After petitioner employees were discharged from their jobs, they
and petitioner union invoked the grievance procedures in the
collective bargaining agreements between the union and respondent
company. Those agreements provide for voluntary grievance
procedures, including arbitration, and reserve the parties'
respective rights to resort to economic weapons when the procedures
fail to resolve a dispute, but are silent as to judicial remedies.
Upon failure of the grievance procedures, petitioners filed an
action under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
(LMRA), which provides a judicial remedy for the breach of a
collective bargaining agreement. The District Court granted the
company's motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that the agreements brought about an inference
that a strike or other job action was the perceived remedy for
failure of successful resolution of a grievance absent agreed
arbitration, such that recourse to the courts under § 301 was
barred.
Held: Petitioners may seek a judicial remedy under
§ 301. While § 301's strong presumption favoring judicial
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements may be overcome
whenever the parties expressly agree to a different method for
adjustment of their disputes, Congress, in passing the LMRA,
envisaged peaceful methods of dispute resolution. Thus, the statute
does not favor an agreement to resort to economic warfare rather
than to mediation, arbitration, or judicial review. A contract
provision reserving the union's right to resort to economic weapons
cannot be construed as an agreement to divest the courts of
jurisdiction to resolve disputes. Such an agreement would have to
be written much more clearly. Pp.
498 U. S.
172-176.
882 F.2d 1081 (CA6 1989), reversed and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 498 U. S. 169
Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The collective bargaining agreements between the parties provide
for voluntary grievance procedures and reserve the parties'
respective rights to resort to economic weapons when the procedures
fail to resolve a dispute. The collective bargaining agreements are
silent as to judicial remedies. The question presented is whether,
upon failure of the grievance procedures, such contracts should be
construed to bar recourse to the courts under § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29
U.S.C. § 185. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in
the Circuits, [
Footnote 1] 494
U.S. 1026 (1990), and we now conclude that the judicial remedy
under § 301 is available to petitioners.
I
Two almost identical collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)
between respondent Ring Screw Works (company) and the union
[
Footnote 2] prohibit
discharges except for "just cause."
Page 498 U. S. 170
Petitioners Groves and Evans contend that they were discharged
in violation of this provision.
Both CBAs provide that the parties will make "an earnest effort"
to settle every dispute that may arise under the agreement. App.
16. Both CBAs also contain a voluntary multi-step grievance
procedure, but neither includes a requirement that the parties
submit disputes to binding arbitration. [
Footnote 3] The CBAs prohibit strikes or lockouts until
the grievance machinery has been exhausted. The no-strike clause
provides:
"The Union will not cause or permit its members to cause, nor
will any member of the Union take part in any strike, either
sit-down, stay-in or any other kind of strike, or other
interference, or any other stoppage, total or partial, of
production at the Company's plant during the terms of this
agreement
until all negotiations have failed through the
grievance procedure set forth herein. Neither will the Company
engage in any lockout
Page 498 U. S. 171
until the same grievance procedure has been carried out."
Id. at 34 (emphasis added);
see id. at 69.
[
Footnote 4] The dispute in
this case arose out of the company's decision to discharge
petitioners. [
Footnote 5] With
the assistance of the union, petitioners invoked the grievance
procedures, but without success. [
Footnote 6] At the end of the procedures, the company
decided not to call for arbitration, and the union decided not to
exercise its right to strike. [
Footnote 7] Instead, petitioners filed this action
invoking federal jurisdiction under § 301, 29 U.S.C. §
185. Following the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Fortune v.
National Twist Drill & Tool Division, Lear Siegler, Inc.,
684 F.2d 374 (1982), the District Court granted the company's
motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 882
F.2d 1081 (1989). The Sixth Circuit explained:
"We believe that the CBAs in question do bring about an
inference that a strike, or other job action, is the perceived
remedy for failure of successful resolution of a grievance absent
agreed arbitration. Such resolution, by work
stoppage or other
interference' is not a happy solution from a societal standpoint of
an industrial dispute, particularly as it relates to the claim of a
single employee
Page 498 U. S.
172
that he has been wrongfully discharged. Were we deciding the
issue with a clean slate, we might be disposed to adopt the
rationale of Dickeson [v. DAW Forest Products Co.], 827
F.2d 627 [(CA9 1987)]."
882 F.2d at 1086. [
Footnote
8]
II
Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides a federal remedy for breach
of a collective bargaining agreement. [
Footnote 9] We have squarely held that § 301
authorizes "suits by and against individual employees as well as
between unions and employers," including actions against an
employer for wrongful discharge.
