents,” nor can it “require the States to govern according to
[its] instructions.”
Id., at 162, 178. And, “[w]hatever the
outer limits of [state] sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: The
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer
a federal regulatory program.”
Id., at 188.[
6]
Yet that is precisely what many spending
conditions require the State to do. Spending conditions like
FNHRA’s are nothing more than commands to States,
qua
States, to administer federal benefits programs on terms dictated
by Congress. Such conditions cannot be treated as having the force
of federal law imposing direct obligations on the States and
securing correlative rights of private parties without violating
the anticommandeering doctrine.
It is no answer that the States consent to
direct regulation by agreeing to the spending conditions in return
for federal dollars. As the Court held in
New York, “[w]here
Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States,
. . . the departure from the constitutional plan cannot
be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.”
Id., at
182. Because the people have surrendered only limited and
enumerated powers to the Federal Government, the States and
Congress cannot jointly circumvent the ratification and amendment
process by agreeing “to the enlargement of the powers of Congress
beyond those enumerated in the Constitution.”
Ibid. The
Federal Government cannot buy (or rent) the States’ power to
implement a federal program and then regard the conditions that the
States are implementing themselves as having the force of federal
law.
B
Of course, it is ultimately the States’
consent that gives effect to conditions in spending legislation,
but it does so in an entirely different manner from an illicit
expansion of Congress’ regulatory powers. Rather, as the Court
observed in
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman,
451 U.S. 1
(1981), “legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much
in the nature of a contract.”
Id., at 17. A federal statute
imposing conditions upon the receipt of federal funding does not
enact those conditions with “the obligation of law”; it merely
“proposes them as the terms of a contractual promise.” Hamburger
132. Such spending provisions “merely stipulate what the government
expects from recipients if it is to pay them or, later, not
withhold further payment and demand its money back.”
Ibid.
Thus, “even when fully recited in statutes, federal conditions do
not come with legal obligation.”
Ibid.
Further, and as already noted, the conditions in
spending legislation only come into force upon the acceptance of
another party. Such conditions are thus “obligatory only by virtue
of such agreement and not by force of law.” D. Engdahl, The
Spending Power, 44 Duke L. J. 1, 104 (1994). To be sure, “it
is a statute that prescribes the funding condition and requires
denial of federal assistance if the funding condition is not agreed
to.”
Ibid. But, “only the agreement—and not the
statute—makes the terms obligatory on the funds recipient and thus
‘secures’ the contemplated third-party rights.”
Ibid.[
7] Accordingly,
such “third-party rights . . . are ‘secured’ (if at all)
not by any ‘law,’ but only by the contract between the recipient
and the United States.”
Ibid.
This contractual understanding of conditional
spending legislation is much more than a mere analogy; it is the
only possible explanation for why such legislation is not an
unconstitutional direct regulation of the States. To deny or
downplay this principle is to seek to have it both ways. Much
spending legislation conditions States’ receipt of federal funds on
their undertaking obligations with respect to third parties. For
such legislation to survive a federalism challenge, it must not
directly impose obligations on the States with the force of federal
law. But, for those conditions to be enforceable under §1983, they
must secure third-party rights by directly imposing correlative
obligations on the States with the force of federal law. Both of
these things cannot be true.
III
This contractual understanding of spending
conditions is also a necessary consequence of the limited nature of
Congress’ spending power, as consistently understood for nearly two
centuries of our Nation’s history. Indeed, this is one point on
which the Framers all seem to have agreed. Despite heated debates
over the source and scope of Congress’ power to spend, all
understood that this power did not carry with it any independent
regulatory authority. That agreement persisted throughout the 19th
century. And, in the 20th, it was a critical underpinning of this
Court’s precedents upholding expansive uses of the spending power
as consistent with Congress’ limited legislative powers and our
federalist system of government.
A
At the outset, while Congress undoubtedly
possesses the power to direct the expenditure of federal funds, it
is important to note that the Constitution contains no “spending
clause.” From the beginning, some have located the spending power
in the General Welfare Clause, and that view has generally been
accepted by this Court’s modern doctrine. See Engdahl, 44 Duke
L. J., at 53, and n. 220 (describing Alexander Hamilton’s
views);
South Dakota v.
Dole,
483
U.S. 203, 206 (1987). Yet, there are serious problems with that
view.
The General Welfare Clause is simply part of the
Taxing Clause, which reads in relevant part: “The Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States.” Art. 1, §8, cl. 1. By its
terms, the only authority vested by this text is a power to “lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” This power is then
qualified by the Debts and General Welfare Clauses, which limit the
objects for which Congress can exercise that power. The General
Welfare Clause is thus most naturally read as a qualification on
the substantive taxing power.
