Respondent federal prison inmates were found guilty by the
prison's Discipline Committee, composed of petitioner prison
officials, of encouraging other inmates to engage in a work
stoppage and of other charges, and were ordered to be placed in
administrative detention and to forfeit a specified number of days
of "good time." On appeals to the Warden and the Regional Director
of the Bureau of Prisons, respondents were ordered released from
administrative detention and all material relevant to the incident
in question was ordered expunged from their records. They were
later paroled and released. But in the meantime, they brought suit
in Federal District Court against petitioners, alleging a violation
of various federal constitutional rights and seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief and damages. After initially dismissing the
complaint on the ground that petitioners were entitled to absolute
immunity from liability, the District Court, on reconsideration,
reinstated the suit. The case was tried to a jury, which found that
petitioners had violated respondents' Fifth Amendment due process
rights, and awarded damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
rejecting petitioners' claim for absolute immunity.
Held: Petitioners are entitled to only qualified
immunity. Pp.
474 U. S.
199-208.
727 F.2d 669, affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, MARSHALL, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.
REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J.,
and WHITE, J., joined,
post, p.
474 U. S.
208.
Page 474 U. S. 194
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether members of a federal
prison's Institution Discipline Committee, who hear cases in which
inmates are charged with rules infractions, are entitled to
absolute, as distinguished from qualified, immunity from personal
damages liability for actions violative of the United States
Constitution.
I
Respondents David Saxner and Alfred Cain, Jr., in January, 1975,
were inmates at the Federal Correctional Institution at Terre
Haute, Ind. They were serving 4- and 5-year sentences,
respectively, and each was within 18 months of a possible release
date. Each was soon to appear before the parole board. The prison
conduct record of each was good. On January 6, 1975, William Lowe,
a Negro inmate at Terre Haute died in the prison hospital. He was
the first of four Negro inmates to die there within the ensuing
7-month period. A work stoppage to protest Lowe's death took place
at the prison on January 7 and 8. Respondent Saxner, a white inmate
who had served as a "jailhouse lawyer," and respondent Cain, a
Negro inmate who was the librarian for the African and New World
Cultural Society, assert that neither of them participated in the
stoppage.
See Brief for Respondents 1. Each, however, was
active in gathering information about Lowe's death and about
conditions at the prison hospital, and in passing that information
to the press, Members of Congress, prison officials, and Saxner's
attorney. [
Footnote 1]
Page 474 U. S. 195
On February 14, respondents were cited in separate Incident
Reports for encouraging other inmates to engage in work stoppage.
App. 50, 52. Each was immediately placed in administrative
segregation, that is, removed from the general inmate population,
and assigned to a separate cell in an unused part of the hospital.
See 28 CFR § 541.20(b) (1985). On the following day,
each respondent was given a copy of the Bureau of Prisons Policy
Statement 7400.5c (subject: Inmate Discipline) (Oct. 4, 1974).
See App. 25-49. Saxner signed a written notice which
explained his rights at a hearing to be held before an Institution
Discipline Committee. Among these were the right to have a written
copy of the charge; the right to have a member of the prison staff
represent him; the rights, except where institutional safety would
be jeopardized, to be present at the hearing, to call witnesses,
and to submit documentary evidence; and the right to receive a
written explanation of the committee's decision.
Id. at
54. [
Footnote 2] Although the
record does not so disclose, we assume that respondent Cain
received a similar notice at that time. Respondents were brought
before the Institution Discipline Committee on February 21. The
committee was composed of petitioners Theodore Cleavinger,
Associate Warden, as chairman; Marvin Marcadis, correctional
supervisor; and Tom P. Lockett, chief of case management. [
Footnote 3]
Page 474 U. S. 196
Respondent Saxner was accompanied at the hearing by Ralph Smith,
staff counselor, whom Saxner had selected to represent him. After
reading the charge and reviewing Saxner's rights, the committee
introduced Saxner's Incident Report and three documents found in
his cell. These were, respectively, a "press release" Saxner had
sent to 50 newspapers; a four-page document which detailed
interviews with inmates about their medical treatment at the prison
hospital; and a letter from Saxner to an American Civil Liberties
Union lawyer, Saunders, which enclosed the other two documents and
which discussed medical conditions, possible litigation on behalf
of the Lowe family and other inmates, communications with the
press, and the obtaining of local counsel. The press release, among
other things, advocated administrative approval of a prisoners'
union and amnesty for those who had participated in the work
stoppage.
