Respondent Burch, while allegedly medicated and disoriented,
signed forms requesting admission to, and treatment at, a Florida
state mental hospital, in apparent compliance with state statutory
requirements for "voluntary" admission to such facilities. After
his release, he brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the
District Court against,
inter alios, petitioners --
physicians, administrators, and staff members at the hospital -- on
the ground that they had deprived him of his liberty without due
process of law. The complaint alleged that they violated state law
by admitting him as a voluntary patient when they knew or should
have known that he was incompetent to give informed consent to his
admission, and that their failure to initiate Florida's involuntary
placement procedure denied him constitutionally guaranteed
procedural safeguards. The court granted petitioners' motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), relying on
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, and
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517,
which held that a deprivation of a constitutionally protected
property interest caused by a state employee's random, unauthorized
conduct does not give rise to a § 1983 procedural due process
claim unless the State fails to provide a postdeprivation remedy.
The court pointed out that Burch did not contend that the State's
statutory procedure for placement was inadequate to ensure due
process, but only that petitioners had failed to follow the
procedure. Since the State could not have anticipated or prevented
the unauthorized deprivation of Burch's liberty, the court
reasoned, there was no feasible predeprivation remedy, and the
State's postdeprivation tort remedies provided Burch with all the
process that was due him. The Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded.
Held: Burch's complaint was sufficient to state a claim
under § 1983 for violation of his procedural due process
rights. While
Parratt and
Hudson apply to
deprivations of liberty, they do not preclude Burch's claim,
because predeprivation procedural safeguards might have been of
value in preventing the alleged deprivation of Burch's liberty
without either valid consent or an involuntary placement hearing.
Such a deprivation is not unpredictable. It is foreseeable that
persons requesting treatment might be incapable of informed
consent, and that state officials with the power to admit patients
might take their apparent willing
Page 494 U. S. 114
ness to be admitted at face value. And the deprivation will
occur, if at all, at a predictable point in the admissions process
-- when a patient is given admission forms to sign. Nor was
predeprivation process impossible here. Florida has a procedure for
involuntary placement, but only the hospital staff is in a position
to take notice of any misuse of the voluntary admission process and
to ensure that the proper procedures are afforded both to those
patients who are unwilling and to those who are unable to give
consent. In addition, petitioners' conduct was not "unauthorized"
within the meaning of
Parratt and
Hudson, since
the State had delegated to them the power and authority to deprive
mental patients of their liberty and the concomitant duty to
initiate the procedural safeguards set up by state law to guard
against unlawful confinement. Pp.
494 U. S.
124-139.
840 F.2d 797 (CA11 1988), affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA
and KENNEDY, JJ., joined,
post, p.
494 U. S.
139.
Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
Respondent Darrell Burch brought this suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 [
Footnote 1]
against the 11 petitioners, who are physicians, administrators, and
staff members at Florida State Hospital (FSH) in Chattahoochee, and
others. Respondent
Page 494 U. S. 115
alleges that petitioners deprived him of his liberty, without
due process of law, by admitting him to FSH as a "voluntary" mental
patient when he was incompetent to give informed consent to his
admission. Burch contends that, in his case, petitioners should
have afforded him procedural safeguards required by the
Constitution before involuntary commitment of a mentally ill
person, and that petitioners' failure to do so violated his due
process rights.
Petitioners argue that Burch's complaint failed to state a claim
under § 1983 because, in their view, it alleged only a random,
unauthorized violation of the Florida statutes governing admission
of mental patients. Their argument rests on
Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U. S. 527
(1981) (overruled in part, not relevant here, by
Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U. S. 327,
474 U. S.
330-331 (1986)), and
Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U. S. 517
(1984), where this Court held that a deprivation of a
constitutionally protected property interest caused by a state
employee's random, unauthorized conduct does not give rise to a
§ 1983 procedural due process claim, unless the State fails to
provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy. The Court in those two
cases reasoned that in a situation where the State cannot predict
and guard in advance against a deprivation, a postdeprivation tort
remedy is all the process the State can be expected to provide, and
is constitutionally sufficient.
In the District Court, petitioners did not file an answer to
Burch's complaint. They moved, instead, for dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court granted
that motion, pointing out that Burch did not contend that Florida's
statutory procedure for mental health placement was inadequate to
ensure due process, but only that petitioners failed to follow the
state procedure. Since the State could not have anticipated or
prevented this unauthorized deprivation of Burch's liberty, the
District Court reasoned, there was no feasible predeprivation
remedy, and, under
Parratt and
Hudson, the
State's postdeprivation tort remedies provided Burch with all the
process that was due him.
Page 494 U. S. 116
On appeal, an Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed the dismissal; it,
too, relied on
Parratt and
Hudson. Burch v. Apalachee
Community Mental Health Services, Inc., 804 F.2d 1549 (1986).
The Court of Appeals, however, upon its own motion, ordered
rehearing en banc. 812 F.2d 1339 (1987). On that rehearing, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court, and remanded the
case. 840 F.2d 797 (1988). Since Burch did not challenge the
constitutional adequacy of Florida's statutory procedure, the court
assumed that that procedure constituted the process he was due.
Id. at 801, n. 8. A plurality concluded that
Parratt did not apply because the State could have
provided predeprivation remedies.
Id. at 801-802. The
State had given petitioners the authority to deprive Burch of his
liberty by letting them determine whether he had given informed
consent to admission. Petitioners, in the plurality's view, were
acting as the State, and, since they were in a position to give
Burch a hearing, and failed to do so, the State itself was in a
position to provide predeprivation process, and failed to do so.
Five judges dissented on the ground that the case was controlled by
Parratt and
Hudson. Id. at 810-814.
This Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict -- so
evident in the divided views of the judges of the Eleventh Circuit
-- that has arisen in the Courts of Appeals over the proper scope
of the
Parratt rule. [
Footnote 2] 489 U.S. 1064 (1989).
Page 494 U. S. 117
Because this case concerns the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal, the question before us is a narrow one. We decide only
whether the
Parratt rule necessarily means that Burch's
complaint fails to allege any deprivation of due process, because
he was constitutionally entitled to nothing more than what he
received -- an opportunity to sue petitioners in tort for his
allegedly unlawful confinement. The broader questions of what
procedural safeguards the Due Process Clause requires in the
context of an admission to a mental hospital, and whether Florida's
statutes meet these constitutional requirements, are not presented
in this case. Burch did not frame his action as a challenge to the
constitutional adequacy of Florida's mental health statutes. Both
before the Eleventh Circuit and in his brief here, he disavowed any
challenge to the statutes themselves, and restricted his claim to
the contention that petitioners' failure to provide
constitutionally adequate safeguards in his case violated his due
process rights. [
Footnote
3]
Page 494 U. S. 118
II
A
For purposes of review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the factual
allegations of Burch's complaint are taken as true. Burch's
complaint, and the medical records and forms attached to it as
exhibits, provide the following factual background:
On December 7, 1981, Burch was found wandering along a Florida
highway, appearing to be hurt and disoriented. He was taken to
Apalachee Community Mental Health Services (ACMHS) in Tallahassee.
[
Footnote 4] ACMHS is a private
mental health care facility designated by the State to receive
patients suffering from mental illness. [
Footnote 5] Its staff in their evaluation forms stated
that, upon his arrival at ACMHS, Burch was hallucinating, confused,
psychotic, and believed he was "in heaven." Exhibit B-1 to
Complaint. His face and chest were bruised and bloodied, suggesting
that he had fallen or had been attacked. Burch was asked to sign
forms giving his consent to admission and treatment. He did so. He
remained at ACMHS for three days, during which time the facility's
staff diagnosed his condition as paranoid schizophrenia and gave
him psychotropic medication. On December 10, the staff found that
Burch was "in need of longer-term stabilization," Exhibit B-2 to
Complaint, and referred him to FSH, a public hospital owned and
operated by the State as a mental health treatment facility.
[
Footnote 6] Later that day,
Burch
Page 494 U. S. 119
signed forms requesting admission and authorizing treatment at
FSH. Exhibits C-1 and C-2 to Complaint. He was then taken to FSH by
a county sheriff.
Upon his arrival at FSH, Burch signed other forms for voluntary
admission and treatment. One form, entitled "Request for Voluntary
Admission," recited that the patient requests admission for
"observation, diagnosis, care and treatment of [my] mental
condition," and that the patient, if admitted, agrees
"to accept such treatment as may be prescribed by members of the
medical and psychiatric staff in accordance with the provisions of
expressed and informed consent."
