Respondent construction company hired nonunion workers for a
project near Port Arthur, Tex., and a citizen protest against the
company's hiring practice was organized at a meeting held by the
Executive Committee of the Sabine Area Building and Construction
Trades Council. During the protest at the construction site,
company employees (including the two individual respondents) were
assaulted and beaten, and construction equipment was burned and
destroyed. The violence and vandalism delayed construction and led
the company to default on its contract. In their action in Federal
District Court against petitioners -- the Sabine Area Building and
Construction Trades Council and certain local unions and
individuals -- respondents asserted that petitioners had conspired
to deprive respondents of their legally protected rights, contrary
to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. V)
making available a cause of action to those injured by conspiracies
formed
"for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws."
The District Court entered judgment for respondents, granting
injunctive relief and awarding damages. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in pertinent part, holding that the purpose of the
conspiracy was to deprive respondents of their First Amendment
right not to associate with a union, that for purposes of §
1985(3) it was not necessary to show some state involvement in the
infringement of First Amendment rights, and that § 1985(3)
reaches conspiracies motivated by political or economic bias as
well as those motivated by racial bias, thus including the
conspiracy to harm the nonunion employees of the nonunion
contractor.
Held: An alleged conspiracy to infringe First Amendment
rights is not a violation of § 1985(3) unless it is proved
that the State is involved in the conspiracy or the aim of the
conspiracy is to influence the activity of the State. Moreover, the
kind of animus that § 1985(3) requires is not present in this
case. Pp.
463 U. S.
830-839.
(a)
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S.
88, upheld the application of § 1985(3) to purely
private conspiracies aimed at interfering with rights
Page 463 U. S. 826
constitutionally protected against private as well as official
encroachment, such as the rights involved in that case -- the right
to travel and Thirteenth Amendment rights. However,
Griffin did not hold or declare that, when the alleged
conspiracy is aimed at a right that is, by definition, only a right
against state interference, such as First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, the plaintiff in a § 1985(3) suit nevertheless need
not prove that the conspiracy contemplated state involvement of
some sort. Pp.
463 U. S.
831-834.
(b) The language and legislative history of § 1985(3)
establish that it requires "some racial, or perhaps otherwise
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action."
Griffin, supra, at
403 U. S. 102.
Pp.
463 U. S.
834-835.
(c) Though the predominant purpose of § 1985(3) was to
combat the then-prevalent animus against Negroes and their
supporters, it is not necessary to determine here whether §
1985(3) must be construed to reach only cases involving racial
bias. Pp.
463 U. S.
835-837.
(d) Even if it is assumed that § 1985(3) is to be construed
to reach conspiracies aimed at any class or organization on account
of its political views or activities, the provision does not reach
conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their
economic views, status, or activities. Neither the language nor the
legislative history of § 1985(3) compels a construction that
would include group action resting on economic or commercial
animus, such as animus in favor of or against unionization. Pp.
463 U. S.
837-839.
680 F.2d 979, reversed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined,
post, p.
463 U. S.
839.
Page 463 U. S. 827
JUSTICE WHITE, delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the scope of the cause of action made
available by 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. V)
* to those injured
by conspiracies formed
"for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws."
I
A. A. Cross Construction Co., Inc. (Cross), contracted with the
Department of the Army to construct the Alligator Bayou Pumping
Station and Gravity Drainage Structure on the Taylor Bayou
Hurricane Levee near Port Arthur, Tex. In accordance with its usual
practice, Cross hired workers for the project without regard to
union membership. Some of them were from outside the Port Arthur
area. Employees
Page 463 U. S. 828
of Cross were several times warned by local residents that
Cross' practice of hiring nonunion workers was a matter of serious
concern to many in the area, and that it could lead to trouble.
According to the District Court, the evidence showed that, at a
January 15, 1975, meeting of the Executive Committee of the Sabine
Area Building and Construction Trades Council a citizen protest
against Cross' hiring practices was discussed and a time and place
for the protest were chosen. On the morning of January 17, a large
group assembled at the entrance to the Alligator Bayou construction
site. In the group were union members present at the January 15
meeting. From this gathering, several truckloads of men emerged,
drove on to the construction site, assaulted and beat Cross
employees, and burned and destroyed construction equipment. The
District Court found that continued violence was threatened "if the
nonunion workers did not leave the area or concede to union
policies and principles."
Scott v. Moore, 461 F.
Supp. 224, 227 (ED Tex.1978). The violence and vandalism
delayed construction and led Cross to default on its contract with
the Army.
The plaintiffs in this case, after amendment of the complaint,
were respondents Scott and Matthews -- two Cross employees who had
been beaten -- and the company itself. The Sabine Area Building and
Trades Council, 25 local unions, and various individuals were named
as defendants. Plaintiffs asserted that defendants had conspired to
deprive plaintiffs of their legally protected rights, contrary to
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. V). The case was tried to
the court. A permanent injunction was entered, and damages were
awarded against 11 of the local unions, $5,000 each to the
individual plaintiffs and $112,385.44 to Cross, plus attorney's
fees in the amount of $25,000.
In arriving at its judgment, the District Court recognized that,
to make out a violation of § 1985(3), as construed in
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88,
403 U. S.
102-103 (1971), the plaintiff must allege and prove four
elements: (1) a conspiracy;
Page 463 U. S. 829
(2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an
act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is
either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States. The District Court
found that the first, third, and fourth of these elements were
plainly established. The issue, the District Court thought,
concerned the second element, for in construing that requirement in
Griffin, we held that the conspiracy not only must have as its
purpose the deprivation of "equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws," but also must be
motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."
