In 1839, a treaty was made between the United States and Mexico
providing for the "adjustment of claims of citizens of the United
States on the Mexican Republic." Under this treaty, a sum of money
was awarded to be paid to the members of the Baltimore Mexican
Company, who had subscribed money to fit out an expedition against
Mexico under General Mina in 1816.
The proceeds of one of the shares of this company were claimed
by two parties, one as being the permanent trustee of the insolvent
owner of the share, and the other as being the assignee of the
provisional trustee and afterwards the assignee of the insolvent
himself.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland that the latter
claimant is entitled to the money is not reviewable by this Court
under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act.
This case was argued at last term on a motion to dismiss for
want of jurisdiction. But the court reserved the point till final
hearing. On the hearing at this term, the question of jurisdiction
continued to be the most important question in the case, and that
on which it was decided by the Court.
A brief history of the facts connected with the case and of the
pleadings will be sufficient to exhibit the questions involved.
In the year 1816, General Xavier Mina, who was at that time
connected with the revolutionary party in Mexico in opposition to
the authority of Spain, came to the City of Baltimore,
Page 52 U. S. 530
and there entered into a contract with certain gentlemen of that
place, who associated themselves under the name of the "Baltimore
Mexican Company," for the purchase of a quantity of arms,
ammunition &c., to fit out an expedition against the then
government of Mexico. On account of the risk attending their
delivery and the uncertainty of the payment, it was agreed that
Mina should pay one hundred percent on the cost of the articles,
and interest. The goods were shipped for Mexico and delivered
according to contract, but were not paid for by General Mina, as he
was soon after taken prisoner and shot.
From this time till 1825, the recovery of the claim was
considered hopeless.
In 1825, Mexico had achieved her independence, and after much
solicitation the government was persuaded to acknowledge the
justice of this claim, and assume the payment of it by an act of
Congress passed to pay the debts of Mina. But notwithstanding the
recognition of this claim as a debt, its payment was delayed for
many years, and seemed almost hopeless.
Many and larger claims were held by citizens of the United
States against Mexico of which the government had been urging the
payment, and finally, on 11 April, 1839, a convention was concluded
between the Secretary of State of the United States and the Mexican
Minister "for the adjustment of claims of citizens of the United
States of America upon the government of the Mexican Republic." By
this treaty, all claims by citizens of the United States upon the
Mexican government &c., were referred to four commissioners,
"who were authorized to decide upon the justice of said claims, and
the amount of compensation due from the Mexican government in each
case."
As the claim of the "Baltimore Mexican Company" had been
recognized as a debt of the Mexican government by a solemn act of
their Congress, its justice could not well be denied. It was
accordingly allowed by the commissioners on proof of its
correctness and exhibition of the original contract with Mina.
David M. Perrine and John Glenn, who claimed to be assignees in
trust of eight of the nine shares into which the stock of the
company had been divided, received the amount of the award, and
according to agreement with their
cestui que trusts,
deposited the money in the Mechanics' Bank of Baltimore, to be
distributed according to the respective rights of the parties
claiming it.
Soon after this was done, Philip E. Thomas and John
Page 52 U. S. 531
White filed their bill in chancery against said Perrine and
Glenn, claiming the share of _____ Smith, and praying the
intervention and assistance of a court of equity, in order to the
just distribution of the proceeds of the award in the hands of the
trustees.
The defendants, Perrine and Glenn, came into court and
submitted
"that they are willing and desirous that the proceeds of the
award may be distributed among the parties under the direction of
the court &c., and join in praying an early reference to an
auditor for that purpose."
The money being thus in court for distribution, all persons who
laid any claim to it intervened by bill or petition against the
trustees and opposing claimants. Among others, the plaintiff in
error, George M. Gill filed his bill, claiming the share and
interest of Lyde Goodwin, who was one of the original nine or ten
persons who were partners or members of the "Baltimore Mexican
Company."