Exhibit E-l to Complaint. Two of the petitioners, Janet V.
Potter and Marjorie R. Parker, signed this form as witnesses.
Potter is an accredited records technician; Parker's job title does
not appear on the form.
On December 23, Burch signed a form entitled "Authorization for
Treatment." This form stated that he authorized "the professional
staff of [FSH] to administer treatment, except electroconvulsive
treatment"; that he had been informed of "the purpose of treatment;
common side effects thereof; alternative treatment modalities;
approximate length of care," and of his power to revoke consent to
treatment; and that he had read and fully understood the
Authorization. Exhibit E-5 to Complaint. Petitioner Zinermon, a
staff physician at FSH, signed the form as the witness.
On December 10, Doctor Zinermon wrote a "progress note"
indicating that Burch was "refusing to cooperate," would not answer
questions, "appears distressed and confused," and "related that
medication has been helpful." Exhibit F-8 to Complaint. A nursing
assessment form dated December 11 stated that Burch was confused
and unable to state the reason for his hospitalization and still
believed that "[t]his is heaven." Exhibits F-3 and F-4 to
Complaint. Petitioner Zinermon on December 29 made a further report
on Burch's condition, stating that, on admission, Burch had been
"disoriented, semimute,
Page 494 U. S. 120
confused and bizarre in appearance and thought . . . not
cooperative to the initial interview," and "extremely psychotic,
appeared to be paranoid and hallucinating." The doctor's report
also stated that Burch remained disoriented, delusional, and
psychotic. Exhibit F-5 to Complaint.
Burch remained at FSH until May 7, 1982, five months after his
initial admission to ACMHS. During that time, no hearing was held
regarding his hospitalization and treatment.
After his release, Burch complained that he had been admitted
inappropriately to FHS and did not remember signing a voluntary
admission form. His complaint reached the Florida Human Rights
Advocacy Committee of the State's Department of Health and
Rehabilitation Services. [
Footnote
7] The Committee investigated and replied to Burch by letter
dated April 4, 1984. The letter stated that Burch in fact had
signed a voluntary admission form, but that there was
"documentation that you were heavily medicated and disoriented
on admission and . . . you were probably not competent to be
signing legal documents."
Exhibit G to Complaint. The letter also stated that, at a
meeting of the Committee with FSH staff on August 4, 1983,
"hospital administration was made aware that they were very
likely asking medicated clients to make decisions at a time when
they were not mentally competent."
Ibid.
In February, 1985, Burch filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida. He alleged,
among other things, that ACMHS and the 11 individual petitioners,
acting under color of Florida law, and
"by and through the authority of their respective positions as
employees at FSH . . . as part of their regular and official
employment at FSH, took part in admitting Plaintiff to FSH
Page 494 U. S. 121
as a 'voluntary' patient."
App. to Pet. for Cert. 200. [
Footnote 8] Specifically, he alleged:
"Defendants, and each of them, knew or should have known that
Plaintiff was incapable of voluntary, knowing, understanding and
informed consent to admission and treatment at FSH. See Exhibit G
attached hereto and incorporated herein.[ [
Footnote 9]] Nonetheless, Defendants, and each of them,
seized Plaintiff and against Plaintiff's will confined and
imprisoned him and subjected him to involuntary commitment and
treatment for the period from December 10, 1981, to May 7, 1982.
For said period of 149 days, Plaintiff was without the benefit of
counsel and no hearing of any sort was held at which he could have
challenged his involuntary admission and treatment at FSH."
". . . Defendants, and each of them, deprived Plaintiff of his
liberty without due process of law in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendants
acted with willful, wanton and reckless disregard of and
indifference to Plaintiff's Constitutionally guaranteed right to
due process of law."
Id. at 201-202.
Page 494 U. S. 122
B
Burch's complaint thus alleges that he was admitted and detained
at FSH for five months under Florida's statutory provisions for
"voluntary" admission. These provisions are part of a comprehensive
statutory scheme under which a person may be admitted to a mental
hospital in several different ways. [
Footnote 10]
First, Florida provides for short-term emergency admission. If
there is reason to believe that a person is mentally ill and likely
"to injure himself or others" or is in "need of care or treatment
and lacks sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on
his own behalf," he may immediately be detained for up to 48 hours.
Fla.Stat. § 394.463(1)(a) (1981). A mental health
professional, a law enforcement officer, or a judge may effect an
emergency admission. After 48 hours, the patient is to be released
unless he "voluntarily gives express and informed consent to
evaluation or treatment," or a proceeding for court-ordered
evaluation or involuntary placement is initiated. §
394.463(1)(d).
Second, under a court order a person may be detained at a mental
health facility for up to five days for evaluation, if he is likely
"to injure himself or others" or if he is in
"need of care or treatment which, if not provided, may result in
neglect or refusal to care for himself and . . . such neglect or
refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his
wellbeing."
§ 394.463(2)(a). Anyone may petition for a court-ordered
evaluation of a person alleged to meet these criteria. After five
days, the patient is to be released unless he gives "express and
informed consent" to admission and treatment, or unless involuntary
placement proceedings are initiated. § 394.463(2)(e).
Third, a person may be detained as an involuntary patient, if he
meets the same criteria as for evaluation, and if the facility
Page 494 U. S. 123
administrator and two mental health professionals recommend
involuntary placement. §§ 394.467(1) and (2). Before
involuntary placement, the patient has a right to notice, a
judicial hearing, appointed counsel, access to medical records and
personnel, and an independent expert examination. §
394.467(3). If the court determines that the patient meets the
criteria for involuntary placement, it then decides whether the
patient is competent to consent to treatment. If not, the court
appoints a guardian advocate to make treatment decisions. §
394.467(3)(a). After six months, the facility must either release
the patient or seek a court order for continued placement by
stating the reasons therefor, summarizing the patient's treatment
to that point and submitting a plan for future treatment.
§§ 394.467(3) and (4).
Finally, a person may be admitted as a voluntary patient. Mental
hospitals may admit for treatment any adult "making application by
express and informed consent" if he is "found to show evidence of
mental illness and to be suitable for treatment." §
394.465(1)(a). "Express and informed consent" is defined as
"consent voluntarily given in writing after sufficient
explanation and disclosure . . . to enable the person . . . to make
a knowing and willful decision without any element of force, fraud,
deceit, duress, or other form of constraint or coercion."
§ 394.455(22). A voluntary patient may request discharge at
any time. If he does, the facility administrator must either
release him within three days or initiate the involuntary placement
process. § 394.465(2)(a). At the time of his admission and
each six months thereafter, a voluntary patient and his legal
guardian or representatives must be notified in writing of the
right to apply for a discharge. § 394.465(3).
Burch, in apparent compliance with § 394.465(1), was
admitted by signing forms applying for voluntary admission. He
alleges, however, that petitioners violated this statute in
admitting him as a voluntary patient, because they knew or should
have known that he was incapable of making an informed
Page 494 U. S. 124
decision as to his admission. He claims that he was entitled to
receive the procedural safeguards provided by Florida's involuntary
placement procedure, and that petitioners violated his due process
rights by failing to initiate this procedure. The question
presented is whether these allegations suffice to state a claim
under § 1983, in light of
Parratt and
Hudson.
III
A
To understand the background against which this question arises,
we return to the interpretation of § 1983 articulated in
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167
(1961) (overruled in part not relevant here,
Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.
S. 658,
436 U. S.
664-689 (1978)). In
Monroe, this Court rejected
the view that § 1983 applies only to violations of
constitutional rights that are authorized by state law, and does
not reach abuses of state authority that are forbidden by the
State's statutes or Constitution, or are torts under the State's
common law. It explained that § 1983 was intended not only to
"override" discriminatory or otherwise unconstitutional state laws,
and to provide a remedy for violations of civil rights "where state
law was inadequate," but also to provide a federal remedy "where
the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in
practice."
Id. at
365 U. S. 173-174. The Court said:
"It is no answer that the State has a law which, if enforced,
would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before
the federal one is invoked."
Id. at
365 U. S. 183.
Thus, overlapping state remedies are generally irrelevant to the
question of the existence of a cause of action under § 1983. A
plaintiff, for example, may bring a § 1983 action for an
unlawful search and seizure despite the fact that the search and
seizure violated the State's Constitution or statutes, and
Page 494 U. S. 125
despite the fact that there are common law remedies for trespass
and conversion. As was noted in
Monroe, in many cases
there is "no quarrel with the state laws on the books,"
id. at
365 U. S. 176;
instead, the problem is the way those laws are or are not
implemented by state officials.