Id. at
403 U. S. 102.
Griffin having involved racial animus and interference
with rights that Congress could unquestionably protect against
private conspiracies, the issue the District Court identified was
whether private conspiratorial discrimination against employees of
a nonunionized entity is the kind of conduct that triggers the
proscription of § 1985(3). The District Court concluded that
the conspiracy encompassed violations of both the civil and
criminal laws of the State of Texas, thus depriving plaintiff of
the protections afforded by those laws, that § 1985(3)
proscribes class-based animus other than racial bias, and that the
class of nonunion laborers and employers is a protected class under
the section. The District Court believed that
"men and women have the right to associate or not to associate
with any group or class of individuals, and concomitantly, to be
free of violent acts against their bodies and property because of
such association or non-association."
461 F. Supp. at 230. The conduct evidenced a discriminatory
animus against nonunion workers; hence, there had been a violation
of the federal law.
The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, except for setting aside
for failure of proof the judgment against 8 of the 11 local
Page 463 U. S. 830
unions, affirmed the judgment of the District Court.
Scott
v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979 (CA5 1982). The Court of Appeals
understood respondents' submission to be that petitioners'
conspiracy was aimed at depriving respondents of their First
Amendment right to associate with their fellow nonunion employees,
and that this curtailment was a deprivation of the equal protection
of the laws within the meaning of § 1985(3). The Court of
Appeals agreed, for the most part, holding that the purpose of the
conspiracy was to deprive plaintiffs of their First Amendment right
not to associate with a union. The court rejected the argument that
it was necessary to show some state involvement to demonstrate an
infringement of First Amendment rights. This argument, it thought,
had been expressly rejected in
Griffin, and it therefore
felt compelled to disagree with two decisions of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit espousing that position.
Murphy
v. Mount Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (1976);
Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (1972). The Court of
Appeals went on to hold that § 1985(3) reached conspiracies
motivated either by political or economic bias. Thus petitioners'
conspiracy to harm the nonunion employees of a nonunionized
contractor embodied the kind of class-based animus contemplated by
§ 1985(3) as construed in
Griffin. Because of the
importance of the issue involved, we granted certiorari, 459 U.S.
1034. We now reverse.
II
We do not disagree with the District Court and the Court of
Appeals that there was a conspiracy, an act done in furtherance
thereof, and a resultant injury to persons and property. Contrary
to the Court of Appeals, however, we conclude that an alleged
conspiracy to infringe First Amendment rights is not a violation of
§ 1985(3) unless it is proved that the State is involved in
the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy is to influence
the activity of the State. We
Page 463 U. S. 831
also disagree with the Court of Appeals' view that there was
present here the kind of animus that § 1985(3) requires.
A
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits any State from denying any person the equal protection of
the laws. The First Amendment, which by virtue of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment now applies to state governments
and their officials, prohibits either Congress or a State from
making any "law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, . . . or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble." Had § 1985(3) in
so many words prohibited conspiracies to deprive any person of the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
or of freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment, it would
be untenable to contend that either of those provisions could be
violated by a conspiracy that did not somehow involve or affect a
State.
"It is a commonplace that rights under the Equal Protection
Clause itself arise only where there has been involvement of the
State or of one acting under the color of its authority. The Equal
Protection Clause 'does not . . . add any thing to the rights which
one citizen has under the Constitution against another.'
United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542,
92 U. S.
554-555. As Mr. JUSTICE DOUGLAS more recently put it,
'The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against
state
action, not against wrongs done by
individuals.'
United States v. Williams, 341 U. S.
70,
341 U. S. 92 (dissenting
opinion). This has been the view of the Court from the beginning.
United States v. Cruikshank, supra; United States v.
Harris, 106 U. S. 629;
Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U. S. 3;
Hodges v. United
States, 203 U. S. 1;
United States v.
Powell, 212 U.S. 564. It remains the Court's view today.
See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S.
296;
Page 463 U. S. 832
United States v. Price, post, p.
383 U. S.
787."
United States v. Guest, 383 U.
S. 745,
383 U. S. 755
(1966). The opinion for the Court by Justice Fortas in the
companion case characterized the Fourteenth Amendment rights in the
same way:
"As we have consistently held 'The Fourteenth Amendment protects
the individual against
state action, not against wrongs
done by
individuals.'
Williams I, 341 U.S. at
341 U. S. 92 (opinion of
Douglas, J.)"
United States v. Price, 383 U.
S. 787,
383 U. S. 799
(1966). In this respect, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit was thus correct in holding that a conspiracy to violate
First Amendment rights is not made out without proof of state
involvement.
Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School, supra, at
1193.
Griffin v. Breckenridge is not to the contrary. There
we held that § 1985(3) reaches purely private conspiracies
and, as so interpreted, was not invalid on its face or as there
applied. We recognized that the language of the section referring
to deprivations of "equal protection" or of "equal privileges and
immunities" resembled the language and prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that, if § 1985(3) was so
understood, it would be difficult to conceive of a violation of the
statute that did not involve the State in some respect. But we
observed that the section does not expressly refer to the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that there is nothing "inherent" in the
language used in § 1985(3) "that requires the action working
the deprivation to come from the State." 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 97.
This was a correct reading of the language of the Act; the section
is not limited by the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
broader scope of § 1985(3) became even more apparent when we
explained that the conspiracy at issue was actionable because it
was aimed at depriving the plaintiffs of rights protected by the
Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution.
Page 463 U. S. 833
Section 1985(3) constitutionally can and does protect those
rights from interference by purely private conspiracies.
Griffin did not hold that, even when the alleged
conspiracy is aimed at a right that is by definition a right only
against state interference, the plaintiff in a § 1985(3) suit
nevertheless need not prove that the conspiracy contemplated state
involvement of some sort. The complaint in
Griffin
alleged, among other things, a deprivation of First Amendment
rights, but we did not sustain the action on the basis of that
allegation, and paid it scant attention. Instead, we upheld the
application of § 1985(3) to private conspiracies aimed at
interfering with rights constitutionally protected against private,
as well as official, encroachment.
Neither is respondents' position helped by the assertion that,
even if the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide authority to
proscribe exclusively private conspiracies, precisely the same
conduct could be proscribed by the Commerce Clause. That is no
doubt the case; but § 1985(3) is not such a provision, since
it "provides no substantive rights itself" to the class conspired
against.