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 424 U. S. 554,
424 U. S.
562
Page 498 U. S. 173
(1976). Our opinion in
Hines described the strong
federal policy favoring judicial enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements. We wrote:
"Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act . . .
reflects the interest of Congress in promoting 'a higher degree of
responsibility upon the parties to such agreements. . . .' S.Rep.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (1947). The strong policy
favoring judicial enforcement of collective bargaining contracts
was sufficiently powerful to sustain the jurisdiction of the
district courts over enforcement suits even though the conduct
involved was arguably or would amount to an unfair labor practice
within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S.
195 (1962);
Atkinson v. Sinclair Rfg. Co.,
370 U. S.
238 (1962);
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U. S.
95 (1962);
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U. S.
502 (1962). Section 301 contemplates suits by and
against individual employees as well as between unions and
employers, and, contrary to earlier indications, § 301 suits
encompass those seeking to vindicate 'uniquely personal' rights of
employees such as wages, hours, overtime pay, and wrongful
discharge.
Smith v. Evening News Assn., supra, [371 U.S.]
at 198-200. Petitioners' present suit against the employer was for
wrongful discharge, and is the kind of case Congress provided for
in § 301."
Id., 424 U.S. at
424 U. S.
561-562. Thus, under § 301, as in other areas of
the law, there is a strong presumption that favors access to a
neutral forum for the peaceful resolution of disputes.
Respondent correctly points out, however, that a presumption
favoring access to a judicial forum is overcome whenever the
parties have agreed upon a different method for the adjustment
Page 498 U. S. 174
of their disputes. [
Footnote
10] The company argues that the union has agreed that, if the
voluntary mediation process is unsuccessful, then the exclusive
remedy that remains is either a strike or a lockout, depending on
which party asserts the breach of contract. According to this view,
the dispute is not whether there was "just cause" for the discharge
of Groves and Evans, but whether the union has enough muscle to
compel the company to rehire them even if there was just cause for
their discharge.
In our view, the statute's reference to "the desirable method
for settlement of grievance disputes,"
see n 10,
supra, refers to the
peaceful resolution of disputes over the application or meaning of
the collective bargaining agreement. [
Footnote 11] Of course, the parties may expressly agree
to resort to economic warfare rather than to mediation,
arbitration, or judicial review, but the statute surely does not
favor such an agreement. For in most situations, a strike or a
lockout, though it may be a method of ending the impasse, is not a
method of resolving the merits of the dispute over the application
or meaning of the contract. Rather, it is simply a method by which
one party imposes its will upon its adversary. Such a method is the
antithesis of the peaceful methods of dispute resolution envisaged
by Congress when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act. [
Footnote 12]
Page 498 U. S. 175
In
Associated General Contractors of Illinois v. Illinois
Conference of Teamsters, 486 F.2d 972 (1973), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was confronted with
the same issue presented by this case, albeit with the union,
rather than the employer, claiming that the contractual provision
foreclosed judicial relief. The Seventh Circuit, in response to the
union's argument that the CBA's terms provided that deadlocked
grievances would be resolved by economic sanctions without resort
to the courts, wrote:
"Unquestionably 'the means chosen by the parties for settlement
of their differences under a collective bargaining agreement [must
be] given full play.'
See United Steelworkers of America v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 564,
363 U. S.
566. . . . But it is one thing to hold that an
arbitration clause in a contract agreed to by the parties is
enforceable. It is quite a different matter to construe a contract
provision reserving the Union's right to resort to 'economic
recourse' as an agreement to divest the courts of jurisdiction to
resolve whatever dispute may arise. This we decline to do."
"In our first opinion in this case, we noted that the parties
had not agreed to compulsory arbitration and that the Union had
expressly reserved the right to 'economic recourse' in the event of
a deadlock. We therefore held that the . . . right to strike was
protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. However, we did not, and do
not now, construe the agreement as requiring economic warfare as
the exclusive or even as a desirable method for settling deadlocked
grievances. The plain language of the
Page 498 U. S. 176
statute protects the right to strike, but there is no plain
language in the contract compelling the parties to use force
instead of reason in resolving their differences. In our view, an
agreement to forbid any judicial participation in the resolution of
important disputes would have to be written much more clearly than
this."