The bill alleges that this company was formed in 1816; that Lyde
Goodwin owned one ninth part of the property; that in February,
1817, Lyde Goodwin applied to the court for the benefit of the
insolvent laws of Maryland, which he duly received; that the
complainant was appointed permanent trustee, and gave the proper
bond for faithful performance of the trust. The bill goes on to
state the convention with Mexico in 1839, the award of the
commissioners, the receipt of the share of Lyde Goodwin by Glenn
and Perrine, under a power of attorney from Oliver's executors, who
claimed title to the same under a pretended assignment from George
J. Brown, the provisional trustee of said Goodwin, and finally
prays that the executors of Oliver, the claimant of the share, and
said trustees, may answer, account, and bring the certificates in
which payment was made into court, that they may be delivered over
to complainant.
The complainant filed also another bill against the trustees and
all other claimants, for the sum of five percent on the whole
amount, as due to Lyde Goodwin for services rendered to the
company, by contract with them.
The complainant founded his claim to the money in both cases on
the allegation "that all Lyde Goodwin's interest in said property
and claims had become vested in the petitioner by virtue of his
application and the laws of the state."
The answers of the defendants admit the application of Lyde
Goodwin for the benefit of the insolvent laws and his discharge,
but state that the complainant, Gill was not appointed permanent
trustee till March, 1837; that on 26 February, 1817, George J.
Brown was duly appointed by the court provisional trustee, and gave
bond and security, and
Page 52 U. S. 532
that the debtor, Lyde Goodwin, on the same day executed to said
trustee a deed of assignment of all his property. That in 1825 said
Brown conveyed to Robert Oliver, and afterwards, on 30 May, 1829,
Lyde Goodwin assigned and conveyed to said Oliver all his title and
interest in the claim of the company on Mexico. The defendants
allege and plead, that by these assignments the title to the share
of Lyde Goodwin vested in Robert Oliver in his lifetime, who is now
represented by his executors.
There was no dispute on the facts of this case, and the only
questions of law involved in it are whether, by the insolvent laws
of Maryland, the title of Gill as permanent trustee, to the money
in court, was better than the previous assignment by the
provisional trustee and Lyde Goodwin himself. On the one side it
was contended that by the insolvent act of Maryland passed in 1805,
all the property and estate of the insolvent which he held at the
time of his discharge vested in his permanent trustee whensoever he
should thereafter be appointed, and that the deed from the
provisional trustee, George J. Brown, conveyed no title to Oliver
under the insolvent laws. Nor did the deed of Goodwin himself
convey any title, because by his insolvent proceedings, all his
right, title, and interest in this claim became divested.
On the contrary, the executors of Oliver contended that until
the recognition of this claim by Mexico in 1825, it did not
constitute such property as would pass by the insolvent assignment.
That after, by the labors of Goodwin and other agents of the
company, this claim was assumed by Mexico and acknowledged as a
debt, it vested in Goodwin as a new acquisition, which he might
convey. And of this opinion was the Court of Appeals of
Maryland.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland was as
follows:
"The appeal in this case coming on for hearing, and having been
fully argued by the solicitors of the respective parties, has been
since fully considered by the court, and it appearing to the court
that that part of the decree appealed from of the court below,
which directed any portion of the fund in controversy to be
transferred or paid to the appellee, George M. Gill as permanent
trustee of Lyde Goodwin, was erroneous and should be reversed, and
it also appearing to the court that said portion of said fund
should be paid over and transferred to the appellants, Charles
Oliver, Robert M. Gibbs, and Thomas Oliver, as executors of Robert
Oliver in the proceedings mentioned, together with all
accumulations of interest or dividends since accruing upon the
same: "
Page 52 U. S. 533
"It is thereupon by this Court and the authority thereof on this
23d day of June in the year 1849 adjudged, ordered, and decreed
that the said decree of the court below, so far as the same
adjudged and decreed any portion of the fund in controversy to be
transferred or paid to the said George M. Gill as permanent trustee
of Lyde Goodwin, be and the same is reversed and annulled, and this
Court, proceeding to pass such decree in the premises as they are
of opinion should have been passed by the court below, do further
adjudge and decree that all and every part of such portion of said
fund so by the court below decreed to be transferred or paid to
said George M. Gill as trustee aforesaid be by the trustees in the
proceedings mentioned, David M. Perrine and John Glenn, transferred
or paid over to the appellants, Charles Oliver, Robert M. Gibbs,
and Thomas Oliver, as executors of Robert Oliver, together with all
and every accumulation of interest or dividends or investments of
the same made or accruing in and upon such part or portion of said
fund, and it is further by this Court and its authority adjudged
and decreed that all other portions of the decree of the court
below except such as is hereby reversed be and the same is hereby
affirmed; it is further adjudged and decreed that the reversal of
the decree of the court below be without costs."