This general rule applies in a straightforward way to two of the
three kinds of § 1983 claims that may be brought against the
State under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
First, the Clause incorporates many of the specific protections
defined in the Bill of Rights. A plaintiff may bring suit under
§ 1983 for state officials' violation of his rights to,
e.g., freedom of speech or freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Second, the Due Process Clause contains a
substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful
government actions "regardless of the fairness of the procedures
used to implement them."
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.
S. 327,
474 U. S. 331
(1986). As to these two types of claims, the constitutional
violation actionable under § 1983 is complete when the
wrongful action is taken.
Id. at
474 U. S. 338
(STEVENS, J., concurring in judgments). A plaintiff, under
Monroe v. Pape, may invoke § 1983 regardless of any
state-tort remedy that might be available to compensate him for the
deprivation of these rights.
The Due Process Clause also encompasses a third type of
protection, a guarantee of fair procedure. A § 1983 action may
be brought for a violation of procedural due process, but here the
existence of state remedies is relevant in a special sense. In
procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a
constitutionally protected interest in "life, liberty,
Page 494 U. S. 126
or property" is not in itself unconstitutional; what is
unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest
without
due process of law. Parratt, 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 537;
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247,
435 U. S. 259
(1978) ("Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons
not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified
deprivation of life, liberty, or property"). [
Footnote 11] The constitutional violation
actionable under § 1983 is not complete when the deprivation
occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to
provide due process. Therefore, to determine whether a
constitutional violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what
process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally
adequate. This inquiry would examine the procedural safeguards
built into the statutory or administrative procedure of effecting
the deprivation, and any remedies for erroneous deprivations
provided by statute or tort law.
In this case, Burch does not claim that his confinement at FSH
violated any of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
[
Footnote 12] Burch's
complaint could be read to include a substantive due process claim,
but that issue was not raised in the petition for certiorari, and
we express no view on whether the facts Burch alleges could give
rise to such a claim. [
Footnote
13] The
Page 494 U. S. 127
claim at issue falls within the third, or procedural, category
of § 1983 claims based on the Due Process Clause.
B
Due process, as this Court often has said, is a flexible concept
that varies with the particular situation. To determine what
procedural protections the Constitution requires in a particular
case, we weigh several factors:
"First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail."
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319,
424 U. S. 335
(1976).
Applying this test, the Court usually has held that the
Constitution requires some kind of a hearing
before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.
See, e.g.,
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.
S. 532,
470 U. S. 542
(1985) ("
the root requirement' of the Due Process Clause" is
"that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing
before he is deprived of any significant protected
interest"; hearing required before termination of employment
(emphasis in original)); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.
S. 584, 442 U. S.
606-607 (1979) (determination by neutral physician
whether statutory admission standard is met required before
confinement of child in mental hospital); Memphis Light, Gas
& Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1,
436 U. S. 18
(1978) (hearing required before cutting off utility service);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565,
419 U. S. 579
(1975) (at minimum, due process requires "some kind of
notice and . . . some kind of hearing" (emphasis in
original); informal hearing required before suspension of students
from
Page 494 U. S. 128
public school);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.
S. 539,
418 U. S.
557-558 (1974) (hearing required before forfeiture of
prisoner's good-time credits);
Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U. S. 67,
407 U. S. 80-84
(1972) (hearing required before issuance of writ allowing
repossession of property);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.
S. 254,
397 U. S. 264
(1970) (hearing required before termination of welfare
benefits).
In some circumstances, however, the Court has held that a
statutory provision for a postdeprivation hearing, or a common law
tort remedy for erroneous deprivation, satisfies due process.
See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.
S. 422,
455 U. S. 436
(1982) ("
the necessity of quick action by the State or the
impracticality of providing any predeprivation process,'" may mean
that a postdeprivation remedy is constitutionally adequate, quoting
Parratt, 451 U.S. at 451 U. S.
539); Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 436 U. S. 19
("where the potential length or severity of the deprivation does
not indicate a likelihood of serious loss and where the procedures
. . . are sufficiently reliable to minimize the risk of erroneous
determination," a prior hearing may not be required); Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651,
430 U. S. 682
(1977) (hearing not required before corporal punishment of junior
high school students); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U. S. 600,
416 U. S.
619-620 (1971) (hearing not required before issuance of
writ to sequester debtor's property).
This is where the
Parratt rule comes into play.
Parratt and
Hudson represent a special case of
the general
Mathews v. Eldridge analysis, in which
postdeprivation tort remedies are all the process that is due,
simply because they are the only remedies the State could be
expected to provide. In
Parratt, a state prisoner brought
a § 1983 action because prison employees negligently had lost
materials he had ordered by mail. [
Footnote 14] The prisoner did not dispute that he had a
postdeprivation remedy. Under state law, a tort claim procedure
Page 494 U. S. 129
was available by which he could have recovered the value of the
materials. 451 U.S. at
451 U. S.
543-544. This Court ruled that the tort remedy was all
the process the prisoner was due, because any predeprivation
procedural safeguards that the State did provide, or could have
provided, would not address the risk of
this kind of
deprivation. The very nature of a negligent loss of property made
it impossible for the State to predict such deprivations and
provide predeprivation process. The Court explained:
"The justifications which we have found sufficient to uphold
takings of property without any predeprivation process are
applicable to a situation such as the present one involving a
tortious loss of a prisoner's property as a result of a random and
unauthorized act by a state employee. In such a case, the loss is
not a result of some established state procedure and the State
cannot predict precisely when the loss will occur. It is difficult
to conceive of how the State could provide a meaningful hearing
before the deprivation takes place."
Parratt, 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 541.
Given these special circumstances, it was clear that the State, by
making available a tort remedy that could adequately redress the
loss, had given the prisoner the process he was due. Thus,
Parratt is not an exception to the
Mathews
balancing test, but rather an application of that test to the
unusual case in which one of the variables in the
Mathews
equation -- the value of predeprivation safeguards -- is negligible
in preventing the kind of deprivation at issue. Therefore, no
matter how significant the private interest at stake and the risk
of its erroneous deprivation,
see Mathews, 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 335,
the State cannot be required constitutionally to do the impossible
by providing predeprivation process.
In
Hudson, the Court extended this reasoning to an
intentional deprivation of property. A prisoner alleged that,
during a search of his prison cell, a guard deliberately and
maliciously destroyed some of his property, including legal
Page 494 U. S. 130
papers. Again, there was a tort remedy by which the prisoner
could have been compensated. 468 U.S. at
468 U. S.
534-535. In
Hudson, as in
Parratt, the
state official was not acting pursuant to any established state
procedure, but, instead, was apparently pursuing a random,
unauthorized personal vendetta against the prisoner.
Id.
at
468 U. S. 521,
n. 2, 532. The Court pointed out:
"The state can no more anticipate and control in advance the
random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees than
it can anticipate similar negligent conduct."
Id. at
468 U. S. 533.
Of course, the fact that the guard's conduct was intentional meant
that he himself could "foresee" the wrongful deprivation, and could
prevent it simply by refraining from his misconduct. Nonetheless,
the Court found that an individual state employee's ability to
foresee the deprivation is "of no consequence," because the proper
inquiry under
Parratt is "whether the
state is in
a position to provide for predeprivation process,"
Id. at
468 U. S. 534
(emphasis added).
C
Petitioners argue that the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was
proper because, as in
Parratt and
Hudson, the
State could not possibly have provided predeprivation process to
prevent the kind of "random, unauthorized" wrongful deprivation of
liberty Burch alleges, so the postdeprivation remedies provided by
Florida's statutory and common law necessarily are all the process
Burch was due. [
Footnote
15]
Page 494 U. S. 131
Before turning to that issue, however, we must address a
threshold question raised by Burch. He argues that
Parratt
and
Hudson cannot apply to his situation, because those
cases are limited to deprivations of property, not liberty.
[
Footnote 16]
Burch alleges that he was deprived of his liberty interest in
avoiding confinement in a mental hospital without either informed
consent [
Footnote 17] or the
procedural safeguards of the involuntary placement process.
Petitioners do not seriously dispute that there is a substantial
liberty interest in avoiding confinement in a mental hospital.
