A patent granted for a "new and useful improvement in making
door and other knobs of all kinds of clay used in pottery, and of
porcelain" by having the
"cavity in which the screw or shank is inserted by which they
are fastened largest at the bottom of its depth, in form of a
dovetail, and a screw formed therein by pouring in metal in a fused
state"
was invalid.
The invention claimed in the schedule was manufacturing knobs as
above described, of potter's clay, or any kind of clay used in
pottery, and shaped and finished by moulding, turning, burning, and
glazing, and also of porcelain.
The knob was not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor
the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which
the metallic shank was securely fastened therein. Knobs had also
been used made of clay.
The only thing new was the substitution of a knob made out of
clay in that peculiar form for a knob of metal or wood. This might
have been a better or cheaper article, but is not the subject of a
patent.
The test was that if no more ingenuity and skill was necessary
to construct the new knob than was possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business, the patent was void, and
this was a proper question for the jury.
This was a question involving the validity of a patent right,
under the following circumstances.
The patent and specification were as follows:
"The United States of America, to all to whom these letters
patent shall come."
"Whereas John G. Hotchkiss, New Haven, Conn., John A Davenport,
and John W. Quincy, New York, have alleged that they have invented
a new and useful improvement in making door and other knobs of all
kinds of clay used in pottery, and
Page 52 U. S. 249
of porcelain, which they state has not been known or used before
their application; have made oath that they are citizens of the
United States, that they do verily believe that they are the
original and first inventors or discoverers of the said
improvement, and that the same hath not, to the best of their
knowledge and belief, been previously known or used; have paid into
the Treasury of the United States the sum of thirty dollars, and
presented a petition to the commissioner of Patents signifying a
desire of obtaining an exclusive property in the said improvement,
and praying that a patent may be granted for that purpose: these
are therefore to grant, according to law, to the said John G.
Hotchkiss, John A. Davenport, and John W. Quincy, their heirs,
administrators, or assigns, for the term of fourteen years from 29
July, 1841, the full and exclusive right and liberty of making,
constructing, using, and vending to others to be used, the said
improvement, a description whereof is given in the words of the
said Hotchkiss, Davenport, and Quincy, in the schedule hereunto
annexed, and is made a part of these presents."
"In testimony, whereof, I have caused these letters to be made
patent, and the seal of the Patent Office has been hereunto
affixed. Given under my hand at the City of Washington, this 29
July, A.D. 1841, and of the independence of the United States of
America the sixty-sixth."
"DANIEL WEBSTER,
Secretary of State"
"Countersigned and sealed with the seal of the Patent
Office."
"HENRY L. ELLSWORTH,
Commissioner of Patents"
"The schedule referred to in these letters patent, and making a
part of the same. To all whom it may concern: "
"Be it known that we, John G. Hotchkiss, of the City and County
of New Haven, and State of Connecticut, and John A. Davenport and
John W. Quincy, both of the City, County, and State of New York,
have invented an improved method of making knobs for locks, doors,
cabinet furniture, and for all other purposes for which wood and
metal, or other material knobs, are used. This improvement consists
in making said knobs of potter's clay, such as is used in any
species of pottery; also of porcelain; the operation is the same as
in pottery, by moulding, turning, and burning and glazing; they may
be plain in surface and color, or ornamented to any degree in both;
the modes of fitting them for their application to doors, locks,
furniture, and other uses, will be as various as the uses to
Page 52 U. S. 250
which they may be applied, but chiefly predicated on one
principle, that of having the cavity in which the screw or shank is
inserted, by which they are fastened, largest at the bottom of its
depth, in form of a dovetail, and a screw formed therein by pouring
in metal in a fused state. In the annexed drawing, A represents a
knob with a large screw inserted, for drawers and similar purposes;
B represents a knob with a shank to pass through and receive a nut;
C, the head of the knob calculated to receive a metallic neck; D, a
knob with a shank calculated to receive a nut on the outside or
front. What we claim as our invention, and desire to secure by
letters patent, is the manufacturing of knobs, as stated in the
foregoing specifications, of potter's clay, or any kind of clay
used in pottery, and shaped and finished by moulding, turning,
burning, and glazing, and also of porcelain."