The opinion of the said Court of Appeals was as follows:
"The majority of this Court who sat in the trial of this cause
and by which was decreed the reversal of the decree of the county
court, at the instance of the solicitors of the appellees, briefly
state the following as their reasons for such reversal. They are of
opinion that the entire contract, upon which the claim of the
appellees is founded is so fraught with illegality and turpitude as
to be utterly null and void and conferring no rights or obligations
upon any of the contracting parties which can be sustained or
countenanced by any court of law or equity in this state or of the
United States; that it has no legal or moral obligation to support
it, and that therefore, under the insolvent laws of Maryland such a
claim does not pass to or vest in the trustee of an insolvent
petitioner. It forms no part of his property or estate within the
meaning of the legislative enactments constituting our insolvent
system. It bears no analogy to the cases, decided in Maryland and
elsewhere, of claims not recoverable in a court of justice, which
nevertheless have been held to vest in the trustees of an insolvent
or the assignees of a bankrupt. In the case referred to, the
claims, as concerned those asserting them, were on their part
tainted by no principle of illegality or immorality; on the
Page 52 U. S. 534
contrary, were sustained by every principle of national law and
natural justice, and nothing was wanting to render them recuperable
but a judicial tribunal competent to take cognizance thereof.
Wholly dissimilar is the claim before us. Such is its character,
that it cannot be presented to a court of justice but by a
disclosure of its impurities, and if anything is conclusively
settled or ought to be so regarded, it is that a claim thus imbued
with illegality and corruption will never be sanctioned or enforced
by a court either of law or equity."
"Entertaining this view of the case, it is unnecessary to
examine the various minor points which were raised in the argument
before us."
To review the judgment of the Court of Appeals, Gill sued out a
writ of error, and brought the case up to this Court.
Page 52 U. S. 545
MR. JUSTICE GRIER delivered the opinion of the Court.
If this Court can take jurisdiction of this case under the
twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, it must be under either
the first or third clause, as the second is admitted to be wholly
inapplicable to it.
1. The first is
"where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute
of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the
decision is against their validity."
2. The third is
"where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of
the Constitution, or of a treaty or statute of, or commission held
under the United States, and the decision is against the title,
right, privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed by
either party under such clause,"
&c.
1. We have sought in vain through the record of this case to
find any question raised directly by the pleadings or "by clear and
necessary intendment therefrom" touching the validity of any
treaty, statute, or authority exercised under the United
States.
Both parties claim certain moneys in court as assignees of Lyde
Goodwin, who was a member of the "Baltimore Mexican Company," and
entitled to a certain proportion of the money awarded to said
company as a just claim on the Mexican government. The validity of
the award, or the treaty under which it was made, is not called in
question by either party, as both claim under them. In order to
ascertain the effect of certain previous assignments made by Lyde
Goodwin, the history of the origin of his claim necessarily makes a
part of the case.
The treaty and award are introduced as a part of this history,
as facts not disputed by either party. The money being in court,
both the treaty and the award were
functi officio, and no
decision of the rights of the claimants
inter se can, in
the nature of the case, involve the validity of either.
The decision of the Court of Appeals that the original contract
with Mina in 1816 did not create such a debt as would
Page 52 U. S. 546
pass by the insolvent laws of Maryland, neither directly nor by
implication questions the validity of any treaty, statute, or
authority under the United States.
That the Baltimore Mexican Company set on foot and prepared the
means of a military expedition against the territories and
dominions of the King of Spain, a foreign prince with whom the
United States were at peace, is a fact in the history of the case
not disputed, and which if wrongly found by the court would not
give us jurisdiction of the case. That such conduct of the company
in making their contract with General Mina was a high misdemeanor,
punishable with fine and imprisonment by the fifth section of the
Act of 5 June, 1794, chap. 51, cannot be disputed by anyone who
will read the statute, and the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
court below, that the contract of the company with Mina in 1816,
being founded on an illegal transaction, was void by the law of
Maryland, where it was made, and passed no equity, right, or title
whatsoever to an insolvent assignee in 1817, involved no question
of "the validity of any treaty or statute of, or an authority
exercised under the United States."
