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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 14–844
_________________
ANTOINE BRUCE, PETITIONER
v. CHARLES E.
SAMUELS, JR., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit
[January 12, 2016]
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case concerns the payment of filing fees
for civil actions commenced by prisoners in federal courts. Until
1996, indigent prisoners, like other indigent persons, could file a
civil action without paying any filing fee. See 28
U. S. C. §1915(a)(1). In the Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 (PLRA), 110Stat. 1321–66, Congress placed several
limitations on prisoner litigation in federal courts. Among those
limitations, Congress required prisoners qualified to proceed
in
forma pauperis nevertheless to pay an initial partial filing
fee. That fee is statutorily set as “20 percent of the greater of”
the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account or the
average monthly balance of the account over the preceding six
months. §1915(b)(1). Thereafter, to complete payment of the filing
fee, prisoners must pay, in monthly installments, “20 percent of
the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.”
§1915(b)(2). The initial partial filing fee may not be exacted if
the prisoner has no means to pay it, §1915(b)(4), and no monthly
installments are required unless the prisoner has more than $10 in
his account, §1915(b)(2).
It is undisputed that the initial partial filing
fee is to be assessed on a per-case basis,
i.e., each time
the prisoner files a lawsuit. In contest here is the calculation of
subsequent monthly installment payments. Petitioner Antoine Bruce
urges a per-prisoner approach under which he would pay 20 percent
of his monthly income regardless of the number of cases he has
filed. The Government urges, and the court below followed, a
per-case approach under which a prisoner would pay 20 percent of
his monthly income for each case he has filed. Courts of Appeals
have divided on which of these two approaches §1915(b)(2)
orders.[
1] To resolve the
conflict, we granted certiorari. 576 U. S. ___ (2015).
We hold that monthly installment payments, like
the initial partial payment, are to be assessed on a per-case
basis. Nothing in §1915’s current design supports treating a
prisoner’s second or third action unlike his first lawsuit.
I
A
In 1892, Congress enacted the
in forma
pauperis (IFP) statute, now codified at 28 U. S. C.
§1915, “to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to
the federal courts.”
Neitzke v.
Williams, 490
U. S. 319, 324 (1989) . Reacting to “a sharp rise in prisoner
litigation,”
Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U. S. 81, 84
(2006) , Congress in 1996 enacted the PLRA, which installed a
variety of measures “designed to filter out the bad claims [filed
by prisoners] and facilitate consideration of the good,”
Coleman v.
Tollefson, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015)
(slip op., at 3) (quoting
Jones v.
Bock, 549
U. S. 199, 204 (2007) ; alteration in original).
Among those measures, Congress required
prisoners to pay filing fees for the suits or appeals they launch.
The provisions on fee payment, set forth in §1915(b), read:
“(1) . . . [I]f a prisoner brings a
civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner
shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee. The court
shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment
of any court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of
20 percent of the greater of—
“(A) the average monthly deposits to the
prisoner’s account; or
“(B) the average monthly balance in the
prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the
filing of the complaint or notice of appeal.
“(2) After payment of the initial partial filing
fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20
percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s
account. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward
payments from the prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each
time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees
are paid.”
The monthly installment scheme described in
§1915(b)(2) also applies to costs awarded against prisoners when
they are judgment losers. §1915(f)(2)(B).
To further contain prisoner litigation, the PLRA
introduced a three-strikes provision: Prisoners whose suits or
appeals are dismissed three or more times as frivolous, malicious,
or failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted are
barred from proceeding IFP “unless the prisoner is under imminent
danger of serious physical injury.” §1915(g). In other words, for
most three strikers, all future filing fees become payable in full
upfront.
Congress included in its 1996 overhaul of §1915
a safety-valve provision to ensure that the fee requirementswould
not bar access to the courts: “In no event shall a prisoner be
prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or
criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets
and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”
§1915(b)(4).
B
Petitioner Antoine Bruce, a federal inmate
serving a 15-year sentence, is a frequent litigant.[
2] In the instant case, Bruce challenges his
placement in a special management unit at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Talladega, Alabama.
Pinson v.
Samuels,
761 F. 3d 1, 3–4 (CADC 2014).[
3] Bruce had previously incurred filing-fee obligations in
other cases and maintained that the monthly filing-fee payments for
this case would not become due until those prior obligations were
satisfied.
Id., at 4, 7. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, whose decision is before us for
review, rejected Bruce’s argument.
Id., at 8–10. Bruce must
make monthly filing-fee payments in this case, the court held,
simultaneously with such payments in earlier commenced cases.
Id., at 8. We agree with the appeals court that §1915(b)(2)
calls for simultaneous, not sequential, recoupment of multiple
filing fees.
II
The IFP statute does not explicitly address
whether multiple filing fees (after the initial partial payment)
should be paid simultaneously or sequentially. Bruce and the
Government present competing interpretations.
A
In support of the per-prisoner approach, Bruce
relies principally on what he sees as a significant contrast
between the singular “clerk” and the plural “fees” as those nouns
appear in 28 U. S. C. §1915(b)(2). That provision
requires payments to be forwarded “to the
clerk of the
court . . . until the
filing fees are
paid.”
