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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 14–1209
_________________
JOHN STURGEON, PETITIONER v. BERT
FROST, in his official capacity as ALASKA REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONALPARK SERVICE, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[March 22, 2016]
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of
the Court.
For almost 40 years, John Sturgeon has hunted
moose along the Nation River in Alaska. Because parts of the river
are shallow and difficult to navigate, Sturgeon travels by
hovercraft, an amphibious vehicle capable of gliding over land and
water. To reach his preferred hunting grounds, Sturgeon must pilot
his hovercraft over a stretch of the Nation River that flows
through the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve, a 1.7 million
acre federal preservation area managed by the National Park
Service. 16 U. S. C. §410hh(10).
Alaska law permits the use of hovercraft.
National Park Service regulations do not. See 36 CFR §2.17(e)
(2015). After Park Service rangers informed Sturgeon that he was
prohibited from using his hovercraft within the boundaries of the
preserve, Sturgeon filed suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. He argues that the Nation River is owned by the State, and
that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA)
prohibits the Park Service from enforcing its regulations on
state-owned land in Alaska. The Park Service disagrees, contending
that it has authority to regulate waters flowing through federally
managed preservation areas. The District Court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of the Park Service. We granted
certiorari.
I
In 1867, Secretary of State William Seward,
serving under President Andrew Johnson, negotiated a treaty to
purchase Alaska from Russia for $7.2 million. Treaty Concerning the
Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America, Mar. 30, 1867,
15Stat. 539. In a single stroke, the United States gained 365
million acres of land—an area more than twice the size of Texas.
Despite the bargain price of two cents an acre, however, the
purchase was mocked by contemporaries as “Seward’s Folly” and
President Johnson’s “Polar Bear Garden.” See C. Naske & H.
Slotnick, Alaska: A History 92–94 (2011) (Naske & Slotnick); S.
Rep. No. 1163, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1957).
The monikers didn’t stick. In 1898, the “Three
Lucky Swedes”—Jafet Lindeberg, Eric Lindblom, and Jon
Brynteson—struck gold in Nome, Alaska. As word of their discovery
spread, thousands traveled to Alaska to try their hand at mining.
Once the gold rush subsided, settlers turned to other types of
mining, fishing, and trapping, fueling an emerging export economy.
See Naske & Slotnick 128–129, 155, 249–251; D. Wharton, The
Alaska Gold Rush 186–187 (1972).
Despite newfound recognition of Alaska’s
economic potential, however, it was not until the 1950’s that
Congress seriously considered admitting Alaska as a State. By that
time, it was clear that Alaska was strategically important both in
the Pacific and Arctic, and that the Territory was rich in natural
resources, including oil. Moreover, the people of Alaska favored
statehood. See Naske & Slotnick 201, 224–235. But there was a
problem: Out of the 365 million acres of land in Alaska, 98 percent
were owned by the Federal Government. As a result, absent a land
grant from the Federal Government to the State, there would be
little land available to drive private economic activity and
contribute to the state tax base. See S. Rep. No. 1163, at 2, 12
(“The expenses of the State of Alaska will be comparatively high,
partially due to the vast land areas within the State; but the
State would be able to realize revenues from only 2 percent of this
vast area unless some provision were made to modify the present
land-ownership conditions”).
A solution was struck. The 1958 Alaska Statehood
Act permitted Alaska to select 103 million acres of “vacant,
unappropriated, and unreserved” federal land—just over a quarter of
all land in Alaska—for state ownership. §§6(a)–(b), 72Stat. 340.
That land grant included “mineral deposits,” which were “subject to
lease by the State as the State legislature may direct.” §6(i),
id., at 342. Upon statehood, Alaska also gained “title to
and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters” within the
State, in addition to “the natural resources within such lands and
waters,” including “the right and power to manage, administer,
lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural resources.”
§3(a), 67Stat. 30, 43 U. S. C. §1311(a); §6(m), 72Stat.
343. With over 100 million acres of land now available to the new
State, Alaska could begin to fulfill its state policy “to encourage
the settlement of its land and the development of its resources by
making them available for maximum use consistent with the public
interest.” Alaska Const., Art. VIII, §1 (2014).