Id. at 81. Neither the investigating officer nor
the charging officer nor any guard was called as a witness. Saxner,
however, testified and introduced affidavits of several inmates.
His request that he be permitted to call inmates to confirm that he
did not encourage any work stoppage was denied on the ground that
such testimony would be cumulative. While admitting that he had
written the press release and had mailed it to persons outside the
prison without authorization, Saxner asserted his innocence on the
specific charge referred.
Id. at 60, 71. The committee
found respondent Saxner guilty of encouraging a work stoppage.
Also, although not specifically so charged, he was found guilty of
unauthorized use of the mail and of possession of contraband, that
is, material advocating an illegal prisoners' union. The committee
ordered that
Page 474 U. S. 197
Saxner be placed in administrative detention and forfeit 84 days
of "good time." His transfer to another institution was
recommended.
Id. at 57. Respondent Cain's hearing took
place the same day before the same committee and immediately prior
to Saxner's hearing.
Id. at 64. He was accompanied by J.
R. Alvarado, a staff representative. He was advised of his rights.
His Incident Report was produced. Two documents found in his cell
(Saxner's letter to Saunders and a manuscript concerning "Ideals
and Proposals of the Prisoner Labor Union") were introduced. Cain
testified and denied that he had encouraged inmates not to work. He
requested the right to cross-examine his accusers, but no other
witness was called. At the conclusion of Cain's hearing, the
committee found him guilty of encouraging a work stoppage and,
although not specifically so charged, of possessing contraband,
that is, "inflammatory material . . . supporting disruptive conduct
in the institution."
Id. at 65. The committee ordered that
Cain be placed in administrative detention and forfeit 96 days of
"good time." His transfer to another institution also was
recommended.
Ibid. Respondents appealed to the Warden of
the institution. The Warden ordered their release from
administrative detention, restored the good time, and directed that
each respondent's record carry a notation that "the incident not
reflect unfavorably" upon consideration for parole.
Id. at
74, 77. The Warden refused, however, to expunge respondents'
records.
Ibid. Saxner and Cain were released into the
general prison population on March 21. Respondents next appealed to
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Prisons. The Regional
D;rector ruled that the disciplinary report, the action by the
committee on the incident, and material relevant thereto were to be
expunged from each respondent's record.
Id. at 79, 80.
Thus, in the end, after these appeals, respondents obtained all the
administrative relief they sought. But in the meantime, for a
Page 474 U. S. 198
definite interval, each had been condemned (improperly as it
turned out) to "administrative detention."
Respondent Saxner was paroled and released in April, 1975.
Respondent Cain was granted parole in June and released in
December.
Meanwhile, in March, 1975, respondents brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
against petitioners, the Terre Haute Warden, and the institution's
administrative supervisor. Their third amended complaint alleged
that the defendants had violated their rights under the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments.
Id. at 12.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U. S. 388
(1971). Respondents sought declaratory and injunctive relief and
compensatory damages. App. 22.
The District Court granted petitioners' motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that their functioning as hearing officers
entitled them to absolute immunity. Nearly two years later,
however, in April, 1981, the District Court, on reconsideration,
reinstated the suit in light of its controlling court's decision in
Mary v. Ramsden, 635 F.2d 590 (CA7 1980), where the Court
of Appeals held that members of a disciplinary committee at a
Wisconsin juvenile facility were entitled to only qualified
immunity. App. 23.
