Eligibility and benefit levels in the federal food stamp program
are determined on a "household," rather than an individual, basis.
The statutory definition of the term "household," as amended in
1981 and 1982, generally treats parents, children, and siblings who
live together as a single household, but does not treat more
distant relatives, or groups of unrelated persons who live
together, as a single household unless they also customarily
purchase food and prepare meals together. Appellees are families
who generally buy their food and prepare their meals as separate
economic units, and who will either lose benefits or have their
food stamp allotment decreased as a result of the 1981 and 1982
amendments to the statute. They filed actions that were
consolidated in Federal District Court, claiming that the statutory
distinction between parents, children, and siblings and all other
groups of individuals violates the guarantee of equal treatment in
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. On cross-motions for
summary judgment, the District Court, applying "heightened
scrutiny," invalidated the distinction.
Held: The statutory distinction is not
unconstitutional. The District Court erred in judging its
constitutionality under "heightened scrutiny," since close
relatives are not a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class. The
statutory distinction does not "directly and substantially"
interfere with family living arrangements, and thereby burden a
fundamental right. Judged under the proper standard of review,
Congress had a rational basis for making the distinction, since it
could reasonably determine that close relatives sharing a home tend
to purchase and prepare meals together, while distant relatives and
unrelated individuals might not be so inclined. Pp.
477 U. S.
638-643.
Reversed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. BRENNAN, J.,
post, p.
477 U. S. 643,
WHITE, J.,
post, p.
477 U. S. 643,
and MARSHALL, J.,
post, p.
477 U. S. 643,
filed dissenting opinions.
Page 477 U. S. 636
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Eligibility and benefit levels in the federal food stamp program
are determined on a "household," rather than an individual, basis.
The statutory definition of the term "household," as amended in
1981 and 1982, generally treats parents, children, and siblings who
live together as a single household, but does not treat more
distant relatives, or groups of unrelated persons who live
together, as a single household unless they also customarily
purchase food and prepare meals together. [
Footnote 1] Although there are variations in the facts
of the four cases that were consolidated in the District Court,
they all raise the question whether the statutory distinction
between parents, children, and siblings, and all other groups of
individuals violates the guarantee of equal treatment in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [
Footnote 2]
Page 477 U. S. 637
I
Appellees are families who generally buy their food and prepare
their meals as separate economic units; each family will either
lose its benefits or have its food stamp allotment decreased as a
result of the 1981 and 1982 amendments. Moreover, as appellees'
counsel eloquently explained, in each case, the loss or reduction
of benefits will impose a severe hardship on a needy family, and
may be especially harmful to the affected young children for whom
an adequate diet is essential.
Appellees accordingly filed these lawsuits to invalidate the
1981 and 1982 amendments and to be treated as separate households
for the purpose of determining eligibility and allotment of food
stamps. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court
considered the merits of appellees' challenge to the
constitutionality of the "household" definition.
The District Court was persuaded that the statutory definition
had a rational basis. It observed that the amendment made it more
difficult for individuals who live together to "manipulate" the
rules "so as to obtain separate household status and receive
greater benefits"; that the administrative burden of "attempting to
make individual household determinations as to
household'
status" was time-consuming; and that unrelated persons who live
together for reasons of economy or health are more likely "`to
actually be separate households'" than related families who live
together. App. to Juris. Statement 5a-6a. It held, however, that "a
stricter standard of review than the `rational basis' test" was
required. Id. at 7a. Relying primarily on United
States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.
S. 528, 413 U. S. 534
(1973), a
Page 477 U. S. 638
case which it construed as holding that a "congressional desire
to harm a politically unpopular group" could not justify the
exclusion of household groups which contained unrelated persons,
the District Court reasoned that,
"if the Supreme Court is willing to protect unpopular political
groups, it should even be more willing to protect the traditional
family value of living together."
App. to Juris. Statement 8a.
We noted probable jurisdiction, 474 U.S. 994 (1985), and now
reverse.
II
The District Court erred in judging the constitutionality of the
statutory distinction under "heightened scrutiny." The
disadvantaged class is that comprised by parents, children, and
siblings. Close relatives are not a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect"
class. As a historical matter, they have not been subjected to
discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete
group; and they are not a minority, or politically powerless.
See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U. S. 307,
427 U. S.
313-314 (1976) (per curiam). In fact, quite the contrary
is true.