Great American Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v.
Novotny, 442 U. S. 366,
442 U. S. 372
(1979). The rights, privileges, and immunities that § 1985(3)
vindicates must be found elsewhere, and here the right claimed to
have been infringed has its source in the First Amendment. Because
that Amendment restrains only official conduct, to make out their
§ 1985(3) case, it was necessary for respondents to prove that
the State was somehow involved in or affected by the
conspiracy.
The Court of Appeals accordingly erred in holding that §
1985(3) prohibits wholly private conspiracies to abridge the right
of association guaranteed by the First Amendment. Because of that
holding, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to determine
whether respondents' action could be sustained under § 1985(3)
as involving a conspiracy to deprive respondents of rights,
privileges, or immunities under state law or those protected
against private action by the Federal
Page 463 U. S. 834
Constitution or federal statutory law. Conceivably, we could
remand for consideration of these possibilities, or we ourselves
could consider them. We take neither course, for, in our view, the
Court of Appeals should also be reversed on the dispositive ground
that § 1985(3)'s requirement that there must be "some racial,
or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus
behind the conspirators' action,"
Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 102,
was not satisfied in this case.
B
As indicated above, after examining the language, structure, and
legislative history of § 1985(3), the
Griffin opinion
emphatically declared that the section was intended to reach
private conspiracies that in no way involved the State. The Court
was nevertheless aware that the sweep of § 1985 as originally
introduced in the House provoked strong opposition in that chamber
and precipitated the proposal and adoption of a narrowing
amendment, which limited the breadth of the bill so that the bill
did not provide a federal remedy for "all tortious, conspiratorial
interferences with the rights of others." 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 101.
In large part, opposition to the original bill had been motivated
by a belief that Congress lacked the authority to punish every
assault and battery committed by two or more persons.
Id.
at
403 U. S. 102;
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68, 115, 153, 188, 315
(1871);
id. at 485-486, 514. As we interpreted the
legislative history 12 years ago in
Griffin, the narrowing
amendment "centered entirely on the animus or motivation that would
be required. . . ." 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 100.
Thus:
"The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of
interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be
avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purpose -- by
requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of
invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of
the limiting amendment.
Page 463 U. S. 835
See the remarks of Representatives Willard and
Shellabarger, quoted
supra, at 100. The language requiring
intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and
immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action. The conspiracy, in other words, must aim at a
deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to
all."
Id. at 102 (footnotes omitted). This conclusion was
warranted by the legislative history, was reaffirmed in
Novotny, supra, and we accept it as the authoritative
construction of the statute.
Because the facts in
Griffin revealed an animus against
Negroes and those who supported them, a class-based, invidious
discrimination which was the central concern of Congress in
enacting § 1985(3), the Court expressly declined to decide
"whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory
intent other than racial bias would be actionable under the portion
of § 1985(3) before us." 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 102,
n. 9. Both courts below answered that question; both held that the
section not only reaches conspiracies other than those motivated by
racial bias, but also forbids conspiracies against workers who
refuse to join a union. We disagree with the latter conclusion, and
do not affirm the former.
C
The Court of Appeals arrived at its result by first describing
the Reconstruction-era Ku Klux Klan as a political organization
that sought to deprive a large segment of the Southern population
of political power and participation in the governance of those
States and of the Nation. The Court of Appeals then reasoned that,
because Republicans were among the objects of the Klan's
conspiratorial activities, Republicans in particular and political
groups in general were to be protected by § 1985(3). Finally,
because it believed that an animus against an economic group such
as those who preferred
Page 463 U. S. 836
nonunion association is "closely akin" to the animus against
political association, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
animus against nonunion employees in the Port Arthur area was
sufficiently similar to the animus against a political party to
satisfy the requirements of § 1985(3).
We are unpersuaded. In the first place, it is a close question
whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus
other than animus against Negroes and those who championed their
cause, most notably Republicans. The central theme of the bill's
proponents was that the Klan and others were forcibly resisting
efforts to emancipate Negroes and give them equal access to
political power. The predominant purpose of § 1985(3) was to
combat the prevalent animus against Negroes and their supporters.
The latter included Republicans generally, as well as others, such
as Northerners who came South with sympathetic views towards the
Negro. Although we have examined with some care the legislative
history that has been marshaled in support of the position that
Congress meant to forbid wholly nonracial, but politically
motivated, conspiracies, we find difficult the question whether
§ 1985(3) provided a remedy for every concerted effort by one
political group to nullify the influence of or do other injury to a
competing group by use of otherwise unlawful means. To accede to
that view would go far toward making the federal courts, by virtue
of § 1985(3), the monitors of campaign tactics in both state
and federal elections, a role that the courts should not be quick
to assume. If respondents' submission were accepted, the
proscription of § 1985(3) would arguably reach the claim that
a political party has interfered with the freedom of speech of
another political party by encouraging the heckling of its rival's
speakers and the disruption of the rival's meetings.
We realize that there is some legislative history to support the
view that § 1985(3) has a broader reach. Senator Edmunds'
statement on the floor of the Senate is the clearest expression of
this view. He said that, if a conspiracy
Page 463 U. S. 837
were formed against a man
"because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a
Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a
Vermonter, . . . then this section could reach it."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 567 (1871). The provision that
is now § 1985(3), however, originated in the House. The
narrowing amendment, which changed § 1985(3) to its present
form, was proposed, debated, and adopted there, and the Senate made
only technical changes to the bill. Senator Edmunds' views, since
he managed the bill on the floor of the Senate, are not without
weight. But we were aware of his views in
Griffin, 403
U.S. at
403 U. S. 102,
n. 9, and still withheld judgment on the question whether §
1985(3), as enacted, went any farther than its central concern --
combating the violent and other efforts of the Klan and its allies
to resist and to frustrate the intended effects of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Lacking other evidence of
congressional intention, we follow the same course here.
