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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 14–378
_________________
STEPHEN DOMINICK McFADDEN, PETITIONER
v. UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fourth circuit
[June 18, 2015]
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement
Act of 1986 (Analogue Act) identifies a category of substances
substantially similar to those listed on the federal controlled
substance schedules, 21 U. S. C. §802(32)(A), and then
instructs courts to treat those analogues, if intended for human
consumption, as controlled substances listed on schedule I for
purposes of federal law, §813. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA)
in turn makes it unlawful knowingly to manufacture, distribute, or
possess with intent to distribute controlled substances.
§841(a)(1). The question presented in this case concerns the
knowledge necessary for conviction under §841(a)(1) when the
controlled substance at issue is in fact an analogue.
We hold that §841(a)(1) requires the Government
to establish that the defendant knew he was dealing with “a
controlled substance.” When the substance is an analogue, that
knowledge requirement is met if the defendant knew that the
substance was controlled under the CSA or the Analogue Act, even if
he did not know its identity. The knowledge requirement is also met
if the defendant knew the specific features of the substance that
make it a “ ‘controlled substance analogue.’ ”
§802(32)(A). Because the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit approved a jury instruction that did not accurately convey
this knowledge requirement, we vacate its judgment and remand for
that court to determine whether the error was harmless.
I
In 2011, law enforcement officials in
Charlottesville, Virginia, began investigating individuals at a
Charlottesville video store for suspected distribution of “bath
salts”—various recreational drugs used to produce effects similar
to those of cocaine, methamphetamine, and other controlled
substances. The owner of the store, Lois McDaniel, had been
purchasing bath salts from petitioner Stephen McFadden for several
months. McFadden had marketed the substances to her as “Alpha,” “No
Speed,”
“Speed,” “Up,” and “The New Up,” and had compared
them to cocaine and crystal meth. He had often sold those products
with labels borrowing language from the Analogue Act, asserting
that the contents were “not for human consumption” or stating that
a particular product “does not contain any of the following
compounds or analogues of the following compounds” and listing
controlled substances. McDaniel purchased the bath salts for $15
per gram and resold them for $30 to $70 per gram.
After investigators had conducted two controlled
buys from the store and confronted McDaniel, she agreed to
cooperate in their investigation by making five controlled buys
from McFadden. The Government intercepted the substances McFadden
sent when they arrived at the local FedEx store. Like the
substances sold in the video store, these substances were white and
off-white powders packaged in small plastic bags. Chemical analysis
identified the powders as containing, among other substances,
3,4-Methylenedioxypyrovalerone, also known as MDPV;
3,4-Methylenedioxy-N-methylcathinone, also known as Meth-ylone or
MDMC; and 4-Methyl-N-ethylcathinone, also known as 4-MEC. When
ingested, each of these sub-stances is capable of producing effects
on the centralnervous system similar to those that controlled
substances (such as cocaine, methamphetamine, and methcathinone)
produce.
A federal grand jury indicted McFadden on eight
counts of distribution of controlled substance analogues and one
count of conspiracy. At trial, McFadden argued that he did not know
the substances he was distributing were regulated as controlled
substances under the Analogue Act. He and the Government also
disagreed about what knowledge was required for a conviction. The
Government sought an instruction requiring only “[t]hat the
defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed a mixture or
substance . . . [t]hat . . . was a controlled
substance analogue . . . with the intent that it be
consumed by humans.” App. 26–27. McFadden sought a more demanding
instruction requiring that he “knew that the substances that he was
distributing possessed the characteristics of controlled substance
analogues,” including their chemical structures and effects on the
central nervous system.
Id., at 29–30. The District Court
compromised, instructing the jury that the statute required that
“the defendant knowingly and intentionally distributed a mixture or
substance that has” substantially similar effects on the nervous
system as a controlled substance and “[t]hat the defendant intended
for the mixture or substance to be consumed by humans.”
Id.,
at 40.
The jury convicted McFadden on all nine counts.
On appeal, McFadden insisted that the District Court “erred in
refusing to instruct the jury that the government was required to
prove that he knew, had a strong suspicion, or deliberately avoided
knowledge that the [substances] possessed the characteristics of
controlled substance analogues.” 753 F. 3d 432, 443 (CA4
2014). Rejecting that argument, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Id., at 444, 446. Stating that it was bound by Circuit
precedent, the court concluded that the “intent element [in the
Act] requires [only] that the government prove that the defendant
meant for the substance at issue to be consumed by humans.”
