The National Labor Relations Board has promulgated a rule
providing that, with exceptions for,
inter alia, cases
presenting "extraordinary circumstances," eight, and only eight,
defined employee units are appropriate for collective bargaining in
acute care hospitals. Petitioner, American Hospital Association,
brought this action challenging the rule's facial validity on the
grounds that (1) § 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) requires the Board to make a separate bargaining unit
determination "in each case," and therefore prohibits the Board
from using general rules to define bargaining units; (2) the rule
violates a congressional admonition to the Board to avoid the undue
proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry; and
(3) the rule is arbitrary and capricious. The District Court agreed
with petitioner's second argument and enjoined the rule's
enforcement, but the Court of Appeals found no merit in any of the
three arguments, and reversed.
Held: The Board's rule is not facially invalid. Pp.
499 U. S.
609-620.
(a) The Board's broad rulemaking powers under § 6 of the
NLRA authorize the rule and are not limited by § 9(b)'s
mandate that the Board decide the appropriate bargaining unit "in
each case." Contrary to petitioner's reading, the clear and more
natural meaning of the "in each case" requirement is simply to
indicate that, whenever there is a disagreement between employers
and employees about the appropriateness of a bargaining unit, the
Board shall resolve the dispute. In doing so, the Board is entitled
to rely on rules that it has developed to resolve certain issues of
general applicability.
See, e.g., United States v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 U. S. 192,
351 U. S. 205.
The rule at issue does not differ significantly from the Board's
many prior rules establishing general principles for the
adjudication of bargaining unit disputes. This interpretation is
reinforced by the NLRA's structure and policy. Nor is petitioner
aided by § 9(b)'s sparse legislative history. Even if any
ambiguity could be found in § 9(b) after application of the
traditional tools of statutory construction, this Court would still
defer to the Board's reasonable interpretation of the statutory
text. Pp.
499 U. S.
609-614.
(b) The rule is not rendered invalid by the admonition,
contained in congressional Reports accompanying the 1974 extension
of NLRA coverage
Page 499 U. S. 607
to all acute care hospitals, that the Board should give "[d]ue
consideration . . . to preventing proliferation of bargaining units
in the health care industry." The argument that the admonition --
when coupled with Congress' 1973 rejection of a bill that would
have placed a general limit of five on the number of hospital
bargaining units -- evinces an intent to emphasize the importance
of § 9(b)'s "in each case" requirement is no more persuasive
than petitioner's reliance on § 9(b) itself. Moreover, even if
this Court accepted petitioner's further suggestion that the
admonition is an authoritative statement of what Congress intended
by the 1974 legislation, the admonition must be read to express the
desire that the Board consider the special problems that
proliferation might create in acute care hospitals. An examination
of the rulemaking record reveals that the Board gave extensive
consideration to this very issue. In any event, the admonition is
best understood as a congressional warning to the Board, and
Congress is free to fashion a remedy for noncompliance if it
believes that the Board has not given "due consideration" to the
problem of proliferation in this industry. Pp.
499 U. S.
614-617.
(c) The rule is not, as petitioner contends, arbitrary and
capricious because it ignores critical differences among the many
acute care hospitals in the country. The Board's conclusion that,
absent extraordinary circumstances, such hospitals do not differ in
substantial, significant ways relating to the appropriateness of
units was based on a "reasoned analysis" of an extensive rulemaking
record and on the Board's years of experience in the adjudication
of health care cases. Pp.
499 U. S.
617-619.
899 F.2d 651 (CA7 1990), affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 499 U. S. 608
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
For the first time since the National Labor Relations Board was
established in 1935, the Board has promulgated a substantive rule
defining the employee units appropriate for collective bargaining
in a particular line of commerce. The rule is applicable to acute
care hospitals, and provides, with three exceptions, that eight and
only eight units shall be appropriate in any such hospital. The
three exceptions are for cases that present extraordinary
circumstances, cases in which nonconforming units already exist,
and cases in which labor organizations seek to combine two or more
of the eight specified units. The extraordinary circumstances
exception applies automatically to hospitals in which the eight
unit rule will produce a unit of five or fewer employees.
