The New York City Police Department and groups representing
various of its minority officers reached a settlement of the
groups' employment discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which settlement was first approved by the
District Court on an interim basis and, finally, after a hearing,
by consent decree. Although petitioners -- a group of white
officers claiming to be adversely affected by the settlement --
presented their objections at the hearing, they chose not to move
to intervene either initially as codefendants or later for purposes
of appeal, but instead filed suit during the period between the
interim approval of the settlement and the final consent decree,
claiming a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
rights. In the
Marino case, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the District Court's dismissal of petitioners' suit, deeming it an
impermissible collateral attack on a consent decree by persons who
could have intervened in the underlying litigation. In the
Costello case, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners'
attempt to appeal from the consent decree because they were not
parties to the litigation giving rise to the decree.
Held:
1. Insofar as the Court of Appeals'
Marino judgment
affirmed the District Court's dismissal of petitioners' suit as an
impermissible collateral attack by nonparties, that judgment is
affirmed by an equally divided Court.
2. As to the issue raised in
Costello, the well-settled
general rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly
become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment prohibits
petitioners from appealing from the consent decree approving the
settlement of the underlying Title VII action. Despite the Court of
Appeals' suggestion that an exception to the general rule may exist
when a nonparty has an interest that is affected by the trial
court's judgment, the better practice is for the nonparty to seek
intervention for purposes of appeal.
806 F.2d 1144 and 806 F.2d 1147, affirmed.
Page 484 U. S. 302
PER CURIAM.
Petitioners seek to challenge a consent decree approving an
agreement settling a Title VII lawsuit against the City of New
York. After the results of a police sergeant's examination revealed
that blacks and Hispanics had passed the examination at
disproportionately low rates, groups representing these minority
members of the New York City Police Department sued the Department
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as
amended, 42
Page 484 U. S. 303
U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq. Three other groups were
permitted to intervene as codefendants: "the Sergeants Benevolent
Association (
SBA'), representing over 500 officers on the
eligible list who had obtained provisional appointments as
sergeants; the Sergeants Eligibles Association (`SEA'),
representing officers who were on the eligible list but had not
received provisional appointments; and various white ethnic
societies and other individual officers (the `Schneider
Intervenors')." Hispanic Society of New York City Police Dept.
v. New York City Police Dept., 806 F.2d 1147, 1151 (CA2 1986)
(Costello case below). The parties reached settlement,
which was first approved by the District Court on an interim basis,
and finally, after a hearing, by consent decree. The settlement
provided that black and Hispanic candidates who had failed to make
the eligible list would be promoted until the racial/ethnic
composition of the new sergeants was approximately the same as the
racial/ethnic composition of the group of candidates taking the
test. The SBA and the SEA signed the agreement; the Schneider
Intervenors, although opposing the settlement, chose not to
appeal.
Petitioners are a group of white police officers who claim that
they were not placed on the eligible list even though they had
scored at least as high on the examination as the lowest scoring
minority officer promoted under the interim order. Although they
presented their objections to the District Court at the hearing,
they chose not to move to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24, either initially as codefendants or later to
replace the Schneider Intervenors for purposes of appeal.
See
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.
S. 385,
432 U. S. 395
(1977). Instead, they filed suit during the period between the
interim approval of the settlement and the final consent decree,
claiming a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
rights. In 806 F.2d 1144 (CA2 1986) (
Marino case below),
the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal of
petitioners' suit, deeming it an impermissible collateral attack on
a consent
Page 484 U. S. 304
decree by persons who could have intervened in the underlying
litigation. Petitioners also attempted to appeal from the consent
decree. In
Costello, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal because petitioners were not parties to the litigation
giving rise to the consent decree. 806 F.2d 1147 (CA2 1986). We
granted certiorari to consider these judgments, 481 U.S. 1047
(1987).
As to the issue raised in
Marino, namely, whether a
district court may dismiss as an impermissible collateral attack a
lawsuit challenging a consent decree by nonparties to the
underlying litigation, we are equally divided, and therefore affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. As to the issue raised in
Costello, we hold that, because petitioners were not
parties to the underlying lawsuit, and because they failed to
intervene for purposes of appeal, they may not appeal from the
consent decree approving that lawsuit's settlement; therefore, we
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The rule that only
parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may
appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled.
See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Louisiana v. Jack, 244 U.
S. 397,
244 U. S. 402
(1917); Fed.Rule App.Proc. 3(c) ("The notice of appeal shall
specify the party or parties taking the appeal"). The Court of
Appeals suggested that there may be exceptions to this general
rule, primarily "when the nonparty has an interest that is affected
by the trial court's judgment." 806 F.2d at 1152. We think the
better practice is for such a nonparty to seek intervention for
purposes of appeal; denials of such motions are, of course,
appealable.
See United Airlines, Inc., supra.
Accordingly, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are
Affirmed.
* Together with
Costello et al. v. New York City Police
Department et al., also on certiorari to the same court (see
this Court's Rule 19.4).