Ibid. (empha-sis added). Even when more than one
filing fee isowed, Bruce contends, the statute instructs that only
one clerk will receive payment each month; in other words,fee
payments are to be made sequentially rather than
simultaneously.
The initial partial payment, which is charged on
a per-case basis, plus the three-strikes provision, Bruce urges,
together suffice to satisfy the PLRA’s purpose, which is to “force
prisoners to think twice about the case and not just file
reflexively,” 141 Cong. Rec. 14572 (1995) (remarks of Sen. Kyl).
The additional economic disincentive that the per-case approach
would occasion, Bruce asserts, could excessively encumber access to
federal courts.
Furthermore, Bruce points out, the per-case
approach breaks down when a prisoner incurs more than five
obligations. Nothing will be left in the account to pay the sixth
fee, Bruce observes. Necessarily, therefore, its payment will be
entirely deferred. Why treat the second obligation unlike the
sixth, Bruce asks. Isn’t the statute sensibly read to render all
monthly payments sequential? Bruce notes in this regard that, under
the per-case approach, his ability to use his account to purchase
amenities will be progressively curtailed; indeed, the account
might be reduced to zero upon his filing or joining a fifth
case.
Finally, Bruce argues, administrative
difficulties counsel against the per-case approach. Costs could
dwarf the monetary yield if prisons, under a per-case regime, were
obliged to send as many as five checks to five different courts
each month. And the problems faced by state-prison officials—who
sometimes must choose which of several claims on a prisoner’s
income (
e.g., child-support, medical copayments) should take
precedence—would be exacerbated under a system demanding
simultaneous payment of multiple litigation charges.
B
The Government emphasizes that §1915 as a
whole has a single-case focus, providing instructions for
each case. It would be anomalous, the Government urges, to
treat paragraph (b)(1)’s initial partial payment, which Bruce
concedes is directed at a single case, differently than paragraph
(b)(2)’s subsequent monthly payments. The two paragraphs, the
Government observes, are linked by paragraph (b)(2)’s opening
clause: “After payment of the initial partial filing fee.”
The per-case approach, the Government adds,
better comports with the purpose of the PLRA to deter frivolous
suits. See
Newlin v.
Helman, 123 F. 3d 429, 436
(CA7 1997) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Otherwise a prisoner could file
multiple suits for the price of one, postponing payment of the fees
for later-filed suits until after the end of imprisonment (and
likely avoiding them altogether [because fees are often
uncollectable on a prisoner’s release]).”), overruled in part on
other grounds by
Lee v.
Clinton, 209 F. 3d 1025
(CA7 2000), and
Walker v.
O’Brien, 216 F. 3d 626
(CA7 2000). The Government further observes that the generally
small size of the initial partial fee—here, $0.64, App. to Pet. for
Cert. 21a—provides scant disincentive, on its own, for multiple
filings.
Responding to Bruce’s observation that, for a
prisoner with more than five charges, even the per-case approach
resorts to sequential payments, the Government agrees, but tells us
that this scenario arises infrequently. “[M]ost prisoners,” the
Government states, “would accrue three strikes (and therefore be
required to pay the full filing fees upfront) by the time they
incurred the obligation for their sixth case.” Brief for
Respondents 29.
Finally, answering Bruce’s concern that the
per-case approach could leave a prisoner without money for
amenities, the Government points out that prisons “are
constitutionally bound to provide inmates with adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care,”
id., at 48 (citing
Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 832 (1994) ),
and must furnish “ ‘paper and pen to draft legal documents’
and ‘stamps to mail them,’ ” Brief for Respondents 48 (quoting
Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U. S. 817, 824, 825 (1977)
). More-over, the Government notes, the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) “goes beyond those requirements,” providing inmates “articles
necessary for maintaining personal hygiene,” and free postage “not
only for legal mailings but also to enable the inmate to maintain
community ties.” Brief for Respondents 48, n. 21 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
III
The Circuits following the per-case approach,
we conclude, better comprehend the statute. Just as §1915(b)(1)
calls for assessment of “
an initial partial filing fee” each
time a prisoner “brings
a civil action or files
an
appeal” (emphasis added), so its allied provision, §1915(b)(2),
triggered immediately after, calls for “monthly payments of 20
percent of the preceding month’s income” simultaneously for each
action pursued. The other two paragraphs of §1915(b) confirm that
the subsection as a whole is written from the perspective of a
single case. See §1915(b)(3) (imposing a ceiling on fees permitted
“for the commencement of
a civil action or
an appeal”
(emphasis added)); §1915(b)(4) (protecting the right to “brin[g]
a civil action or appea[l]
a civil or criminal
judgment” (emphasis added)). There is scant indication that the
statute’s perspective shifts partway through paragraph
(2).[
4]
Bruce’s extratextual points do not warrant a
departure from the interpretation suggested by the text and
context. The per-case approach more vigorously serves the statutory
objective of containing prisoner litigation, while the safety-valve
provision, see
supra, at 4, ensures against denial of access
to federal courts. Bruce’s administrability concerns carry little
weight given reports from several States that the per-case approach
is unproblematic. See Brief for State of Michigan et al. as
Amici Curiae 18–20.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is
Affirmed.