See 29 CFR § 103.30 (1990).
Petitioner, American Hospital Association, brought this action
challenging the facial validity of the rule on three grounds:
first, petitioner argues that § 9(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act requires the Board to make a separate bargaining unit
determination "in each case," and therefore prohibits the Board
from using general rules to define bargaining units; second,
petitioner contends that the
Page 499 U. S. 609
rule that the Board has formulated violates a congressional
admonition to the Board to avoid the undue proliferation of
bargaining units in the health care industry; and, finally,
petitioner maintains that the rule is arbitrary and capricious.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois agreed with petitioner's second argument and enjoined
enforcement of the rule.
718 F.
Supp. 704 (1989). The Court of Appeals found no merit in any of
the three arguments, and reversed. 899 F.2d 651 (CA7 1990). Because
of the importance of the case, we granted certiorari, 498 U.S. 894
(1990). We now affirm.
I
Petitioner's first argument is a general challenge to the
Board's rulemaking authority in connection with bargaining unit
determinations based on the terms of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151
et seq., as
originally enacted in 1935. In § 1 of the NLRA, Congress made
the legislative finding that the "inequality of bargaining power"
between unorganized employees and corporate employers had adversely
affected commerce, and declared it to be the policy of the United
States to mitigate or eliminate those adverse effects
"by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection."
29 U.S.C. § 151. The central purpose of the Act was to
protect and facilitate employees' opportunity to organize unions to
represent them in collective bargaining negotiations.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Act created the Board and generally
described its powers. §§ 153-155. Section 6 granted the
Board the "authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind
. . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions" of the Act. § 156. This
Page 499 U. S. 610
grant was unquestionably sufficient to authorize the rule at
issue in this case unless limited by some other provision in the
Act.
Petitioner argues that § 9(b) provides such a limitation
because this section requires the Board to determine the
appropriate bargaining unit "in each case." § 159(b). We are
not persuaded. Petitioner would have us put more weight on these
three words than they can reasonably carry.
Section 9(a) of the Act provides that the representative
"designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
purposes" shall be the exclusive bargaining representative for all
the employees in that unit. § 159(a). This section, read in
light of the policy of the Act, implies that the initiative in
selecting an appropriate unit resides with the employees. Moreover,
the language suggests that employees may seek to organize "a unit"
that is "appropriate" -- not necessarily
the single most
appropriate unit.
See, e.g., Trustees of Masonic Hall and
Asylum Fund v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 634 (CA2 1983);
State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 356, 358
(CA7) (en banc),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 832 (1969);
Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. NLRB, 705 F.2d 570, 574 (CA1
1983);
Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers v.
NLRB, 194 U.S.App.D.C. 37, 41, 595 F.2d 844, 848 (1979);
NLRB v. Western Southern Life Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 119, 123
(CA3),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 978 (1968). Thus, one union
might seek to represent all of the employees in a particular plant,
those in a particular craft, or perhaps just a portion thereof.
Given the obvious potential for disagreement concerning the
appropriateness of the unit selected by the union seeking
recognition by the employer -- disagreements that might involve
rival unions claiming jurisdiction over contested segments of the
workforce, as well as disagreements between management and labor --
§ 9(b) authorizes the Board to decide whether the designated
unit is appropriate.
Page 499 U. S. 611
See Hearings on S.1958 before the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor, pt. 1, p. 82 (1935) (hereinafter Hearings), 1
Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act 1935, p.
1458 (hereinafter Legislative History) (testimony of Francis
Biddle, Chairman of National Relations Board); H.R. Rep. No. 972,
74th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 (1935), 2 Legislative History 2976.