See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480,
445 U. S.
491-492 (1980) (commitment to mental hospital entails "a
massive curtailment of liberty," and requires due process
protection);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at
442 U. S. 600
(there is a "substantial liberty interest in not being confined
unnecessarily for medical treatment");
Addington v. Texas,
441 U. S. 418,
441 U. S. 425
(1979) ("civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection");
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715,
406 U. S. 738
(1972) (due process requires at least that the nature and duration
of commitment to a mental hospital "bear some reasonable relation
to the purpose" of the commitment). Burch's confinement at FSH for
five months without a hearing or any other procedure to determine
either that he validly had consented to admission, or that he met
the statutory standard for involuntary placement, clearly infringes
on this liberty interest.
Burch argues that postdeprivation tort remedies are never
constitutionally adequate for a deprivation of liberty, as opposed
to property, so the
Parratt rule cannot apply to this
Page 494 U. S. 132
case. We, however, do not find support in precedent for a
categorical distinction between a deprivation of liberty and one of
property.
See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U. S. 538,
405 U. S. 552
(1972) ("the dichotomy between personal liberties and property
rights is a false one");
Wolff, 418 U.S. at
418 U. S.
557-558 (a hearing is generally required before final
deprivation of property interests, and "a person's liberty is
equally protected"). In
Parratt itself, the Court said,
451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 542,
that its analysis was "quite consistent with the approach taken" in
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651
(1977), a liberty interest case.
It is true that
Parratt and
Hudson concerned
deprivations of property. It is also true that Burch's interest in
avoiding six months' confinement is of an order different from
inmate
Parratt's interest in mail-order materials valued
at $23.50. But the reasoning of
Parratt and
Hudson emphasizes the State's inability to provide
predeprivation process because of the random and unpredictable
nature of the deprivation, not the fact that only property losses
were at stake. In situations where the State feasibly can provide a
predeprivation hearing before taking property, it generally must do
so regardless of the adequacy of a postdeprivation tort remedy to
compensate for the taking.
See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at
470 U. S. 542;
Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at
436 U. S. 18;
Fuentes, 407 U.S. at
407 U. S. 80-84;
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at
397 U. S. 264.
Conversely, in situations where a predeprivation hearing is unduly
burdensome in proportion to the liberty interest at stake,
see
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at
430 U. S. 682, or where the State is truly unable to
anticipate and prevent a random deprivation of a liberty interest,
postdeprivation remedies might satisfy due process. Thus, the fact
that a deprivation of liberty is involved in this case does not
automatically preclude application of the
Parratt
rule.
To determine whether, as petitioners contend, the
Parratt rule necessarily precludes § 1983 liability
in this case, we must ask whether predeprivation procedural
safeguards could address the risk of deprivations of the kind Burch
alleges.
Page 494 U. S. 133
To do this, we examine the risk involved. The risk is that some
persons who come into Florida's mental health facilities will
apparently be willing to sign forms authorizing admission and
treatment, but will be incompetent to give the "express and
informed consent" required for voluntary placement under §
394.465(1)(a). Indeed, the very nature of mental illness makes it
foreseeable that a person needing mental health care will be unable
to understand any proffered "explanation and disclosure of the
subject matter" of the forms that person is asked to sign, and will
be unable "to make a knowing and willful decision" whether to
consent to admission. [
Footnote
18] § 394.455(22) (definition of informed consent). A
person who is willing to sign forms but is incapable of making an
informed decision is, by the same token, unlikely to benefit from
the voluntary patient's statutory right to request discharge.
See § 394.465(2)(a). Such a person thus is in danger
of being confined indefinitely without benefit of the procedural
safeguards of the involuntary placement process, a process
specifically designed to protect persons incapable of looking after
their own interests.
See §§ 394.467(2) and (3)
(providing for notice, judicial hearing, counsel, examination by
independent expert, appointment of guardian advocate, etc.).
Persons who are mentally ill and incapable of giving informed
consent to admission would not necessarily meet the statutory
standard for involuntary placement, which requires either that they
are likely to injure themselves or others or that their neglect or
refusal to care for themselves threatens their wellbeing.
See § 394.467(1)(b). The involuntary placement
process serves to guard against the confinement of
Page 494 U. S. 134
a person who, though mentally ill, is harmless and can live
safely outside an institution. Confinement of such a person not
only violates Florida law, but also is unconstitutional.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563,
422 U. S. 575
(1975) (there is no constitutional basis for confining mentally ill
persons involuntarily "if they are dangerous to no one and can live
safely in freedom"). Thus, it is at least possible that, if Burch
had had an involuntary placement hearing, he would not have been
found to meet the statutory standard for involuntary placement, and
would not have been confined at FSH. Moreover, even assuming that
Burch would have met the statutory requirements for involuntary
placement, he still could have been harmed by being deprived of
other protections built into the involuntary placement procedure,
such as the appointment of a guardian advocate to make treatment
decisions, and periodic judicial review of placement. §§
394.467(3) and (4). [
Footnote
19]
The very risks created by the application of the informed
consent requirement to the special context of mental health care
are borne out by the facts alleged in this case. It appears from
the exhibits accompanying Burch's complaint that he was simply
given admission forms to sign by clerical workers, and, after he
signed, was considered a voluntary patient. Burch alleges that
petitioners knew or should have known that he was incapable of
informed consent. This allegation is supported, at least as to
petitioner Zinermon, by the psychiatrist's admission notes,
described above, on Burch's mental state. Thus, the way in which
Burch allegedly was admitted to FSH certainly did not ensure
compliance with the statutory standard for voluntary admission.
Page 494 U. S. 135
We now consider whether predeprivation safeguards would have any
value in guarding against the kind of deprivation Burch allegedly
suffered. Petitioners urge that here, as in
Parratt and
Hudson, such procedures could have no value at all,
because the State cannot prevent its officials from making random
and unauthorized errors in the admission process. We disagree.
The Florida statutes, of course, do not allow incompetent
persons to be admitted as "voluntary" patients. But the statutes do
not direct any member of the facility staff to determine whether a
person is competent to give consent, nor to initiate the
involuntary placement procedure for every incompetent patient. A
patient who is willing to sign forms but incapable of informed
consent certainly cannot be relied on to protest his "voluntary"
admission and demand that the involuntary placement procedure be
followed. The staff are the only persons in a position to take
notice of any misuse of the voluntary admission process, and to
ensure that the proper procedure is followed.
Florida chose to delegate to petitioners a broad power to admit
patients to FSH,
i.e., to effect what, in the absence of
informed consent, is a substantial deprivation of liberty. Because
petitioners had state authority to deprive persons of liberty, the
Constitution imposed on them the State's concomitant duty to see
that no deprivation occur without adequate procedural
protections.
It may be permissible constitutionally for a State to have a
statutory scheme like Florida's, which gives state officials broad
power and little guidance in admitting mental patients. But when
those officials fail to provide constitutionally required
procedural safeguards to a person whom they deprive of liberty, the
state officials cannot then escape liability by invoking
Parratt and
Hudson. It is immaterial whether the
due process violation Burch alleges is best described as arising
from petitioners' failure to comply with state procedures for
admitting involuntary patients, or from the absence of a
Page 494 U. S. 136
specific requirement that petitioners determine whether a
patient is competent to consent to voluntary admission. Burch's
suit is neither an action challenging the facial adequacy of a
State's statutory procedures, nor an action based only on state
officials' random and unauthorized violation of state laws. Burch
is not simply attempting to blame the State for misconduct by its
employees. He seeks to hold state officials accountable for their
abuse of their broadly delegated, uncircumscribed power to effect
the deprivation at issue.
This case, therefore, is not controlled by
Parratt and
Hudson, for three basic reasons:
First, petitioners cannot claim that the deprivation of Burch's
liberty was unpredictable. Under Florida's statutory scheme, only a
person competent to give informed consent may be admitted as a
voluntary patient. There is, however, no specified way of
determining, before a patient is asked to sign admission forms,
whether he is competent. It is hardly unforeseeable that a person
requesting treatment for mental illness might be incapable of
informed consent, and that state officials with the power to admit
patients might take their apparent willingness to be admitted at
face value and not initiate involuntary placement procedures. Any
erroneous deprivation will occur, if at all, at a specific,
predictable point in the admission process -- when a patient is
given admission forms to sign.
This situation differs from the State's predicament in
Parratt. While it could anticipate that prison employees
would occasionally lose property through negligence, it certainly
"cannot predict precisely when the loss will occur." 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 541.