Consider also that the General Welfare Clause
references not only the “general Welfare” but also “the common
Defence.” If the Clause were construed as an affirmative grant of
power to spend for the common defense, it would make redundant
Congress’ powers to “raise and support Armies” and to “provide and
maintain a Navy,” also found in Article I, §8, cls. 12–13. Thus,
“[i]f the reference to ‘common Defence’ spending simply alludes to
power conferred elsewhere,” then it seems illogical to consider the
terms “general Welfare” as the source of a freestanding power to
spend for whatever purposes. D. Engdahl, The Basis of the Spending
Power, 18 Seattle U. L. Rev. 215, 222 (1995).
The Taxing Clause is also a strange candidate
for the source of a general congressional spending power because
“it fails to provide any authority at all to spend money acquired
otherwise than by taxation.”
Ibid. Yet, “[t]he federal
treasury receives money from many other sources, including
penalties, fines, user fees, leases, surplus property sales, gifts,
bequests, and returns on investments.”
Ibid. And those sums
are a pittance in comparison to those raised under Congress’
Borrowing Clause power, see Art. I., §8, cl. 2, which has
always been one of the major sources of federal funds. Unless
federal spending on credit and from revenues not derived from
“Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” is unconstitutional, the
General Welfare Clause cannot be the source of Congress’ spending
power.
The Clause certainly is not an independent grant
of
regulatory power to legislate for the general welfare, as
the history of the Constitution’s framing and ratification makes
clear. The Philadelphia Convention initially adopted a resolution
that Congress be authorized “ ‘to legislate in all cases for
the general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the
States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
legislation.’ ” J. Renz, What Spending Clause? (Or the
President’s Paramour), 33 John Marshall L. Rev. 81, 104 (1999)
(Renz). But the Convention later abandoned this vesting of a broad
power to legislate for the general welfare in favor of the
enumeration of specific federal legislative powers and the creation
of a taxing power limited by the General Welfare Clause. See R.
Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay
in Original Understanding, 52 Kan. L. Rev. 1, 23–29 (2003)
(Natelson); see also Renz 104–105 (counting five instances in which
the Convention considered and rejected attempts “to insert a grant
of general legislative power into the Constitution”).[
8]
Consistent with its text, Federalist advocates
of the Constitution defended the General Welfare Clause to the
ratifying public as nothing more than a limitation on the taxing
power. See,
e.g., 3 Debates on the Constitution 207 (J.
Elliot ed. 1876) (Elliot’s Debates) (E. Randolph, Virginia
Convention) (“The plain and obvious meaning of this is, that no
more duties, taxes, imposts, and excises, shall be laid, than are
sufficient to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and
general welfare, of the United States”); N. Webster, An Examination
Into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution, in
Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States 50 (P. Ford ed.
1888) (“[I]n the very clause which gives the power of levying
duties and taxes, the purposes to which the money shall be
appropriated are specified, viz.
to pay the debts and provide
for the common defence and general welfare of the United
States”); see also Natelson 47–49. “[T]heir basic message was
that the language in question was not a grant at all—rather it was
a restriction on federal authority.”
Id., at 39. As Governor
Randolph emphatically declared: “Is this an independent, separate,
substantive power, to provide for the general welfare of the United
States? No, sir.” 3 Elliot’s Debates 466.
Federalists went out of their way to
specifically disclaim that the General Welfare Clause would vest
any independent
regulatory power. For example, James Madison
expressly rejected Anti-Federalist attempts to portray the General
Welfare Clause as granting “an unlimited commission to exercise
every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the common
defense or general welfare.” The Federalist No. 41, p. 262 (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961). Similarly, in rebutting Patrick Henry’s warning
that the Clause would vest a regulatory power, Governor Randolph
observed: “You must violate every rule of construction and common
sense, if you sever it from the power of raising money, and annex
it to anything else, in order to make it that formidable power
which it is represented to be.” 3 Elliot’s Debates 600. Again and
again, leading Federalists represented the General Welfare Clause
simply “as qualifying the fiscal power.” E. Corwin, The Spending
Power of Congress—Apropos the Maternity Act, 36 Harv. L. Rev.
548, 552 (1923) (citing The Federalist Nos. 30 and 34 (A.
Hamilton), and 41 (J. Madison)). “It was generally understood” by
the Constitution’s ratifiers “that the General Welfare Clause did
not confer power to regulate”; such regulatory powers were
conferred only by specific enumerations such as the Commerce
Clause. T. Sky, To Provide for the General Welfare 67 (2003)
(Sky).
Thus, even if one implausibly regards the
General Welfare Clause as a “Spending Clause,” it is unambiguous
that the Clause confers no independent regulatory power.
Importantly, the same holds for every other plausible textual
anchor for Congress’ general spending power. First, the Necessary
and Proper Clause is a natural candidate for the spending power
because spending funds may be “necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution” the Federal Government’s enumerated powers. Art.
I., §8, cl. 18; see G. Lawson & G. Seidman, The Constitution of
Empire 30 (2004) (Lawson & Seidman) (“This ‘Sweeping Clause’
. . . unquestionably includes the power to enact spending
laws that are ‘necessary and proper’ for effectuating federal
powers”); K. Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L. J.