Section 9(b) provides:
"The Board shall decide
in each case whether, in order
to insure to employees the full benefit of their right to
self-organization and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to
effectuate the policies of this Act, the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft
unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof."
(Emphasis added.)
Petitioner reads the emphasized phrase as a limitation on the
Board's rulemaking powers. Although the contours of the restriction
that petitioner ascribes to the phrase are murky, petitioner's
reading of the language would prevent the Board from imposing any
industry-wide rule delineating the appropriate bargaining units. We
believe petitioner's reading is inconsistent with the natural
meaning of the language read in the context of the statute as a
whole.
The more natural reading of these three words is simply to
indicate that, whenever there is a disagreement about the
appropriateness of a unit, the Board shall resolve the dispute.
Under this reading, the words "in each case" are synonymous with
"whenever necessary" or "in any case in which there is a dispute."
Congress chose not to enact a general rule that would require plant
unions, craft unions or industry-wide unions for every employer in
every line of commerce, but also chose not to leave the decision up
to employees or employers alone. Instead, the decision "in each
case" in which a dispute arises is to be made by the Board.
In resolving such a dispute, the Board's decision is presumably
to be guided not simply by the basic policy of the Act, but also by
the rules that the Board develops to circumscribe and
Page 499 U. S. 612
to guide its discretion either in the process of case-by-case
adjudication or by the exercise of its rulemaking authority. The
requirement that the Board exercise its discretion in every
disputed case cannot fairly or logically be read to command the
Board to exercise standardless discretion in each case. As a noted
scholar on administrative law has observed:
"[T]he mandate to decide 'in each case' does not prevent the
Board from supplanting the original discretionary chaos with some
degree of order, and the principal instruments for regularizing the
system of deciding 'in each case' are classifications, rules,
principles, and precedents. Sensible men could not refuse to use
such instruments and a sensible Congress would not expect them
to."
K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 145 (3d ed.1972).
This reading of the "in each case" requirement comports with our
past interpretations of similar provisions in other regulatory
statutes.
See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,
351 U. S. 192,
351 U. S. 205
(1956);
FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U. S.
33,
377 U. S. 41-44
(1964);
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.
S. 458,
461 U. S. 467
(1983). These decisions confirm that, even if a statutory scheme
requires individualized determinations, the decisionmaker has the
authority to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues of
general applicability unless Congress clearly expresses an intent
to withhold that authority.
Even petitioner acknowledges that "the Board could adopt rules
establishing general principles to guide the required case-by-case
bargaining unit determinations." Brief for Petitioner 19.
Petitioner further acknowledges that the Board has created many
such rules in the half-century during which it has adjudicated
bargaining unit disputes. Reply Brief for Petitioner 8-11.
Petitioner contends, however, that a rule delineating the
appropriate bargaining unit for an entire industry is qualitatively
different from these prior rules, which, at most, established
rebuttable presumptions that certain units would be considered
appropriate in certain circumstances.
Page 499 U. S. 613
We simply cannot find in the three words "in each case" any
basis for the fine distinction that petitioner would have us draw.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the Board's rule is not an
irrebuttable presumption; instead, it contains an exception for
"extraordinary circumstances." Even if the rule did establish an
irrebuttable presumption, it would not differ significantly from
the prior rules adopted by the Board. As with its prior rules, the
Board must still apply the rule "in each case." For example, the
Board must decide in each case, among a host of other issues,
whether a given facility is properly classified as an acute care
hospital and whether particular employees are properly placed in
particular units.
Our understanding that the ordinary meaning of the statutory
language cannot support petitioner's construction is reinforced by
the structure and the policy of the NLRA. As a matter of statutory
drafting, if Congress had intended to curtail in a particular area
the broad rulemaking authority granted in § 6, we would have
expected it to do so in language expressly describing an exception
from that section or at least referring specifically to the
section. And, in regard to the Act's underlying policy, the goal of
facilitating the organization and recognition of unions is
certainly served by rules that define in advance the portions of
the workforce in which organizing efforts may properly be
conducted.