The case then was tried to a jury. In response to special
interrogatories, the jury found that petitioners had violated
respondents' Fifth Amendment due process rights. [
Footnote 4] The jury awarded each respondent
$1,500 compensatory damages against each petitioner, or a total of
$4,500; each petitioner was thus subjected to liability totaling
$3,000.
Id. at 9.
Petitioners' subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was denied. They appealed, contending,
Page 474 U. S. 199
among other things, that, as members of the discipline
committee, they were entitled to absolute immunity. [
Footnote 5] The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed.
Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669 (1984). It held that
petitioners' claim for absolute immunity was foreclosed by Seventh
Circuit precedent denying such immunity to state correctional
officers serving in a similar capacity.
Id. at 670.
See Reddig v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1117 (1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984);
Chavis v.
Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1288,
cert. denied sub nom. Boles v.
Chavis, 454 U. S. 907
(1981);
Mary v. Ramsden, 635 F.2d at 600. Petitioners'
request for rehearing en banc was denied by a vote of 5 to 4. App.
to Pet. for Cert. 36a. Because of the importance of the issue, and
because the Seventh Circuit rulings, although consistent with
Jihaad v. O'Brien, 645 F.2d 556, 561 (CA6 1981), were
claimed to be in some conflict with the en banc decision of the
Fourth Circuit in
Ward v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 1098 (1982),
we granted certiorari. 469 U.S. 1206 (1985).
II
A. This Court has observed:
"Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than
the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts
committed within their judicial jurisdiction."
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547,
386 U. S.
553-554 (1967). The Court specifically has pronounced
and followed this doctrine of the common law for more than a
century. In
Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872), it ruled that a
federal judge may not be held accountable in damages for a judicial
act taken within his court's jurisdiction. Such immunity applies
"however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in
its consequences it may have proved to
Page 474 U. S. 200
the plaintiff."
Id. at
80 U. S. 347.
"Nor can this exemption of the judges from civil liability be
affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are
performed."
Ibid. In
Pierson v. Ray, supra, the
Court held that absolute immunity shielded a municipal judge who
was sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by clergymen who
alleged that he had convicted them unconstitutionally for a
peaceful protest against racial segregation. The Court stressed
that such immunity was essential to protect the integrity of the
judicial process. 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 554.
And in
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.
S. 349 (1978), the Court once again enunciated this
principle, despite any "informality with which [the judge]
proceeded," and despite any
ex parte feature of the
proceeding.
Id. at
435 U. S. 363,
and n. 12. With this judicial immunity firmly established, the
Court has extended absolute immunity to certain others who perform
functions closely associated with the judicial process. The federal
hearing examiner and administrative law judge have been afforded
absolute immunity.
"There can be little doubt that the role of the modern federal
hearing examiner or administrative law judge . . . is 'functionally
comparable' to that of a judge."
Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478,
438 U. S. 513
(1978). Full immunity also has been given to federal and state
prosecutors.
Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927),
aff'g 12 F.2d 396 (CA2 1926);
Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U. S. 409,
424 U. S.
424-426 (1976). The same is true for witnesses,
including police officers, who testify in judicial proceedings.
Witnesses are "integral parts of the judicial process" and,
accordingly, are shielded by absolute immunity.
Briscoe v.
LaHue, 460 U. S. 325,
460 U. S. 335
(1983). And the Court has noted the adoption in this country of the
principle of immunity for grand jurors.
See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. at
424 U. S. 423, n. 20.
See also Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. at
438 U. S. 509-510. Although this Court has not decided
whether state parole officials enjoy absolute immunity as a matter
of federal law,
see Martinez v. California, 444 U.
S. 277,
444 U. S. 284
(1980), federal
Page 474 U. S. 201
appellate courts have so held.
See, e.g., Sellars v.
Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (CA9),
cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1102 (1981);
Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828,
830-831 (CA8 1983);
United States ex rel. Powell v.
Irving, 684 F.2d 494 (CA7 1982).