The validity or binding effect of the original contract with
Mina is neither directly nor indirectly affirmed, either in the
convention with Mexico or in the award of the commissioners under
it.
The fact that the "Baltimore Mexican Company" exposed not only
their property to capture by the Spanish vessels of war but their
own persons to fine and imprisonment by the authorities of the
United States only enhanced the justice and equity of their claims
against the new government of Mexico.
The original contract with General Mina was a Maryland contract,
and its validity and construction are questions of Maryland law,
which this Court is not authorized to decide in the present
action.
2. We are equally at a loss to discover in this record where or
how "the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a
treaty or statute of, or commission held under the United States"
is drawn in question in this case.
As we have already said, both parties claim money in court, and
in order to test the value of their respective assignments from
Lyde Goodwin, introduce the history of the claim from its
origin.
The treaty and award are facts in that history. They were before
the court but as facts, and not for construction. If A hold land
under a patent from the United States or a Spanish grant ratified
by treaty, and his heirs, devisees, or assignees dispute as to
which has the best title under him, this does not
Page 52 U. S. 547
make a case for the jurisdiction of this Court under the
twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. If neither the validity
nor construction of the patent or title under the treaty is
contested, if both parties claim under it, and the contest arises
from some question without or
dehors the patent or the
treaty, it is plainly no case for our interference under this
section.
That the title originated in such a patent or treaty is a fact
in the history of the case incidental to it, but the essential
controversy between the parties is without and beyond it. So in
this case, both claim the money in court. It is a fact that the
money has been paid by the Republic of Mexico, on a claim which has
been pronounced just and equitable by commissioners under the
convention of 1839. It is a fact also that the origin of this claim
was for arms and ammunition furnished for an expedition under
General Mina for the purpose of insurrection against the Spanish
government. It is a fact that the Baltimore Mexican Company, or the
individuals composing it, exposed themselves to punishment under
the neutrality act. It is a fact also that afterwards, when Mexico
had succeeded in establishing her independence, when her rebellion
had become a successful revolution, that she very justly and
honorably made herself debtor to those who periled their property
and persons in her service at the commencement of her struggle. It
is a fact that though this claim was acknowledged as a just debt by
Mexico as early as 1825, payment was never obtained till after the
award of the commissioners under the convention with Mexico in
1839, "for the adjustment of claims of citizens of the United
States on the Mexican Republic." It is a fact that this claim thus
recognized by the Mexican Congress was pronounced a just debt in
favor of citizens of the United States against the Republic of
Mexico.
But whether this debt of the Mexican government, first
acknowledged and made tangible as such in 1825, did previously
exist as an equity, a right, or a chose in action capable of
passing by assignment under the insolvent laws of Maryland in 1817
is a question not settled in the treaty or award nor involving any
question as to the construction of either, but arising wholly from
without and entirely independent of either the one or the other.
The treaty was that "all claims of citizens of the United States
found to be just and equitable should be paid." The award was that
this claim of the "Baltimore Mexican Company," which had been
acknowledged in 1825 as a valid claim by Mexico, was a just debt,
not a false or feigned one, and ought to be paid. The money is
awarded to be paid to Glenn and Perrine "in trust for whom it may
concern." The award does not undertake to settle the equities or
rights of
Page 52 U. S. 548
the different persons claiming to be legal or equitable
assignees or transferees of the interests of the several members of
the company. That is left to the tribunals of the state where the
members of the company resided and the assignments were made. In
deciding this question, the courts of Maryland have put no
construction on the treaty or award asserted by one party to be the
true one and denied by the other. It was before them as a fact
only, and not for the purpose of construction. Whether this money
paid into court under the award and first acknowledged by Mexico as
a debt in 1825 existed as a debt transferable by the Maryland
insolvent laws in 1817, or whether it for the first time assumed
the nature of a chose in action transferable by assignment after
1825, when acknowledged of record by Mexico and passed by the
assignment of Lyde Goodwin to Robert Oliver, was a question wholly
dehors the treaty and award, and involving the
construction of the laws of Maryland only, and not of any treaty or
statute or commission under the United States.