The Statehood Act did not, however, determine
the rights of the Alaska Natives, who asserted aboriginal title to
much of the same land now claimed by the State. Naske &
Slotnick 287–289. To resolve the dispute, Congress in 1971 passed
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which extinguished
aboriginal land claims in Alaska. 85Stat. 688, as amended, 43
U. S. C. §1601 et seq. In exchange, Congress
provided for a $960 million settlement and permitted corporations
organized by groups of Alaska Natives to select 40 million acres of
federal land to manage within the State. §§1605, 1610–1615; Naske
& Slotnick 296–297. Congress sought to implement the settlement
“rapidly, with certainty, in conformity with the real economic and
social needs” of Alaska Natives. §1601(b).
In addition to settling the claims of the Alaska
Natives, ANCSA directed the Secretary of the Interior to select up
to 80 million acres of unreserved federal land in Alaska for
addition to the National Park, Forest, Wildlife Refuge, and Wild
and Scenic Rivers Systems, subject to congressional approval.
§1616(d)(2). When Congress failed to approve the Secretary’s
selections, however, President Carter unilaterally designated 56
million acres of federal land in Alaska as national monuments. See
Presidential Proclamation Nos. 4611–4627, 3 CFR 69–104 (1978
Comp.).
President Carter’s actions were unpopular among
many Alaskans, who were concerned that the new monuments would be
subject to restrictive federal regulations. Protesters demonstrated
in Fairbanks, and more than 2,500 Alaskans participated in the
“Great Denali-McKinley Trespass.” The goal of the trespass was to
break over 25 Park Service rules in a two-day period—including by
camping, hunting, snowmobiling, setting campfires, shooting guns,
and unleashing dogs. During the event, a “rider on horseback,
acting the part of Paul Revere, galloped through the crowd yelling,
‘The Feds are coming! The Feds are coming!’ ” N. Y.
Times, Jan. 15, 1979, p. A8; Anchorage Daily News, Jan. 15, 1979,
pp. 1–2.
Congress once again stepped in to settle the
controversy, passing the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act. 94Stat. 2371, 16 U. S. C. §3101
et seq. ANILCA had two stated goals: First, to provide
“sufficient protection for the national interest in the scenic,
natural, cultural and environmental values on the public lands in
Alaska.” §3101(d). And second, to provide “adequate opportunity for
satisfaction of the economic and social needs of the State of
Alaska and its people.” Ibid.
ANILCA set aside 104 million acres of land in
Alaska for preservation purposes, in the process creating ten new
national parks, preserves, and monuments—including the
Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve—and tripling the number of
acres set aside in the United States for federal wilderness
preservation. See §410hh; Naske & Slotnick 315–316. At the same
time, ANILCA specified that the Park Service could not prohibit on
those lands certain activities of particular importance to
Alaskans. See, e.g., §3170(a) (Secretary must permit
reasonable use of vehicles “for travel to and from villages and
homesites”); §3201 (Secretary must permit “the taking of fish and
wildlife for sport purposes and subsistence uses” within National
Preserves in Alaska, subject to regulation and certain exceptions).
President Carter’s earlier land designations were rescinded. See
§3209(a).
Under ANILCA, federal preservation lands in
Alaska were placed into “conservation system units,” which were
defined to include “any unit in Alaska of the National Park System,
National Wildlife Refuge System, National Wild and Scenic Rivers
Systems, National Trails System, National Wilderness Preservation
System, or a National Forest Monument.” §3102(4). Congress drew the
bound-aries of those units to “follow hydrographic divides or
em-brace other topographic or natural features,” however, rather
than to map the Federal Government’s landholdings. §3103(b). As a
consequence, in addition to federal land, over 18 million acres of
state, Native Corporation, and private land ended up inside the
boundaries of conservation system units. See Brief for Petitioner
6.
This brings us back to Sturgeon and his
hovercraft.