Likewise, in
Hudson, the State might be able to predict
that guards occasionally will harass or persecute prisoners they
dislike, but cannot "know when such deprivations will occur." 468
U.S. at
468 U. S.
533.
Second, we cannot say that predeprivation process was impossible
here. Florida already has an established procedure
Page 494 U. S. 137
for involuntary placement. The problem is only to ensure that
this procedure is afforded to all patients who cannot be admitted
voluntarily, both those who are unwilling and those who are unable
to give consent.
In
Parratt, the very nature of the deprivation made
predeprivation process "impossible." 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 541.
It would do no good for the State to have a rule telling its
employees not to lose mail by mistake, and it
"borders on the absurd to suggest that a State must provide a
hearing to determine whether or not a corrections officer should
engage in negligent conduct."
Daniels, 474 U.S. at
474 U. S. 342,
n. 19 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgments). In
Hudson,
the errant employee himself could anticipate the deprivation since
he intended to effect it, but the State still was not in a position
to provide predeprivation process, since it could not anticipate or
control such random and unauthorized intentional conduct. 468 U.S.
at
468 U. S.
533-534. Again, a rule forbidding a prison guard from
maliciously destroying a prisoner's property would not have done
any good; it would be absurd to suggest that the State hold a
hearing to determine whether a guard should engage in such
conduct.
Here, in contrast, there is nothing absurd in suggesting that,
had the State limited and guided petitioners' power to admit
patients, the deprivation might have been averted. Burch's
complaint alleges that petitioners "knew or should have known" that
he was incompetent, and nonetheless admitted him as a voluntary
patient in "willful, wanton, and reckless disregard" of his
constitutional rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. 201-202. Understood
in context, the allegation means only that petitioners disregarded
their duty to ensure that the proper procedures were followed, not
that they, like the prison guard in
Hudson, were bent upon
effecting the substantive deprivation and would have done so
despite any and all predeprivation safeguards. Moreover, it would
indeed be strange to allow state officials to escape § 1983
liability for failing to provide constitutionally required
procedural
Page 494 U. S. 138
protections, by assuming that those procedures would be futile
because the same state officials would find a way to subvert
them.
Third, petitioners cannot characterize their conduct as
"unauthorized" in the sense the term is used in
Parratt
and
Hudson. The State delegated to them the power and
authority to effect the very deprivation complained of here,
Burch's confinement in a mental hospital, and also delegated to
them the concomitant duty to initiate the procedural safeguards set
up by state law to guard against unlawful confinement. In
Parratt and
Hudson, the state employees had no
similar broad authority to deprive prisoners of their personal
property, and no similar duty to initiate (for persons unable to
protect their own interests) the procedural safeguards required
before deprivations occur. The deprivation here is "unauthorized"
only in the sense that it was not an act sanctioned by state law,
but, instead, was a "depriv[ation] of constitutional rights . . .
by an official's abuse of his position."
Monroe, 366 U.S.
at
366 U. S. 172.
[
Footnote 20]
We conclude that petitioners cannot escape § 1983 liability
by characterizing their conduct as a "random, unauthorized"
violation of Florida law which the State was not in a position to
predict or avert, so that all the process Burch could possibly be
due is a postdeprivation damages remedy. Burch, according to the
allegations of his complaint, was deprived of a substantial liberty
interest without either valid consent or an involuntary placement
hearing, by the very state officials charged with the power to
deprive mental patients of their liberty and the duty to implement
procedural safeguards.
Page 494 U. S. 139
Such a deprivation is foreseeable, due to the nature of mental
illness, and will occur, if at all, at a predictable point in the
admission process. Unlike
Parratt and
Hudson,
this case does not represent the special instance of the
Mathews due process analysis where postdeprivation process
is all that is due because no predeprivation safeguards would be of
use in preventing the kind of deprivation alleged.
We express no view on the ultimate merits of Burch's claim; we
hold only that his complaint was sufficient to state a claim under
§ 1983 for violation of his procedural due process rights.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 1983 reads:
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law. . . ."
[
Footnote 2]
Several Courts of Appeals have found
Parratt
inapplicable where the defendant state officials had the
state-clothed authority to effect a deprivation, and had the power
to provide the plaintiff with a hearing before they did so.
See, e.g., Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839, 843 (CA6
1988);
Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, 839 F.2d 375 382
(CA7 1988);
Fetner v. City of Roanoke, 813 F.2d 1183,
1185-1186 (CA11 1987);
Freeman v. Blair, 793 F.2d 166, 177
(CA8 1986);
Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886, 891-893
(CA2 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986);
Bretz
v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (CA9 1985) (en banc);
Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 774 F.2d 358, 363-365 (CA10
1985).
Other Courts of Appeals have held that
Parratt applies
even to deprivations effected by the very state officials charged
with providing predeprivation process.
See, e.g., Vinson v.
Campbell County Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194, 199 (CA6 1987);
HolIoway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287, 1292-1293 (CA5 1986);
Yates v. Jamison, 782 F.2d 1182, 1185 (CA4 1986);
Wadhams v. Procunier, 772 F.2d 75, 77-78 (CA4 1985);
Toney-El v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1224, 1227-1228 (CA7 1985);
Collins v. King, 743 F.2d 248, 254 (CA5 1984).
In addition, the Courts of Appeals are divided on the question
whether
Parratt applies to deprivations of liberty as well
as deprivations of property rights.
Compare McRorie v.
Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 786 (CA9 1986), and
Conway v.
Village of Mount Kisco, 758 F.2d 46, 48 (CA2 1985),
with
Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578, 584 (CA6 1985) (en banc),
Toney-El v. Franzen, 777 F.2d at 1227,
and Thibodeaux
v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329, 337-339 (CA5 1984).
[
Footnote 3]
See Brief for Respondent 6 ("Burch is not attacking the
facial validity of Florida's voluntary admission procedures any
more than he is attacking the facial validity of Florida's
involuntary admission procedures.").
Inasmuch as Burch does not claim that he was deprived of due
process by an established state procedure, our decision in
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.
S. 422 (1982), is not controlling. In that case, the
plaintiff challenged not a state official's error in implementing
state law, but "the
established state procedure' that destroys
his entitlement without according him proper procedural
safeguards." Id. at 455 U. S.
436.
Burch apparently concedes that, if Florida's statutes were
strictly complied with, no deprivation of liberty without due
process would occur. If only those patients who are competent to
consent to admission are allowed to sign themselves in as
"voluntary" patients, then they would not be deprived of any
liberty interest at all. And if all other patients -- those who are
incompetent and those who are unwilling to consent to admission --
are afforded the protections of Florida's involuntary placement
procedures, they would be deprived of their liberty only after due
process.
[
Footnote 4]
ACHMS was a named defendant in this case, but did not petition
for certiorari.
[
Footnote 5]
Under Fla.Stat. § 394.461(1) (1981), the State Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services may "designate any community
facility as a receiving facility for emergency, short-term
treatment and evaluation."
[
Footnote 6]
See §§ 394.457(8) and .455(8).
[
Footnote 7]
See § 20.19(6)(b)2 (creating statewide Human
Rights Advocacy Committee of eight citizens, charged with
"[r]eceiving, investigating, and resolving reports of abuse or
deprivation of constitutional and human rights" concerning health
care).
[
Footnote 8]
Burch further alleged that petitioners' "respective roles in the
voluntary' admission process are evidenced by
admissions-related documents" attached as exhibits to the
complaint. App. to Pet. for Cert. 200. The documents referred to
are the request-for-admission and authorization-of-treatment forms
described above, and other related forms.
[
Footnote 9]
Exhibit G is the April 4, 1984, letter to Burch from the Human
Rights Advocacy Committee. Two specially concurring judges of the
Eleventh Circuit expressed the view that this exhibit served as an
allegation of a hospital custom and practice of eliciting consent
to admission from incompetent patients. 840 F.2d 797, 808 (1988).
Since the plurality opinion did not rely on this reading of Burch's
complaint, we express no view as to whether the complaint with
attached exhibits sufficed to state a custom and practice
claim.
[
Footnote 10]
We describe the statutory scheme as it existed in 1980-1981,
when Burch was confined at FSH. The statutes have been amended
since then in details not relevant for present purposes.
[
Footnote 11]
The Court in
Carey v. Pinphus explained that a
deprivation of procedural due process is actionable under §
1983 without regard to whether the same deprivation would have
taken place even in the presence of proper procedural safeguards.