The sparse legislative history of the provision affords
petitioner no assistance. That history reveals that the phrase was
one of a group of "small amendments" suggested by the Secretary of
Labor "for the sake of clarity."
See Senate Committee on
Education and Labor, Memorandum Comparing S. 2926 and S.1958, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (Comm. Print 1935), 1 Legislative History 1332,
Hearings, pt. 1, 1442, 1445; Hearings on H.R. 6288 before the House
Committee on Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 283-284 (1935), 2
Legislative History 2757-2758. If this amendment had been intended
to place the important limitation on the scope of the Board's
rulemaking powers that petitioner suggests, we would expect
Page 499 U. S. 614
to find some expression of that intent in the legislative
history.
Cf. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.,
446 U. S. 578,
446 U. S.
600-601 (1980) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
The only other relevant legislative history adds nothing to the
meaning conveyed by the text that was enacted. Petitioner relies on
a comment in the House Committee on Labor Report that the matter of
the appropriate unit
"is obviously one for determination in each individual case, and
the only possible workable arrangement is to authorize the
impartial government agency, the Board, to make that
determination."
H.R.Rep. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 (1935), reprinted in
2 Legislative History 2976. This comment, however, simply restates
our reading of the statute as requiring that the Board decide the
appropriate unit in every case in which there is a dispute. The
Report nowhere suggests that the Board cannot adopt generally
applicable rules to guide its "determination in each individual
case."
In sum, we believe that the meaning of § 9(b)'s mandate
that the Board decide the appropriate bargaining unit "in each
case" is clear and contrary to the meaning advanced by petitioner.
Even if we could find any ambiguity in § 9(b) after employing
the traditional tools of statutory construction, we would still
defer to the Board's reasonable interpretation of the statutory
text.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U. S. 837,
467 U. S.
842-843 (1984). We thus conclude that § 9(b) does
not limit the Board's rulemaking authority under § 6.
II
Consideration of petitioner's second argument requires a brief
historical review of the application of federal labor law to acute
care hospitals. Hospitals were "employers" under the terms of the
NLRA as enacted in 1935, but in 1947, Congress excepted
not-for-profit hospitals from the coverage of the Act.
See
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970) (repealed, 1974). In 1960, the Board
decided that proprietary hospitals
Page 499 U. S. 615
should also be excepted,
see Flatbush General Hospital,
126 N.L.R.B. 144, 145, but this position was reversed in 1967,
see Butte Medical Properties, 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 268.
In 1973, Congress addressed the issue and considered bills that
would have extended the Act's coverage to all private health care
institutions, including not-for-profit hospitals. The proposed
legislation was highly controversial, largely because of the
concern that labor unrest in the health care industry might be
especially harmful to the public. Moreover, the fact that so many
specialists are employed in the industry created the potential for
a large number of bargaining units, in each of which separate union
representation might multiply management's burden in negotiation
and might also increase the risk of strikes. Motivated by these
concerns, Senator Taft introduced a bill that would have repealed
the exemption for hospitals, but also would have placed a limit of
five on the number of bargaining units in nonprofit health care
institutions. S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Senator Taft's
bill did not pass.
In the second session of the same Congress, however, the
National Labor Relations Act Amendments of 1974 were enacted.
See 88 Stat. 395. These amendments subjected all acute
care hospitals to the coverage of the Act, but made no change in
the Board's authority to determine the appropriate bargaining unit
in each case.
See ibid. Both the House and the Senate
Committee Reports on the legislation contained this statement:
"
EFFECT ON EXISTING LAW"
"
Bargaining Units"
"Due consideration should be given by the Board to preventing
proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry. In
this connection, the Committee notes with approval the recent Board
decisions in
Four Seasons Nursing Center, 208 NLRB No. 50,
85 LRRM 1093 (1974), and
Woodland Park Hospital, 205 NLRB
No.