1343, 1348 (1988) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause
“includes the power to spend public funds on authorized federal
activities”). But, because the Clause authorizes only those
spending measures that are “ ‘necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution’ other enumerated federal powers[,]
Congress can . . . spend only if the appropriation is
tied to the execution of one of the federal government’s granted
powers.” Lawson & Seidman 30. The Clause thus “does not provide
a stand-alone grant of spending authority, and certainly not an
authority to spend for a nonspecific ‘general welfare of the United
States.’ ”
Ibid.
A second plausible source of the spending power
is the Property Clause, which provides that “Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States.” Art. IV, §3, cl. 2. The term “other Property” may
“comprehen[d] personal property no less than real,” and “personal
property includes money, as well as financial assets of all kinds.”
Engdahl, 18 Seattle U. L. Rev., at 250 (emphasis deleted). But
the power to dispose of funds does not carry with it any regulatory
power; the Property Clause “only authorizes the control and
disposition of federal property” and “does not disturb the
allocation of
governance authority otherwise accomplished
under the principle of enumerated powers.”
Id., at 251.
Thus, when disposing of federal property under the Property Clause,
“Congress has no more competence to make ‘law’ than any private
donor or testator has.” Engdahl, 44 Duke L. Rev., at 104.
B
In the early decades after ratification, both
the source and the scope of the spending power were hotly
contested, usually in debates over “internal improvements” such as
roads and canals. One side, represented by Madison, maintained that
federal spending must be strictly in aid of the Federal
Government’s specifically enumerated powers—for instance,
expenditures to construct a road would be justified only if the
road could be constructed under the Post Roads Clause or some other
enumerated power. See Renz 108–119; see also J. Eastman, Restoring
the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 Chap. L. Rev. 63, 72
(2001). As this side of the debate also took a narrow view of the
enumerated powers, it generally argued that the Federal Government
could not fund internal improvements without a constitutional
amendment. See Sky 140–141. The other camp, associated with the
nationalist views of Hamilton and Joseph Story, understood the
General Welfare Clause to “include a very broad spending
authority,” which could be applied to purposes not specifically
enumerated by the Constitution. Natelson 12; see also Renz
124–126.
Even this camp, however, understood that “the
General Welfare Clause does not include a power to regulate.”
Natelson 12; see also Sky 96. Hamilton, for example, made clear
that the spending power did not “imply a power to do whatever else
should appear to Congress conducive to the general welfare.” Report
on the Subject of Manufactures 37 (1791). As he further elaborated,
“[a] power to appropriate money [does] not carry a power to do any
other thing, not authorized in the Constitution, either expressly
or by fair implication.”
Ibid. Instead, any regulatory
authority had to be tethered to some independent regulatory power.
Thus, under this view, Congress could spend money on roads and
canals unconnected with the enumerated powers, but it would have to
depend on the States for any regulatory legislation needed to
complete and preserve the improvements.
This understanding that the spending power
itself extended only to the “
application of money,”
ibid. (emphasis in original), led Hamilton to favor a
constitutional amendment “empowering Congress to open canals.”
Letter from A. Hamilton to J. Dayton (1799), in 10 Works of
Alexander Hamilton 334 (H. Lodge ed. 1904). After all, opening
canals “involve[d] much more than spending money: it involve[d]
acquiring rights of way and constructing and operating the
improvements.” Engdahl, 44 Duke L. Rev., at 23. Thus, it was
precisely the “insufficiency of the spending power to override
state law obstacles to achieving the targeted end that made
Hamilton conclude that a constitutional amendment for canals was
necessary.”
Id., at 24. “[F]ederal funding alone” could not
“override” “incompatible or adverse state policies.”
Ibid.
As this example demonstrates, even those who held the broadest
conception of the spending power recognized that it was only a
power to spend, not a power to impose binding requirements with the
force of federal law. See Sky 95.
The limited nature of the spending power was
also a rare point of agreement in Hamilton and Jefferson’s bitter
quarrel over the constitutionality of a national bank. Reflecting
the ratification era understanding of the General Welfare Clause,
Jefferson observed that “the laying of taxes is the
power
and the general welfare the
purpose for which the power is
to be exercised.” Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for
Establishing a National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in 19 Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 277 (J. Boyd ed. 1974) (emphasis in original). If
the General Welfare Clause went beyond “describing the purpose of
the” Taxing Clause and represented “a distinct and independent
power to do any act [Congress may] please, which might be for the
good of the Union,” it “would render all the preceding and
subsequent enumerations of power completely useless.”
Ibid.;
accord, J. Madison, The Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 1791), in 13 Papers of
James Madison 375 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds. 1981)
(interpreting the General Welfare Clause as a distinct power “would
supersede all the powers reserved to the state governments”). In
response, Hamilton justified the bank based on Congress’ enumerated
powers, such as the Commerce and Taxing Clauses. Opinion on the
Constitutionality of an Act To Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in
8 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 97 (H. Syrett ed. 1965). He
discussed the General Welfare Clause only as a limitation: “It is
true, that [Congress] cannot without breach of trust, lay taxes for
any other purpose than the general welfare.”