D
Even if the section must be construed to reach conspiracies
aimed at any class or organization on account of its political
views or activities, or at any of the classes posited by Senator
Edmunds, we find no convincing support in the legislative history
for the proposition that the provision was intended to reach
conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their
economic views, status, or activities. Such a construction would
extend § 1985(3) into the economic life of the country in a
way that we doubt that the 1871 Congress would have intended when
it passed the provision in 1871.
Respondents submit that Congress intended to protect two general
classes of Republicans, Negroes and Northern immigrants, the latter
because the Klan resented carpetbagger efforts to dominate the
economic life of the South. Respondents rely on a series of
statements made during the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
of which § 1985 was a part,
Page 463 U. S. 838
indicating that Northern laborers and businessmen who had come
from the North had been the targets of Klan conspiracies. Brief for
Respondents 42-44. As we understand these remarks, however, the
speakers believed that these Northerners were viewed as suspect
because they were Republicans and were thought to be sympathetic to
Negroes. We do not interpret these parts of the debates as
asserting that the Klan had a general animus against either labor
or capital, or against persons from other States as such. Nor is it
plausible that the Southern Democrats were prejudiced generally
against enterprising persons trying to better themselves, even if
those enterprising persons were from Northern States. The animus
was against Negroes and their sympathizers, and perhaps against
Republicans as a class, but not against economic groups as such.
Senator Pool, on whose remarks respondents rely, identified what he
thought was the heart of the matter:
"The truth is that, whenever a northern man, who goes into a
southern State, will prove a traitor to the principles which he
entertained at home, when he will lend himself to the purposes of
the Democracy or be purchased by them, they forget that he is a
carpet-bagger and are ready to use him and elevate him to any
office within their gift."
Cong Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st. Sess., 607 (1871).
We thus cannot construe § 1985(3) to reach conspiracies
motivated by economic or commercial animus. Were it otherwise, for
example, § 1985(3) could be brought to bear on any act of
violence resulting from union efforts to organize an employer or
from the employer's efforts to resist it, so long as the victim
merely asserted and proved that the conduct involved a conspiracy
motivated by an animus in favor of unionization, or against it, as
the case may be. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
151
et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), addresses in great
detail the relationship between employer, employee, and union in a
great variety of situations,
Page 463 U. S. 839
and it would be an unsettling event to rule that strike and
picket-line violence must now be considered in the light of the
strictures of § 1985(3). Moreover, if anti-union,
anti-nonunion, or anti-employer biases represent the kinds of
animus that trigger § 1985(3), there would be little basis for
concluding that the statute did not provide a cause of action in a
variety of other situations where one economic group is pitted
against another, each having the intent of injuring or destroying
the economic health of the other. We think that such a construction
of the statute, which is at best only arguable, and surely not
compelled by either its language or legislative history, should be
eschewed, and that group actions generally resting on economic
motivations should be deemed beyond the reach of § 1985(3).
Economic and commercial conflicts, we think, are best dealt with by
statutes, federal or state, specifically addressed to such
problems, as well as by the general law proscribing injuries to
persons and property. If we have misconstrued the intent of the
1871 Congress, or, in any event, if Congress now prefers to take a
different tack, the Court will, of course, enforce any statute
within the power of Congress to enact.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
* Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. V), in its
entirety, provides as follows:
"(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges"
"If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go
in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State
or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more
persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any
citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support
or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election
of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or
Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or
to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such
support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this
section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy,
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived
of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action
for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or
deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators."
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL,
and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.
The Ku Klux Klan Act was the Reconstruction Congress' response
to politically motivated mob violence in the post-bellum South
designed to intimidate persons in the exercise of their legal
rights. While § 1 of the Act prohibits state officials from
violating the federal rights of citizens, § 2 addresses the
problem of mob violence directly. [
Footnote 1] It provides
Page 463 U. S. 840
criminal and civil liability for private conspiracies to
deprive
"either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws."
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, § 2, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976 ed., Supp. V)). Today, in a classic
case of mob violence intended to intimidate persons from exercising
their legal rights, the Court holds that the Ku Klux Klan Act
provides no protection.
I
The Court first holds that § 1985(3) prohibits a private
conspiracy to interfere with the exercise of First Amendment rights
only if some state action is involved. [
Footnote 2]
Ante at
463 U. S.
830-834. The Court assumes that § 1985(3) merely
bans private conspiracies to accomplish deprivations that are
actionable under § 1983 when caused by state officials.
Although Congress could have passed such a statute, the simple fact
is that it did not.
A
On its face, § 1985(3) differs structurally from §
1983.
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325,
460 U. S.
336-337 (1983);
id. at
460 U. S. 356
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting);
Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U. S. 88,
403 U. S. 99
(1971). Unlike § 1983, § 1985(3) does not provide a cause
of action for the deprivation of independent rights "secured by the
Constitution and laws." Instead, it prohibits private conspiracies
intended to prevent persons or classes of persons from the equal
exercise of any of their
Page 463 U. S. 841
civil rights. No violation of an independent legal right is
required, nor does § 1985(3) require state action or the
involvement of the State in any other way.
The legislative history unambiguously establishes the meaning
and function of the "equal protection" and "equal privileges and
immunities" language in § 1985(3). [
Footnote 3] As originally introduced by Representative
Shellabarger, § 2 did not contain these terms. Instead, it
imposed federal criminal liability on private conspiracies to
commit certain enumerated actions that would be federal crimes if
committed in an enclave subject to United States jurisdiction.
[
Footnote 4] In support of his
bill, the Congressman argued that Congress had constitutional
authority to legislate against private action in order to protect
and secure the rights of national citizenship. Referring
Page 463 U. S. 842
to Justice Washington's statement of national privileges and
immunities in
Coreld v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230)
(CCED Pa. 1825), Shellabarger stated that § 2 "punishes, not
individual crime, but only banded, mastering, confederated
violence. Then also it must be directed against the rights,
privileges, or immunities of a citizen." Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess., App. 69 (Mar. 28, 1871).