Nor does the statutory classification "directly and
substantially" interfere with family living arrangements, and
thereby burden a fundamental right.
Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U. S. 374,
434 U. S.
386-387, and n. 12 (1978).
See id. at
434 U. S.
403-404 (STEVENS, J., concurring);
Califano v.
Jobst, 434 U. S. 47,
434 U. S. 58
(1977). The "household" definition does not order or prevent any
group of persons from dining together. Indeed, in the overwhelming
majority of cases, it probably has no effect at all. It is
exceedingly unlikely that close relatives would choose to live
apart simply to increase their allotment of food stamps, for the
cost of separate housing would almost certainly exceed the
incremental value of the additional stamps.
See 50
Fed.Reg. 36641, 36642 (1985). Thus, just as in
Page 477 U. S. 639
United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno -- the
decision which the District Court read to require "heightened
scrutiny" -- the "legislative classification must be sustained if
the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest." 413 U.S. at
413 U. S. 533.
See id. at
413 U. S.
533-538. [
Footnote
3]
Under the proper standard of review, we agree with the District
Court that Congress had a rational basis both for treating parents,
children, and siblings who live together as a single "household"
and for applying a different standard in determining whether groups
of more distant relatives and unrelated persons living together
constitute a "household."
Page 477 U. S. 640
As a general matter, the economies of scale that may be realized
in group purchase and preparation of food surely justified Congress
in providing additional food stamp benefits to households that
could not achieve such efficiencies. [
Footnote 4] Moreover, the Legislature's recognition of the
potential for mistake and fraud [
Footnote 5] and the cost-ineffectiveness of case-by-case
verification of claims that individuals ate as separate households
[
Footnote 6]
Page 477 U. S. 641
unquestionably warrants the use of general definitions in this
area. [
Footnote 7]
The question that remains is whether Congress could accommodate
the wishes of distant relatives and unrelated individuals to dine
separately without invidiously discriminating against close
relatives. [
Footnote 8] The
question, in other words, is whether Congress could
"[l]imi[t] the availability of the 'purchase and prepare food
separately' rule to those most likely to actually be separate
households, although living together
Page 477 U. S. 642
with others for reasons of economy or health (
i.e.,
[distant relatives and] unrelated persons)."
S.Rep. No. 97-504, p. 25 (1982).
So stated, the justification for the statutory classification is
obvious. Congress could reasonably determine that close relatives
sharing a home -- almost by definition -- tend to purchase and
prepare meals together, while distant relatives and unrelated
individuals might not be so inclined. In that event, even though
close relatives are undoubtedly as honest as other food stamp
recipients, the potential for mistaken or misstated claims of
separate dining would be greater in the case of close relatives
than would be true for those with weaker communal ties, simply
because a greater percentage of the former category in fact prepare
meals jointly than the comparable percentage in the latter
category. The additional fact that close relatives represent by far
the largest proportion of food stamp recipients [
Footnote 9] might well have convinced
Congress that limited funds would not permit the accommodation
given distant relatives and unrelated persons to be stretched to
embrace close relatives as well. [
Footnote 10] Finally,
Page 477 U. S. 643
Congress might have reasoned that it would be somewhat easier
for close relatives -- again, almost by definition -- to
accommodate their living habits to a federal policy favoring common
meal preparation than it would be for more distant relatives or
unrelated persons to do so. Because of these differences, we are
persuaded that Congress could rationally conclude that the two
categories merited differential treatment. Neither the decision to
take "one step" in 1981 -- when the rule was applied to parents and
children -- nor the decision to take a second step in 1982, when
the rule was extended to siblings as well -- was irrational because
Congress did not simultaneously take a third step that would apply
to the entire food stamp program.
The judgment of the District Court is therefore
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 3(i) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 703, as
redesignated and amended, 7 U.S.C. § 2012(i), provided in
part:
"'Household' means (1) an individual who lives alone or who,
while living with others, customarily purchases foods and prepares
meals for home consumption separate and apart from the others, or
(2) a group of individuals who live together and customarily
purchase food and prepare meals together for home consumption;
except that parents and children, [bb]or siblings,[eb]
who live together shall be treated as a group of individuals
who customarily purchase and prepare meals together for home
consumption even if they do not do so, unless one of the
parents, [bb]or siblings,[eb]
is an elderly or disabled
member."
The italicized language was added to the definition by §
101(1) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub.L.
