SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 20–322
_________________
MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
et al., PETITIONERS
v. ESTEBAN ALEMAN GONZALEZ,
et al.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
et al., PETITIONERS
v. EDWIN OMAR FLORES TEJADA,
et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[June 13, 2022]
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan
joins, and with whom Justice Breyer joins as to Parts II–A–2,
II–B–2, and III, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part.
The Court holds that lower federal courts are
powerless to issue classwide injunctive relief against the
Executive Branch’s violation of noncitizens’ rights under several
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). It reaches
this conclusion in a purportedly textualist opinion that, in truth,
elevates piecemeal dictionary definitions and policy concerns over
plain meaning and context. I respectfully dissent from the Court’s
blinkered analysis, which will leave many vulnerable noncitizens
unable to protect their rights.[
1]
I
Respondents in these two cases are named
plaintiffs in two class actions: Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Jose
Eduardo Gutierrez Sanchez in the
Aleman Gonzalez litigation,
and Edwin Omar Flores Tejada in the
Flores Tejada
litigation. Respondents sought withholding of removal under the INA
based on their fear that, if returned to their countries of origin,
they would face persecution or torture. See
ante, at 2;
Johnson v.
Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. ___, ___–___
(2021) (slip op., at 5–7) (explaining “withholding-only
proceedings”). The Government detained them pending their
proceedings, a detention this Court has held authorized by 8
U. S. C. §1231. See
Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 1).
In both cases, respondents raised statutory and
constitutional challenges to their prolonged detention without bond
hearings. In both cases, respondents moved to certify classes of
similarly situated individuals. In
Aleman Gonzalez, the
District Court certified a class of “ ‘all individuals who are
detained pursuant to 8 U. S. C. §1231(a)(6) in the Ninth
Circuit . . . and who have reached or will reach six
months in detention, and have been or will be denied a prolonged
detention bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.’ ”
Gonzalez v.
Sessions, 325 F.R.D. 616, 621, 626 (ND
Cal. 2018). In
Flores Tejada, the District Court certified a
class of “ ‘[a]ll individuals who (1) were placed in
withholding only proceedings . . . in the Western
District of Washington . . . , and (2) have been detained
for 180 days (a) without a custody hearing or (b) since receiving a
custody hearing.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 149a. By these
definitions, the specified classes include only individuals against
whom the Government has initiated removal proceedings.
Both District Courts held that §1231(a)(6) did
not authorize prolonged detention exceeding six months without bond
hearings.[
2] Both District
Courts issued classwide injunctive relief (preliminary in
Aleman
Gonzalez and permanent in
Flores Tejada) requiring
individualized bond hearings. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in
relevant part.
When the Government petitioned for certiorari,
it challenged only the lower courts’ interpretations of §1231(a)(6)
as requiring bond hearings after six months of detention. See Pet.
for Cert. I. The Court granted certiorari on the question presented
by the Government in these cases and a companion case from the
Third Circuit. 594 U. S. ___ (2021); see
Johnson v.
Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U. S. ___ (2022). The Court
additionally directed the parties in these cases “to brief and
argue the following question: Whether, under 8 U. S. C.
§1252(f )(1), the courts below had jurisdiction to grant
classwide injunctive relief.” 594 U. S. ___. As to that
question, the Court now holds that §1252(f )(1) barred the
lower courts from granting such relief.
II
Section 1252(f )(1) sets forth a precise
limitation on the lower federal courts’ jurisdiction to enter
injunctive relief in cases involving specified sections of the INA.
The provision states:
“
(f ) Limit on injunctive
relief
“
(1) In general
“Regardless of the nature of the action or claim
or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no
court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or
authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of [§§1221–1232], as
amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with respect to the
application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom
proceedings under such part have been initiated.”
Section 1252(f )(1) includes two operative
clauses: a primary clause that strips courts of authority “to
enjoin or restrain the operation of ” the specified provisions
of the INA, and a saving clause that reserves that authority as
applied to a noncitizen “against whom proceedings . . .
have been initiated.” Properly read, both clauses independently
preserve the lower courts’ authority to order classwide injunctive
relief compelling the Executive Branch to comply with the INA in
these cases. The Court holds otherwise only by disregarding the
language Congress used in §1252(f )(1) itself, elsewhere in
§1252, and in the INA as a whole.