II
A
One fall day in 2007, Sturgeon was piloting
his hovercraft on the Nation River, which rises in the Ogilvie
Mountains in Canada and joins the Yukon River within the boundaries
of the Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve conservation system
unit (Yukon-Charley). Sturgeon was headed to a hunting ground
upstream from the preserve, just shy of the Canadian border. To
reach that hunting ground, dubbed “moose meadows,” Sturgeon had to
travel on a portion of the river that flows through the
preserve.
About two miles into his trip on the Nation
River, Sturgeon stopped on a gravel bar to repair the steering
cable of his hovercraft. As he was performing the repairs, Sturgeon
was approached by three Park Service rangers. The rangers informed
him that hovercraft were prohibited under Park Service regulations,
and that he was committing a crime by operating his hovercraft
within the boundaries of the Yukon-Charley. Despite Sturgeon’s
protests that Park Service regulations did not apply because the
river was owned by the State of Alaska, the rangers ordered
Sturgeon to remove his hovercraft from the preserve. Sturgeon
complied, heading home without a moose.
Sturgeon now fears that he will be criminally
prosecuted if he returns to hunt along the Nation River in his
hovercraft. To avoid prosecution, Sturgeon sued the Park Service
and several federal officials in the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska. He seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief permitting him to operate his hovercraft within the
boundaries of the Yukon-Charley. Alaska intervened in support of
Sturgeon, and the Park Service opposed the suit.
The District Court granted summary judgment to
the Park Service. Sturgeon v. Masica, 2013 WL 5888230
(Oct. 30, 2013). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed in pertinent part. Sturgeon v. Masica, 768
F. 3d 1066 (2014).
We granted certiorari. 576 U. S. ___
(2015).
B
The Secretary of the Interior has authority to
“prescribe regulations” concerning “boating and other activities on
or relating to water located within System units, including water
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 54
U. S. C. §100751(b) (2012 ed., Supp. II). “System units”
are in turn defined as “any area of land and water administered by
the Secretary, acting through the Director [of the Park Service],
for park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other
purposes.” §§100102, 100501.
The Park Service’s hovercraft regulation was
adopted pursuant to Section 100751(b). The hovercraft ban applies
not only within “[t]he boundaries of federally owned lands and
waters administered by the National Park Service,” but also to
“[w]aters subject to the jurisdiction of theUnited States located
within the boundaries of the National Park System, including
navigable waters . . . withoutregard to the ownership of
submerged lands.” 36 CFR §1.2(a). The hovercraft ban is not limited
to Alaska, but instead has effect in federally managed preservation
areas across the country.
Section 103(c) of ANILCA, in contrast, addresses
the scope of the Park Service’s authority over lands within the
boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska. The first
sentence of Section 103(c) specifies the property included as a
portion of those units. It states: “Only those lands within the
boundaries of any conservation system unit which are public lands
(as such term is defined in this Act) shall be deemed to be
included as a portion of such unit.” 16 U. S. C.
§3103(c). ANILCA defines the word “land” to include “lands, waters,
and interests therein,” and the term “public lands” to include
“lands the title to which is in the United States after December 2,
1980,” with certain exceptions. §3102. In sum, only “lands, waters,
and interests therein” to which the United States has “title” are
considered “public” land “included as a portion” of the
conservation system units in Alaska.
The second sentence of Section 103(c) concerns
the Park Service’s authority to regulate “non-public” lands in
Alaska, which include state, Native Corporation, and private
property. It provides: “No lands which, before, on, or after
December 2, 1980, are conveyed to the State, to any Native
Corporation, or to any private party shall be subject to the
regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units.”
§3103(c).
The third sentence of Section 103(c) explains
how new lands become part of conservation system units: “If the
State, a Native Corporation, or other owner desires to convey any
such lands, the Secretary may acquire such lands in accordance with
applicable law (including this Act), and any such lands shall
become part of the unit, and be administered accordingly.”
Ibid.
C
The parties dispute whether Section 103(c) of
ANILCA created an Alaska-specific exception to the Park Service’s
general authority over boating and related activities in federally
managed preservation areas. Sturgeon, the Park Service, and the
Ninth Circuit each adopt a different reading of Section 103(c),
reaching different conclusions about the scope of the Park
Service’s powers.