"JOHN G. HOTCHKISS"
"J. A. DAVENPORT"
"JOHN W. QUINCY"
"Witnesses:"
"ALPS. SHERMAN"
"JAMES MONTGOMERY"
In October, 1845, the plaintiffs in error brought an action in
the Circuit Court of the United States for Ohio, against the
defendants, for a violation of the patent right.
The defendants pleaded not guilty, and gave the following
notice:
"The plaintiffs will please take notice, that on the trial of
the above cause the defendants will give in evidence to the jury,
that the said John G. Hotchkiss, John A. Davenport, and John W.
Quincy were not the original and first inventors and discoverers of
making or manufacturing knobs of potter's clay or of porcelain.
They will also prove that the making of knobs from potter's clay,
and also from porcelain and other clays used by potters, was known
and practiced, and such knobs were made, used, and sold, in the
Cities of New York, Albany, Troy, and Brooklyn, in the State of New
York; also in Jersey City, in the State of New Jersey; also in the
City of Philadelphia, State of Pennsylvania; by John Mayer, Thomas
Frere, William Lundy, Jr., and Charles W. Vernerck, residing in the
City of New York; also by John Harrison, residing in Jersey City,
in the State of New Jersey; and by Littlefield, Hattrick &
Shannon, of Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, long before
29 July, in the year 1841, the date of the patent in the
declaration mentioned. They will also prove that similar knobs were
manufactured of potter's clay, and also of porcelain, and were also
used and sold, long prior to the said 29th day of July, 1841, in
the town of Burslem, in Staffordshire,
Page 52 U. S. 251
England; also in the Town of Sandyford, near Tunstall; also in
the Town of Hanley, Staffordshire, England; also at Woodenbose
Village, in the County of Derbyshire, England. And the said
defendants will prove the manufacture and use of said knobs, so
made of clay and porcelain, by Godfrey Webster and John Webster,
who now reside in East Liverpool, Columbiana County, Ohio, and also
by Enoch Bulloch, who now resides in Wellsville, in the same
county; also by Daniel Bennett, who now [resides] in the City of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; all of whom formerly resided in
Staffordshire, England. The defendants will also prove that the
said patentees, John G. Hotchkiss, John A. Davenport, and John W.
Quincy, at the time of making application for the said patent, well
knew that the said knobs so patented had been previously made and
sold in a foreign country, to-wit, in the Kingdom of Great Britain,
and also in Germany, and did not believe themselves to be the first
inventors or discoverers of manufacturing knobs from potter's clay
or porcelain. All of which will be insisted upon in bar of the
action."
"CHAS. FOX,
Attorney for the Defendants"
And in July, 1848, the following additional notice:
"The plaintiffs in this cause will please take notice, that on
the trial of the cause the defendants will give in evidence to the
jury that the said John G. Hotchkiss, John A. Davenport, and John
W. Quincy were not the original and first inventors and discoverers
of making or manufacturing knobs of potter's clay, or of porcelain;
they will also prove that knobs made of potter's clay, and of
porcelain and other clays, had been previously publicly used and
sold in the cities of New York, Albany, Troy, and Brooklyn, in the
State of New York; also in Jersey City, in the State of New Jersey;
also in New Haven and Middletown, in the State of Connecticut, long
before and at the date of the patent under which the plaintiffs
claim; the defendants will likewise prove, on said trial, that John
Mayer, residing in Staten Island; Hoope & Lee, residing in the
City of Brooklyn, in the State of New York; Edward H. Higgins, John
Penfield, John Duntze, residing in Hew Haven, in the State of
Connecticut; Matthew Fifo, William Fifo, Jane Fifo, John C. Smith,
and certain persons doing business under the name of Smith, Fifo
& Co., residing in the City of Philadelphia, in the State of
Pennsylvania, as early as the year 1831, and from that time on, and
until, and at the time of obtaining the patent under which the
plaintiffs claim, and before the alleged discovery and invention
set forth in said patent, made, manufactured, and publicly sold and
used, knobs made of potter's
Page 52 U. S. 252
clay, and of other clays, and of porcelain, in the several
cities and places named."