A
1
Section 1252(f )(1)’s primary clause
provides that the lower federal courts may not “enjoin or restrain
the operation of ” the specified provisions of the INA. An
injunction that compels the Executive Branch to comply with the
specified provisions (or, phrased differently, prohibits the
unlawful implementation of the specified provisions) does not
“enjoin or restrain” the “operation” of those provisions.
This is clear as a matter of plain meaning.
Starting with the word “operation,” all agree that the ordinary
meaning of “operation” is “functioning” or “working.”
Ante,
at 5. An injunction requiring the Executive Branch to conform its
conduct with a statute or to cease statutorily unauthorized conduct
does not enjoin or restrain the “functioning or working” of the
statute. That is because unlawful agency action is not a part of
the functioning or working of the authorizing statute.
The Government responds that “operation,” as
used in §1252(f )(1), is synonymous with “implementation,”
which may include either lawful or unlawful implementation. This
contention, however, disregards Congress’ careful choice of
language. Section 1252(f )(1) says nothing about enjoining or
restraining the Executive Branch’s “implementation” of the law. By
contrast, in other subsections of §1252 enacted simultaneously with
this one, Congress twice expressly limited jurisdiction over
challenges to “implementation” of a statute or order or specified a
particular forum for judicial review of such challenges. See
§1252(a)(2)(A)(i) (restricting jurisdiction to review claims
“arising from or relating to the implementation or operation of an
order of removal”); §1252(e)(3)(A) (channeling review of the
“implementation” of specified provisions into the U. S.
District Court for the District of Columbia); see also
§1252(a)(2)(A)(iv) (limiting jurisdiction to review “procedures and
policies adopted by the Attorney General to implement” a certain
provision). As this Court previously explained when interpreting
this very statute: “ ‘[W]here Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section . . . it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion.’ ”
Nken v.
Holder,
556 U.S.
418, 430 (2009). “This is particularly true here, where [the
relevant subsections of §1252] were enacted as part of a unified
overhaul of judicial review procedures.”
Id., at
430–431.
In addition to Congress’ deliberate use of
“operation,” its use of “enjoin or restrain” in this context is
most naturally read to bar only lower court injunctions that stop
the operation of a statute, not those that command the Executive
Branch to conform its conduct to the statute. It is true that,
depending on the context, the word “enjoin” may describe a
prohibition (“abstain or desist from . . . some act”) or
an affirmative command (“perform . . . some act”).
Black’s Law Dictionary 529 (6th ed. 1990); see
ante, at 4.
In §1252(f )(1), however, clear textual signals point to the
conclusion that “enjoin” refers to a prohibition on the operation
of a statute. First, Congress consistently has used the term
“enjoin” in Title 8 to refer to prohibitions, including in the
immediately neighboring and simultaneously enacted subsection,
§1252(f )(2).[
3] “A
standard principle of statutory construction provides that
identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally
be given the same meaning,”
Powerex Corp. v.
Reliant
Energy Services, Inc.,
551 U.S.
224, 232 (2007), particularly where, as here, “the same term
was used in related provisions enacted at the same time,”
Return
Mail, Inc. v.
Postal Service, 587 U. S. ___, ___
(2019) (slip op., at 12). Even beyond §1252 itself, every use of
“enjoin” in Title 8 refers to prohibitory injunctions.[
4] Moreover, in §1252(f )(1)
specifically, “enjoin” is paired with the term “restrain,” which
means to “check, hold back, or prevent (a person or thing) from
some course of action.” 8 Oxford English Dictionary 756 (2d ed.
1989) (emphasis deleted). “[T]he company [the word] keeps,”
Direct Marketing Assn. v.
Brohl, 575 U.S. 1, 13
(2015), thus cements a prohibitory reading of “enjoin.” Under this
reading, lower courts may not prohibit the operation of the
specified statutes, but nothing in §1252(f )(1) prevents them
from commanding compliance with the statutes or enjoining
unauthorized agency action.
Finally, if any ambiguity remains as to the
meaning of the primary “enjoin or restrain the operation of ”
clause, a longstanding clear-statement principle counsels in favor
of preserving the lower courts’ remaining equitable jurisdiction.