Sturgeon, joined by the State, understands
Section 103(c) to stand for a simple proposition: The Park Service
is prohibited from regulating “non-public” land in Alaska as if
that land were owned by the Federal Government. He contends that
his reading is consistent with the history of federal land
management in Alaska, beginning with the Alaska Statehood Act and
culminating in ANILCA.
Sturgeon’s argument proceeds in two steps.
First, he asserts that the Nation River is not “public land” for
purposes of ANILCA and is therefore not part of the Yukon-Charley.
As discussed, ANILCA defines “public lands” as lands to which the
United States has “title.” 16 U. S. C. §3102. And Section
103(c) provides that “[o]nly those lands within the boundaries of
any conservation system unit which are public lands (as such term
is defined in this Act) shall be deemed to be included as a portion
of such unit.” §3103(c).
Sturgeon argues that the Nation River is not
“public land” because it is owned by the State and not by the
Federal Government. To support his argument, Sturgeon relies on the
Alaska Statehood Act, which granted ownership of the submerged
lands beneath the navigable waters in Alaska, and the resources
within those waters, to the State. See §6(m), 72Stat. 343; 43
U. S. C. §1311(a). He also cites this Court’s decision in
United States v. California, 436 U. S. 32 (1978)
, which stated that “the Submerged Lands Act transferred title to
and ownership of the submerged lands and waters” to the States.
Id., at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the
State and not the Federal Government owns the Nation River,
Sturgeon urges, it is not “public” land under ANILCA and is
therefore not part of the Yukon-Charley.
Second, Sturgeon asserts that because the Nation
River is not part of the Yukon-Charley, the Park Service lacks
authority to regulate it. His argument rests on the second sentence
of Section 103(c), which states that “[n]o lands which, before, on,
or after December 2, 1980, are conveyed to the State, to any Native
Corporation, or to any private party shall be subject to the
regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units.”
16 U. S. C. §3103(c).
Sturgeon argues that the phrase “regulations
applicable solely to public lands within such units” refers to
those regulations that apply “solely” by virtue of the Park
Service’s “authority to manage national parks.” Brief for
Petitioner 18, 26–27. The word “solely,” Sturgeon contends, simply
ensures that “non-public” lands within the boundaries of those
units remain subject to laws generally “applicable to both public
and private lands (such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act).”
Id., at 19. Because the hovercraft regulation was adopted
pursuant to the Park Service’s authority over federally managed
preservation areas, and is not a law of general applicability like
the Clean Air Act or the Clean Water Act, Sturgeon concludes that
Section 103(c) bars enforcement of the regulation.
The Park Service, in contrast, reads Section
103(c) more narrowly. In its brief in this Court, the Park Service,
while defending the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, relies
primarily on very different arguments. The agency stresses that it
has longstanding authority to regulate waters within federally
managed preservation areas, and that Section 103(c) does not take
any of that authority away. In reaching its conclusion, the Park
Service disagrees with Sturgeon at each step.
First, the Park Service contends that the Nation
River is part of the Yukon-Charley. To support that contention, the
agency cites ANILCA’s definition of “public lands,” which—as
noted—includes “lands, waters, and interests therein” to which the
United States has “title.” 16 U. S. C. §3102. The Park
Service argues that the United States has “title” to an “interest”
in the water within the boundaries of the Yukon-Charley under the
reserved water rights doctrine.
The reserved water rights doctrine specifies
that “when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the
public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the
Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then
unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of
the reservation.” Cappaert v. United States, 426
U. S. 128, 138 (1976) . By creating the Yukon-Charley, the
Park Service urges, the Federal Government reserved the water
within the boundaries of the conservation system unit to achieve
the Government’s conservation goals. As a result, the Federal
Government has “title” to an “interest” in the Nation River, making
it “public” land subject to Park Service regulations.