Page 499 U. S. 616
144, 84 LRRM 1075 (1973), as well as the trend toward broader
units enunciated in
Extendicare of West Virginia, 203 NLRB
No. 170, 83 LRRM 1242 (1973).*"
"*By our reference to
Extendicare, we do not
necessarily approve all of the holdings of that decision."
See S.Rep. No. 93-766, p. 5 (1974); H.R. Rep. No.
93-1051, pp. 6-7 (1974) U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1974, pp.
3946, 3950.
Petitioner does not -- and obviously could not -- contend that
this statement in the Committee Reports has the force of law, for
the Constitution is quite explicit about the procedure that
Congress must follow in legislating. Nor, in view of the fact that
Congress refused to enact the Taft bill that would have placed a
limit of five on the number of hospital bargaining units, does
petitioner argue that eight units necessarily constitute
proliferation. Rather, petitioner's primary argument is that the
admonition, when coupled with the rejection of a general rule
imposing a five-unit limit, evinces Congress' intent to emphasize
the importance of the "in each case" requirement in §
9(b).
We find this argument no more persuasive than petitioner's
reliance on § 9(b) itself. Assuming that the admonition was
designed to emphasize the requirement that the Board determine the
appropriate bargaining unit in each case, we have already explained
that the Board's rule does not contravene this mandate.
See 499 U. S.
supra.
Petitioner also suggests that the admonition "is an
authoritative statement of what Congress intended when it extended
the Act's coverage to include nonproprietary hospitals." Brief for
Petitioner 30. Even if we accepted this suggestion, we read the
admonition as an expression by the Committees of their desire that
the Board give "due consideration" to the special problems that
"proliferation" might create in acute care hospitals. Examining the
record of the Board's rulemaking proceeding, we find that it gave
extensive
Page 499 U. S. 617
consideration to this very issue.
See App. 20, 78-84,
114, 122, 131, 140, 158-159, 191-194, 246-254.*
In any event, we think that the admonition in the Committee
Reports is best understood as a form of notice to the Board that,
if it did not give appropriate consideration to the problem of
proliferation in this industry, Congress might respond with a
legislative remedy. So read, the remedy for noncompliance with the
admonition is in the hands of the body that issued it.
Cf.
Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts,
492 U. S. 158,
492 U. S. 168
(1989) (legislative history that cannot be tied to the enactment of
specific statutory language ordinarily carries little weight in
judicial interpretation of the statute). If Congress believes that
the Board has not given "due consideration" to the issue, Congress
may fashion an appropriate response.
III
Petitioner's final argument is that the rule is arbitrary and
capricious because
"it ignores critical differences among the more than 4,000
acute-care hospitals in the United States, including differences in
size, location, operations, and work-force organization."
Brief for Petitioner 39. Petitioner supports this argument by
noting that, in at least one earlier unit determination, the Board
had commented that the diverse character of the health care
industry precluded generalizations about the appropriateness of any
particular bargaining unit.
See St. Francis Hospital, 271
N.L.R.B.
Page 499 U. S. 618
948, 953, n. 39 (1984),
remanded sub nom. Electrical Workers
v. NLRB, 259 U.S.App.D.C. 168, 814 F.2d 697 (1987).
The Board responds to this argument by relying on the extensive
record developed during the rulemaking proceedings, as well as its
experience in the adjudication of health care cases during the
13-year period between the enactment of the health care amendments
and its notice of proposed rulemaking. Based on that experience,
the Board formed the "considered judgment" that "acute care
hospitals do not differ in substantial, significant ways relating
to the appropriateness of units." App. 188-189. Moreover, the Board
argues, the exception for "extraordinary circumstances" is adequate
to take care of the unusual case in which a particular application
of the rule might be arbitrary.