B. The Court has extended absolute immunity to the President
when damages liability is predicated on his official act.
Nixon
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731,
457 U. S.
744-758 (1982).
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U. S. 800,
457 U. S. 807
(1982). "For executive officials in general, however, our cases
make plain that qualified immunity represents the norm."
Ibid. See Scheuer v. Rlodes, 416 U.
S. 232 (1974) (State Governor and his aides);
Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, supra, (Presidential aides);
Butz v.
Economou, supra, (Cabinet member, acknowledging, however, that
there are "those exceptional situations where it is demonstrated
that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of the public
business," 438 U.S. at
438 U. S.
507);
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.
S. 555 (1978) (state prison officials);
Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U. S. 308
(1975) (school board members);
Pierson v. Ray, supra
(police officers).
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.
S. 483 (1896) (Postmaster General), and
Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U. S. 564
(1959) (Government officials), where full immunity was afforded,
both antedated
Bivens. In any event,
"federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal
liability for unconstitutional conduct must bear the burden of
showing that public policy requires an exemption of that
scope."
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at
438 U. S. 506;
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at
457 U. S.
808.
C. The Court has said that "in general our cases have followed a
functional' approach to immunity law." Id. at
457 U. S. 810.
"[O]ur cases clearly indicate that immunity analysis rests on
functional categories, not on the status of the defendant."
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 342.
Absolute immunity flows not from rank or title or "location within
the Government," Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at
438 U. S. 511,
but from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual
official. And
Page 474 U. S. 202
in
Butz, the Court mentioned the following factors,
among others, as characteristic of the judicial process and to be
considered in determining absolute, as contrasted with qualified,
immunity: (a) the need to assure that the individual can perform
his functions without harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence
of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a
means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation from
political influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the
adversary nature of the process; and (f) the correctability of
error on appeal.
Id. at
438 U. S.
512.
III
We turn to the application of these principles to the facts of
the present case. Judge Cudahy of the Court of Appeals, in his
separate concurring opinion, 727 F.2d at 673, stressed the
Butz factors and was persuaded by what he felt were the
absence of procedural safeguards, the rare and exceptional
character of absolute immunity, and the need for such immunity only
when public policy requires it.
Id. at 674-676.
Petitioners, in response, and seemingly in order to negate the
significance of certain of the specified factors, point out that
grand jury proceedings possess few procedural safeguards that are
associated with court proceedings, and are largely immune from any
type of judicial review.
See, e.g., United States v.
Calandra, 414 U. S. 338,
414 U. S. 345
(1974);
Costello v. United States, 350 U.
S. 359 (1956). Petitioners also observe that
prosecutorial decisionmaking is not subject to the formalities of
trials; instead, the prosecutor exercises broad and generally
unreviewable discretion. Yet grand jurors and prosecutors enjoy
absolute immunity. Petitioners finally argue that the Court's cases
teach that absolute immunity shields an official if (a) the
official performs an adjudicatory function comparable to that of a
judge, (b) the function is of sufficient public importance, and (c)
the proper performance of that function would be subverted if the
official
Page 474 U. S. 203
were subjected to individual suit for damages. Brief for
Petitioners 21. When we evaluate the claim of immunity for the
committee members, we bear in mind that immunity status is for the
benefit of the public, as well as for the individual concerned.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at
386 U. S. 564.
The committee members, in a sense, do perform an adjudicatory
function in that they determine whether the accused inmate is
guilty or innocent of the charge leveled against him; in that they
hear testimony and receive documentary evidence; in that they
evaluate credibility and weigh evidence; and in that they render a
decision. We recognize, too, the presence of some societal
importance in this dispute-resolution function. The administration
of a prison is a difficult undertaking at best, for it concerns
persons many of whom have demonstrated a proclivity for antisocial,
criminal, and violent conduct.
See Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U. S. 517,
468 U. S.
526-527 (194). We also acknowledge that many inmates do
not refrain from harassment and intimidation. The number of
nonmeritorious prisoners' cases that come to this Court's notice is
evidence of this. Tension between prison officials and inmates has
been described as "unremitting."
Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U. S. 539,
418 U. S. 562
(1974). "Retaliation is much more than a theoretical possibility."
Ibid. And we do not underestimate the fact, stressed by
petitioners, that committee members usually are persons of modest
means and, if they are suable and unprotected, perhaps would be
disinclined to serve on a discipline committee.
See Ward v.
Johnson, 690 F.2d at 1108.
We conclude, nonetheless, that these concerns, to the extent
they are well-grounded, are overstated in the context of
constitutional violations. We do not perceive the discipline
committee's function as a "classic" adjudicatory one, as
petitioners would describe it. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9-10. Surely, the
members of the committee, unlike a federal or state judge, are not
"independent"; to say that they are is to ignore reality. They are
not professional hearing officers, as are
Page 474 U. S. 204
administrative law judges. They are, instead, prison officials,
albeit no longer of the rank and file, temporarily diverted from
their usual duties.
See Ward v. Johnson, 690 F.2d at 1115
(dissenting opinion). They are employees of the Bureau of Prisons,
and they are the direct subordinates of the warden, who reviews
their decision. They work with the fellow employee who lodges the
charge against the inmate upon whom they sit in judgment. The
credibility determination they make often is one between a coworker
and an inmate. They thus are under obvious pressure to resolve a
disciplinary dispute in favor of the institution and their fellow
employee.
See Ponte v. Real, 471 U.
S. 491,
471 U. S. 513
(1985) (dissenting opinion). It is the old situational problem of
the relationship between the keeper and the kept, a relationship
that hardly is conducive to a truly adjudicatory performance.
Neither do we equate this discipline committee membership to
service upon a traditional parole board. The board is a "neutral
and detached" hearing body.
Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U. S. 471,
408 U. S. 489
(1972). The parole board member has been described as an impartial
professional serving essentially "
as an arm of the sentencing
judge.'" Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d. at 1302, n. 15,
quoting Bricker v. Michigan Parole Board, 405 F.
Supp. 1340, 1345 (ED Mich. 1975). And in the penalty context,
the parole board is constitutionally required to provide greater
due process protection than is the institution discipline
committee. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 418 U. S.
561.
We relate this committee membership, instead, to the school
board service the Court had under consideration in
Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U. S. 308
(1975). The school board members were to function as "adjudicators
in the school disciplinary process," and they were to "judge
whether there have been violations of school regulations and, if
so, the appropriate sanctions for the violations."
Id. at
420 U. S. 319.
Despite the board's adjudicative function of that extent, the Court
concluded that the board members were to be protected by
Page 474 U. S. 205
only qualified immunity. After noting the suggestion of the
presence of a deterrence-from-service factor, the Court concluded
that
"absolute immunity would not be justified, since it would not
sufficiently increase the ability of school officials to exercise
their discretion in a forthright manner to warrant the absence of a
remedy for students subjected to intentional or otherwise
inexcusable deprivations."
Id. at
420 U. S. 320.
That observation and conclusion are equally applicable here. It is
true, of course, that the "prisoner and the schoolchild stand in
wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of
criminal conviction and incarceration."
Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U. S. 651,
430 U. S. 669
(1977). But in
Ingraham, it was also said that, even if
schoolchildren and their parents do not have a prisoner's motive or
proclivity to institute harassing lawsuits, they have "little need
for the protection of the Eighth Amendment," for
"the openness of the public school and its supervision by the
community afford significant safeguards against the kinds of abuses
from which the Eighth Amendment protects the prisoner."
Id. at
430 U. S. 670.
If qualified immunity is sufficient for the schoolroom, it should
be more than sufficient for the jailhouse where the door is closed,
not open, and where there is little, if any, protection by way of
community observation.