This Court “ ‘will not construe a statute to displace courts’
traditional equitable authority absent the clearest
command.’ ”
McQuiggin v.
Perkins,
569 U.S.
383, 397 (2013) (quoting
Holland v.
Florida,
560 U.S.
631, 646 (2010)); accord,
e.g., Porter v.
Warner Holding Co.,
328 U.S.
395, 398 (1946);
Brown v.
Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503
(1836). There can be no doubt that §1252(f )(1) operates to
displace equitable authority to an extent. As explained, however,
the most natural and contextual reading of the provision’s primary
clause does not limit federal courts’ authority to enjoin or
restrain agency action unauthorized by statute, or to compel agency
action commanded by a statute. The clause contains nothing
approaching the clear command necessary, under centuries of this
Court’s precedents, to displace that authority.
2
Independently of §1252(f )(1)’s primary
clause, the provision’s saving clause also operates to preserve the
lower federal courts’ equitable authority here. That clause
provides that lower courts may enjoin or restrain the operation of
the covered statutory provisions “with respect to the application
of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings
under such part have been initiated.” §1252(f )(1). Each
beneficiary of the injunctions in these cases is “an individual
alien against whom [removal] proceedings . . . have been
initiated.”
Ibid. Under these circumstances,
§1252(f )(1) poses no barrier to classwide injunctive
relief.
The Government contends that the phrase “an
individual alien” is inconsistent with injunctive relief on a
classwide basis. A class action, however, is a collection of
individual claims. See,
e.g., Califano v.
Yamasaki,
442 U.S.
682, 701 (1979) (“Where the district court has jurisdiction
over the claim of each individual member of the class, Rule 23
provides a procedure by which the court may exercise that
jurisdiction over the various individual claims in a single
proceeding”);
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P. A.
v.
Allstate Ins. Co.,
559 U.S.
393, 408 (2010) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (“A class
action, no less than traditional joinder (of which it is a
species), merely enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of
multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits”). Moreover,
contextual and historical evidence demonstrates that the enacting
Congress would not have prohibited classwide relief simply by using
the word “individual.”
It was well understood when Congress enacted
§1252(f )(1) in 1996 that mere use of the word “individual”
would not preclude classwide adjudication or relief. In
Califano, a unanimous Court interpreted §205(g) of the
Social Security Act, codified at 42 U. S. C. §405(g), to
permit class actions and classwide relief, even though the statute
provided only that “ ‘[a]ny individual’ ” could obtain
judicial review. See 442 U. S., at 698–701. The Court rejected
the Government’s argument that the word “individual” required “a
case-by-case adjudication of claims under §205(g) that is
incompatible with class relief.”
Id., at 698–699. “[C]lass
relief is consistent with the need for case-by-case adjudication,”
the Court noted, “at least so long as the membership of the class
is limited to those who meet the requirements of ” the
provision.
Id., at 701.
“We normally assume that, when Congress enacts
statutes, it is aware of relevant judicial precedent.”
Merck
& Co. v.
Reynolds,
559 U.S.
633, 648 (2010). When §1252(f )(1) was enacted in 1996,
that precedent included both
Califano and the settled rule,
discussed above, that a statute should not be construed to displace
a court’s equitable authority absent a clear command. Yet Congress
provided no such command against all classwide injunctive relief in
§1252(f )(1).
Indeed, in other subsections of §1252, Congress
provided precisely such a clear command. Section 1252(e)(1)(B),
enacted simultaneously with §1252(f )(1), explicitly divests
federal courts of authority to “certify a class under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” in certain cases. The
enacting Congress thus knew how to preclude classwide relief and
did so in unmistakable terms when that was its intent. In
§1252(f )(1), however, it made no mention of class actions or
Rule 23. Again, “ ‘it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion’ ” of language, particularly where, as here, it
enacted the language as part of a unified whole.
Nken, 556
U. S., at 430.
The Government responds that this reading of
§1252(f )(1)’s saving clause renders the word “individual”
superfluous. “ ‘[S]ometimes the better overall reading of the
statute contains some redundancy,’ ” however, as Congress may
“emplo[y] a belt and suspenders approach” to ensure its aims are
met.
Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
Christian, 590
U. S. ___, ___, n. 5 (2020) (slip op., at 10, n. 5).
Relevant here, parties other than individuals in removal
proceedings may bring immigration-related lawsuits. For example,
prior to 1996, several organizations brought preenforcement
challenges to immigration statutes. See Brief for Respondents 55
(collecting examples). In recent years, States, too, increasingly
have sued on behalf of their own interests. See,
e.g.,
Biden v.
Texas, No. 21–954, now pending before the
Court;
Department of Homeland Security v.
Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 591 U. S. ___ (2020);
United States
v.
Texas, 579 U.S. 547 (2016) (
per curiam). In
drafting §1252(f )(1), Congress had every reason “to be doubly
sure,”
Barton v.
Barr, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020)
(slip op., at 16), that only individuals in removal proceedings and
not other entities would receive injunctive relief restraining the
operation of the specified provisions of the INA. Additionally, the
Government’s redundancy concern is particularly unpersuasive
because Congress used the adjective “individual” redundantly in
other immigration-related provisions within Title 8. See §1446(a)
(authorizing the Attorney General to waive investigation of
applicant for naturalization “in an individual case or in such
cases or classes of cases as may be designated by him”); §1601(4)
(expressing concern that “individual aliens,” prior to 1996, were
“burden[ing] the public benefits system”).
3
In sum, the courts below retained their
equitable authority to issue classwide injunctive relief for two
independent reasons. First, the relief the District Courts issued
did not purport “to enjoin or restrain the operation of ” any
statute; rather, the District Courts sought to enforce a statute
and enjoin what they deemed to be unlawful agency action. Second,
and in any event, the injunctive relief issued below fell within
§1252(f )(1)’s saving clause because it concerned only the
application of provisions of the INA to individual noncitizens in
removal proceedings.
This interpretation is a reasonable one.
Congress’ express and particular use of words in §1252(f )(1)
protected the specified statutory provisions against restraint by
lower court injunctions, but evinced no quarrel with lower courts
ensuring that the Executive Branch complied with the commands in
those provisions. In addition, Congress ensured that this goal did
not come at the expense of violating the rights of noncitizens in
removal proceedings.
B
The Court reaches a contrary result only by
prioritizing unavailing and largely atextual concerns.
1
Starting with the primary “enjoin or restrain
the operation of ” clause, the Court accepts the Government’s
argument that “the ‘operation of ’ the relevant statutes is
best understood to refer to the Government’s efforts to enforce or
implement them.”
Ante, at 5. Aside from ignoring Congress’
choice to restrict judicial review of “implementation” in some
subsections of §1252 but not others, the Court misapprehends how
statutes operate. No doubt, “laws ordinarily ‘work’ or ‘function’
. . . through the actions of officials or other persons
who implement them.”
Ante, at 5. That proposition, however,
only holds if those individuals properly implement the relevant
statute. An unlawful implementation of a statute is not the
“work[ing]” or “function[ing]” of the statute at all; it is simply
unauthorized. Restraining such action does not interfere with the
operation of the statute for purposes of §1252(f )(1).
Resisting this result, the Court offers a string
cite of several inapt uses of “operation,” none of which concern
the operation of legal authority. See
ante, at 7–8. The
Court wonders why, “[i]f cars, trucks, railroads, water utilities,
drainage ditches, auto dealerships, planes, radios, video poker
machines, cable TV systems, and many other things can be unlawfully
or improperly operated, . . . the same cannot be said of
a statute.”
Ante, at 8. The answer is obvious: Unlike all of
those examples, a statute is the law. Officials may implement a
statute unlawfully, but a statute does not operate in conflict with
itself.[
5]
The Court also agrees with the Government that
“enjoin,” as used in §1252(f )(1), necessarily takes on both
affirmative and negative connotations, but only by rigidly
segmenting each word in the clause, defining each in isolation, and
adding those definitions together. See
ante, at 4.
Elsewhere, however, this Court has cautioned against such a
piecemeal approach to statutory interpretation. Cf.,
e.g.,
FCC v.
AT&T Inc.,
562 U.S.
397, 406 (2011) (cautioning that “two words together may assume
a more particular meaning than those words in isolation”).