It is a conclusive test of the question of jurisdiction of this
Court in the present case that if we assume jurisdiction and
proceed to consider the merits of the case, we find it to involve
no question either of validity or construction of treaties or
statutes of the United States.
But the only questions in the case will be found to be what was
the effect of the appointment of George M. Gill in 1837 as
permanent trustee under the insolvent laws of Maryland of 1805? Was
the void and illegal contract with Mina, made in 1816, such a chose
in action as would pass by such insolvent law in 1817? Or did it
first become an assignable claim after it was acknowledged by
Mexico in 1825, and, as a new acquisition of Lyde Goodwin after his
insolvency, pass by his assignment to Oliver. A resolution of these
questions by or through anything to be found on the face of the
treaty or award or any necessary intendment or even possible
inference therefrom is palpably impossible.
The whole case evidently turns on the construction of the laws
of Maryland, and on facts connected with the previous history of
the claim, which are not disputed, and which are incidental to the
treaty and award, but which raise no question either as to their
validity or construction.
This case is therefore
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY, MR. JUSTICE McLEAN, MR. JUSTICE WAYNE,
and MR. JUSTICE WOODBURY dissented.
CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY stated that in his opinion, this Court
Page 52 U. S. 549
had jurisdiction of the question upon which the case was decided
in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, and that their decision was
erroneous, and ought to be reversed.
MR. JUSTICE McLEAN concurred in opinion with the Chief
Justice.
MR. JUSTICE WOODBURY.
I object to the form of the judgment to be entered in this case,
rather than to the results of it to the parties. By dismissing the
writ of error for want of jurisdiction, as is done here, the
judgment in the state court is left in full force, whereas in my
view this Court has jurisdiction, and should affirm the judgment in
the state court, thus leaving it, as the other course does, in full
force, but on different grounds. The consequence to the parties, by
pursuing either course, differs so little that it does not seem
necessary to go into any elaborate exposition of the reasons for
this dissent, and I shall therefore content myself with stating
only the general grounds for it.
All that seems indispensable to give jurisdiction to us in this
class of cases is that the plaintiff in error should have set up in
support of his claim in the state court some right or title under a
treaty or doings by authority from Congress, and that it should be
overruled by the state court.
See the twenty-fifth section
of the act of 1789, 1 Stat. 85, and various decisions under it,
including
Owings v. Northwood's
Lessee, 5 Cranch 348, and
Smith
v. Maryland, 6 Cranch 304;
43 U. S. 2 How.
372. Here the appellant set up in his bill a claim to money under a
treaty with Mexico, and an award under it by commissioners
appointed by an act of Congress, and the state court, in his
opinion, overruled his claim. This, in my view, gives jurisdiction
to us whether the state court decided right or wrong.
See Armstrong v. Athens
County, 16 Pet. 285;
Miller v.
Nichols, 4 Wheat. 311. The very object of the writ
of error is to ascertain whether they did decide right or wrong,
and the jurisdiction to make this revision of their opinion arises
not from its error, but its subject matter, the latter being a
claim set up under some United States authority.
Neilson v.
Lagow, 7 How. 775.
The next and only remaining inquiry for me, supposing that we
have jurisdiction, is whether the state court formed a right
conclusion in overruling the claim set up by the appellant. I think
they did. So far as it rested on authority under the United States,
it is by no means clear that they overruled it improperly. The
claim, so far as regards the enforcement of the treaty with Mexico,
does not seem to have been overruled
Page 52 U. S. 550
in terms by the state court. That court did not decide that the
treaty was corrupt or illegal or in any way a nullity when they
held that the original contract violated the laws of neutrality. So
far, too, as regards the award made by the commissioners, that the
Baltimore Mexican Company and their legal representatives had a
just claim under the treaty for the amount awarded, it was not
overruled at all.