Id., at 129. In
his view, the spending power was emphatically limited to “
the
application of
money.”
Ibid. (emphasis in
original). Jefferson and Hamilton could agree that it was no
independent font of legislative power.
In sum, the Framers and Ratifiers understood the
Taxing and General Welfare Clause as granting only a power to tax.
What our modern cases refer to as the “Spending Clause”—in fact,
the General Welfare Clause—was understood by the Framers and the
ratifying public as granting no regulatory authority. One thing
that the opposing men and factions of the founding generation
agreed upon was that the Federal Government’s power to spend was
just that—a power to spend, involving no regulatory authority.
Instead, the power to bind with the force of law must come from
Congress’ enumerated legislative powers rather than its spending
power.
C
Though the scope and source of the spending
power continued to be vigorously contested into the 19th century,
the fundamental understanding that federal spending measures could
not bind with the force of law remained common ground. For example,
in his last official act, President Madison vetoed an internal
improvements bill in part because the “train of powers incident” to
constructing and maintaining such improvements were beyond
Congress’ enumerated powers. 30 Annals of Cong. 211, 212 (1817).
The General Welfare Clause could not provide the needed regulatory
authority, as such an interpretation “would have the effect of
giving to Congress a general power of legislation,” thus rendering
the Constitution’s “special and careful enumeration of powers
. . . nugatory and improper.”
Id., at 212. That
the bill required state consent was likewise insufficient because,
if the power “be not possessed by Congress, the assent of the
States . . . cannot confer the power.”
Ibid.
Upon assuming office, President James Monroe
sent a message to Congress agreeing with Madison’s views; the
message was then referred to a special Committee in the House of
Representatives led by Congressman Henry Tucker. Corwin, 36 Harv.
L. Rev., at 559–560. The Tucker Committee produced an
exhaustive report on internal improvements, which disagreed with
nearly every aspect of Madison and Monroe’s position.
Id.,
at 560–561. Significantly, however, the Committee agreed that the
General Welfare Clause did not vest the power needed to make
internal improvements, relying instead on the Constitution’s
specific enumerations such as the Post Roads Clause. 31 Annals of
Cong. 454 (1817) (“disavow[ing] any use of the general phrase in
the Constitution to provide for the common defence and general
welfare, as applicable to the enumeration of powers, or as
extending the power of Congress beyond the specified powers”). The
Tucker Committee also agreed with President Monroe that the
spending power did not “extend the specified or incidental powers
of the Government” or allow Congress to exercise any
“jurisdictional [
i.e., regulatory] rights” over
improvements.
Id., at 459–460. Thus, “if the power to make a
road or dig a canal is not given” by one of Congress’ enumerated
regulatory powers, “the power of appropriating money cannot confer
it.”
Id., at 459.[
9]
In his second term, President Monroe set forth
the fullest exposition of the understanding that the spending power
involved no regulatory authority. In 1822, Congress passed a bill
to establish a system of internal improvements, asserting the
“power to establish turnpikes with gates and tolls, and to enforce
the collection of tolls by [federal] penalties.” Sky 147 (internal
quotation marks omitted). President Monroe then vetoed the measure,
judging that Congress’ spending authority did not extend to such “a
complete right of jurisdiction and sovereignty for all the purposes
of internal improvement, and not merely the right of applying money
under the power vested in Congress to make appropriations.” 2
Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1908, p. 142 (J.
Richardson ed. 1897) (Richardson). Because Monroe understood “that
Congress do[es] not possess this power [and] the States
individually can not grant it,” he agreed with Madison and Hamilton
that the “power can be granted only by an amendment to the
Constitution.”
Id., at 143.
To explain his veto, President Monroe sent
Congress an extensive report entitled “Views of the President of
the United States on the Subject of Internal Improvements.” In this
report—perhaps “the most elaborate constitutional discussion ever
sent to the Capitol from the White House”—Monroe synthesized the
understanding of the spending power from the founding of the
Republic. L. Rogers, The Postal Power of Congress 75 (1916). And,
in doing so, he largely settled the contours of that understanding
for over a century.
In the centerpiece of the Views, Monroe
explained that the spending power carries no incidental power to
regulate individuals or States. Echoing Hamilton, Monroe understood
the spending power to consist of “a right to appropriate the public
money, and nothing more.” Richardson 162. It carries with it “no
incidental power, nor does it draw after it any consequences of
that kind.”
Id., at 168. Monroe proceeded to carefully
distinguish the spending power from Congress’ authority to impose
obligations and duties: “[T]he use or application of the money
after it is raised is a power altogether of a different character”
from Congress’ enumerated regulatory powers such as the taxing
power; “[i]t imposes no burden on the people, nor can it act on
them in a sense to take power from the States.”