Moreover, the Court pays no mind to Congress’ other uses of
“enjoin” in §1252 and elsewhere in Title 8 as meaning banning or
stopping.
The Court offers one final purportedly textual
basis for its strained reading of the primary clause: that it is
the only option consistent with §1252(f )(1)’s prefatory
clause. See
ante, at 8–9; §1252(f )(1) (“Regardless of
the nature of the action or claim . . . ”). The prefatory
clause, however, does not purport to expand the scope of
§1252(f )(1)’s restriction; it simply makes clear that the
restriction must apply to all claims that would otherwise fall
within it, without exception. See
Atlantic Richfield Co.,
590 U. S., at ___, n. 5 (slip op., at 10, n. 5)
(reasoning similarly as to phrase “ ‘without regard to the
citizenship of the parties or the amount in
controversy’ ”).
The Court closes with two policy arguments. It
deems it “most unlikely” that Congress would enact a statute that
disproportionately limits lower courts’ authority to issue
injunctive relief to remedy constitutional claims, a result it
contends would flow from respondents’ reading.
Ante, at 9.
This is in large part a problem of the Court’s own making. As
explained, a proper interpretation of §1252(f )(1)’s saving
clause preserves lower courts’ authority to issue injunctive relief
on constitutional claims, including on a classwide basis, so long
as all plaintiffs are individuals against whom removal proceedings
have been initiated. Moreover, even in preenforcement challenges
brought by entities or by individuals not in removal proceedings,
respondents’ reading of §1252(f )(1) does not prohibit
injunctive relief exclusively as to constitutional claims, but also
as to claims that arise from any statutes external to the covered
INA provisions (for example, a claim that a covered provision
violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)). See
ante, at 9, n. 4. The correct reading of
§1252(f )(1) evenhandedly protects the specified INA
provisions from all such external, preenforcement, lower court
injunctions, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds,
without shielding unlawful agency action inconsistent with the
specified provisions. Whatever the Court may think of the wisdom of
that policy, it is a perfectly plausible one.
The Court also worries that under this reading
of §1252(f )(1), the inquiry as to whether injunctive relief
is available may overlap with the merits of a claim that a covered
provision has been violated.
Ante, at 9–10. The Court is
wrong to find “anything unusual about that consequence.”
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes,
564 U.S.
338, 351 (2011). Even as to the question of subject-matter
jurisdiction (as opposed to the remedial authority at issue here),
“[t]he necessity of touching aspects of the merits . . .
is a familiar feature of litigation.”
Id., at 351–352;
accord,
e.g., Perry v.
Merit Systems Protection
Bd., 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 14) (“[T]he
distinction between jurisdictional and merits issues is not
inevitably sharp, for the two inquiries may overlap”). Any overlap
may be substantial: Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, for
instance, “all elements of a meritorious claim are also
jurisdictional.”
Brownback v.
King, 592 U. S.
___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 8).[
6] This concern, too, offers no justification for the
Court’s departure from ordinary meaning or its disregard of clear
contextual evidence contrary to its view.
2
The Court’s arguments in support of its
reading of the saving clause fare little better. The Court opens
with language from past cases suggesting support for its
interpretation. See
ante, at 5–6. None of the cases the
Court quotes, however, presented or decided the scope of
§1252(f )(1)’s bar on injunctive relief.
The Court next affords dispositive weight to its
class- exclusive view of the word “individual” in
§1252(f )(1). See
ante, at 6. The Court distinguishes
Califano in a footnote, asserting that §1252(f)(1)’s saving
clause should be construed narrowly because it is an exception to
the primary clause. See
ante, at 11, n. 6. The point,
however, is not that the statute interpreted in
Califano was
identical to §1252(f)(1), but that
Califano established that
a statute’s mere use of the word “individual” does not suffice to
preclude classwide relief. Moreover, the Court overlooks that it is
§1252(f)(1)’s primary clause (which divests lower courts of their
“ ‘traditional equitable authority’ ”) that constitutes
an exception to the norm.
McQuiggin, 569 U. S., at 397.
The Court ignores the clear-statement rule for such displacements
of courts’ equitable jurisdiction.
Califano and the
clear-statement rule both instruct that Congress would not have
done so much so obliquely, particularly when it clearly prohibited
class relief in another subsection of the same statute.