In the debate that followed, radical Republicans supported the
bill on a broader ground. They asserted that the Fourteenth
Amendment had altered the balance between the States and the
National Government, so that Congress now was permitted to protect
life, liberty, and property by legislating directly against
criminal activity. [
Footnote 5]
From the beginning of the debate, Democratic and other opponents of
the bill saw the radical imprimatur on § 2 and argued that it
exceeded congressional authority by extending federal jurisdiction
to cover common crimes. [
Footnote
6] Republicans of more moderate persuasion also refused to
support § 2 as proposed, fearing that it reflected the radical
view.
Unlike the Democrats, however, the moderate Republicans agreed
with Shellabarger that Congress had authority to reach private
conduct by virtue of its power to protect the rights of national
citizenship. They believed that Fourteenth Amendment rights were
possessed by persons regardless of the presence of state action.
See Cong.Globe 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 153 (Apr. 4,
1871) (remarks of Rep. Garfield);
id. at 486 (Apr. 5,
1871) (remarks of Rep. Cook);
Monell v. New York City Dept. of
Social Services, 436 U. S. 658,
436 U. S. 673
(1978). The dispute within the Republican majority centered on
whether the bill itself was limited to
Page 463 U. S. 843
this purpose, or instead whether it did or should usurp state
authority over local and individual crimes.
Although individual views among the moderates differed,
[
Footnote 7] the extensive
remarks of Representative Garfield summarized their position well.
See R. Harris, The Quest for Equality 47 (1960). Garfield
did not believe that Congress had the power to displace the
criminal jurisdiction of the States. In his view, however, the
Fourteenth Amendment provided citizens with an affirmative and
congressionally enforceable right to equal protection of the laws:
"the provision that the States shall not "deny the equal protection
of the laws" implies that they shall afford equal protection."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 153 (Apr. 4, 1871). When the
States neglect or refuse to provide equal protection,
"it is undoubtedly within the power of Congress to provide by
law for the punishment of all persons, official or private, who
shall invade these rights [guaranteed by the Civil War Amendments],
and who by violence, threats, or intimidation shall deprive any
citizen of their fullest enjoyment."
Ibid.
Garfield's theory of the Fourteenth Amendment was that the right
of equal protection of the laws, as well as other rights, were
rights of national citizenship guaranteed directly to the people.
They existed independently of any state action. He disagreed with
the radicals about the circumstances under which Congress could
step in to protect those rights. He stated:
"[T]he chief complaint is not that the laws of the State are
unequal, but that even where the laws are just and
Page 463 U. S. 844
equal on their face, yet, by a systematic maladministration of
them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a
portion of the people are denied equal protection under them.
Whenever such a state of facts is clearly made out, I believe the
last clause of the first section [of the Fourteenth Amendment]
empowers Congress to step in and provide for doing justice to those
persons who are thus denied equal protection."
Ibid. Garfield concluded by stating that he could
support the bill if § 2 was amended to reflect this view.
Ibid.
Because the moderates held the balance of power,
see
Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original
Purpose, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 402, 412, n. 47 (1979), some amendment was
necessary. The day after Garfield's speech, Shellabarger introduced
a new § 2. Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 477 (Apr. 5,
1871). The amendment removed the list of actionable crimes and
added a civil cause of action for persons injured by the
conspiracy. It also added the critical language that imposed
liability on persons who
"conspire together for the purpose, either directly or
indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities
under the laws. [
Footnote
8]"
Ibid. According to Shellabarger:
Page 463 U. S. 845
"The object of the amendment is . . . to confine the authority
of this law to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack
the equality of rights of American citizens; that any violation of
the right, the animus and effect of which is to strike down the
citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as
contrasted with his and other citizens' rights shall be within the
scope of the remedies of this section."
Id. at 478. Representative Willard -- who opposed the
original version and claimed to have drafted the amendment --
stated that
"the essence of the crime should consist in the intent to
deprive a person of the equal protection of the laws and of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; in other words, that the
Constitution secured, and was only intended to secure, equality of
rights and immunities, and that we could only punish by United
States laws a denial of that equality."
Id. at App. 188 (Apr. 6, 1871). Although these are the
only two statements that bear directly on the clause at issue,
other Representatives generally approved of the amendment because
it avoided the evil of imposing a federal criminal law on the
States. [
Footnote 9] As
Page 463 U. S. 846
amended, this bill was adopted by the House on April 6.
Id. at 522.
The Senate considered the House bill for only three days, and
with a few limited changes, adopted it on April 14.
Id. at
709. In explaining the scope of § 2, Senator Edmunds expressed
the view that it included conspiracies to
"overthrow the Government, conspiracies to impede the course of
justice, conspiracies to deprive people of the equal protection of
the laws, whatever those laws may be."
Id. at 568 (Apr. 11, 1871). Senator Pool expressed his
support by remarking that the Fourteenth Amendment had conferred a
new right on every citizen -- the right to protection of the laws.
Id. at 608 (Apr. 12, 1871).
Throughout the debates on § 2, the Republican majority
agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred rights, including
the right to equal protection of the laws, directly on persons, and
that those rights could be violated by private conspirators. The
debate was over the conditions under which the Federal Government
could step in to assert jurisdiction to protect those rights -- a
separate constitutional
Page 463 U. S. 847
question of federal-state comity -- not over the nature of the
rights themselves. By limiting § 2 to deprivations of equal
protection and of equal privileges and immunities, the 42d Congress
avoided the constitutional problems the more moderate Republicans
saw in the creation of a general federal criminal law. The effect
of that language was to limit federal jurisdiction to cases in
which persons were the victims of private conspiracies motivated by
the intent to interfere in the equal exercise and enjoyment of
their legal rights. [
Footnote
10] Congress did not intend any requirement of state
involvement in either a civil or criminal action under §
2.