Petitioners assert with some vigor that procedural formality is
not a prerequisite for absolute immunity. They refer to well-known
summary and
ex parte proceedings, such as the issuance of
search warrants and temporary restraining orders, and the setting
of bail. And they sound a note of practicality by stating that
recasting prison disciplinary tribunals in the mold of formal
administrative bodies would be inimical to the needs of prison
discipline and security. It is said that committee procedures fully
comply with, and indeed exceed, what
Wolff v. McDonnell,
supra, requires, that they are sufficiently "judicial" to
qualify for absolute immunity, and that
Wolff "would be
undone" as a practical matter if absolute immunity were not
afforded. Brief for Petitioners 30.
Page 474 U. S. 206
In any event, it is asserted, committee proceedings contain
ample safeguards to ensure the avoidance or correction of
constitutional errors. Among these are the qualifications for
committee service; prior notice to the inmate; representation by a
staff member; the right to present certain evidence at the hearing;
the right to be present; the requirement for a detailed record; the
availability of administrative review at three levels (demonstrated
by the relief obtained on review by these respondents at the first
two levels); and the availability of ultimate review in federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Finally, it is said that
qualified immunity would provide insufficient protection for
committee members.
We are not persuaded. To be sure, the line between absolute
immunity and qualified immunity often is not an easy one to
perceive and structure. That determination in this case, however,
is not difficult, and we readily conclude that these committee
members fall on the qualified immunity side of the line.
Under the Bureau's disciplinary policy in effect at the time of
respondents' hearings, few of the procedural safeguards contained
in the Administrative Procedure Act under consideration in
Butz were present. The prisoner was to be afforded neither
a lawyer nor an independent nonstaff representative. There was no
right to compel the attendance of witnesses or to cross-examine.
There was no right to discovery. There was no cognizable burden of
proof. No verbatim transcript was afforded. Information presented
often was hearsay or self-serving. The committee members were not
truly independent. In sum, the members had no identification with
the judicial process of the kind and depth that has occasioned
absolute immunity.
Qualified immunity, however, is available to these committee
members. That, we conclude, is the proper point at which to effect
the balance between the opposing considerations. This
less-than-absolute protection is not of small consequence. As the
Court noted in
Butz, 438 U.S. at
Page 474 U. S. 207
438 U. S.
507-508, insubstantial lawsuits can be recognized and be
quickly disposed of, and firm application of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure "will ensure that federal officials are not
harassed by frivolous lawsuits."
Id. at
438 U. S. 508.
All the committee members need to do is to follow the clear and
simple constitutional requirements of
Wolff v. McDonnell,
supra; they then should have no reason to fear substantial
harassment and liability. Qualified immunity has been widely
imposed on executive officials who possess greater
responsibilities.
See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, Butz v.
Economou, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, all
supra, and
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511
(1985).
"[I]t is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or
should know he is acting outside the law, and . . . insisting on an
awareness of clearly established constitutional limits will not
unduly interfere with the exercise of official judgment."
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at
438 U. S.
506-507.
See also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at
360 U. S.
588-589 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting);
Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 411
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
See Gray, Private
Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 Calif.L.Rev. 303, 339 (1959). Public
policy has not dictated otherwise.
It is the business of prison officials, of course, to maintain
order within their institutions. But this fact does not support a
claim that every step taken to protect constitutional rights of
prisoners will lead to a breakdown in institutional discipline and
security. Routine and automatic arguments to this effect have been
made before, and have been rejected by this Court.
See Johnson
v. Avery, 393 U. S. 483,
393 U. S.
486-487 (1969);
Lee v. Washington, 390 U.
S. 333,
390 U. S. 334
(1968);
Ex parte Hill, 312 U. S. 546
(1941).
We likewise are not impressed with the argument that anything
less than absolute immunity will result in a flood of litigation
and in substantial procedural burdens and expense for committee
members. This argument, too, has been made before. But this Court's
pronouncements in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
Page 474 U. S. 208
457 U.S. at
457 U. S.
813-820, place the argument in appropriate perspective,
for many cases may be disposed of without the necessity of pretrial
discovery proceedings. Our experience teaches us that the vast
majority of prisoner cases are resolved on the complaint alone. Of
those prisoners whose complaints survive initial dismissal, few
attempt discovery, and fewer still actually obtain it.
