Petitioner Berger, an attorney appointed to represent a capital
defendant in proceedings before this Court, filed a motion
requesting compensation for services rendered in an amount
exceeding the $2,500 maximum permitted under the Criminal Justice
Act (CJA) and adhered to by this Court. She argued that the cap for
capital cases had been lifted by the Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act
of 1988, which permits the Court to award compensation in an amount
"reasonably necessary" to ensure competent representation, 21
U.S.C. § 848(q)(10).
Held:
1. Section 848(q)(10)'s language authorizes federal courts to
compensate attorneys appointed to represent capital defendants
under the CJA in an amount exceeding the $2,500 limit. This
interpretation is supported by the guidelines developed by the
Judicial Conference to assist courts in interpreting and applying
§ 848(q)'s mandate.
2. The amount of compensation that is "reasonably necessary" to
ensure that capital defendants receive competent representation in
proceedings before this Court may not exceed $5,000. The existing
practice has allowed for a level of representation that has been of
high quality, and the administrative ease by which requests for
fees are disposed of under the CJA's bright-line rule has assisted
in conserving the Court's limited resources. However, it is
possible that the $2,500 cap may, at the margins, deter otherwise
willing and qualified attorneys from offering their services to
represent indigent capital defendants. While compensation should be
increased, given the rising costs of practicing law today, it would
not be a wise expenditure of the Court's resources to deal with fee
applications on an individual case-by-case basis. Such an inquiry
is time-consuming, its result imprecise, and it would lead the
Court into an area in which it has little experience.
3. Berger is entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of
$5,000.
Motion granted.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Vivian Berger, appointed to represent a capital
defendant in proceedings before this Court pursuant to this
Page 498 U. S. 234
Court's Rule 39.6, has filed a motion requesting compensation
for such services well in excess of the statutory maximum of $2,500
permitted under present practice by the Criminal Justice Act of
1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2) (CJA). Although it has been the
practice of this Court to adhere to the limits of §
3006A(d)(2), petitioner argues that this statutory cap for capital
cases recently has been lifted by a provision of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Amendments Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4312, 21 U.S.C. § 801
et seq., which permits the Court to award compensation in
an amount "reasonably necessary" to ensure competent
representation. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10).
The relevant statutory language is this:
"Notwithstanding the rates and maximum limits generally
applicable to criminal cases and any other provision of law to the
contrary, the court shall fix the compensation to be paid to
attorneys appointed under this subsection and the fees and expenses
to be paid for investigative, expert, and other reasonably
necessary services authorized under paragraph (9), at such rates or
amounts as the court determines to be reasonably necessary to carry
out the requirements of paragraphs (4) through (9)."
The language of this section, by its terms, authorizes federal
courts to compensate attorneys appointed to represent capital
defendants under the CJA in an amount exceeding the $2,500 limit of
§ 3006A(d)(2) of that Act. Guidelines developed by the
Judicial Conference to assist courts in interpreting and applying
the mandate of § 848(q) support this interpretation. 7
Guidelines for Administration of Criminal Justice Act (Apr.1990).
Section 6.02(A) of the Guidelines, entitled "Inapplicability of CJA
Hourly Rates and Compensation Maximums," provides that counsel
"shall be compensated at a rate and in an amount determined
exclusively by
Page 498 U. S. 235
the presiding judicial officer to be reasonably necessary to
obtain qualified counsel to represent the defendant, without regard
to CJA hourly rates or compensation maximums."
Section 6.02(B) recommends that counsel be compensated
"at a rate and in an amount sufficient to cover appointed
counsel's general office overhead and to ensure adequate
compensation for representation provided."
That section also recommends that courts
"limit the hourly rate for attorney compensation in federal
capital prosecutions and in death penalty federal habeas corpus
proceedings between $75 and $125 per hour for in-court and
out-of-court time."
Ibid.
We adopt this general approach, and therefore turn to the
question of what level of compensation is "reasonably necessary" to
ensure that capital defendants receive competent representation in
proceedings before this Court. Our Rules provide that
"[i]n a case in which certiorari has been granted or
jurisdiction has been noted or postponed, this Court may appoint
counsel to represent a party financially unable to afford an
attorney to the extent authorized by the Criminal Justice Act of
1964, as amended, 18 U.S.C. 3006A."
Rule 39.7. It has been our practice to award appointed counsel
in both capital and noncapital cases the amount of compensation
requested, up to the $2,500 cap of § 3006A(d)(2). We note that
this practice has served both the Court and the parties well. Under
existing practice, the level of representation by appointed counsel
in capital cases has almost invariably been of high quality, and
the administrative ease by which requests for fees are disposed of
under the bright-line rule of § 3006A(d)(2) assists in
conserving the limited resources of the institution.
It could be reasonably argued, on the basis of our practice to
date, that there is no need to award attorney's fees in an amount
greater than the $2,500 cap in order to induce capable counsel to
represent capital defendants in this Court. But we think this
argument is outweighed by the possibility that the cap of $2,500
may, at the margins, deter otherwise
Page 498 U. S. 236
willing and qualified attorneys from offering their services to
represent indigent capital defendants. Given the rising costs of
practicing law today, we believe that appointed counsel in capital
cases should be able to receive compensation in an amount not to
exceed $5,000, twice the limit permitted under our past practice.
We decline to accept petitioner's request that we adopt an
individual case-by-case approach to counsel fees. Such an inquiry
is time-consuming, its result necessarily imprecise, and it would
lead us into an area in which we have little experience. It would
not be a wise expenditure of this Court's limited time and
resources to deal with fee applications such as those of petitioner
on an individualized basis.
We therefore grant the motion of petitioner Vivian Berger for
fees in the amount of $5,000.
It is so ordered.
* Berger was appointed to represent Robyn Leroy Parks in this
Court.
See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.
S. 484 (1990).