B
Consistent with this view, the Court has held on several
occasions that § 2 reaches purely private conspiracies. In
United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629
(1883), the Court construed § 2 to prohibit a private
conspiracy to deprive certain persons of equal protection by
removing them from jail by force and lynching them. Section 2, it
stated, applies
"no matter how well the State may have performed its duty. Under
it private persons are liable to punishment for conspiring
Page 463 U. S. 848
to deprive any one of the equal protection of the laws enacted
by the State. [
Footnote
11]"
Id. at
106 U. S. 639;
cf. United States v. Williams, 341 U. S.
70,
341 U. S. 76
(1951) (plurality opinion) (similar conspiracy provision, 18 U.S.C.
§ 241, reaches private action).
Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651
(1951), arose from a political brawl between two white groups. The
complaint alleged a § 1985(3) conspiracy to hinder the
plaintiffs' equal enjoyment of their First Amendment rights.
Id. at
341 U. S.
653-654. The Court noted possible constitutional
problems with imposing civil liability for this type of activity,
id. at
341 U. S. 659,
but passed over the issue.
Id. at
341 U. S. 661.
Instead, it found that the alleged conspiracy was not one
prohibited by the statute, because there was no "allegation that
defendants were conscious of or trying to influence the law."
Ibid. The
Collins decision thus suggested a
requirement of state involvement virtually identical to that
adopted by the Court today.
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S.
88 (1971), however, put this suggested requirement to
rest. In a unanimous decision, the Court stated that the evolution
of the law had washed away the constitutional concerns of
Collins, and that there was no reason "not to accord to
the words of the statute their apparent meaning." [
Footnote 12] 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 96.
The Court expressly rejected a requirement of state involvement in
the
Page 463 U. S. 849
form of an intent to interfere with state officials. [
Footnote 13]
Id. at
403 U. S. 99;
see Comment, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights:
McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 90
Harv.L.Rev. 1721, 1730 (1977) (state involvement requirement is
incompatible with
Griffin). It then reviewed the
legislative history to find that the only statutory limitation on
the broad sweep of § 1985(3) was a requirement of "some
racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus." 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 102;
see id. at
403 U. S.
99-102.
As
Griffin held, the "equal protection of the laws" and
the "equal privileges and immunities" language in § 1985(3)
was intended by the 42d Congress to prevent the statute from
creating a general federal criminal or tort law. It was not
intended to impose a state action or state involvement requirement
on actions under the statute. Properly interpreted, § 1985(3)
prohibits private conspiracies designed to interfere with persons'
equal enjoyment and exercise of their civil rights even if those
conspiracies have no state involvement of any kind. [
Footnote 14]
II
As
Griffin recognized, the words "equal protection of
the laws" and "equal privileges and immunities" limit the types
of
Page 463 U. S. 850
actionable private conspiracies to those involving class-based
animus. As an initial matter, the intended victims must be victims
not because of any personal malice the conspirators have toward
them, but because of their membership in or affiliation with a
particular class. Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 702 (Apr. 14,
1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds);
see id. at 567 (Apr. 11,
1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). Moreover, the class must exist
independently of the defendants' actions; that is, it cannot be
defined simply as the group of victims of the tortious action.
See Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673, 678 (CA7 1976);
Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 928 (CA9
1975).
A
Aside from this initial rule of exclusion, however, the types of
classes covered by the statute are far from clear. The statutory
language is broad, and could include a wide variety of class-based
denials of equal protection and equal enjoyment of rights; yet it
is also indefinite, and in
Griffin, the Court reserved the
question whether nonracial classes are covered. 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 102.
The legislative history provides little assistance, probably
because the congressional majority had little disagreement on the
need to halt conspirational Klan violence, and was far more
concerned with its constitutional authority to criminalize such
conspiracies.
The general statements of the Act's purpose give some indication
of the breadth of the remedy Congress provided. Contrary to the
Court's suggestion,
ante at
463 U. S.
835-837, the 42d Congress viewed the Ku Klux Klan as
preeminently a political organization, whose violence was thought
to be premised most often on the political viewpoints of its
victims. [
Footnote 15]
"They
Page 463 U. S. 851
murder men in their own houses for a difference in political
opinions and defy the laws which denounce these acts."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 72 (Mar. 30, 1871)
(remarks of Rep. Blair);
see id. at 391 (Apr. 1, 1871)
(remarks of Rep. Elliott). Moreover, as the legislative history
surveyed above reveals, Congress recognized that this violence
could fester because the general opposition to Reconstruction
policies in the South rendered local law enforcement authorities
less likely to protect the rights of persons affiliated in any way
with those policies.
In my view, Congress intended to provide a federal remedy for
all classes that seek to exercise their legal rights in unprotected
circumstances similar to those of the victims of Klan violence.
Instead of contemplating a list of actionable class traits, though,
Congress had in mind a functional definition of the scope of §
2. As Representative Garfield stated in the debates, the chief
danger was "a systematic maladministration of [the laws], or a
neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions."
Id. at
App. 153 (Apr. 4, 1871). Congress did not require that a § 2
plaintiff allege a neglect on the part of state officers to enforce
the laws equally. Instead, it took the view that, whenever a
conspiracy involved invidious animus toward a class of persons, the
possibility of ineffective state enforcement was sufficient to
support federal intervention. [
Footnote 16]
Id. at 485 (Apr. 5, 1871) (remarks
of Rep. Cook).
Page 463 U. S. 852
B
This view of the scope of § 2 is corroborated by
congressional statements of concern for another group subject to
Klan violence: economic migrants. While the Klan's victims usually
were Republicans, Congress extended protection to this group
because of its tenuous position in the South. Reconstruction,
although mainly a political program,
see J. Randall &
D. Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction 592-600 (2d ed.1961),
also was an attempt to reorganize the economic life of the region.
W. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America 345-353 (1962).
Particularly irritating to the poorer Southerners who supported the
Ku Klux Klan was the new competition in the labor market from
Negroes.