Id., at
164.
Applying this understanding of the spending
power to the question of internal improvements, Monroe explained
that Congress could only “appropriate the money necessary to make
them.”
Id., at 168. Where none of Congress’ enumerated
regulatory powers was applicable, Monroe concluded, “[f]or every
act requiring legislative sanction or support the State authority
must be relied on.”
Ibid. Thus, Congress could not itself
pass laws providing for “[t]he condemnation of the land,
. . . the establishment of turnpikes and tolls, and the
protection of the work when finished.”
Ibid.
Monroe’s summation of the federal spending
power, reflecting that it does not carry with it any regulatory
power, was accepted throughout the 19th century by friends and foes
of federal power alike. In his 1825 inaugural address, President
John Quincy Adams explained that Monroe’s Views had “conciliated
the sentiments and approximated the opinions of enlightened minds
upon the question of constitutional power.” Inaugural Address, Mar.
4, 1825, in 5 American State Papers, Foreign Relations 753, 755
(1858). Five years later, President Andrew Jackson vetoed the
Maysville Road Bill of 1830 for the same reasons Monroe had vetoed
the Cumberland Road Bill of 1822: Congress lacks “[t]he right to
exercise as much jurisdiction as is necessary to preserve the works
and to raise funds by the collection of tolls to keep them in
repair,” and “[w]ithout [such power] nothing extensively useful can
be effected.” Richardson 492.
Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the
Constitution also recognized that the spending power did not carry
with it any auxiliary power to bind individuals or States. Citing
Monroe’s Views liberally, Story agreed that Congress could not
enact a system of internal improvements under the General Welfare
Clause. Although he located the spending power in that Clause,
Story understood that the power was confined “to mere
appropriations of money,” and that, as a result, the Federal
Government could not regulate internal improvements except pursuant
to its legislative “enumerated powers.” 3 Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, §1269, p. 150 (1833); see also
Sky 224 (“[A]s read by Story, the General Welfare Clause did
not constitute a regulatory power, independent of the
spending power, authorizing Congress to enact whatever measures it
wished . . . under an unlimited power to legislate for
the general welfare of the United States”).
Although disagreement on whether Congress could
spend for purposes beyond the enumerated powers persisted through
the Antebellum and Reconstruction eras, the understanding that the
spending power did not imply regulatory power persisted. See
generally Sky 232–240, 270–291. Because Congress was acting solely
under its power to spend, it relied on the States’ acceptance of
terms and upon the States’ legislative powers to carry out federal
spending programs.
D
Given this consensus, it is not surprising
that the first federal grant-in-aid spending programs were
contractual in nature. The Morrill Act of 1862, perhaps the first
such program, extended an offer to the States to accept donations
of federal lands on the condition that the State use the land to
establish a college. 12Stat. 504–505. States had two years to
accept the federal terms in the form of an Act by the State’s
legislature.
Id., at 505 Significantly, the only consequence
for a State’s breach of the use condition was contractual in
nature—“the grant to such State shall cease; and said State shall
be bound to pay the United States the amount received of any lands
previously sold.”
Id., at 504–505. The Second Morrill Act,
enacted in 1890, followed the same framework, donating money for
the endowment of agricultural and mechanical arts colleges, subject
to the condition that black students not be excluded. Ch. 841,
26Stat. 417. Like the First Morrill Act, the only consequence for
noncompliance was that future appropriations under the Act would
cease until the State brought itself into compliance.
Id.,
at 419.
In the early 20th century, the adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment and the national income tax vastly expanded the
revenue available to the Federal Government. But the increasingly
ambitious spending programs that followed did not break the
contractual pattern established by the Morrill Acts. Thus,
early-20th-century highway grants took the form of an offer to
enter a contract, with the consequence of noncompliance being the
cutoff of federal funds. See Corwin, 36 Harv. L. Rev., at 574,
n. 72 (describing Federal Highway Act of 1916); see also
id., at 573–575 (collecting other examples).
Even in the New Deal era, advocates of
far-reaching spending programs continued to understand the spending
power as a mere power of appropriation. Professor Corwin, for
example, recognized that the States must be depended upon to
exercise the legislative power needed to implement such programs.
Thus, “federal highway construction relie[d] on the state power of
eminent domain, as well as on state power to police and protect
highways during and after their construction.” National-State
Cooperation—Its Present Possibilities, 46 Yale L. J. 599, 617
(1937). Similarly, national protection of forests depended on “the
power of the states to regulate the conduct of persons entering
forests,” and the provision of maternity benefits depended on “the
power of the cooperating states to compel birth registration, the
licensing of mid-wives, etc.”
Ibid. Thus, more than 100
years after Monroe’s Views, it was still well understood that the
Federal Government’s spending power needed to work with “the wider
coercive powers of the states” to accomplish its ends.
Ibid.
