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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 14–185
_________________
NOEL REYES MATA, PETITIONER
v. LORETTA
E.LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fifth circuit
[June 15, 2015]
Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the
Court.
An alien ordered to leave the country has a
statutory right to file a motion to reopen his removal proceedings.
See 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(7)(A). If immigration officials
deny that motion, a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction to
consider a petition to review their decision. See
Kucana v.
Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 242, 253 (2010) .
Notwithstanding that rule, the court below declined to take
jurisdiction over such an appeal because the motion to reopen had
been denied as untimely. We hold that was error.
I
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
66Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §1101
et seq., and its implementing regulations set out the
process for removing aliens from the country. An immigration judge
(IJ) conducts the initial proceedings; if he orders removal, the
alien has the opportunity to appeal that decision tothe Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board). §§1229a(a)(1), (c)(5). “[E]very
alien ordered removed” also
“has a right to file one motion” with the IJ
or Boardto “reopen his or her removal proceedings.”
Dada v.
Mukasey, 554 U. S. 1 –5 (2008); see §1229a(c)(7)(A).
Subject to exceptions not relevant here, that motion to reopen
“shall be filed within 90 days” of the final removal order.
§1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Finally, the BIA’s regulations provide that,
separate and apart from acting on the alien’s motion, the BIA may
reopen removal proceedings “on its own motion”—or, in Latin,
sua sponte—at any time. 8 CFR §1003.2(a) (2015).
Petitioner Noel Reyes Mata is a Mexican citizen
who entered the United States unlawfully almost 15 years ago. In
2010, he was convicted of assault under the Texas Penal Code. The
federal Department of Homeland Secu-rity (DHS) immediately
initiated removal proceedings against him, and in August 2011 an IJ
ordered him removed. See App. 6–13. Mata’s lawyer then filed a
notice of appeal with the BIA, indicating that he would soon submit
a written brief stating grounds for reversing the IJ’s decision.
But the attorney never filed the brief, and the BIA dismissed the
appeal in September 2012. See App. 4–5.
More than a hundred days later, Mata (by then
represented by new counsel) filed a motion with the Board to reopen
his case. DHS opposed the motion, arguing in part that Mata had
failed to file it, as the INA requires, within 90 days of the
Board’s decision. Mata responded that the motion was “not time
barred” because his first lawyer’s “ineffective assistance” counted
as an “exceptional circumstance[ ]” excusing his lateness.
Certified Administrative Record in No. 13–60253 (CA5, Aug. 2,
2013), p. 69. In addressing those arguments, the Board reaffirmed
prior decisions holding that it had authority to equitably toll the
90-day period in certain cases involving ineffective
representation. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 7; see also,
e.g.,
In re Santa Celenia Diaz, 2009 WL 2981747 (BIA, Aug. 21,
2009). But the Board went on to determine that Mata was not
entitled to equitable tolling because he could not show prejudice
from his attorney’s deficient performance; accordingly, the Board
found Mata’s motion untimely. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 7–8. And
in closing, the Board decided as well that Mata’s case was not one
“that would warrant reopening as an exercise of” its
sua
sponte authority.
Id., at 9 (stating that “the power to
reopen on our own motion is not meant to be used as a general cure
for filing defects” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Mata petitioned the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit to review the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen,
arguing that he was entitled to equitable tolling. The Fifth
Circuit, however, declined to “address the meritsof Mata’s
equitable-tolling . . . claim[ ].”
Reyes Mata
v.
Holder, 558 Fed. Appx. 366, 367 (2014) (
per
curiam). It stated instead that “[i]n this circuit, an alien’s
request [to the BIA] for equitable tolling on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel is construed as an invitation for
the BIA to exercise its discretion to reopen the removal proceeding
sua sponte.”
Ibid. And circuit precedent held that
courts have no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise
its
sua sponte power to reopen cases. See
ibid.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Mata’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
Every other Circuit that reviews removal orders
has affirmed its jurisdiction to decide an appeal, like Mata’s,
that seeks equitable tolling of the statutory time limit to file a
motion to reopen a removal proceeding.[
1] We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 574
U. S. ___ (2015). And because the Federal Government agrees
with Mata that the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over his appeal,
we appointed an
amicus curiae to defend the judgment
below.[
2] We now reverse.
II
As we held in
Kucana v.
Holder,
circuit courts have jurisdiction when an alien appeals from the
Board’s denial of a motion to reopen a removal proceeding. See 558
U. S., at 242, 253. The INA, in combination with a statute
cross-referenced there, gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction to
review “final order[s] of removal.” 8 U. S. C.
§1252(a)(1); 28 U. S. C. §2342. That jurisdiction, as the
INA expressly contemplates, encompasses review of decisions
refusingto reopen or reconsider such orders. See 8
U. S. C. §1252(b)(6) (“[A]ny review sought of a motion to
reopen or reconsider [a removal order] shall be consolidated with
the review of the [underlying] order”). Indeed, as we explained in
Kucana, courts have reviewed those decisions for nearly a
hundred years; and even as Congress curtailed other aspects of
courts’ jurisdiction over BIA rulings, it left that authority in
place. See 558 U. S., at242–251.
Nothing changes when the Board denies a motion
to reopen because it is untimely—nor when, in doing so, the Board
rejects a request for equitable tolling. Under the INA, as under
our century-old practice, the reason for the BIA’s denial makes no
difference to the jurisdictional issue. Whether the BIA rejects the
alien’s motion to re-open because it comes too late or because it
falls short in some other respect, the courts have jurisdiction to
review that decision.