Id., at 441; see
id., at 444.
We granted a writ of certiorari, 574 U. S
___ (2015), and now vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand.
II
A
The Analogue Act requires a controlled
substance analogue, if intended for human consumption, to be
treated “as a controlled substance in schedule I” for purposes of
federal law. §1201, 100Stat. 3207–13, 21 U. S. C. §813.
We therefore must turn first to the statute that addresses
controlled substances, the CSA. The CSA makes it “unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” §401(a)(1),
84Stat. 1260, 21 U. S. C. §841(a)(1). Under the most
natural reading of this provision, the word “knowingly” applies not
just to the statute’s verbs but also to the object of those
verbs—“
a controlled substance.” See
Flores-Figueroa
v.
United States, 556 U. S. 646, 650 (2009) ;
id., at 657 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment);
id., at 660–661 (Alito, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment). When used as an indefinite article,
“a” means “[s]ome undetermined or unspecified particular.”
Webster’s New International Dictionary 1 (2d ed. 1954). And the CSA
defines “controlled substance” as “a drug or other substance, or
immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V.”
§802(6) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ordinary meaning of
§841(a)(1) thus requires a defendant to know only that the
substance he is dealing with is some unspecified substance listed
on the federal drug schedules. The Courts of Appeals have
recognized as much. See,
e.g., United States v.
Andino, 627 F. 3d 41, 45–46 (CA2 2010);
United
States v.
Gamez-Gonzalez, 319 F. 3d 695, 699 (CA5
2003);
United States v.
Martinez, 301 F. 3d 860,
865 (CA7 2002).
That knowledge requirement may be met by showing
that the defendant knew he possessed a substance listed on the
schedules, even if he did not know which substance it was. Take,
for example, a defendant whose role in a larger drug organization
is to distribute a white powder to customers. The defendant may
know that the white powder is listed on the schedules even if he
does not know precisely what substance it is. And if so, he would
be guilty of knowingly distributing “a controlled substance.”
The knowledge requirement may also be met by
showing that the defendant knew the identity of the substance he
possessed. Take, for example, a defendant who knows he is
distributing heroin but does not know that heroin is listed on the
schedules, 21 CFR §1308.11 (2014). Because ignorance of the law is
typically no defense to criminal prosecution,
Bryan v.
United States, 524 U. S. 184, 196 (1998) , this
defendant would also be guilty of knowingly distributing “a
controlled substance.”[
1]
The Analogue Act extends the framework of the
CSA to analogous substances. 21 U. S. C. §813. The Act
defines a “controlled substance analogue” as a substance:
“(i) the chemical structure of which is
substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled
substance in schedule I or II;
“(ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is
substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant,
or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a
controlled substance in schedule I or II; or
“(iii) with respect to a particular person,
which such person represents or intends to have a stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system
that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant,
depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system
of a controlled substance in schedule I or II.” §802(32)(A).
It further provides, “A controlled substance
analogue shall, to the extent intended for human consumption, be
treated, for the purposes of any Federal law as a controlled
substance in schedule I.” §813.
The question in this case is how the mental
state requirement under the CSA for knowingly manufacturing,
distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute “a controlled
substance” applies when the controlled substance is in fact an
analogue. The answer begins with §841(a)(1), which expressly
requires the Government to prove that a defendant knew he was
dealing with “a controlled substance.” The Analogue Act does not
alter that provision, but rather instructs courts to treat
controlled substance analogues “as . . . controlled
substance[s] in schedule I.” §813. Applying this statutory command,
it follows that the Government must prove that a defendant knew
that the substance with which he was dealing was “a controlled
substance,” even in prosecutions involving an analogue.[
2]
That knowledge requirement can be established in
two ways. First, it can be established by evidence that a defendant
knew that the substance with which he was dealing is some
controlled substance—that is, one actually listed on the federal
drug schedules or treated as such by operation of the Analogue
Act—regardless of whether he knew the particular identity of the
substance. Second, it can be established by evidence that the
defendant knew the specific analogue he was dealing with, even if
he did not know its legal status as an analogue. The Analogue Act
defines a controlled substance analogue by its features, as a
substance “the chemical structure of which is substantially similar
to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in schedule I
or II”; “which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar
to or greater than” the effect of a controlled substance in
schedule I or II; or which is represented or intended to have that
effect with respect to a particular person. §802(32)(A). A
defendant who possesses a substance with knowledge of those
features knows all of the facts that make his conduct illegal, just
as a defendant who knows he possesses heroin knows all of the facts
that make his conduct illegal. A defendant need not know of the
existence of the Analogue Act to know that he was dealing with “a
controlledsubstance.”