97-35, 95 Stat. 358. The clause extending the proviso to siblings,
which appears in boldface, was added by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub.L. 97-253, 96 Stat. 772.
[
Footnote 2]
"The federal sovereign, like the States, must govern
impartially. The concept of equal justice under law is served by
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process, as well as by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S.
88,
426 U. S. 100
(1976).
Accord, e.g., United States Dept. of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 413 U. S. 528,
413 U. S. 533,
n. 5 (1973);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.
S. 497,
347 U. S. 499
(1954).
[
Footnote 3]
In
United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, we
held that the definition of the term "household" in the Food Stamp
Act as amended in 1971, 84 Stat. 2048, was unconstitutional. That
definition drew a distinction between households composed entirely
of persons who are related to one another and households containing
one or more members who are unrelated to the rest. Unlike the
present statute, the 1971 definition completely disqualified all
households in the latter category. Not only were all groups of
unrelated persons ineligible for benefits, but even groups of
related persons would lose their benefits if they admitted one
nonrelative to their household. We concluded that this definition
did not further the interest in preventing fraud, or any other
legitimate purpose of the Food Stamp Program.
"Thus, in practical operation, the 1971 amendment excludes from
participation in the food stamp program
not those persons
who are 'likely to abuse the program' but, rather,
only
those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they
cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to
retain their eligibility."
413 U.S. at
413 U. S. 538.
The House Committee Report on the Food Stamp Act of 1977 made this
reference to the 1971 amendment invalidated in
Moreno:
"This proviso was essentially an attempt to ban food stamp
participation by communal households (so-called 'hippie communes').
In 1973, the Supreme Court, in
Moreno v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 413 U. S. 628, upheld an
earlier ruling by a lower court to the effect that this provision
was unconstitutional. It had been implemented for only a brief
period in a few states."
H.R.Rep. No. 95-464, p. 140 (1977). The 1971 definition was,
therefore, "wholly without any rational basis," and "invalid under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 413 U.S. at
413 U. S.
538.
[
Footnote 4]
See S.Rep. No. 97-504, p. 24 (1982) ("Because of
economics of scale, small (one-, two-, and three-person) households
are provided more food stamps per person than larger households.
For example, current benefit levels are $70 for 1-, $128 for 2-,
$183 for 3-person households"); S.Rep. No. 97-128, p. 31 (1981)
("It should be noted that, because of economics of scale, small
(one, two, or three persons) households are provided more food
stamps per person than larger households -- for example, $70 for
one, $128 for two, $183 for three, and $233 for four").
[
Footnote 5]
See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 97-504, p. 25 (1982) ("Thus, for
larger households that are able to fragment into separate, smaller
households simply by purchasing and preparing food separately, or
claiming to do so, benefits can be significantly increased. In
1981, Congress took a first step toward limiting this potential
manipulation of food stamp rules by
requiring that parents
and children living together apply together, except for elderly or
disabled parents. This year's Committee proposal would take the
next logical step"); H.R.Rep. No. 97-106, pp. 118-119 (1981)
("Currently, the program definition of household states, in part,
that a household may consist of an individual or group of
individuals who, while living with others, customarily purchase
food and prepare meals for home consumption separate and apart from
others. This can result in some closely related individuals
claiming separate household status for purposes of obtaining food
stamp benefits to which they would not otherwise be entitled. For
example, an individual over 18 years old, who is living with his
parents and has no visible means of support, could be eligible to
participate, even though his parents would not be eligible, if the
individual were to claim separate household status and indicate
that he has zero gross income. The individual could, under existing
law, be certified as a separate household, although in fact he was
being supported by his parents"); S.Rep. No. 97128, p. 31 (1981)
("[C]urrent law . . . enables large households to fragment into
separate households, result[ing] in increased food stamp
benefits"); S.Rep. No. 97-139, pp. 52-53 (1981) ("Under present
law, family units may apply as separate households and receive
larger benefits if they claim to purchase food and prepare meals
separately, even though the children are totally supported by the
parents").
[
Footnote 6]
"Limiting the availability of the 'purchase and prepare food
separately' rule to those most likely to actually be separate
households, although living together with others for reasons of
economy or health (
i.e., unrelated persons and the elderly
or disabled), would place a reasonable control on a situation that
State and local administrators have identified as one which
r[e]quires congressional action. In fact, tightening of the
household definition was the leading recommendation for change made
in response to a recent survey by the Committee. Suggestions for
revision were received from Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming,
and numerous local administrators, including several who testified
before the Committee."