The following bill of exceptions was taken during the trial:
"The plaintiffs offered in evidence the patent specifications
and drawings, and other evidence, tending to prove the originality,
novelty, and usefulness of the inventions as described in said
specification; and other evidence, tending to show the violation of
said patent by the defendant, and rested. Whereupon the defendants
offered evidence tending to show that the said alleged invention
was not originally invented by anyone of the said patentees; and
that if said invention was original with any of the said patentees,
it was not the joint invention of all of said patentees; and other
evidence, tending to show that the mode of fastening the shank or
collet to the knob, adopted by the plaintiffs, and in said
specification described, had been known and used in Middletown,
Connecticut, prior to the alleged inventions of the plaintiffs, as
a mode of fastening shanks or collets to metallic knobs. And the
evidence being closed, the counsel for the plaintiffs insisted in
the argument, that, although the knob, in the form in which it is
patented, may have been known and used in the United States prior
to their invention and patent; and although the shank and spindle,
by which it is attached, may have been known and used in the United
States prior to said invention and patent, yet if such shank and
spindle had never before been attached to a knob made of potter's
clay or porcelain, and if it required skill and thought and
invention to attach the said knob of clay to the metal shank and
spindle, so that the same would unite firmly, and make a solid and
substantial article of manufacture, and if the said knob of clay or
porcelain so attached were an article better and cheaper than the
knob theretofore manufactured of metal or other materials, that the
patent was valid, and asked the court so to instruct the jury,
which the court refused to do; but, on the contrary thereof,
instructed the jury, that if knobs of the same form, and for the
same purposes with that described by the plaintiffs in their
specifications, made of metal or other material, had been known and
used in the United States prior to the alleged invention and patent
of the plaintiffs, and if the spindle and shank, in the form used
by the plaintiffs, had before that time been publicly known and
used in the United States, and had been theretofore attached to
metallic knobs by means of the dovetail and the infusions of melted
metal, as the same is directed in the specification of the
plaintiffs to be attached to the knob of potter's clay or
porcelain, so that if the knob of clay or porcelain
Page 52 U. S. 253
is the mere substitution of one material for another, and the
spindle and shank be such as were theretofore in common use, and
the mode of connecting them to the knob by dovetail be the same
that was theretofore in use in the United States, the material
being in common use, and no other ingenuity or skill being
necessary to construct the knob than that of an ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business, the patent is void, and the
plaintiffs are not entitled to recover. The counsel for the
defendants asked the court to instruct the jury that if they should
be satisfied that anyone of the patentees was the original inventor
of the article in question, and that the same was new and useful,
yet if they should be satisfied from the evidence that all the
patentees did not participate in the invention, the patent is void,
and the plaintiffs cannot recover. The court gave the above,
modified by the remark, that the patent was
prima facie
evidence that the invention was joint, though the fact might be
disproved on the trial; and the court remarked, there was no
evidence except that of a slight presumption against the joint
invention as proved by the patent; to which refusal of the court to
instruct the jury as asked by the counsel for the plaintiffs, and
to the instructions given, the plaintiffs, by their counsel,
except, and pray the court to sign this their bill of
exceptions."
"JOHN McLEAN [SEAL]"
Page 52 U. S. 264
MR. JUSTICE NELSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The suit was brought against the defendants for the alleged
infringement of a patent for a new and useful improvement in making
door and other knobs of all kinds of clay used in pottery, and of
porcelain.