Id. at 266 (even if the deprivation was in fact justified,
so the plaintiffs did not suffer any "other actual injury" caused
by the lack of due process, "the fact remains that they were
deprived of their right to procedural due process"). It went on to
say, however, that, in cases where the deprivation would have
occurred anyway, and the lack of due process did not itself cause
any injury (such as emotional distress), the plaintiff may recover
only nominal damages.
Id. at 264, 266.
[
Footnote 12]
One concurring judge of the Eleventh Circuit expressed the view
that Burch's complaint stated a claim for an unreasonable seizure
in violation of Fourth Amendment protections. 840 F.2d at 807-808.
Burch has not pursued this theory, however, and we do not address
it.
[
Footnote 13]
Five specially concurring judges of the Eleventh Circuit found
Burch's complaint sufficient to state a substantive due process
claim.
Id. at 803-804. The remainder of the en banc court
either did not reach the issue,
id. at 807 (Clark, J.,
concurring), or took the view that Burch did not state such a
claim, and that even if he had, the admission and treatment of a
mentally ill person apparently willing to be admitted is not the
sort of inherently wrongful and arbitrary state action that would
constitute a substantive due process violation.
Id. at 809
(Anderson, J., concurring specially);
id. at 815-817
(dissenting opinion for five judges).
[
Footnote 14]
Parratt was decided before this Court ruled, in
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327,
474 U. S. 336
(1986), that a negligent act by a state official does not give rise
to § 1983 liability.
[
Footnote 15]
Burch does not dispute that he had remedies under Florida law
for unlawful confinement. Florida's mental health statutes provide
that a patient confined unlawfully may sue for damages. §
394.459(13) ("Any person who violates or abuses any rights or
privileges of patients" is liable for damages, subject to
good-faith immunity but not immunity for negligence). Also, a
mental patient detained at a mental health facility, or a person
acting on his behalf, may seek a writ of habeas corpus to "question
the cause and legality of such detention and request . . .
release." § 394.459(10)(a). Finally, Florida recognizes the
common law tort of false imprisonment.
Johnson v. Weiner,
155 Fla. 169, 19 So. 2d 699 (1944).
[
Footnote 16]
Some Courts of Appeals have limited the application of
Parratt and
Hudson to deprivations of property.
See n 2,
supra.
[
Footnote 17]
Of course, if Burch had been competent to consent to his
admission and treatment at FSH, there would have been no
deprivation of his liberty at all. The State simply would have been
providing Burch with the care and treatment he requested. Burch
alleges, however, that he was not competent, so his apparent
willingness to sign the admission forms was legally
meaningless.
[
Footnote 18]
The characteristics of mental illness thus create special
problems regarding informed consent. Even if the State usually
might be justified in taking at face value a person's request for
admission to a hospital for medical treatment, it may not be
justified in doing so without further inquiry as to a mentally ill
person's request for admission and treatment at a mental
hospital.
[
Footnote 19]
Hence, Burch might be entitled to actual damages, beyond the
nominal damages awardable for a procedural due process violation
unaccompanied by any actual injury,
see Carey v. Pinphus,
435 U. S. 247,
435 U. S.
266-267 (1978), if he can show either that if the proper
procedure had been followed he would have remained at liberty and
that he suffered harm by being confined, or that even if he would
have been committed anyway under the involuntary placement
procedure, the lack of this procedure harmed him in some way.
[
Footnote 20]
Contrary to the dissent's view of
Parratt and
Hudson, those cases do not stand for the proposition that,
in every case where a deprivation is caused by an "unauthorized . .
. departure from established practices,"
post at
494 U. S. 146,
state officials can escape § 1983 liability simply because the
State provides tort remedies. This reading of
Parratt and
Hudson detaches those cases from their proper role as
special applications of the settled principles expressed in
Monroe and
Mathews.
Justice O'CONNOR, with whom Chief Justice SCALIA and Justice
KENNEDY join, dissenting.
Without doubt, respondent Burch alleges a serious deprivation of
liberty, yet equally clearly he alleges no violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court concludes that an allegation of
state actors' wanton, unauthorized departure from a State's
established policies and procedures, working a deprivation of
liberty, suffices to support a procedural due process claim even
though the State provides adequate postdeprivation remedies for
that deprivation. The Court's opinion unnecessarily transforms well
established procedural due process doctrine, and departs from
controlling precedent. I respectfully dissent.
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527
(1981), and
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.
S. 517 (1984), should govern this case. Only by
disregarding the gist of Burch's complaint -- that state actors'
wanton and unauthorized departure from established practice worked
the deprivation -- and by transforming the allegations into a
challenge to the adequacy of Florida's admissions procedures can
the Court attempt to distinguish this case from
Parratt
and
Hudson.
Page 494 U. S. 140
Burch alleges a deprivation occasioned by petitioners'
contravention of Florida's established procedures. Florida allows
the voluntary admission process to be employed to admit to its
mental hospitals only patients who have made "application by
express and informed consent for admission," and requires that the
elaborate involuntary admission process be used to admit patients
requiring treatment and incapable of giving such consent.
See Fla.Stat. §§ 394.465, 394.467 (1979). Burch
explicitly disavows any challenge to the adequacy of those
established procedural safeguards accompanying Florida's two
avenues of admission to mental hospitals.
See Brief for
Respondent 5 ("[T]he constitutional adequacy of Florida's voluntary
admission and treatment procedures has never been an issue in this
case, since Burch was committed as an involuntary patient for
purposes of this appeal");
id. at 6 ("Burch is not
attacking the facial validity of Florida's voluntary admission
procedures any more than he is attacking the facial validity of
Florida's involuntary admission procedures"). Nor does the
complaint allege any widespread practice of subverting the State's
procedural safeguards. Burch instead claims that, in his case,
petitioners wrongfully employed the voluntary admission process
deliberately or recklessly to deny him the hearing that Florida
requires state actors to provide, through the involuntary admission
process, to one in his position. He claims that petitioners "knew
or should have known" that he was incapable of consent but "with
willful, wanton and reckless disregard of and indifference to" his
constitutional rights "subjected him to involuntary commitment"
without any hearing "at which he could have challenged his
involuntary admission and treatment." App. to Pet. for Cert.
200-202 (complaint);
see Brief for Respondent i, n. 1
("The complaint alleges an intentional, involuntary commitment of
Respondent by Petitioners . . ."). Consistent with his disavowal of
any attack upon the adequacy of the State's established procedures,
Burch alleges that petitioners flagrantly and at least recklessly
contravened
Page 494 U. S. 141
those requirements. In short, Burch has alleged that
petitioners' unauthorized actions worked the deprivation of his
liberty.
Parratt and
Hudson should readily govern
procedural due process claims such as respondent's. Taken together,
the decisions indicate that for deprivations worked by such random
and unauthorized departures from otherwise unimpugned and
established state procedures the State provides the process due by
making available adequate postdeprivation remedies. In
Parratt, the Court addressed a deprivation which "occurred
as a result of the unauthorized failure of agents of the State to
follow established state procedure." 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 543.
The random nature of the state actor's unauthorized departure made
it not "practicable for the State to provide a predeprivation
hearing,"
ibid., and adequate postdeprivation remedies
available through the State's tort system provided the process due
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hudson applied this
reasoning to intentional deprivations by state actors and confirmed
the distinction between deprivation pursuant to "an established
state procedure" and that pursuant to "random and unauthorized
action." 468 U.S. at
468 U. S.
532-533;
cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U. S. 422,
455 U. S.
435-436 (1982). In
Hudson, the Court explained
that the
Parratt doctrine was applicable because "the
state cannot possibly know in advance of a negligent deprivation of
property," and that "[t]he controlling inquiry is solely whether
the state is in a position to provide for predeprivation process."
468 U.S. at
468 U. S.
534.
Application of
Parratt and
Hudson indicates
that respondent has failed to state a claim allowing recovery under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioners' actions were unauthorized: they
are alleged to have wrongly and without license departed from
established state practices.
Cf. Hudson, 468 U.S. at
468 U. S.
532-533;
Parratt, 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 543.
Florida officials in a position to establish safeguards commanded
that the voluntary admission process be employed only for
consenting
Page 494 U. S. 142
patients and that the involuntary hearing procedures be used to
admit unconsenting patients. Yet it is alleged that petitioners
"with willful, wanton and reckless disregard of and indifference
to" Burch's rights contravened both commands. As in
Parratt, the deprivation "occurred as a result of the
unauthorized failure of agents of the State to follow established
state procedure." 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 543.