Second, the Park Service contends that even if
the Nation River is not “public” land, the agency still has
authority to regulate it. According to the Park Service, the second
sentence of Section 103(c) imposes only a limited restriction on
the agency’s power, prohibiting it from enforcing on “non-public”
lands only those regulations that explicitly apply “solely to
public lands.” The hovercraft regulation applies both within “[t]he
boundaries of feder-ally owned lands and waters administered by the
National Park Service” and to “[w]aters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States located within the boundaries of
the National Park System, including navigable waters
. . . without regard to the ownership of submerged
lands.” 36 CFR §1.2(a). Accordingly, the Park Service asserts, the
hovercraft regulation does not apply “solely to public lands,” and
Section 103(c) therefore does not prevent enforcement of the
regulation. See Brief for Respondents 56–58.
The Ninth Circuit, for its part, adopted a
reading of Section 103(c) different from the primary argument
advanced by the Park Service in this Court. The Court of Appeals
did not reach the question whether the Nation River counts as
“public” land for purposes of ANILCA. Instead, it held that the
phrase “regulations applicable solely to public lands within such
units” distinguishes between Park Service regulations that apply
solely to “public” lands in Alaska, and Park Service
regulations that apply to federally managed preservation areas
across the country. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, the Park Service
may enforce nationally applicable regulations on both “public” and
“non-public” property within the boundaries of conservation system
units in Alaska, because such regulations do not apply “solely to
public lands within such units.” The Park Service may not, however,
apply Alaska-specific regulations to “non-public” lands within the
boundaries of those units.
According to the Ninth Circuit, because the
hovercraft regulation “applies to all federal-owned lands and
waters administered by [the Park Service] nationwide, as well as
all navigable waters lying within national parks,” the hovercraft
ban does not apply “solely” within conservation system units in
Alaska. 768 F. 3d, at 1077. The Ninth Circuit concluded that
the Park Service therefore has authority to enforce its hovercraft
regulation on the Nation River. Id., at 1078. The Ninth
Circuit’s holding is subject to some interpretation, but Sturgeon,
the State, the Alaska Native Corporations, and the Park Service (at
least at times) concur in our understanding of the decision below.
See Brief for Petitioner 25; Brief for State of Alaska as Amicus
Curiae 23; Brief for Arctic Slope Regional Corporation
et al. as Amici Curiae 12–13; Brief for Doyon, Ltd.,
et al. as Amici Curiae 31–32; Brief for Respondents 20;
Tr. of Oral Arg. 61; 80 Fed. Reg. 65573 (2015).
III
We reject the interpretation of Section 103(c)
adopted by the Ninth Circuit. The court’s reading of the phrase
“regulations applicable solely to public lands within such units”
may be plausible in the abstract, but it is ultimately inconsistent
with both the text and context of the statute as a whole. Statutory
language “cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental
canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be
read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Services,
Inc., 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 6) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Under the reading of the statute adopted below,
the Park Service may apply nationally applicable regulations to
“non-public” lands within the boundaries of conservation system
units in Alaska, but it may not apply Alaska-specific regulations
to those lands. That is a surprising conclusion. ANILCA repeatedly
recognizes that Alaska is different—from its “unrivaled scenic and
geological values,” to the “unique” situation of its “rural
residents dependent on subsistence uses,” to “the need for
development and use of Arctic resources with appropriate
recognition and consideration given to the unique nature of the
Arctic environment.” 16 U. S. C. §§3101(b), 3111(2),
3147(b)(5).
ANILCA itself accordingly carves out numerous
Alaska-specific exceptions to the Park Service’s general authority
over federally managed preservation areas. For example, ANILCA
requires the Secretary of the Interior to permit “the exercise of
valid commercial fishing rights or privi-leges” within the National
Wildlife Refuge System in Alaska, including the use of “campsites,
cabins, motorized vehicles, and aircraft landings directly incident
to the exercise of such rights or privileges,” with certain
exceptions. 94Stat. 2393. ANILCA also requires the Secretary to
“permit on the public lands appropriate use for subsistence
purposes of snowmobiles, motorboats, and other means of surface
transportation traditionally employed for such purposes by local
residents, subject to reasonable regulation.” 16 U. S. C.