The improvement consists in making the knobs of clay or
porcelain, and in fitting them for their application to doors,
locks, and furniture, and various other uses to which they may be
adapted, but more especially in this that of having the cavity in
the knob in which the screw or shank is inserted, and by which it
is fastened, largest at the bottom and in the form of dovetail, or
wedge reversed, and a screw formed therein by pouring in metal in a
fused state; and, after referring to drawings of the article thus
made, the patentees conclude as follows:
"What we claim as our invention and desire to secure by letters
patent is the manufacturing of knobs, as stated in the foregoing
specifications, of potter's clay, or any kind of clay used in
pottery, and shaped and finished by moulding, turning, burning, and
glazing, and also of porcelain."
On the trial evidence was given on the part of the plaintiffs
tending to prove the originality and usefulness of the invention,
and also the infringement by the defendants, and on the part of the
defendants, tending to show the want of originality, and that the
mode of fastening the shank to the knob, as claimed by the
plaintiffs, had been known and used before, and had been used and
applied to the fastening of the shanks to metallic knobs.
And upon the evidence being closed, the counsel for the
plaintiffs prayed the court to instruct the jury that, although the
clay knob, in the form in which it was patented, may have been
before known and used, and also the shank and spindle by which it
is attached may have been before known and used, yet if such shank
and spindle had never before been attached in this mode to a knob
of potter's clay, and it required skill and invention to attach the
same to a knob of this description, so that they would be firmly
united, and make a strong and substantial article, and which, when
thus made, would become an article much better and cheaper than the
knobs made of metal or other materials, the patent was valid, and
the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover.
The court refused to give the instruction, and charged the jury
that, if knobs of the same form and for the same purposes as that
claimed by the patentees, made of metal or other material,
Page 52 U. S. 265
had been before known and used, and if the spindle and shank, in
the form used by them, had been before known and used, and had been
attached to the metallic knob by means of a cavity in the form of
dovetail and infusion of melted metal, the same as the mode claimed
by the patentees, in the attachment of the shank and spindle to
their knob, and the knob of clay was simply the substitution of one
material for another, the spindle and shank being the same as
before in common use, and also the mode of connecting them by
dovetail to the knob the same as before in common use, and no more
ingenuity or skill required to construct the knob in this way than
that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the
business, the patent was invalid, and the plaintiffs were not
entitled to a verdict.
This instruction, it is claimed, is erroneous, and one for which
a new trial should be granted.
The instruction assumes, and, as was admitted on the argument,
properly assumes, that knobs of metal, wood &c., connected with
a shank and spindle, in the mode and by the means used by the
patentees in their manufacture, had been before known, and were in
public use at the date of the patent, and hence the only novelty
which could be claimed on their part was the adaptation of this old
contrivance to knobs of potter's clay or porcelain; in other words,
the novelty consisted in the substitution of the clay knob in the
place of one made of metal or wood, as the case might be. And in
order to appreciate still more clearly the extent of the novelty
claimed, it is proper to add, that this knob of potter's clay is
not new, and therefore constitutes no part of the discovery. If it
was, a very different question would arise, as it might very well
be urged, and successfully urged, that a knob of a new composition
of matter, to which this old contrivance had been applied, and
which resulted in a new and useful article, was the proper subject
of a patent.
The novelty would consist in the new composition made
practically useful for the purposes of life, by the means and
contrivances mentioned. It would be a new manufacture, and
nonetheless so, within the meaning of the patent law, because the
means employed to adapt the new composition to a useful purpose was
old, or well known.
But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic
shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob,
nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened
therein. All these were well known, and in common use, and the only
thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material
from that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement.
Page 52 U. S. 266
Now it may very well be, that, by connecting the clay or
porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this well known mode, an
article is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the
metallic or wood knob; but this does not result from any new
mechanical device or contrivance, but from the fact, that the
material of which the knob is composed happens to be better adapted
to the purpose for which it is made. The improvement consists in
the superiority of the material, and which is not new, over that
previously employed in making the knob.
But this of itself can never be the subject of a patent. No one
will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of
materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than
the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that
reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one,
or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to
a patent.
The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or
invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the
selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the
instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.