See
Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits
in the Federal Courts, 92 Harv.L.Rev. 610 (1979). And any expense
of litigation largely is alleviated by the fact that a Government
official who finds himself as a defendant in litigation of this
kind is often represented, as in this case, by Government counsel.
If the problem becomes acute, the Government has alternatives
available to it: it might decide to indemnify the defendant
official; Congress could make the claim a subject for the Federal
Tort Claims Act; and Congress could even consider putting in place
administrative law judges to preside at prison committee hearings.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
This activity apparently resulted in a visit to the Terre Haute
facility by an Assistant Surgeon General and in a lawsuit
concerning the last of the four hospital deaths.
See Green v.
Carlson, 581 F.2d 669 (CA7 198),
aff'd, 446 U. S.
14 (1980).
[
Footnote 2]
The Policy Statement did not provide for cross-examination,
representation by a lawyer, verbatim record of the proceeding, or
nonagency or judicial review. Neither did it specify the standard
of proof or the standard of punishment.
[
Footnote 3]
The Solicitor General advises us,
see Brief for
Petitioners 3, n. 4, that a committee of this kind at the Terre
Haute facility usually was composed of three members. By
regulation, the chairman and one other member must be of
department-head level, or higher.
See 28 CFR §
541.16(b) (1985). The reporting officer, investigating officer, and
any person who was a witness to the incident or played a
significant part in having the charge referred, may not be a member
of the committee except "where virtually every staff member in the
institution witnessed the incident in whole or in part."
Ibid.
[
Footnote 4]
Judgment was entered in favor of the defendant Warden and the
defendant administrative supervisor. Respondents did not contest
this aspect of the judgment on appeal.
[
Footnote 5]
The sole question raised by petitioners in this Court is
whether, as committee members, they were entitled to absolute
immunity. Petitioners state that they have not challenged --
although they do not concede -- the ruling that they violated
"clearly established constitutional rights" of respondents.
See Brief for Petitioners 7, n. 8.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE WHITE
join, dissenting.
The Court concludes that the members of the Institution
Discipline Committee of a federal prison are more like school board
members than they are like administrative law judges or members of
a parole board, and that therefore they are not entitled to
absolute immunity from liability for damages. Concededly the
hearings in which these officials perform their adjudicatory
function do not include all of the procedural safeguards or the
adherence to written precedent that surround the function of an
administrative law judge, but I do not read
Butz v.
Economou, 438 U. S. 478
(1978), as making these factors dispositive against a claim for
absolute immunity. I also think that the factors peculiar to the
prison
Page 474 U. S. 209
environment counsel in favor of such an immunity for these
officials.
Litigation before administrative law judges is generally
conducted by lawyers, who are trained to suppress their dislike of,
or contempt for, the particular judge before whom they try their
case. The lawyers and their clients come from their homes and
hotels to a government building in the morning, present their case
to the judge, go and have lunch, return in the afternoon, and again
present their case. When the court recesses for the day, the
parties and their lawyers return to their homes and hotels. At
least one side will be disappointed with the ultimate ruling of the
judge, but there is little reason to think that they will bear
personal animus or hostility toward the judge as a result of his
decision.
Inside the prison walls, however, a considerably different
atmosphere appears to obtain. A prisoner charged with a serious
violation of prison regulations and threatened with administrative
detention and loss of good time may have quite different emotions
when appearing before the Institution Discipline Committee than
does, for example, the plant manager of an employer charged with a
violation of the National Labor Relations Act appearing before an
administrative law judge.
"Prison life, and relations between the inmates themselves and
between the inmates and prison officials or staff, contain the
ever-present potential for violent confrontation and
conflagration."
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
433 U. S. 119,
433 U. S. 132
(1977).