§3121(b). And it provides that National Preserves “in Alaska shall
be administered and managed as a unit of the National Park System
in the same manner as a national park except as otherwise
provided in this Act and except that the taking of fish and
wildlife for sport purposes and subsistence uses, and trapping
shall be allowed” pursuant to applicable law. §3201 (emphasis
added).
Many similar examples are woven throughout
ANILCA. See, e.g., 94Stat. 2393 (Secretary must administer
wildlife refuge “so as to not impede the passage of navigation and
access by boat on the Yukon and Kuskokwim Rivers,” subject to
reasonable regulation); id., at 2388 (Secretary must allow
reindeer grazing uses in certain areas, including construction of
necessary facilities); 16 U. S. C. §3203(a)
(Alaska-specific rules for wilderness management apply “in
recognition of the unique conditions in Alaska”); §3170(a)
(Secretary must permit reasonable use of snowmachines, motorboats,
and airplanes within conserva-tion system units “for travel to and
from villages and homesites”).
All those Alaska-specific provisions reflect the
simple truth that Alaska is often the exception, not the rule. Yet
the reading below would prevent the Park Service from recognizing
Alaska’s unique conditions. Under that reading, the Park Service
could regulate “non-public” lands in Alaska only through rules
applicable outside Alaska as well. Thus, for example, if the
Park Service elected to allow hovercraft during hunting season in
Alaska—in a departure from its nationwide rule—the more relaxed
regulation would apply only to the “public” land within the
boundaries of the unit. Hovercraft would still be banned from the
“non-public” land, even during hunting season. Whatever the reach
of the Park Service’s authority under ANILCA, we cannot conclude
that Section 103(c) adopted such a topsy-turvy approach.
Moreover, it is clear that Section 103(c) draws
a distinction between “public” and “non-public” lands within the
boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska. See §3103(c)
(“Only those lands within the boundaries of any conservation system
unit which are public lands . . . shall be deemed to be
included as a portion of such unit”); ibid. (No lands
“conveyed to the State, to any Native Corporation, or to any
private party shall be subject to the regulations applicable solely
to public lands within such units”). And yet, according to the
court below, if the Park Service wanted to differentiate between
that “public” and “non-public” land in an Alaska-specific way, it
would have to regulate the “non-public” land pursuant to rules
applicable outside Alaska, and the “public” land pursuant to
Alaska-specific provisions. Assuming the Park Service has authority
over “non-public” land in Alaska (an issue we do not decide), that
strikes us as an implausible reading of the statute.
Looking at ANILCA both as a whole and with
respect to Section 103(c), the Act contemplates the possibility
that all the land within the boundaries of conservation system
units in Alaska may be treated differently from federally managed
preservation areas across the country, and that “non-public” lands
within the boundaries of those units may be treated differently
from “public” lands within the unit. Under the Ninth Circuit’s
reading of Section 103(c), however, the former is not an option,
and the latter would require contorted and counterintuitive
measures.
We therefore reject the interpretation of
Section 103(c) adopted by the court below. That reading of the
statute was the sole basis for the disposition of this case by the
Court of Appeals. We accordingly vacate the judgment of that court
and remand for further proceedings.
We do not reach the remainder of the parties’
arguments. In particular, we do not decide whether the Nation River
qualifies as “public land” for purposes of ANILCA. Sturgeon claims
that it does not; the Park Service that it does. The parties’
arguments in this respect touch on vital issues of state
sovereignty, on the one hand, and federal authority, on the other.
We find that in this case those issues should be addressed by the
lower courts in the first instance.
Given this determination, we also do not decide
whether the Park Service has authority under Section 100751(b) to
regulate Sturgeon’s activities on the Nation River, even if the
river is not “public” land, or whether—as Sturgeon argues—any such
authority is limited by ANILCA. Fin-ally, we do not consider the
Park Service’s alternative ar-gument that it has authority under
ANILCA over both “public” and “non-public” lands within the
boundaries of conservation system units in Alaska, to the extent a
regulation is written to apply specifically to both types of land.
We leave those arguments to the lower courts for consideration as
necessary.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