I remember having tried an action in the circuit in the district
of Connecticut some years since, brought upon a patent for an
improvement in manufacturing buttons. The foundation of the button
was wood, and the improvement consisted in covering the face with
tin, and which was bent over the rim so as to be firmly secured to
the wood. Holes were perforated in the center, by which the button
could be fastened to the garment. It was a cheap and useful article
for common wear, and in a good deal of demand.
On the trial, the defendant produced a button, which had been
taken off a coat on which it had been worn before the Revolution,
made precisely in the same way, except the foundation was bone. The
case was given up on the part of the plaintiff. Now the new article
was better and cheaper than the old one; but I did not then
suppose, nor do I now, that this could make any difference, unless
it was the result of some new contrivance or arrangement in the
manufacture. Certainly it could not, for the reason that the
materials with which it was made were of a superior quality, or
better adapted to the uses to which the article is applied.
It seemed to be supposed, on the argument, that this mode of
fastening the shank to the clay knob produced a new and peculiar
effect upon the article, beyond that produced when applied to the
metallic knob, inasmuch as the fused metal by which the shank was
fastened to the knob prevented the shank
Page 52 U. S. 267
from acting immediately upon the knob, it being enclosed and
firmly held by the metal; that for this reason the clay or
porcelain knob was not so liable to crack or be broken, but was
made firm and strong, and more durable.
This is doubtless true. But the peculiar effect thus referred to
is not distinguishable from that which would exist in the case of
the wood knob, or one of bone or ivory, or of other materials that
might be mentioned.
Now if the foregoing view of the improvement claimed in this
patent be correct, it is quite apparent that there was no error in
the submission of the questions presented at the trial to the jury,
for unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of
fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application
of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an
absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute
essential elements of every invention. In other words, the
improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the
inventor.
We think, therefore, that the judgment is, and must be
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE WOODBURY dissented.
I feel obliged to dissent from my brethren in this case. It is
chiefly, however, in regard to the manner in which some of the
facts were submitted to the jury; but involving as it does an
important principle in the practice under our patent system, it may
be useful to explain the grounds of my dissent.
It is agreed that in July, 1841, John G. Hotchkiss and two
others obtained a patent for what they described as "a new and
useful improvement in making door and other knobs of all kinds of
clay used in pottery, and of porcelain."
The first question of law which arises on the record is whether
the patent covered merely the knob, the bulbous handle, or included
also the shank or spindle, and the mode of fastening it to the
handle.
The charge of the judge at the trial, as drawn up in the
exceptions, seems to have proceeded on the ground that the patent
and invention covered both the knob and mode of fastening. Whether
this was a correct construction does not, however, seem to be very
material, when we consider the instructions given to the jury in
other respects, and that they were equally applicable to the
bulbous handle alone, or the handle with its dovetail hollow, or
the handle and the shank combined.
If both parties acquiesced below in the idea that the patent
Page 52 U. S. 268
was not only for such a knob, but the combination of such a knob
with the shank in the mode described, and the charge was predicated
on that view, it is perhaps not allowable here to take a different
position.
In order to understand clearly what is deemed objectionable in
the course pursued below, it may be noticed that the chief grounds
of objection to the patent thus construed below seem to have been,
that the invention was not original, nor of a character to be
patentable.
The statement in the bill of exceptions is in some respects
obscure. But the substance of the instruction on this, as set out
there, is that if the invention had been made before or was now
confined,
"so that the knob of clay or porcelain is the mere substitution
of one material for another, . . . the material being in common use
and no other ingenuity or skill being necessary to construct the
knob than that of an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business
-- the patent is void,"
&c.
The counsel for the plaintiffs next requested the court to
proceed further, and charge the jury that,
"if the said knob of clay or porcelain so attached were an
article better and cheaper than the knob theretofore manufactured
of metal or other materials, the patent was valid."
But the court did not give any such instruction. In this, I
think, was the chief error. From the record, I feel bound to
believe that evidence was offered on both sides as to the
originality and utility of the knob, and its mode of combination
with the shank. It would seem, then, to have been the duty of the
court below to instruct the jury, that it was their province to
decide not only on which side the evidence preponderated, but if
the invention was cheaper and better than what preceded it, that
protection should be given to it as patentable.