And, a State’s acceptance of federal funds in return for exercising
its own powers did not expand the Federal Government’s legislative
powers.
In sum, from the framing of the Constitution to
well into the 20th century, it was virtually undisputed that
Congress’ spending power was nothing more than a power to spend. It
included no regulatory authority to bind parties, to secure rights
or impose duties with the force of federal law, and no authority to
directly regulate the States even with their consent.
E
When cases concerning expansive federal
spending programs first began to reach this Court, they vividly
illustrated both the enduring understanding of the spending power
as a nonregulatory power and the contractual understanding of
spending conditions. The Federal Government defended major spending
programs on the basis of that understanding, and the programs
survived this Court’s review only because of those traditional
premises.
In
Massachusetts v.
Mellon,
262 U.S.
447 (1923), the Court rejected as nonjusticiable Massachusetts’
claim that the Maternity Act of 1921 was “an attempt to legislate
outside the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution and
within the field of local powers exclusively reserved to the
States.”
Id., at 482. The Court first stated that it
“[p]robably . . . would be sufficient to point out that
the powers of the State are not invaded, since the statute imposes
no obligation but simply extends an option which the State is free
to accept or reject.”
Id., at 480. In other words, the State
could not be injured because the Act was not a direct legal
regulation. Rather, it was a mere offer to bargain—it “imposed” no
“burden . . . upon the States” and did not require them
“to do or to yield anything” of its own force.
Id., at 482.
The State could not seek judicial redress because the contractual
nature of the Act’s provisions meant that States could vindicate
their own rights “by the simple expedient of not yielding.”
Ibid.; see also Corwin, 36 Harv. L. Rev., at 579
(noting that the Maternity Act adhered to the traditional
requirements of state consent and the “general
caveat
against jurisdictional rights following in the wake of
appropriations”). “[T]he Justices in
Mellon understood that
Congress’ power to spend money is
not a
legislative
power.” Engdahl, 52 S. D. L. Rev., at 498 (emphasis in
original).
Cases involving New Deal spending programs teach
the same lesson. For example,
United States v.
Butler,
297 U.S. 1
(1936), concerned the constitutionality of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, which offered subsidies to farmers not to sell
crops. The Government defended the Act on the ground that it did
not regulate any private or state party. Instead, “[a]ny commands
or restrictions in the Act [were] imposed only upon the use by
[federal] administrative officials of the money granted.” Brief for
United States in
United States v.
Butler, O. T. 1935,
No. 401, p. 264. In line with the traditional distinction between
mere spending and regulatory commands, the Government urged that
“Congress ha[d] not gone beyond its power of authorizing an
expenditure” precisely because “[i]t ha[d] not sought to force or
command citizens to receive the money offered and to perform the
conditions upon which the funds are to be disbursed.”
Id.,
at 265. The Government expressly relied on the contractual nature
of the Act’s conditions, as distinct from any “exercise of
sovereign regulation”:
“It would be most unusual to suppose that
a contract of this nature, entered into freely by both parties, is
an exercise of sovereign regulation and control over one of the
parties or over the subject matter with which the contract deals.
. . . The rights of the United States under the contracts
are no greater than would be the rights of a private citizen under
similar contracts, and enforcement must be by ordinary judicial
process according to the law of the forum. The contracts are not
derogatory of any sovereign rights of the States; they are carried
out pursuant to and under the protection of the laws of the States.
. . . The purpose and effect of the contracts so entered
into are simply to accomplish the spending of the money on the
conditions imposed by Congress, and in authorizing execution of
such contracts Congress was not exerting a power outside of the
field of appropriation.”
Id., at 266–267.
The Government also disclaimed that the Act
would have pre-emptive effect: Because it went “no further than
offering benefits to those who comply with certain conditions,”
States “remain[ed] as free after the passage of this Act as before
to pass laws rendering it impossible for any of their inhabitants
to comply with such conditions.”
Id., at 268. Thus, to avoid
a Tenth Amendment problem, the Government relied on the traditional
distinction between the Federal Government’s power to spend and its
power to regulate:
“The distinction between an application of the
Federal lawmaking power to enforce compliance with the desire of
Congress and the use of the spending power to offer benefits which
might persuade people to that end [was] recognized in this manner
by th[e] first Congresses.
. . . . .
“When the United States goes no further than
extending benefits to citizens who arrange their affairs in a
manner thought beneficial by Congress, there is no direct exercise
of Federal power on those affairs and they remain subject to the
unhampered control of the States. Consequently, in a case of this
nature, the effect which the Act of Congress will have in a State
is dependent entirely upon the voluntary action of that State and
its inhabitants.”
Id., at 274, 276.
In deciding the case, the Court took the
Government’s concessions as given, stating, “[i]t is not contended
that [the General Welfare Clause] grants power to regulate
agricultural production.”