The wanton or reckless nature of the failure indicates it to be
random. The State could not foresee the particular contravention
and was hardly "in a position to provide for predeprivation
process,"
Hudson, 468 U.S. at
468 U. S. 534,
to ensure that officials bent upon subverting the State's
requirements would in fact follow those procedures. For this
wrongful deprivation resulting from an unauthorized departure from
established state practice, Florida provides adequate
postdeprivation remedies, as two courts below concluded, and which
the Court and respondent do not dispute.
Parratt and
Hudson thus should govern this case and indicate that
respondent has failed to allege a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The allegedly wanton nature of the subversion of the state
procedures underscores why the State cannot in any relevant sense
anticipate and meaningfully guard against the random and
unauthorized actions alleged in this case. The Court suggests that
the State could foresee "that a person requesting treatment for
mental illness might be incapable of informed consent."
Ante at
494 U. S. 136.
While foreseeability of that routine difficulty in evaluating
prospective patients is relevant in considering the general
adequacy of Florida's voluntary admission procedures,
Parratt and
Hudson address whether the State can
foresee, and thus be required to forestall, the deliberate or
reckless departure from established state practice. Florida may be
able to predict that, over time, some state actors will subvert its
clearly implicated requirements. Indeed, that is one reason that
the State must implement an adequate remedial scheme. But Florida
"cannot predict precisely when the loss will occur,"
Parratt,
supra, at
Page 494 U. S. 143
451 U. S. 541,
and the Due Process Clause does not require the State to do more
than establish appropriate remedies for any wrongful departure from
its prescribed practices.
The Court attempts to avert the force of
Parratt and
Hudson by characterizing petitioners' alleged failures as
only the routine but erroneous application of the admissions
process. According to the Court, Burch suffered an "erroneous
deprivation,"
ante at
494 U. S. 136,
and the "risk of deprivations of the kind Burch alleges" is that
incompetent "persons who come into Florida's mental health
facilities will apparently be willing to sign forms,"
ante
at
494 U. S. 133,
prompting officials to "mak[e] random and unauthorized errors in
the admission process."
Ante at
494 U. S. 135.
The Court's characterization omits petitioners' alleged wrongful
state of mind, and thus the nature and source of the wrongful
deprivation.
A claim of negligence will not support a procedural due process
claim,
see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.
S. 327 (1986), and it is an unresolved issue whether an
allegation of gross negligence or recklessness suffices.
Id. at
474 U. S. 334,
n. 3. Respondent, if not the Court, avoids these pitfalls.
According to Burch, petitioners "knew" him to be incompetent or
were presented with such clear evidence of his incompetence that
they should be charged with such knowledge. App. to Pet. for Cert.,
at 201. Petitioners also knew that Florida law required them to
provide an incompetent prospective patient with elaborate
procedural safeguards. Far from alleging inadvertent or negligent
disregard of duty, respondent alleges that petitioners "acted with
willful, wanton and reckless disregard of and indifference" to his
rights by treating him without providing the hearing that Florida
requires.
Id. at 202. That is, petitioners did not bumble
or commit "errors" by taking Burch's "apparent willingness to be
admitted at face value."
Ante at
494 U. S. 135,
494 U. S. 136.
Rather, they deliberately or recklessly subverted his rights and
contravened state requirements.
The unauthorized and wrongful character of the departure from
established state practice makes additional procedures
Page 494 U. S. 144
an "impracticable" means of preventing the deprivation.
"The underlying rationale of
Parratt is that, when
deprivations of property are effected through random and
unauthorized conduct of a state employee, predeprivation procedures
are simply 'impracticable,' since the state cannot know when such
deprivations will occur."
Hudson, 468 U.S. at
468 U. S. 533;
see Parratt, 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 541.
The Court suggests that additional safeguards surrounding the
voluntary admission process would have quite possibly reduced the
risk of deprivation.
Ante at
494 U. S.
135-136. This reasoning conflates the value of
procedures for preventing error in the repeated and usual case
(evaluated according to the test set forth in
Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319
(1976)), with the value of additional predeprivation procedures to
forestall deprivations by state actors bent upon departing from or
indifferent to complying with established practices.
Unsurprisingly, the Court is vague regarding how its proffered
procedures would prevent the deprivation Burch alleges, and why the
safeguards would not form merely one more set of procedural
protections that state employees could willfully, recklessly and
wantonly subvert. Indeed, Burch alleges that, presented with the
clearest evidence of his incompetence, petitioners nonetheless
wantonly or recklessly denied him the protections of the State's
admission procedures and requirements. The state actor so
indifferent to guaranteed protections would be no more prevented
from working the deprivation by additional procedural requirements
than would the mail handler in
Parratt or the prison guard
in
Hudson. In those cases, the State could have, and no
doubt did, provide a range of predeprivation requirements and
safeguards guiding both prison searches and care of packages.
See Parratt, 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 530;
id. at
451 U. S. 543.
("[T]he deprivation occurred as a result of the unauthorized
failure of agents of the State to follow established state
procedure. There is no contention that the procedures themselves
are inadequate . . ."). In all three cases, the unpredictable,
wrongful departure is beyond
Page 494 U. S. 145
the State's reasonable control. Additional safeguards designed
to secure correct results in the usual case do not practicably
forestall state actors who flout the State's command and
established practice.
Even indulging the Court's belief that the proffered safeguards
would provide "some" benefit,
Parratt and
Hudson
extend beyond circumstances in which procedural safeguards would
have had "negligible" value.
Ante at
494 U. S. 129.
In
Parratt and
Hudson, additional measures would
conceivably have had some benefit in preventing the alleged
deprivations. A practice of barring individual or unsupervised
shakedown searches, a procedure of always pairing or monitoring
guards, or a requirement that searches be conducted according to
"an established policy" (the proposed measure rejected as
unnecessary in
Hudson, 468 U.S. at
468 U. S.
528-530) might possibly have helped to prevent the type
of deprivation considered in
Hudson. More sensible
staffing practices, better training, or a more rigorous tracking
procedure may have averted the deprivation at issue in
Parratt. In those cases, like this one, the State knew the
exact context in which the wrongful deprivation would occur. Yet
the possibility of implementing such marginally beneficial
measures, in light of the type of alleged deprivation, did not
alter the analysis. The State's inability to foresee and to
forestall the wrongful departure from established procedures
renders additional predeprivation measures "impracticable," and not
required by the dictates of due process.
See Hudson, 468
U.S. at
468 U. S. 533;
Parratt, 451 U.S. at
451 U. S.
541.
Every command to act imparts the duty to exercise discretion in
accord with the command, and affords the opportunity to abuse that
discretion. The
Mathews test measures whether the State
has sufficiently constrained discretion in the usual case, while
the
Parratt doctrine requires the State to provide a
remedy for any wrongful abuse. The Court suggests that this case
differs from
Parratt and
Hudson because
petitioners possessed a sort of delegated power.
See
ante
Page 494 U. S. 146
at
494 U. S.
135-138. Yet petitioners no more had the delegated power
to depart from the admission procedures and requirements than did
the guard in
Hudson to exceed the limits of his
established search and seizure authority, or the prison official in
Parratt wrongfully to withhold or misdeliver mail.
Petitioners' delegated duty to act in accord with Florida's
admissions procedures is akin to the mailhandler's duty to follow
and implement the procedures surrounding delivery of packages, or
the guard's duty to conduct the search properly. In the appropriate
circumstances and pursuant to established procedures, the guard in
Hudson was charged with seizing property pursuant to a
search. The official in
Parratt no doubt possessed some
power to withhold certain packages from prisoners.
Parratt
and
Hudson distinguish sharply between deprivations caused
by unauthorized acts and those occasioned by established state
procedures.
See Hudson, 468 U.S. at
468 U. S. 532;
Parratt, 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 541;
accord, Logan, 455 U.S. at
455 U. S.
435-436. The delegation argument blurs this line and
ignores the unauthorized nature of petitioners' alleged departure
from established practices.
The suggestion that the State delegated to petitioners
insufficiently trammeled discretion conflicts with positions that
the Court ostensibly embraces. The issue whether petitioners
possessed undue discretion is bound with and more properly analyzed
as an aspect of the adequacy of the State's procedural safeguards,
yet the Court claims Burch did not present this issue, and purports
not to decide it.