Id. at 19; Randall & Donald,
supra,
at 684. Moreover, carpetbaggers from the North moved into the South
to seek their fortunes as well as to make new lives. C. Woodward,
Reunion and Reaction 52-57 (1966).
Many of the Democratic opponents of the Act saw the Act's
protection of Negroes and carpetbaggers as just another facet of
the Reconstruction policies of economic exploitation. [
Footnote 17] Republican supporters
of the bill also recognized the economic features of
Reconstruction. They, however, saw the Klan terrorism as directed
at the legitimate economic activities of those who migrated to the
South to better themselves. [
Footnote 18]
Page 463 U. S. 853
Representative Kelley was the most explicit: he interpreted the
Klan problem as essentially one of Southern resistance to economic
migrations of Northerners.
Id. at 338-339, 341 (Mar. 29,
1871). [
Footnote 19]
C
The 42d Congress was concerned about these economic migrants
because of their vulnerability as symbols and effects of
Reconstruction policies. Congress' answer to the problem of Klan
violence -- a problem with political, racial, and economic
overtones -- was to create a general federal remedy to protect
classes of people from private conspiracies aimed at interfering
with the class members' equal exercise of their civil rights. The
critical consideration is the 42d Congress' perception that the
atrocities perpetrated by the Klan were injuring persons who,
largely because of their political affiliation, were unable to
demand protection from local law enforcement officials. Congress
intended to provide a remedy to any class of persons, whose beliefs
or associations placed them in danger of not receiving equal
protection of the laws from local authorities. While certain class
traits, such as race, religion, sex, and national origin,
per
se meet this requirement, other traits also may implicate the
functional concerns in particular situations.
III
In the circumstances of this case, respondents are protected by
§ 2 and fall within this definition. Port Arthur,
Page 463 U. S. 854
Tex., was a self-professed union town. Respondents were
threatened because of petitioners' view that nonunion workers were
encroaching into an area that petitioners desired to keep
union-dominated. The identity or individuality of each of the
victims was irrelevant to the conspiracy; the victims were attacked
because of their preexisting nonunion association. The conspiracy
was similar to the Klan conspiracies Congress desired to punish in
enacting § 2. In this union town, the effectiveness of local
law enforcement protection for nonunion workers was open to
question. [
Footnote 20]
Petitioners intended to hinder a particular group in the exercise
of their legal rights because of their membership in a specific
class.
IV
In
Griffin v. Breckenridge, we reaffirmed our general
approach to Reconstruction civil rights statutes, including §
1985(3). Those statutes are to be given "
a sweep as broad as
[their] language.'" 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 97,
quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.
S. 787, 383 U. S. 801
(1966). In the 12 years since Griffin, that principle has
not lost its vitality. I see no basis for the Court's crabbed and
uninformed reading of the words of § 1985(3). I
dissent.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 1 of the Act is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976 ed., Supp. V). Section 2, in addition to the prohibition at
issue here (now codified in § 1985(3), first clause),
prohibits conspiracies to interfere with the performance of duties
by federal officers (§ 1985(1)), with the administration of
federal courts (§ 1985(2), first part), with the
administration of state courts, (§ 1985(2), second part), with
the duties of a state officer (§ 1985(3), second clause), and
with the right to support candidates in a federal election (§
1985(3), third clause).
See Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.
S. 719,
460 U. S. 724
(1983).
See generally Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.
S. 325,
460 U. S. 336,
n. 17 (1983) (describing §§ 3-6).
[
Footnote 2]
The Court does not require that the conspirators be state
officials or act under color of state law. Instead, the requirement
is that the conspiracy intend to cause the State or a person acting
under color of state law to deprive the victims of the conspiracy
of their constitutional rights.
[
Footnote 3]
The Court's misinterpretation of the language of the statute is
compounded by the Court's subtle confusion of statutory
construction with constitutional interpretation. As
Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88,
403 U. S. 104
(1971), established and the Court seemingly recognizes,
see
ante at
463 U. S.
832-833, the two questions are separate. Determining the
scope of § 1985(3) is a matter of statutory construction, and
has nothing to do with current interpretations of the First or
Fourteenth Amendments. The 42d Congress' view of its constitutional
authority in 1871 to reach private conduct under the Fourteenth
Amendment is relevant in interpreting the reach of §
1985(3).
[
Footnote 4]
The original version of § 2 provided:
"That if two or more persons shall, within the limits of any
State, band or conspire together to do any act in violation of the
rights, privileges, or immunities of another person, which, being
committed within a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States, would, under any law of the United States
then in force, constitute the crime of either murder, manslaughter,
mayhem, robbery, assault and battery, perjury, subornation of
perjury, criminal obstruction of legal process or resistance of
officers in discharge of official duty, arson, or larceny; and if
one or more of the parties to said conspiracy shall do any act to
effect the object thereof, all the parties to or engaged in said
conspiracy, whether principals or accessories [
sic], shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall
be liable, &c., and the crime shall be punishable as such in
the courts of the United States."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68-69 (Mar. 28, 1871)
(statement of Rep. Shellabarger), quoting H.R. 320, § 2, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1871).
[
Footnote 5]
See, e.g., Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 73
(Mar. 30, 1871) (remarks of Rep. A. Blair);
id. at App. 85
(Mar. 31, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Bingham);
id. at App. 141
(Apr. 3, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Shanks).
[
Footnote 6]
See, e.g., id. at 337 (Mar. 29, 1871) (remarks of Rep.
Whitthorne),
id. at 361 (Mar. 31, 1871) (remarks of Rep.
Swan);
id. at 366 (Mar. 31, 1871); (remarks of Rep.
Arthur);
id. at 373 (Mar. 31, 1871) (remarks of Rep.
Archer).
[
Footnote 7]
Representative Farnsworth, for example, took the more
conservative view that Congress could not punish individuals under
the Equal Protection Clause, but could only prohibit unequal state
legislation.
Id. at 115 (Mar. 31, 1871). He ultimately
voted for the Act.