"A further problem with the existing household definition occurs
when members of a household 'claim' to purchase and prepare food
separately, but, in fact, do not. Verification of a household's
claim can be difficult and administratively burdensome, as noted in
the following examples from State administrators."
S.Rep. No. 97-504, pp. 24-25 (1982).
[
Footnote 7]
See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S.
47,
434 U. S. 53
(1977) ("General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is
to be administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such
rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some
individual cases");
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.
S. 471,
397 U. S. 485
(1970) ("
The problems of government are practical ones, and may
justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations -- illogical,
it may be, and unscientific'" (quoting Metropolis Theatre Co.
v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61,
228 U. S. 69-70
(1913))). See also e.g., Mathews v. De Castro,
429 U. S. 181,
429 U. S. 189
(1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.
S. 749, 422 U. S. 785
(1975).
[
Footnote 8]
Although the origin of the distinction is not entirely clear,
the Report of the House Agriculture Committee suggests that its
decision not to
"expan[d] the single household concept to the entire caseload,
requiring all individuals living in the same home to be treated as
one household"
was based on its concern over "the impact of the amendment upon
various types of living arrangements." H.R.Rep. No. 97-106, p. 256
(1981).
[
Footnote 9]
Cf. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Economic Characteristics of Households in the United States: Fourth
Quarter 1984, pp. 24, 34 (1986) (statistical table indicating that
more than 87% of households receiving food stamps are families
related by blood, marriage, or adoption who live and eat together);
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Economic
Characteristics of Households in the United States: Third Quarter
1984, pp. 26, 36 (1986) (same); U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Economic Characteristics of Households in the United
States: Second Quarter 1984, pp. 26, 36 (1985) (same); U.S. Dept.
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Economic Characteristics of
Households in the United States: First Quarter 1984, pp. 26, 36
(1985) (same).
[
Footnote 10]
"[A]n open-ended rule that allows most or all households to
fragment simply by changing food purchasing and eating habits is
too subject to manipulation."
S.Rep. No. 97-504, p. 25 (1982). Even a small percentage of
error -- given the millions of families involved and the fact that
Congress believed that almost all of them could purchase food
jointly -- could result in the improper expenditure of many
millions of dollars.
See Budget of the United States
Government FY 1985, p. 8-43 (in 1983, approximately 21 million
participants received food stamp assistance valued at nearly $12
billion); U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States 1986, pp. 122-123 (106th ed.) (same).
Congress "expect[ed] that eligibility workers could effectively
question claims" of "
separateness'" submitted by distant
relatives and unrelated individuals. S.Rep. No. 97-504, p. 26
(1982).
JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I would affirm on the ground that the challenged classifications
violate the Equal Protection Clause because they fail the rational
basis test.
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
For the reasons given in the last three paragraphs of JUSTICE
MARSHALL's dissenting opinion, the classification at issue in this
case is irrational. Accordingly, I dissent.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
This case demonstrates yet again the lack of vitality in this
Court's recent equal protection jurisprudence.
See, e.g.,
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.
S. 432,
473 U. S.
455
Page 477 U. S. 644
(1985) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part);
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1,
411 U. S. 70
(1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). In my view, when analyzing
classifications affecting the receipt of governmental benefits, a
court must consider
"the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the
governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted
state interests in support of the classification."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.
S. 471,
397 U. S. 521
(1970) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). By contrast, the Court's rigid,
bipolar approach, which purports to apply rational basis scrutiny
unless a suspect classification is involved or the exercise of a
fundamental right is impeded,
see ante at
477 U. S.
638-639, puts legislative classifications impinging upon
sensitive issues of family structure and survival on the same plane
as a refusal to let a merchant hawk his wares on a particular
street corner. I do not believe the equal protection component of
the Due Process Clause could become such a blunt instrument.
The importance of the interests involved in this case can hardly
be denied. The Court concludes that the challenged statute does not
directly and substantially interfere with family living
arrangements,
cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.
S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion), because it "does not
order or prevent any group of persons from dining together, "
ante at
477 U. S. 638.
The Court relies, apparently, on the fact that the statute does not
use criminal sanctions, but merely the loss of benefits, to
influence family living decisions. It is a bit late in the day,
however, to cut off due process analysis -- be it procedural or
substantive -- by simply invoking such a distinction.