In either view, considered as an invention of the knob alone, or
the knob and handle combined, the chief question is still the same,
whether proper instructions as to its being patentable, and all the
proper instructions which the circumstances required, were
given.
Now on the point as to the invention being patentable, the
direction virtually was to consider it not so, if an ordinary
mechanic could have made or devised it; whereas in my view the true
test of its being patentable was, if the invention was new, and
better and cheaper than what preceded it. This test, adopted by the
circuit court, is one sometimes used to decide whether the
invention for which a patent has been obtained is new enough or
distinguished enough from a former invention to prevent it from
being an infringement, and to justify a new
Page 52 U. S. 269
patent for it, and not, as here, whether it is valuable or
material enough
per se to be protected by any patent.
Whenever the kind of test adopted below is used otherwise than
to see if there has been an infringement or not, it is to ascertain
whether the invention is original or not, that is whether it is a
trifling change and merely colorable or not. Webster on Sub. Mat.
25; Curtis on Patents, §§ 6, 7; 2 Gallis.C.C. 51; 1 Mason
C.C. 182. But it is impossible for an invention to be merely
colorable, if, as claimed here, it was better and cheaper, and
hence this last criterion should, as requested by the plaintiffs,
have been suggested as a guide to the jury.
Then, if they became convinced that the knob in this case, by
its material, or form inside, or combination with the shank, was in
truth better and cheaper than what had preceded it for this
purpose, it would surely be an improvement. It would be neither
frivolous nor useless, and under all the circumstances it is
manifest that the skill necessary to construct it, on which both
the court below and the Court here rely, is an immaterial inquiry,
or it is entirely subordinate to the question whether the invention
was not cheaper and better. Thus, some valuable discoveries are
accidental, rather than the result of much ingenuity, and some
happy ones are made without the exercise of great skill, which are
still in themselves both novel and useful. Such are entitled to
protection by a patent, because they improve or increase the power,
convenience, and wealth of the community.
Chancellor Kent has truly said 2 Kent's Comm. 371,
"The law has no regard to the process of mind by which the
invention was accomplished, whether the discovery be by accident or
by sudden or by long and laborious thought."
See also Earle v. Sawyer, 4 Mason C.C. 1, 6;
Crane
v. Price, Webster's Pat.Cases 411.
In this last case, Chief Justice Tindall goes quite as far as
Chancellor Kent and says:
"In point of law, the labor of thought or experiment and the
expenditure of money are not the essential grounds of consideration
on which the question whether the invention is or is not the
subject matter of a patent ought to depend. For if the invention be
new and useful to the public, it is not material whether it be the
result of long experiments and profound research, or whether by
some sudden and lucky thought or mere accidental discovery."
So in
Earle v. Sawyer, 4 Mason 1, the doctrine settled
is that
"a combination, if simple and obvious, yet if entirely new, is
patentable. And it is no objection to it, that up to a certain
point it makes use of old machinery."
And Justice Story says in so many words:
"It is of no consequence whether
Page 52 U. S. 270
the thing be simple or complicated, whether it be by accident or
by long, laborious thought, or by an instantaneous flash of the
mind, that it was first done. . . . The law looks to the fact, and
not the process by which it is accomplished."
P. 6.
It is thus apparent to my mind that the test adopted below for
the purpose to which it was applied, and which has just been
sanctioned here, has not the countenance of precedent, either
English or American, and at the same time it seems open to great
looseness or uncertainty in practice.
But it has been urged here that this invention was merely
applying clay and porcelain to a new purpose, and that merely a new
purpose, in our patent system, is not entitled to protection. 2
Story 190, 412;
Losh v. Hague, Webster Pat.Cas. 207;
Curtis on Patents 87. The meaning of this rule, however, as
eviscerated from all the cases is that the application of an old
machine or old composition of matter before patented to a new
object, or what is termed a double use, does not entitle one to a
patent connected with this new object, because then there is no new
machinery or new combination of old parts, as in merely applying a
patent grist mill to a new purpose of grinding plaster.