Our observations in
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.
S. 475 (1973), about the relationship between a State
and its prisoners are equally applicable to the relationship
between the Federal Government and its prisoners:
"The relationship of state prisoners and the state officers who
supervise their confinement is far more intimate than that of a
State and a private citizen. For state prisoners, eating, sleeping,
dressing, washing, working, and playing are all done under the
watchful eye of the
Page 474 U. S. 210
State, and so the possibilities for litigation under the
Fourteenth Amendment are boundless. What for a private citizen
would be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with his
tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the
prisoner, a dispute with the State."
Id. at
411 U. S.
492.
In
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.
S. 539 (1974), our first major decision applying the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to prison disciplinary
proceedings, we said:
"Prison disciplinary proceedings . . . take place in a closed,
tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to
violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated
for doing so. Some are first offenders, but many are recidivists
who have repeatedly employed illegal and often very violent means
to attain their ends. They may have little regard for the safety of
others or their property or for the rules designed to provide an
orderly and reasonably safe prison life. . . . Guards and inmates
coexist in direct and intimate contact. Tension between them is
unremitting. Frustration, resentment, and despair are commonplace.
Relationships among the inmates are varied and complex, and perhaps
subject to the unwritten code that exhorts inmates not to inform on
a fellow prisoner."
Id. at
418 U. S.
561-562.
Not only may emotions run higher and tensions be exacerbated in
the prison environment, but prisoners simply are not subject to
many of the constraints which often deter members of the population
at large from litigating at the drop of a hat. We have held, for
example, that prisoners in confinement are entitled to free access
to lawbooks or some other legal assistance.
Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U. S. 817
(1977). And the great majority of prisoners qualify for
in
forma pauperis status, which entitles them to relief from
statutory
Page 474 U. S. 211
filing fees. With less to profitably occupy their time than
potential litigants on the outside, and with a justified feeling
that they have much to gain and virtually nothing to lose,
prisoners appear to be far more prolific litigants than other
groups in the population. And prisoners have made increasing use of
§ 1983 and
Bivens-type suits in recent years: 18,856
such suits were filed in federal court in the year ending June 30,
1984, as compared to just 6,606 in 1975. Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director 143, Table
24 (1984).
In light of the foregoing, I think a slightly different
balancing of the ledger is called for in the case of prison
disciplinary officials than in the case of administrative law
judges. The latter are surrounded by greater procedural protections
for the litigants, and are governed by precedent. But the former
operate in a far more volatile environment, are called upon to make
decisions more quickly, and are much more likely to be the object
of harassing litigation in the absence of absolute immunity. If in
fact the administrative system set up by the government offers
administrative relief from these officials' mistakes, and thereby
permits the vindication of constitutional claims in this manner, I
believe that the grant of absolute immunity meets the conditions
set out in
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.
S. 478 (1978).
Here we need not look far for the availability or speed of
administrative relief. Both respondents appeared before the
Institution Discipline Committee on February 21, 1975. A few days
later, that committee issued its ruling, and respondents appealed
to the Warden. On March 21, 1975, the Warden granted most of the
relief requested, ordering respondents released from administrative
segregation and restoring their forfeited good time. He also
directed that their records carry a notation that the incident
should not adversely affect their chances for parole. Respondents
then appealed to the Regional Director of the Bureau of Prisons,
who, on April 11, 1975, granted respondents' final request
Page 474 U. S. 212
that all mention of the incident be expunged from their records.
The entire administrative proceeding, from the day on which the
hearing before the committee was held to the final ruling of the
Regional Director granting respondents all of the relief requested,
took less than two months.
In
Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266
(1948), we said that
"[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by
the considerations underlying our penal system."
Id. at
334 U. S. 285.
It requires no more than a commonsense application of this
observation to the general principles laid down in
Butz,
supra, to conclude that the members of the Institution
Discipline Committee are entitled to absolute immunity from
liability for their decisions. I respectfully dissent.