We do not believe that the challenged rule is inconsistent with
the Board's earlier comment on diversity in the health care
industry. The comment related to the entire industry, whereas the
rule does not apply to many facilities, such as nursing homes,
blood banks, and outpatient clinics.
See St. Francis, 271
N.L.R.B. at 953, n. 39. Moreover, the Board's earlier
discussion
"anticipate[d] that after records have been developed and a
number of cases decided from these records, certain recurring
factual patterns will emerge and illustrate which units are
typically appropriate."
See ibid.
Given the extensive notice and comment rulemaking conducted by
the Board, its careful analysis of the comments that it received,
and its well-reasoned justification for the new rule, we would not
be troubled even if there were inconsistencies between the current
rule and prior NLRB pronouncements. The statutory authorization
"from time to time to make, amend, and rescind" rules and
regulations expressly contemplates the possibility that the Board
will reshape its policies on the basis of more information and
experience in the administration of the Act.
See 29 U.S.C.
§ 156. The question whether the Board has changed its view
about
Page 499 U. S. 619
certain issues or certain industries does not undermine the
validity of a rule that is based on substantial evidence and
supported by a "reasoned analysis."
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S.
29,
463 U. S. 42,
463 U. S. 57
(1983).
The Board's conclusion that, absent extraordinary circumstances,
"acute care hospitals do not differ in substantial, significant
ways relating to the appropriateness of units," App. 189, was based
on a "reasoned analysis" of an extensive record.
See 463
U.S. at
463 U. S. 57.
The Board explained that diversity among hospitals had not
previously affected the results of bargaining unit determinations,
and that diversification did not make rulemaking inappropriate.
See App. 55-59. The Board justified its selection of the
individual bargaining units by detailing the factors that supported
generalizations as to the appropriateness of those units.
See,
e.g., id. at 93-94, 97, 98, 101, 118-120, 123-129, 133-140.
The fact that petitioner can point to a hypothetical case in which
the rule might lead to an arbitrary result does not render the rule
"arbitrary or capricious." This case is a challenge to the validity
of the entire rule in all its applications. We consider it likely
that, presented with the case of an acute care hospital to which
its application would be arbitrary, the Board would conclude that
"extraordinary circumstances" justified a departure from the rule.
See 29 CFR § 103.30(a), (b) (1990). Even assuming,
however, that the Board might decline to do so, we cannot conclude
that the entire rule is invalid on its face.
See Illinois
Commerce Commission v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 249
U.S.App.D.C. 389, 393-394, 776 F.2d 355, 359360 (1985) (Scalia,
J.);
Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. United States, 682
F.2d 1092, 1105 (CA5 1982);
Cf. FDIC v. Mallen,
486 U. S. 230,
486 U. S. 247
(1988) ("A statute such as this is not to be held unconstitutional
simply because it may be applied in an arbitrary or unfair way in
some hypothetical case not before the Court").
Page 499 U. S. 620
In this opinion, we have deliberately avoided any extended
comment on the wisdom of the rule, the propriety of the specific
unit determinations, or the importance of avoiding work stoppages
in acute care hospitals. We have pretermitted such discussion not
because these matters are unimportant, but because they primarily '
concern the Board's exercise of its authority rather than the
limited scope of our review of the legal arguments presented by
petitioner. Because we find no merit in any of these legal
arguments, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
* We further note that the Board's rule is fully consistent with
the two NLRB case holdings expressly approved by the admonition. In
one of those cases, the Board refused to approve a bargaining unit
composed of only x-ray technicians, and instead ruled that all
technical workers should be grouped together.
See Woodland Park
Hospital, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 888-889 (1973). In the other
case, the Board refused to permit a unit of only two employees.
See Four Seasons Nursing Center of Joliet, 208 N.L.R.B.
403 (1974). The current rule authorizes a single unit for all
technical workers and prohibits units of fewer than five employees.
See 29 CFR § 103.30(a) (1990).