It is not manifest, then, that anything really in the treaty or
in the award set up by Gill the plaintiff was actually decided
against, but only something he claimed to be there; that when the
appellants claimed that he, rather than others, was legally
entitled to one ninth of the sum awarded to the Baltimore Mexican
Company, the state court seems to have overruled that. But in doing
this, they must still have held the treaty itself to be valid, and
the award of the commissioners under it to be valid, or they could
not have decreed this share of the fund to Oliver's executors, as
they appear to have done expressly by the record.
All must concede that the state court speaks in its language
against the Mina "contract" alone as illegal, and in terms does not
impugn either the treaty or the award, and it is merely a matter of
inference or argument that either of these was assailed or any
right properly claimed under them overruled. But it is true the
court held that Oliver's executors, rather than the appellant, were
entitled to the fund furnished by Mexico and long subsequent to
Mina's contract; but in coming to that conclusion, they seem to
have been governed by their views as to their own laws and the
principles of general jurisprudence. The treaty or award contained
nothing as to the point whether Gill or Oliver's executors had the
better right to this share, but only that the Mexican Company and
their legal representatives should receive the fund. This last the
court did not question.
But who was the legal representative of Lyde Goodwin's share?
Who, by insolvencies, sales, or otherwise, had become entitled to
it?
That was the question before the court, and the one they
settled, and in deciding that, they overruled the claim of Gill to
be so, by virtue of any authority in the treaty or award, and in
saying that the fund should go to Oliver's executors, as best
entitled, rather than Gill, they did it under their own state
laws.
It is a general rule for the state tribunals, and not the
commissioners, to settle any conflict between different claimants,
and the usage, when disputes exist, is not for commissioners to go
further than act on the validity of the claim, and decide
Page 52 U. S. 551
besides the superior rights of one of the claimants.
Frevall v.
Bache, 14 Pet. 95;
Comegys v.
Vasse, 1 Pet. 212;
Sheppard v.
Taylor, 5 Pet. 710.
It is true that the opinion given in the state court in support
of its judgment is not entirely free from some grounds for
misconception, yet the judgment itself appears right, and, if
erroneous, resting as it does wholly on the state laws, it is not
competent for us, under this writ of error, to reverse it. We can
reverse it only when wrong, and wrong too for deciding improperly
against some claim under a United States law or treaty.
This I think it has not done. In short, the whole real truth
appears to be that the state court considered the Mina contract in
1817 as a violation of the neutrality act of 1794, and therefore,
when Lyde Goodwin failed in the same year and went into insolvency,
that his share in the contract, being illegal and void, could not
then pass to his creditors, or his trustee in their behalf. But
when the Mexican government, about 1825, adopted the contract and
acknowledged its liability to pay those entitled, the court seems
to have thought that their obligation was virtually a new one. It
occurred after the insolvency, and hence seems supposed not to have
passed to the creditors, any more than did new property
subsequently acquired.
See Insolvent Act of 1805, ch. 110,
§ 2. Consequently the commissioners held that the creditors
and their trustee were not entitled to its benefits. Goodwin could
and did legally assign to Oliver his new rights and new guarantees
for his share from Mexico. These last, though growing out of the
original Mina purchase, were not a violation of the act of 1794 --
were honorable, though not compellable, and were not deemed illegal
either by Mexico or the government of the United States, or the
commissioners, or the state court.
Again, under the state laws doubts seemed to arise, in deciding
on which was the proper claimant, whether the original trustee was
not duly appointed in 1817, and could not legally assign this
claim, if it passed to him then or afterwards, as he attempted to
pass it to Oliver, rather than considering it as belonging to, or
vesting in, Gill the appellant, who was not appointed trustee till
1825, and then in a manner somewhat questionable. 4 Gill &
Johns. 392. That, however, was likewise a point arising exclusively
under the state laws, and which we are not authorized to decide in
this writ of error.
It is for reasons like these that in my opinion the judgment in
the state court, so far as it related to any claim set up and
supposed to be overruled under any authority derived from the
United States, is within our jurisdiction, but that the state
Page 52 U. S. 552
court did not improperly overrule any such claim so set up, and
hence that the judgment in the state court ought to be
affirmed.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Court of Appeals for the Western Shore of Maryland, and
was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here
ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this Court that this cause be and
the same is hereby dismissed for the want of jurisdiction.