But it is entirely different if you apply an old earth, or old
mechanical power, or old principle in physics, to a new object.
There is then a new form adopted, or a new combination for the
purpose. And though the elementary material be old, or the
elementary principle operating be old, it being difficult to
discover a new substance or new elementary principle, yet there is
a new shape and consistency and use given, or a new
modus
operandi, which, if cheaper and better, benefits the world and
deserves protection and encouragement.
If these are the effects, however small the skill or ingenuity
required to imitate them, they are not excluded from the aid of the
laws by either principles or precedents. They are not mere double
uses of a previous machine or composition, but a double or
additional form or composition of an article for a new purpose.
There is a new manufacture, as here of clay into knobs, or knobs
with a dovetail hollow combined with a shank. The books are full of
such slight changes in structure, composition, or mode of
application, which were novel, and better in their results, and
therefore upheld, and were not and could not be regarded merely as
the application of an old machine to new purposes. Beside the new
material and the new mode of fastening, when the results as here
are considerably improved, they suffice to make the invention
patentable. Webster on the Sub. Matter 29, 30. These are then all
required by the
Page 52 U. S. 271
strictest law,
viz., "diversity of method" and
"diversity of effect." Phillips on Patents 122.
Here, the new material for a knob, instead of former materials,
was more durable than wood, was cheaper than iron, and very
beautiful to the eye, instead of looking coarser. Its structure to
receive a dovetailed shank and secure it by fused metal, rather
than by a hole through and a screw at the end, appears to have been
highly important, and if embraced in the patent, as was probably
considered in the court below, furnished an additional reason for
instructing the jury to consider whether the knob in controversy
was not cheaper and better than what preceded it.
The precedents are quite full on this, and some of them in all
respects nearly in point. Similar to this was the hot blast,
substituted for the cold in making iron, and a patent for it
upheld.
Neilson's Case, Webster P.C. 14. The blast was
still air, but in a different condition, leading to new and useful
results. So the use of the flame of gas to finish cloth rather than
the flame of oil. Webster P.C. 99. So steel plates used instead of
copper in engraving.
Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank, 4
Wash.C.C. 9, 11. That very closely resembles the present case.
So pit coal, substituted for charcoal in making iron, has been
deemed patentable Webster P.C. 14; and anthracite for bituminous
coal, 273. There are also some strong opinions beside these
decisions in favor of a change in metal for an instrument being
alone sufficient for a patent, if more useful or cheaper.
See Webster on Sub. Matter 25, note, and Curtis on
Patents, § 8. Phillips on Patents 134, if there be any
contrivance connected with it. Indeed, why should it not be
sufficient? A new mode of operating or a new composition to produce
better results is the daily ground for a patent. All which the act
of Congress itself requires is that the invention be for "any new
and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter," &c., 5 Stat., p. 119, § 6. Must it
not then be considered such an improvement, if operating with new
materials both cheaper and more durable?
Who cannot realize that, since the improved modes of cutting,
boring, and shaping, the substitution of iron for wood in many
manufactures might not often be a gain in strength and durability,
quite beyond any difference in expense, and be justly patentable?
Who, too, would not deem it material to gain by the use of wood or
leather, or a cheap metal, instead of gold and silver, for some
manufacture or mechanical purpose, when it can be done with
increased benefit as well as cheapness. And why is not he a
benefactor to the community,
Page 52 U. S. 272
and to be encouraged by protection, who invents a use of so
cheap an earth as clay for knobs, or in a new form or combination,
by which the community are largely gainers?
On the whole case, then, it seems to me that justice between
these parties, as well as sound legal principle, requires another
trial on instructions upon some points omitted, and instructions in
some other respects different in law from what were given in this
instance at the first trial.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Ohio, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is
now here ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment of
the said circuit court in this cause be, and the same is hereby
affirmed with costs.