See
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254,
397 U. S. 262
(1970);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.
S. 618,
394 U. S. 627
(1969).
The food stamp benefits at issue are necessary for the affected
families' very survival, and the Federal Government denies that
benefit to families who do not, by preparing their
Page 477 U. S. 645
meals together, structure themselves in a manner that the
Government believes will minimize unnecessary expenditures. The
importance of that benefit belies any suggestion that the
Government is not directly and substantially influencing the living
arrangements of families whose resources are so low that they must
rely on their relatives for shelter. The Government has thus chosen
to intrude into the family dining room -- a place where I would
have thought the right to privacy exists in its strongest form.
What possible interest can the Government have in preventing
members of a family from dining as they choose? It is simply none
of the Government's business.
The challenged classifications amount to a conclusive
presumption that related families living under the same roof do all
of their cooking together. Thus, the regulation does not merely
affect the important privacy interest in family living arrangements
recognized in
Moore, but the even more vital interest in
survival. As Congress itself recognized, some separate families
live in the same house, but cannot prepare meals together because
of different work schedules.
See S.Rep. No. 97-504, p. 26
(1982). Others may lack sufficient plates and utensils to
accommodate more than a few persons at once, or may have only one
burner on their stove. These extended families simply lack the
option of cooking and eating together. For them, the legislative
presumption in this case does far greater damage than merely
prescribing with whom they must dine. By assuming that they realize
economies of scale that they in fact cannot achieve, the regulation
threatens their lives and health by denying them the minimal
benefits provided to all other families of similar income and
needs.
Balanced against these vital interests is Congress' undeniably
legitimate desire to prevent fraud and waste in the food stamp
program. The legislative presumption that Congress used, however,
is related at best tenuously to the achievement of those goals.
While I believe that our standard of
Page 477 U. S. 646
review must take into consideration the importance of the
individual interests affected, I have some doubt that the
classification used here could pass even a rational basis test. In
United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.
S. 528 (1973), we held that a definition of "household"
that excluded any living group containing an individual unrelated
to any other member of the group did not rationally further the
Government's interest in preventing fraud in the food stamp
program. Despite the Court's attempts to distinguish this case from
Moreno, the critical fact in both cases is that the
statute drew a distinction that bears no necessary relation to the
prevention of fraud.
See id. at
413 U. S.
535-536 ("denial of essential federal food assistance to
all otherwise eligible households containing unrelated
members" not rationally related to fraud prevention). In the
present case, the Government has provided no justification for the
conclusion that related individuals living together are more likely
to lie about their living arrangements than are unrelated
individuals. Nor has it demonstrated that fraudulent conduct by
related households is more difficult to detect than similar abuses
by unrelated households.
Congress stressed its desire to prevent fraud in the food stamp
program,
see H.R.Rep. No. 97-687, p. 25 (1982); H.R.Rep.
No. 97-106, p. 50 (1981), and it classified the "household
consolidation" provision as an antifraud measure. Nevertheless, the
Committee Reports cite no hard evidence that related persons living
together were in fact significant sources of fraud; the Committees
merely determined that the Government could save money by
"tighten[ing] the definition of an eligible food stamp household."
S.Rep. No. 97-504 at 24. The House did hypothesize, in the course
of considering the 1981 amendments, that an 18-year-old child
living with his parents could declare himself a separate household
for food stamp purposes, H.R.Rep. No. 97-106, at 119. If indeed
that abuse widely existed, the resulting legislation, which lumped
together all nonelderly parents and their offspring
Page 477 U. S. 647
living under one roof as a "household," provided a more than
sufficient cure. Nevertheless, Congress proceeded to restrict
eligibility even further the following year.
When it moved beyond the rule that merely grouped parents and
children, and, in the 1982 amendments, grouped siblings together as
well, Congress interfered substantially with the desires of
demonstrably separate families to remain separate families. It did
so, moreover, while recognizing that distinct families living
together often are genuinely separate households, and that the food
stamp program should permit separate families that are not related
to live together, but maintain separate households. S.Rep. No.
97-504, at 25. Congress nevertheless assumed that related families
are less likely to be genuinely separate households than are
unrelated families, and failed even to provide related families a
chance to rebut the legislative presumption. In view of the
importance to the affected families of their family life and their
very survival, the Court's extreme deference to this untested
assumption is simply inappropriate. I respectfully dissent.