The United States has a right to bring an action of trespass
quare clausum fregit against a person for cutting and
carrying away trees from the public lands.
This was an action of trespass
quare clausum fregit
brought by the United States for cutting trees upon the public
lands, commenced in the Superior Court of West Florida in 1844, to
which the defendant pleaded not guilty on 26 March, 1845. The cause
remained pending in said court until 15 January 1848, when, in
pursuance of the Act of 22 February, 1847, ch. 17, § 8, it was
transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida and was ordered to stand for trial at the
ensuing March term.
At that term, the defendant appeared, and on leave filed a
Page 52 U. S. 230
demurrer to the declaration, which, after argument, was
overruled and the cause set down for trial on the plea of not
guilty.
The cause having come on, the defendant requested the court to
charge the jury --
1st. That the only remedy for the United States for cutting pine
timber on the public lands was by indictment.
2d. That the United States has no common law remedy for private
wrongs.
3d. That the right of the United States to bring this action
must be derived either from an act of Congress or from the law of
some state in which the contract was made by which it acquired the
property on which this trespass is alleged to have been
committed.
4th. These lands were acquired by treaty from Spain, and that
the United States has no common law remedy for trespass committed
thereon. And that, Congress not having authorized the exercise of
this remedy, the plaintiff ought not to recover any damages.
Which charge the court refused to give, whereupon the defendant
excepted.
The jury found the defendant guilty of the trespass and assessed
the damages of the United States at $362.50, for which amount, and
$122.22 costs, judgment was entered up. A motion in arrest of
judgment was overruled.
The Supreme Court having, at the last term, decided that it had
jurisdiction in cases like this under the Act of 27 February, 1847,
without reference to the amount in controversy, the case now came
before the Court on the points raised by the bill of exceptions.
50 U. S. 9 How.
579.
Page 52 U. S. 231
MR. JUSTICE GRIER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action of trespass
quare clausum fregit
brought by the United States against Loftin Cotton, in which he is
charged with cutting and carrying away a large number of pine and
juniper trees from the lands of plaintiff.
On the trial below, the counsel for defendant requested the
court to instruct the jury 1st, "that the only remedy for the
United States for cutting pine timber on the public lands was by
indictment;" 2d, "that the United States have no common law remedy
for private wrongs." The refusal by the court to give these
instructions is now alleged as error.
Every sovereign state is of necessity a body politic, or
artificial person, and as such capable of making contracts and
holding property, both real and personal. It is true that, in
consequence of the peculiar distribution of the powers of
government between the states and the United States, offenses
against the latter, as a sovereign, are those only which are
defined by statute, while what are called common law offenses are
the subjects of punishment only by the states and territories
within whose jurisdiction they are committed. But the powers of the
United States as a sovereign, dealing with offenders against their
laws, must not be confounded with their rights as a body politic.
It would present a strange anomaly indeed if, having the power to
make contracts and hold property as other persons, natural or
artificial, they were not entitled to the same remedies for their
protection. The restraints of the Constitution upon their sovereign
powers cannot affect their civil rights. Although as a sovereign
the United States may not be sued, yet as a corporation or body
politic they may bring suits to enforce their contracts and protect
their property in the state courts or in their own tribunals
administering the same laws. As an owner of property in almost
every state of the Union, they have the same right to have it
protected by the local laws that other persons have. As was said by
this Court in
Dugan v. United
States, 3 Wheat. 181, "It would be strange to deny
them a right which is secured to
Page 52 U. S. 232
every citizen of the United States." In the
United
States v. Bank of the Metropolis, 15 Pet. 392, it
was decided that when the United States, by its authorized agents,
become a party to negotiable paper, it have all the rights and
incur all the responsibilities of other persons who are parties to
such instruments. In
United States v.
Gear, 3 How. 120, the right of the United States to
maintain an action of trespass for taking ore from their lead mines
was not questioned.
Many trespasses are also public offenses by common law, or are
made so by statute. But the punishment of the public offense is no
bar to the remedy for the private injury. The fact, therefore, that
the defendant in this case might have been punished by indictment
as for a public offense is no defense against the present action.
Whether, if he had actually been indicted and amerced for this
trespass in a criminal prosecution in the name of the United
States, such conviction and fine could be pleaded in bar to a civil
action by the same plaintiff is a question not before us in this
case, and is therefore not decided.
The judgment of the district court is therefore
Affirmed.
Order
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the District Court of the United States for the Northern
District of Florida, and was argued by counsel. On consideration
whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the
judgment of the said district court in this cause be and the same
is hereby affirmed with damages at the rate of six percentum per
annum.