Id. at 976 (footnote omitted). This reasoning applies
equally to cases in which the union, an employee, or the employer
is the party invoking judicial relief.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Compare Fortune v. National Twist Drill & Tool Division,
Lear Siegler, Inc., 684 F.2d 374 (CA6 1982),
and Haynes v.
United States Pipe and Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414 (CA5 1966),
with Associated General Contractors of Illinois v. Illinois
Conference of Teamsters, 486 F.2d 972 (CA7 1973);
Dickeson
v. DAW Forest Products Co., 827 F.2d 627 (CA9 1987),
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v.
Hensel Phelps Construction Co., 376 F.2d 731 (CA10),
cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967),
and Breish v. Ring Screw
Works, 397 Mich. 586,
248 N.W.2d
526 (1976).
[
Footnote 2]
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) Local # 771 is one
of the three petitioners, and serves as collective bargaining agent
for the two employee petitioners, Arthur Groves and Bobby J.
Evans.
[
Footnote 3]
Thus, one CBA provides, in part:
"Section 1. Should a difference arise between the Company and
the Union or its members employed by the Company, as to the meaning
and application of the provisions of the agreement, an earnest
effort will be made to settle it as follows:"
"Step 1. Between the employee, his steward and the foreman of
his department. If a satisfactory settlement is not reached,
then"
"Step 2. Between the Shop Committee, with or without the
employee, and the Company management. If a satisfactory settlement
is not reached, then"
"Step 3. The Shop Committee and/or the Company may call the
local Union president and/or the International representative to
arrange a meeting in an attempt to resolve the grievance. If a
satisfactory settlement is not reached, then"
"Step 4. The Shop Committee and the Company may call in an
outside representative to assist in settling the difficulty. This
may include arbitration by mutual agreement in discharge cases
only."
App. 16-17.
[
Footnote 4]
One of the CBAs contained the following provision: "Unresolved
grievance (except arbitration decisions) shall be handled as set
forth in Article XVI, Section 7."
Id. at 53. The
referenced provision is the no-strike clause. There has been no
claim at any stage of this litigation that this provision justifies
a different interpretation of the two otherwise almost identical
CBAs.
[
Footnote 5]
The company terminated petitioner Groves for allegedly
excessive, unexcused absences, and dismissed petitioner Evans for
allegedly falsifying company records.
[
Footnote 6]
There is no dispute that the grievance procedures were properly
followed, and that the union fairly represented petitioners.
[
Footnote 7]
In Evans' case, a strike vote was taken by the unit members at
the plant at which he worked, but the issue did not receive the
required two-thirds majority; in Groves' case, a strike vote was
never taken.
[
Footnote 8]
The Sixth Circuit relied on its reasoning in
Fortune,
as restated in subsequent opinions:
"This circuit has concluded, in essence that, regardless of
whether the contractual dispute resolution mechanism results in a
final and binding' decision, the existence of that mechanism
will foreclose judicial review, provided we find that it was
intended to be exclusive. . . ."
""While we may question the wisdom of foreclosing judicial
review of contracts which fail to provide for either
final' or
`binding' peaceful resolution via arbitration, since the absence of
such a provision cannot be taken to infer that the union (and
thereby its employees) gained anything in its contract negotiations
as a result, it is nevertheless well established in this circuit
that a panel of this court is bound by the prior decisions.of
another panel of the same issues." Moctako v. Acme-Cleveland
Corp., 826 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir.1987) (unpublished per
curiam)."
882 F.2d at 1086. Given the panel's expressed doubt about the
correctness of the Circuit precedent that it was following,
together with the fact that there was a square conflict in the
Circuits, it might have been appropriate for the panel to request a
rehearing en banc.
[
Footnote 9]
Section 301(a) of the LMRA, 61 Stat. 156, provides:
"(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties."
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
[
Footnote 10]
Section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides:
"Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective bargaining agreement."
29 U.S.C. § 173(d).
[
Footnote 11]
As we explained in
Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U. S. 574
(1960):
"The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is
actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the
collective bargaining agreement."
Id. at 581. Here, the parties' dispute centers on the
question whether there was just cause for the discharges.
[
Footnote 12]
"If unions can break agreements with relative impunity, then
such agreements do not tend to stabilize industrial relations. The
execution of an agreement does not by itself promote industrial
peace. The chief advantage which an employer can reasonably expect
from a collective labor agreement is assurance of uninterrupted
operation during the term of the agreement. Without some effective
method of assuring freedom from economic warfare for the term of
the agreement, there is little reason why an employer would desire
to sign such a contract."
S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 16 (1947).