Similarly, that jurisdiction remains unchanged
if the Board, in addition to denying the alien’s statutorily
authorized motion, states that it will not exercise its separate
sua sponte authority to reopen the case. See
supra, at 1–2. In
Kucana, we declined to decide
whether courts have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s use of that
discretionary power. See 558 U. S., at 251, n. 18. Courts
of Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit, have held that they
generally lack such authority. See,
e.g., Enriquez-Alvarado
v.
Ashcroft, 371 F. 3d 246, 249–250 (CA5 2004);
Tamenut v.
Mukasey, 521 F. 3d 1000, 1003–1004
(CA8 2008) (en banc) (
per curiam) (citing other decisions).
Assuming
arguendo that is right, it means only that judicial
review ends after the court has evaluated the Board’s ruling on the
alien’s motion. That courts lack jurisdiction over one matter (the
sua sponte decision) does not affect their jurisdiction
over another (the decision on the alien’s request).
It follows, as the night the day, that the Court
of Appeals had jurisdiction over this case. Recall: As authorized
by the INA, Mata filed a motion with the Board to reopen his
removal proceeding. The Board declined to grant Mata his proposed
relief, thus conferring jurisdiction on an appellate court under
Kucana. The Board did so for timeliness reasons, holding
that Mata had filed his motion after 90 days had elapsed and that
he was not entitled to equitable tolling. But as just explained,
the reason the Board gave makes no difference: Whenever the Board
denies an alien’s statutory motion to reopen a removal case, courts
have jurisdiction to review its decision. In addition, the Board
determined not to exercise its
sua sponte authority to
reopen. But once again, that extra ruling does not matter. The
Court of Appeals did not lose jurisdiction over the Board’s denial
of Mata’s motion just because the Board also declined to reopen his
case
sua sponte.
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Mata’s
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. That decision, as described
earlier, hinged on “constru[ing]” Mata’s motion as something it was
not: “an invitation for the BIA to exercise” its
sua sponte authority. 558 Fed. Appx., at 367;
supra, at 3.
Amicus’s defense of that approach
centrally relies on a merits-based premise: that the INA forbids
equitable tolling of the 90-day filing period in any case, no
matter how exceptional the circumstances. See Brief for
Amicus
Curiae by Invitation of the Court 14–35. Given that is so,
amicus continues, the court acted permissibly in
“recharacteriz[ing]” Mata’s pleadings.
Id., at 36. After
all, courts often treat a request for “categorically unavailable”
relief as instead “seeking relief [that] may be available.”
Id., at 35, 38. And here (
amicus concludes) that
meant construing Mata’s request for equitable tolling as a request
for
sua sponte reopening—even though that caused the
Fifth Circuit to lose its jurisdiction.
But that conclusion is wrong even on the
assumption—and it is only an assumption—that its core premise about
equitable tolling is true.[
3]
If the INA precludes Mata from getting the relief he seeks, then
the right course on appeal is to take jurisdiction over the case,
explain why that is so, and affirm the BIA’s decision not to
reopen. The jurisdictional question (whether the court has power to
decide if tolling is proper) is of course distinct from the merits
question (whether tolling is proper). See
Steel Co. v.
Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89
(1998) (“[T]he absence of a valid . . . cause of action
does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction”). The Fifth Circuit
thus retains jurisdiction even if Mata’s appeal lacks merit. And
when a federal court has jurisdiction, it also has a “virtually
unflagging obligation . . . to exercise” that authority.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United
States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976) . Accordingly,the Court
of Appeals should have asserted jurisdiction over Mata’s appeal and
addressed the equitable tolling question.
Contrary to
amicus’s view, the practice
of recharacterizing pleadings so as to offer the possibility of
relief cannot justify the Court of Appeals’ alternative approach.
True enough (and a good thing too) that courts sometimes construe
one kind of filing as another: If a litigant misbrands a motion,
but could get relief under a different label, a court will often
make the requisite change. See,
e.g., 12 J. Moore, Moore’s
Federal Practice, §59.11[4] (3 ed. 2015) (explaining how courts
treat untimely Rule 59 motions as Rule 60 motions because the
latter have no time limit). But that established practice does not
entail sidestepping the judicial obligation to exercise
jurisdiction. And it results in identifying a route to relief, not
in rendering relief impossible. That makes all the difference
between a court’s generously reading pleadings and a court’s
construing away adjudicative authority.
And if, as
amicus argues, that construal
rests on an underlying merits decision—that the INA precludes any
equitable tolling—then the Court of Appeals has effectively
insulated a circuit split from our review. Putting theFifth Circuit
to the side, all appellate courts to have addressed the matter have
held that the Board may sometimes equitably toll the time limit for
an alien’s motion to reopen. See n. 1,
supra. Assuming
the Fifth Circuit thinks otherwise, that creates the kind of split
of authority we typically think we need to resolve. See this
Court’s Rule 10(a). But the Fifth Circuit’s practice of
recharacterizing appeals like Mata’s as challenges to the Board’s
sua sponte decisions and then declining to exercise
jurisdiction over them prevents that split from coming to light. Of
course, the Court of Appeals may reach whatever conclusion it
thinks best as to the availability of equitable tolling; we express
no opinion on that matter. See n. 3,
supra. What the Fifth
Circuit may not do is to wrap such a merits decision in
jurisdictional garb so that we cannot address a possible division
between that court and every other.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