B
The Court of Appeals did not adhere to §813’s
command to treat a controlled substance analogue “as a controlled
substance in schedule I,” and, accordingly, it did not apply the
mental-state requirement in §841(a)(1). Instead, it concluded that
the only mental state requirement for prosecutions involving
controlled substance analogues is the one in §813—that the
analogues be “intended for human consumption.” metricconverter753
F. 3d, at 436 (citing
United States v.
Klecker,
metricconverter348 F. 3d 69, 71 (CA4 2003)). Because that
interpretation is inconsistent with the text and structure of the
statutes, we decline to adopt it.
Unsurprisingly, neither the Government nor
McFadden defends the Court of Appeals’ position. But their
alternative interpretations fare no better. The Government agrees
that the knowledge requirement in §841(a)(1) applies to
prosecutions involving controlled substance analogues, yet contends
that it is met if the “defendant knew he was dealing with an
illegal or regulated substance” under some law. Brief for United
States 15. Section 841(a)(1), however, requires that a defendant
knew he was dealing with “a controlled substance.” That term
includes only those drugs listed on the federal drug schedules or
treated as such by operation of the Analogue Act. §§802(6), 813. It
is not broad enough to include all substances regulated by any
law.[
3]
For his part, McFadden contends that, in the
context of analogues, knowledge of “a controlled substance” can
only be established by knowledge of the characteristics that
make a substance an “analogue” under the Act. In support of that
argument, he relies heavily on our conclusion in
Staples v.
United States, 511 U. S. 600 (1994) , that a statute
making it “ ‘unlawful for any person . . . to
receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the
National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record,’ ”
id., at 605 (quoting 26 U. S. C. §5861(d)), required
proof that a defendant “knew of the features of his AR–15 that
brought it within the scope of the Act,” 511 U. S., at 619.
McFadden reasons by analogy that a defendant convicted under
§841(a)(1) must also know the features of the substance that
brought it within the scope of the Analogue Act. But that position
ignores an important textual distinction between §841(a)(1) and the
statute at issue in
Staples. The statute at issue in
Staples defined “a firearm” by its physical features such as
the length of its barrel and its capacity to shoot more than one
shot with a single function of the trigger. Unlike those physical
features that brought the firearm “within the scope of” that
statute, the fea-ture of a substance “that br[ings] it within the
scope of” §841(a)(1) is the fact that it is
“ ‘controlled.’ ” §802(6). Knowledge of
that fact
can be established in the twoways previously discussed: either by
knowledge that a substance is listed or treated as listed by
operation ofthe Analogue Act, §§802(6), 813, or by knowledge of the
physical characteristics that give rise to that treatment.
Supra, at 7.
McFadden also invokes the canon of
constitutional avoidance, arguing that we must adopt his
interpretation of the statute lest it be rendered
unconstitutionally vague. But that argument fails on two grounds.
Under our precedents, this canon “is a tool for choosing between
competing plausible interpretations of a provision.”
Warger
v.
Shauers, 574 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 10)
(internal quotation marks omitted). It “has no application” in the
interpretation of an unambiguous statute such as this one. See
ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if this
statute were ambiguous, McFadden’s argument would falter. Under our
precedents, a scienter requirement in a statute “alleviate[s]
vagueness concerns,” “narrow[s] the scope of the [its]
prohibition[,] and limit[s] prosecutorial discretion.”
Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U. S. 124, 149, 150
(2007) . The scienter requirement in this statute does not, as
McFadden suggests, render the statute vague. More-over, to the
extent McFadden suggests that the substantial similarity test for
defining analogues is itself indeterminate, his proposed
alternative scienter requirement would do nothing to cure that
infirmity.
III
The District Court’s instructions to the jury
did not fully convey the mental state required by the Analogue Act.
The jury was instructed only that McFadden had to “knowingly and
intentionally distribut[e] a mixture or substance that has an
actual, intended, or claimed stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system” substantially
similar to that of a controlled substance. App. 40.
The Government contends that any error in the
jury instructions was harmless because no rational jury could have
concluded that McFadden was unaware that the substances he was
distributing were controlled. We have recognized that even the
omission of an element from a jury charge is subject to
harmless-error analysis.
Neder v.
United States, 527
U. S. 1, 15 (1999) . Because the Court of Appeals did not
address that issue, we remand for that court to consider it in the
first instance.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