See ante at
494 U. S. 117,
and n. 3,
494 U. S.
135-136;
but see infra at
494 U. S.
150-151. By suggesting that petitioners' acts are
attributable to the State,
cf. ante at
494 U. S.
135-136, the Court either abandons its position that
"Burch does not claim that he was deprived of due process by an
established state procedure,"
ante at
494 U. S. 117,
n. 3, or abandons
Parratt and
Hudson's
distinction between established procedures and unauthorized
departures from those practices. Petitioners were not charged with
formulating policy, and the complaint does not allege widespread
and
Page 494 U. S. 147
common departure from required procedures. Neither do the
Court's passing reflections that a hearing is constitutionally
required in the usual case of treatment of an incompetent patient
advance the argument.
Ante at
494 U. S. 117,
494 U. S. 135.
That claim either states the conclusion that the State's combined
admission procedures are generally inadequate, or repudiates
Parratt and
Hudson's focus upon random and
unauthorized acts and upon the State's ability to formulate
safeguards. To the extent that a liberty interest exists in the
application of the involuntary admission procedures whenever
appropriate, it is the random and unauthorized action of state
actors that effected the deprivation, one for which Florida also
provides adequate postdeprivation process.
See Fla.Stat.
§ 768.28(1) (1979) (partial waiver of immunity, allowing tort
suits); § 394.459(13) (1979) (providing action against "[a]ny
person who violates or abuses any rights or privileges of patients"
provided by the Florida Mental Health Act).
The Court's delegation of authority argument, like its claim
that "we cannot say that predeprivation process was impossible
here,"
ante at
494 U. S. 135,
revives an argument explicitly rejected in
Hudson. In
Hudson, the Court rebuffed the argument that
"because an agent of the state who intends to deprive a person
of his property can provide predeprivation process, then, as a
matter of due process, he must do so."
468 U.S. at
468 U. S. 534
(internal quotation omitted). By failing to consider whether "the
state cannot possibly know in advance" of the wrongful
contravention and by abandoning "[t]he controlling inquiry . . .
whether the state is in a position to provide for predeprivation
process," the Court embraces the "fundamental misunderstanding of
Parratt."
Ibid. Each of the Court's distinctions
abandons an essential element of the
Parratt and
Hudson doctrines, and together they disavow those cases'
central insights and holdings.
The Court's reliance upon the State's inappropriate delegation
of duty also creates enormous line-drawing problems. Today's
decision applies to deprivations occasioned by state
Page 494 U. S. 148
actors given "little guidance" and "broadly delegated,
uncircumscribed power" to initiate required procedures.
Ante at
494 U. S. 135,
494 U. S. 136.
At some undefined point, the breadth of the delegation of power
requires officials to channel the exercise of that power or become
liable for its misapplications. When guidance is provided and the
power to effect the deprivation circumscribed, no liability arises.
And routine exercise of the power must be sufficiently fraught with
the danger of "erroneous deprivation."
Ante at
494 U. S. 136.
In the absence of this broadly delegated power that carries with it
pervasive risk of wrongful deprivation,
Parratt and
Hudson still govern. In essence, the Court's rationale
applies when state officials are loosely charged with fashioning
effective procedures or ensuring that required procedures are not
routinely evaded. In a roundabout way, this rationale states the
unexceptional conclusion that liability exists when officials'
actions amount to the established state practice, a rationale
unasserted in this case and, otherwise, appropriately analyzed
under the
Mathews test.
The Court's decision also undermines two of this Court's
established and delicately related doctrines, one articulated in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319
(1976), and the other articulated in
Parratt. As the Court
acknowledges, the procedural component of the Due Process Clause
requires the State to formulate procedural safeguards and adequate
postdeprivation process sufficient to satisfy the dictates of
fundamental fairness and the Due Process Clause.
Ante at
494 U. S. 127.
Until today, the reasoning embodied in
Mathews largely
determined that standard and the measures a State must establish to
prevent a deprivation of a protected interest from amounting to a
constitutional violation.
Mathews employed the now
familiar three-part test (considering the nature of the private
interest, efficacy of additional procedures, and governmental
interests) to determine what predeprivation procedural safeguards
were required of the State. 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 335.
That test reflects a carefully crafted accommodation
Page 494 U. S. 149
of conflicting interests, weighed and evaluated in light of what
fundamental fairness requires.
Parratt drew upon concerns
similar to those embodied in the
Mathews test. For
deprivations occasioned by wrongful departures from unchallenged
and established state practices,
Parratt concluded that
adequate postdeprivation process meets the requirements of the Due
Process Clause because additional predeprivation procedural
safeguards would be "impracticable" to forestall these
deprivations. 451 U.S. at
451 U. S. 541.
The
Mathews and
Paratt doctrines work in tandem.
State officials able to formulate safeguards must discharge the
duty to establish sufficient predeprivation procedures, as well as
adequate postdeprivation remedies to provide process in the event
of wrongful departures from established state practice. The
doctrines together define the procedural measures that fundamental
fairness and the Constitution demand of the State.
The Court today discovers an additional realm of required
procedural safeguards. Now, all procedure is divided into three
parts. In place of the border clearly dividing the duties required
by
Mathews from those required by
Parratt, the
Court marks out a vast
terra incognita of unknowable
duties and expansive liability of constitutional dimension. The
Mathews test, we are told, does not determine the State's
obligation to provide predeprivation procedural safeguards. Rather,
to avoid the constitutional violation, a State must have fully
circumscribed and guided officials' exercise of power and provided
additional safeguards, without regard to their efficacy or the
nature of the governmental interests. Even if the validity of the
State's procedures is not directly challenged, the burden is
apparently on certain state actors to demonstrate that the State
sufficiently constrained their powers. Despite the many cases of
this Court applying and affirming
Mathews, it is unclear
what now remains of the test. And the
Parratt doctrine no
longer reflects a general interpretation of the Due Process Clause
or the complement of the principles contained in
Mathews.
It is, instead, displaced
Page 494 U. S. 150
when the State delegates certain types of duties in certain
inappropriate ways. This resulting "no-man's land" has no apparent
boundaries. We are provided almost no guidance regarding what the
Due Process Clause requires, how that requirement is to be deduced,
or why fundamental fairness imposes upon the States the obligation
to provide additional safeguards of nearly any conceivable value.
We are left only with the implication that where doubt exists,
liability of constitutional dimension will be found. Without so
much as suggesting that our prior cases have warned against such a
result, the Court has gone some measure to "
make of the
Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon
whatever systems may already be administered by the States.'"
Parratt, 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 544
(quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693,
424 U. S. 701
(1976)).
The Court's departure from the
Mathews and
Parratt doctrines is particularly unjustified because it
is unnecessary for resolution of this case. While I believe that
Burch's complaint and subsequent argument do not properly place
before the Court a traditional challenge to Florida's voluntary
admission procedures, the Court, without so declaring, has decided
otherwise. Yet, rather than acknowledge this course, the Court
crafts its doctrinal innovations.
Understandably reluctant to grapple with Burch's framing of his
complaint, the Court less understandably avoids that difficulty of
pleading by creating the innovation which so disrupts established
law. The Court discovers that
"Burch's suit is neither an action challenging the facial
adequacy of a State's statutory procedures nor an action based only
on state officials' random and unauthorized violation of state
laws."
Ante at
494 U. S. 136.
That is, Burch's suit is not one that established law supports, and
thus requires today's unwarranted departure.
The Court believes that Florida's statutory scheme contains a
particular flaw.
Ante at
494 U. S.
135-137. That statutory omission involves the
determination of competence in the
Page 494 U. S. 151
course of the voluntary admission process, and the Court signals
that it believes that these suggested additional safeguards would
not be greatly burdensome.
Ibid. The Court further
believes that Burch's complaint and argument properly raise these
issues, and that adopting the additional safeguards would provide
relevant benefit to one in Burch's position. The traditional
Mathews test was designed and, until today, has been
employed, to evaluate and accommodate these concerns.
See
Washington v. Harper, post, at
494 U. S.
228-235 (applying
Mathews test, rather than
approach suggested today, to evaluate the adequacy of a State's
procedures governing administration of antipsychotic drugs to
prisoners). That test holds Florida to the appropriate standard
and, given the Court's beliefs set out above, would perhaps have
yielded a result favoring respondent. While this approach, if made
explicit, would have required a strained reading of respondent's
complaint and arguments, that course would have been far preferable
to the strained reading of controlling procedural due process law
that the Court today adopts. Ordinarily, a complaint must state a
legal cause of action, but here it may be said that the Court has
stated a novel cause of action to support a complaint.
I respectfully dissent.