On the question of Congress’ disparate inclusion
and exclusion of language in §1252 referring to class actions, the
Court declines to decide what it thinks. Taking one path, it
suggests that one should not “give much weight to this negative
inference.”
Ante, at 10. But see
Nken, 556
U. S., at 430–431 (giving weight to equivalent inference when
interpreting same statute). Taking another, the Court admits that
adhering to its holding might well “rule out efforts to obtain any
injunctive relief that applies to multiple named plaintiffs (or
perhaps even rule out injunctive relief in a lawsuit brought by
multiple named plaintiffs).”
Ante, at 11. That result, which
would require separate remedial orders or even separate lawsuits
for family members asserting legally and factually identical claims
based on joint immigration applications or proceedings, is absurd.
There is no conceivable benefit in requiring identical claims to be
raised in separate, duplicative actions. This bizarre outcome
offers further proof that the Court has erred.
III
The ramifications of the Court’s errors should
not be ignored. Today’s holding risks depriving many vulnerable
noncitizens of any meaningful opportunity to protect their
rights.
To understand why, consider the practical
realities of the removal and detention system. Noncitizens
subjected to removal proceedings are disproportionately unlikely to
be familiar with the U. S. legal system or fluent in the
English language. Even so, these individuals must navigate the
Nation’s labyrinthine immigration laws without entitlement to
appointed counsel or legal support. If they are detained, like
respondents here, they face particularly daunting hurdles. On
average, immigration detention facilities are located significantly
farther away from detained individuals’ communities and court
proceedings than criminal jails, making it extraordinarily
difficult to secure legal representation. Even for those
individuals who can locate and afford counsel under these
circumstances, such remote confinement impedes evidence gathering
and communication with counsel. After traveling (perhaps for hours)
to meet with detained clients, attorneys may be barred from doing
so due to logistical or administrative errors; legal phone calls,
too, frequently are nonconfidential, prohibitively costly, or
otherwise unavailable. Exacerbating these challenges, the
Government regularly transfers detained noncitizens between
facilities, often multiple times.[
7]
It is one matter to expect noncitizens facing
these obstacles to defend against their removal in immigration
court. It is another entirely to place upon each of them the added
burden of contesting systemic violations of their rights through
discrete, collateral, federal-court proceedings. In a great many
cases, the inevitable consequence of barring classwide injunctive
relief will be that those violations will go unremedied, except as
to the few fortunate enough to afford competent collateral counsel
or to secure vigorous
pro bono representation. The
burdens will fall on those least able to vindicate their rights, as
well as the law firms and nonprofit organizations that will
endeavor to assist as many of these noncitizens as their capacity
permits.[
8]
If, somehow, a substantial number of noncitizens
are able to overcome these obstacles and file separate federal
lawsuits against unlawful removal or detention policies, a
different problem will arise. Class litigation not only enables
individual class members to enforce their rights against powerful
actors, but also advances judicial economy by eliminating the need
for duplicative proceedings pertaining to each class member. In
contrast, the Court’s overbroad reading of §1252(f )(1) forces
noncitizens facing unlawful detention, if they are able, “to flood
district court dockets with individual habeas actions raising
materially indistinguishable claims and requesting materially
indistinguishable injunctive relief.” Brief for Retired Federal
Judges as
Amici Curiae 15. There is no reason to think
Congress intended either of these untenable results.
In fairness, the Court’s decision is not without
limits. For instance, the Court does not purport to hold that
§1252(f )(1) affects courts’ ability to “hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. §706(2). No such
claim is raised here. In addition, the Court rightly does not
embrace the Government’s eleventh-hour suggestion at oral argument
to hold that §1252(f )(1) bars even classwide declaratory
relief,[
9] a suggestion that
would (if accepted) leave many noncitizens with no practical remedy
whatsoever against clear violations by the Executive Branch.
Even with these limits, however, the
repercussions of today’s decision will be grave. In view of the
text and context of §1252(f )(1), these repercussions offer
yet more evidence that the Court’s interpretive effort has gone
badly astray.
* * *
The essence of statutory interpretation is to
review the plain meaning of a provision in its context. The Court’s
analysis, by violating several interpretive principles, ultimately
fails in that endeavor. I respectfully dissent.