Butler, 297 U. S., at 64. The
Court then agreed with Justice Story’s observation that “the only
thing granted is the power to tax for the purpose of providing
funds for payment of the nation’s debts and making provision for
the general welfare.”
Ibid. Congress’ spending power, even
if located in the General Welfare Clause, conferred no regulatory
power.
The Court proceeded to hold the Act
unconstitutional precisely because it was, in reality, “a statutory
plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a matter
beyond the powers delegated to the federal government.”
Id.,
at 68. That was because the “regulation [was] not in fact
voluntary,” as it would lead to “financial ruin” for farmers who
refused the Act’s benefits.
Id., at 70–71. Confirming
another aspect of the traditional doctrine, the Court held that
even the purely voluntary consent of private parties could not
expand Congress’ limited regulatory powers.
Id., at
74–75.[
10]
The challenge to the Social Security Act in
Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis,
301
U.S. 548 (1937), followed a similar pattern but reached the
opposite result based on a different level of perceived coercion.
As in
Butler, the Federal Government defended a federal
statute—here, the Social Security Act—by representing that
conditions on the grant of federal funds “are not regulatory” in
nature and are thus within the spending power. Brief for United
States in
Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, O. T. 1936,
No. 837, p. 135. Seeking to avoid a repeat of its loss in
Butler, the Government argued that the program was also not
regulatory in fact because it did not coerce States to take or
refrain from taking any actions. Brief for United States in
Steward Machine Co. 100, 105–106.
This time, the Court agreed with the Government,
finding that the Act was not coercive and thus did not “go beyond
the bounds of ” Congress’ spending power.
Steward Machine
Co., 301 U. S., at 591–592. Then, in rejecting a
federalism challenge to the measure, the Court observed that once
the State accepted the federal conditions, it was bound with even
lesser force than an ordinary contract.
Id., at 594–595. The
State was “still free, without breach of an agreement, to change
her system over night.”
Id., at 595. “No officer or agency
of the national Government [could] force a compensation law upon
her or keep it in existence,” nor could they “supervise or control
the application of the payments.”
Ibid.[
11]
The Court again demonstrated its adherence to
the traditional view in
Oklahoma v.
Civil Serv.
Comm’n,
330 U.S.
127 (1947). There, the U. S. Civil Service Commission
determined that an Oklahoma highway commissioner had violated the
Hatch Act, pledging to withhold a portion of the State’s highway
grants equal to two years’ of the commissioner’s compensation if
the State failed to remove him. Oklahoma challenged the
Commission’s order and the Act on which it was based as an illicit
attempt to regulate the State’s internal affairs.
Id., at
133. Citing
Mellon, the Court held that the Act was valid
because it did not directly regulate the State, which had “adopted
the ‘simple expedient’ of not yielding” by refusing to remove its
highway commissioner. 330 U. S., at 143.
Thus, to defend these spending programs in the
first half of the 20th century, the Government relied on the
long-settled understanding that the power to spend carries with it
no sovereign legislative power to create rights and duties. To the
contrary, the Government represented that these programs had the
binding force, at most, of contracts. They did not pre-empt, nor
did they bind States with the force of law; they merely spent
federal dollars upon conditions, the violation of which entitled
the Government to cease further payments. The Court took this
position as a given, and the contractual nature of spending
conditions is precisely what saved them from constitutional
challenge.
In sum, the historical record is clear and
consistent on a critical proposition: The spending power is the
power to spend only. Any duties imposed by regulatory legislation,
and any correlative rights secured by law, must find their source
in one of Congress’ enumerated powers or the legislative powers of
the States. Congress’ spending power cannot secure rights by
law.
IV
The contractual nature of spending conditions
was taken as a given until the second half of the 20th century,
when individuals first began to bring §1983 suits premised on
violations of conditions contained within spending statutes
(usually, the Social Security Act). From the enactment of §1983’s
predecessor statute in 1871 to the Court’s decision in
Thiboutot in 1980, this Court had never held that §1983 was
available to redress any and all violations of federal legislation.
Indeed, there were almost “no square holdings” concerning the
precise scope of the statutory rights vindicable by §1983.
Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Organization,
441 U.S.
600, 645 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); see also
Eisen
v.
Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 561–566 (CA2 1969) (Friendly, J.).
Perhaps the only such square holding was that of
Holt v.
Indiana Mfg. Co.,
176 U.S.
68 (1900), which narrowly construed §1983’s predecessor statute
to “refer to civil rights only,” making it “inapplicable” in a suit
based on the federal patent laws.
Id., at 72.[
12]
The traditional understanding of both the
spending power and §1983 began slowly eroding in the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s, culminating in
Thiboutot. On the spending-power
side, the Court held in
Cannon v.
University of
Chicago,
441 U.S.
677 (1979), that the spending conditions of Title IX of the
Education Amendments created binding duties on private
universities, the violation of which could be the ground of a
federal lawsuit by a private party. In doing so, the Court “simply
ignored the crucial difference between restraints accepted as
conditions of funding, and restraints imposed by virtue of a
legislative power.” Engdahl, 52 S. D. L. Rev., at 509.
