DOE v. SMITH, 486 U.S. 1308 (1988)
Decided:
June 15, 1988
Syllabus
U.S. Supreme Court
DOE v. SMITH , 486 U.S. 1308 (1988)486 U.S. 1308
John DOE
v.
Jane SMITH.
No. A-954.
June 15, 1988.
Justice STEVENS, Circuit Justice.
Applicant has filed an application with me as Circuit Justice to enter an order enjoining Jane Smith from obtaining an abortion of their unborn child. For the reasons hereinafter stated, the application is denied.
Applicant initiated proceedings seeking this relief from the Elkhart, Indiana, Superior Court on May 31, 1988. After granting a temporary restraining order without notice, the Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing, made detailed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and filed a written opinion. The findings recite, in part:
"5) That the unrebutted testimony
from both the parties is that the Plaintiff is the natural father
of the unborn child of the mother.
"6) That the Plaintiff and the
Defendant have never been married and do not contemplate
marriage.
"7) That the child was conceived
in April of 1988 during a liaison between the mother and the
father, which commenced in February or March and terminated shortly
after conception.
"8) That at the time conception
occurred, the father was separated from his wife of six months, and
upon leaving the Defendant he became reunited with his first
wife.
"9) That the father has two
children, one his biological issue, with his first wife.
* * * * *
"12) That the father has been
sporadically employed at low- paying jobs for the last eighteen
months.
"13) That the mother has testified
she is physically, emotionally and economically unwilling to bear
the child.
"14) That the parties mutually
agree that there is no foreseeable possibility of their reuniting
in any way."
In his opinion, the trial judge stated, in part:
"While the Court has carefully
weighed the testimony, it is apparent that although the Plaintiff
has expressed a legitimate and apparently sincere interest in the
unborn fetus, his interest would not be sufficient to outweigh the
Constitutionally protected right of the Defendant to abort her
child. It would appear from the Danforth decision that in order to
require the mother to carry a child to term against her wishes, the
father must demonstrate clear and compelling reasons justifying
such actions. In this case, the father has failed to do so.
Reviewing the undisputed facts presented in this Cause, the Court
is unable to find that the interests of the Plaintiff outweigh the
interest of the Defendant. It is significant that, among other
facts, the evidence discloses the parties are not married, that
there is no suggestion they will ever reunite, that the Plaintiff
is able to father other children and, in fact, has other children,
and that the Plaintiff has showed substantial instability in his
marital and roman- [486 U.S. 1308 , 1310]
Opinions
v.
Jane SMITH.
No. A-954. June 15, 1988. Justice STEVENS, Circuit Justice. Applicant has filed an application with me as Circuit Justice to enter an order enjoining Jane Smith from obtaining an abortion of their unborn child. For the reasons hereinafter stated, the application is denied. Applicant initiated proceedings seeking this relief from the Elkhart, Indiana, Superior Court on May 31, 1988. After granting a temporary restraining order without notice, the Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing, made detailed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and filed a written opinion. The findings recite, in part:
U.S. Supreme Court
DOE v. SMITH , 486 U.S. 1308 (1988) 486 U.S. 1308 John DOEv.
Jane SMITH.
No. A-954. June 15, 1988. Justice STEVENS, Circuit Justice. Applicant has filed an application with me as Circuit Justice to enter an order enjoining Jane Smith from obtaining an abortion of their unborn child. For the reasons hereinafter stated, the application is denied. Applicant initiated proceedings seeking this relief from the Elkhart, Indiana, Superior Court on May 31, 1988. After granting a temporary restraining order without notice, the Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing, made detailed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and filed a written opinion. The findings recite, in part:
"5) That the unrebutted testimony
from both the parties is that the Plaintiff is the natural father
of the unborn child of the mother.
"6) That the Plaintiff and the
Defendant have never been married and do not contemplate
marriage.
Page 486 U.S. 1308 , 1309
Page 486 U.S. 1308 , 1309
"7) That the child was conceived
in April of 1988 during a liaison between the mother and the
father, which commenced in February or March and terminated shortly
after conception.
"8) That at the time conception
occurred, the father was separated from his wife of six months, and
upon leaving the Defendant he became reunited with his first
wife.
"9) That the father has two
children, one his biological issue, with his first wife.
* * * * *
"12) That the father has been
sporadically employed at low- paying jobs for the last eighteen
months.
"13) That the mother has testified
she is physically, emotionally and economically unwilling to bear
the child.
"14) That the parties mutually
agree that there is no foreseeable possibility of their reuniting
in any way."
In his opinion, the trial judge stated, in part:
"While the Court has carefully
weighed the testimony, it is apparent that although the Plaintiff
has expressed a legitimate and apparently sincere interest in the
unborn fetus, his interest would not be sufficient to outweigh the
Constitutionally protected right of the Defendant to abort her
child. It would appear from the Danforth decision that in order to
require the mother to carry a child to term against her wishes, the
father must demonstrate clear and compelling reasons justifying
such actions. In this case, the father has failed to do so.
Reviewing the undisputed facts presented in this Cause, the Court
is unable to find that the interests of the Plaintiff outweigh the
interest of the Defendant. It is significant that, among other
facts, the evidence discloses the parties are not married, that
there is no suggestion they will ever reunite, that the Plaintiff
is able to father other children and, in fact, has other children,
and that the Plaintiff has showed substantial instability in his
marital and roman-
Page 486 U.S. 1308 , 1310 tic life. Based upon the Plaintiff's romantic patterns over the last eight months, it would be impossible for the Court to predict the stability of his family unit at the time of birth.
"In summary, even if the Danforth decision permits the Court
to balance the interest of the father of the unborn child against
those of the mother, in this particular case the balancing would be
in the mother's favor."
On June 14, 1988, the Indiana Supreme Court accepted transfer
of the case, based on its emergency nature, but denied a petition
for a stay. In doing so it relied on "the presumption of the
validity accorded all trial court judgments," this Court's decision
in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-72,
2840-2842, 49 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1976), and its conclusion that there
was not a sufficient likelihood that John Doe would prevail on the
merits of his appeal to justify a stay.
In addition to the reasons set forth by the trial court and
the Indiana Supreme Court, I would add that I have serious doubts
concerning the availability of a federal remedy for this claim in
view of the fact that Jane Smith's decision to obtain an abortion
can be carried out without any action on the part of the State of
Indiana or any other state governmental subdivision. Applicant does
not argue that he has an absolute right to veto Jane Smith's
decision, but rather contends that the respective interests of the
parties should be balanced by a neutral tribunal before her
decision is implemented. Since such balancing has already been done
by the trial court, since the Indiana Supreme Court has indicated
that there is a presumption of correctness to the decision of the
trial court in a matter of this kind, and since there is some
danger that a delay in implementing Jane Smith's decision may
increase the risk of physical or emotional harm to Smith,
applicant's claim provides a particularly weak basis for invoking
the extraordinary judicial relief that is sought. Indeed, I have
substantial
Page 486 U.S.
1308 , 1311
doubt whether there has yet been a final decision by the
highest court of the State of Indiana that would provide a basis
for appellate jurisdiction in this Court.
Page 486 U.S. 1308 , 1310 tic life. Based upon the Plaintiff's romantic patterns over the last eight months, it would be impossible for the Court to predict the stability of his family unit at the time of birth.
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