And, on the §1983 side, the Court had considered a number of suits
against state officials for violations of the Social Security Act
without analyzing their cognizability under §1983. See
Thiboutot, 448 U. S., at 6 (collecting cases);
id., at 26 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Far from being a
long-accepted fact, purely statutory §1983 actions are an invention
of the last 20 years”).
The stage was thus set for
Thiboutot to
discard nearly two centuries of settled spending-power doctrine by
holding that federal spending conditions secure rights by law.
Ignoring both the contractual nature of spending programs and the
enforcement-power-based understanding of §1983,
Thiboutot
declared that “the plain language of the statute undoubtedly
embrace[d] respondents’ claim that [the State] violated the Social
Security Act.”
Id., at 4 (majority opinion). The centerpiece
of the Court’s opinion was its imprecise framing of the relevant
question: “whether the phrase ‘and laws,’ as used in §1983, means
what it says, or whether it should be limited to some subset of
laws.”
Ibid. After framing the issue thus, the Court
reasoned that nothing in the legislative history compelled limiting
the term “and laws” to civil rights laws enacted under the
Reconstruction Amendments. See
id., at 6–8.
But the Court’s opinion completely missed the
deeper conceptual question whether spending-power statutes can ever
impose obligations, and thus secure corresponding rights, with the
force of federal law.[
13] As
explained at length above, the limited nature of the spending power
dictates a negative answer. And, a contrary understanding would
transform the terms of federal-state agreements into binding
regulations of state entities by federal law—violating the
constitutional prohibition against directly regulating or
commandeering the States.
It took less than a year after
Thiboutot
for the Court to realize the “ ‘constitutional difficulties’
with imposing affirmative obligations on the States pursuant to the
spending power” and to take the first step toward ameliorating the
problems with
Thiboutot.
Pennhurst, 451 U. S.,
at 17, n. 13. In
Pennhurst, the Court held that a
provision of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act (a conditional spending Act) could not be enforced
against a state entity under §1983.
Id., at 18. The Court
first held that the provision could not be considered as
enforcement legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.,
at 16–17.[
14] The Court then
explained the fundamentally different natures of legislation under
the Reconstruction Amendments and “legislation enacted pursuant to
the spending power,” the latter of which “is much in the nature of
a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply
with federally imposed conditions.”
Id., at 17. Consistent
with the traditional position, the Court also explained that “[i]n
legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical
remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is
not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action
by the Federal Government to terminate the funds to the State.”
Id., at 28. Ultimately, because the
Pennhurst Court
determined that the provision at issue was not intended to secure
rights by imposing obligations on States, see
id., at 22–27,
it did not need to confront the constitutional problem created by
Thiboutot. Nonetheless,
Pennhurst both recognized the
problem and pointed to the solution—a return to the traditional
contractual understanding that itself flows naturally from the
limited nature of Congress’ spending authority.
Without that understanding, however, it is
unavoidable that spending conditions that impose substantive
obligations on the States with the force of federal law are
unconstitutional.[
15] As
shown above, the federal spending power is nothing more than the
power to spend. It neither contains nor implies any sovereign
regulatory power to legislate rights and duties with the force of
federal law, and the regulated party’s consent cannot change that
conclusion. The contractual nature of the spending power was
essential to the Government’s defense and this Court’s approval of
far-reaching spending programs; the programs survived only with
that traditional understanding as a premise.[
16] The Federal Government and private litigants
cannot now discard that understanding to argue that such programs
impose obligations directly on the States that are enforceable
against state and local officials under §1983, without running
headlong into the anticommandeering doctrine and long-recognized
limitations on the federal spending power.
* * *
By holding that FNHRA creates rights
enforceable under §1983, the majority creates a grave
constitutional problem that cannot be brushed away with a mere
incantation of
Thiboutot. As explained above, spending-power
legislation cannot “secure” rights “by law.” Conditions on a
State’s receipt of federal funds are effective, not by virtue of
federal law, but by dint of a federal-state agreement. The very
constitutionality of such conditions depends on their eschewal of
securing rights and imposing concomitant obligations on States.
The line from
Mellon and
Butler,
to
Thiboutot, to this case amounts to a constitutional bait
and switch that cannot continue to be glossed over or ignored. In
holding that spending conditions are not merely contractual, but
can directly impose obligations on the States with the force of
federal law, the Court unravels the very rationale for their
constitutionality. Either conditions in statutes enacted under the
spending power are in the nature of contract terms and do not
secure rights by federal law, or they are unconstitutional because
they exceed the spending power and illicitly commandeer the States.
The consequence of the majority’s rejection of the contractual
understanding is not that spending conditions are enforceable under
§1983. Rather, it is that they are unconstitutional. It is well
past time for this Court to re-examine
Thiboutot and the
nature of Congress’ spending power.