Id. at 522 (Apr. 6, 1871). Other
Republicans held the belief that Congress could punish individuals
only when their conspiracy intended to obstruct a state official's
duty to provide equal protection of the laws.
See Comment,
A Construction of Section 1985(C) in Light of Its Original Purpose,
46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 402, 414-415 (1979). The bill as passed, however,
was not limited by either type of restriction.
[
Footnote 8]
Immediately following this clause in the amendment were two
other proposed clauses using similar equal protection language. The
first prohibited a conspiracy
"for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted
authorities of any State from giving or securing to all persons
within such State the equal protection of the laws."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 477 (Apr. 5, 1871). This
clause is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), second clause,
see n 1,
supra, and clearly requires some state involvement.
The second clause prohibited a conspiracy
"to injure any person in his person or his property for lawfully
enforcing the right of any person or class of persons to the equal
protection of the laws."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 477 (Apr. 5, 1871). An
amendment in the Senate added to this last clause the prohibition
of a conspiracy
"for the purpose of in any manner impeding, hindering,
obstructing, or defeating the due course of justice in any State or
Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen of the United States
the due and equal protection of the laws."
Id. at 702 (Apr. 14, 1871). This clause as amended is
now codified in the second part of § 1985(2).
[
Footnote 9]
For example, Representative Cook, who had opposed the original
version and who had introduced similar amendments,
see id.
at 478 (Apr. 5, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger), stated that
the amendment did not provide for federal punishment of "an assault
and battery when committed by two or more persons within a State."
Id. at 485 (Apr. 5, 1871).
"The proposition we maintain is that wherever the Constitution
of the United States secures a right to a citizen, Congress may
enforce and protect that right. One absolute test is this: Congress
may legislate to protect any right the denial of which by a State
court would give the citizen affected thereby a right to appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States for redress. . . . I do not
care what that right is, so it is a right which is secured by the
Constitution of the United States, either by an affirmative or a
negative provision. Whether a right secured by the Constitution
touches the person of a citizen, that right may be protected by the
national laws."
Ibid.
However, Representative Burchard, who shared with Farnsworth a
more limited view of congressional authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment,
see n 7,
supra, stated in general terms that
"[t]he gravamen of the offense is the unlawful attempt to
prevent a State through its officers enforcing in behalf of a
citizen of the United States his constitutional right to equality
of protection."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 315 (Apr. 6, 1871).
Shortly thereafter, Representative Farnsworth restated his view,
see n 7,
supra, and attempted to amend the clause immediately
following the one at issue to limit its scope to federal officers.
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 513 (Apr. 6, 1871). After a
lengthy colloquy with Representative Poland,
id. at
512-514, Farnsworth dropped his amendment.
Id. at 515. In
any event, Burchard agreed with Cook that the
"amendment obviates in a great measure the objections and the
doubtful construction as to the extent of jurisdiction for the
punishment of crimes intended by the bill. It is not denial of
protection, but of equality of protection, which constitutes the
offense against the United States."
Id. at App. 315 (Apr. 6, 1871).
[
Footnote 10]
The Court in
Great American Federal Savings & Loan Assn.
v. Novotny, 442 U. S. 366,
442 U. S. 372,
376 (1979), stated that § 1985(3) is a remedial statute, and
provides no substantive rights. The 42d Congress also believed it
was providing a remedy,
see Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess., App. 68 (Mar. 28, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger) -- a
remedy for violations of the right to equal protection which it
believed was guaranteed against both state and private action. To
the extent that the language of § 2 incorporated that
interpretation of the scope of the right, it is not strictly
remedial from the current perspective on constitutional law.
Moreover, like other conspiracy statutes, § 1985(3) "is best
viewed as a unique provision for which a remedial versus
substantive characterization is misplaced." Note, Private
Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights: The Scope of Section 1985(3)
After
Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Novotny, 61 B.U.L.Rev. 1007, 1021 (1981). The Novotny Court's
statements were accurate, if unnecessary, in the context of the
issue in that case, but should not be given independent
significance. The Court, however, employs them in summary fashion
to dispose of the statutory construction question without real
analysis of the issue.
Ante at
463 U. S.
833.
[
Footnote 11]
Although the indictment was valid under the statute, 106 U.S. at
106 U. S. 639,
the Court found no constitutional authorization for the criminal
prohibition of § 2 under the Fourteenth Amendment,
id. at
106 U. S.
638-640, citing
United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U. S. 542
(1876), under the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 106 U.S. at
106 U. S. 637,
106 U. S.
640-643, or under Art. 4, § 2,
id. at
106 U. S.
643.
[
Footnote 12]
As the Court notes,
ante at
463 U. S. 832,
the
Griffin court stated:
"A century of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication has . . . made
it understandably difficult to conceive of what might constitute a
deprivation of the equal protection of the laws by private persons.
Yet there is nothing inherent in the phrase that requires the
action working the deprivation to come from the State."
403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 97.
This implicitly recognizes that the Members of the 42d Congress
believed that the right to equal protection of the laws could be
violated by private action.
[
Footnote 13]
This form of state action is covered by the second clause of
§ 1985(3), which imposes liability for hindering a state
officer in providing equal protection. 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 99;
see nn.
1 and |
1 and S. 825fn10|>10,
supra. The Court today asserts that
Griffin
rejected a general requirement that the conspiracy itself involve
state action, but did not reject specifically the requirement of
state involvement when the constitutional right implicated is one
against state action.
See 1 and S. 825fn2|>n. 2,
supra. The Court,
however, simply ignores the fact that we also rejected the latter
type of requirement as a matter of statutory construction,
see 403 U.S. at
403 U. S. 99,
and arrives at a contradictory construction by imposing the
constitutional interpretation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments on the statute.
See 1 and S. 825fn3|>n. 3,
supra.
[
Footnote 14]
The Constitution poses no obstacle to this exercise of
congressional power. The Court correctly recognizes that Congress
has the power under the Commerce Clause to ban such conspiracies.
Ante at
463 U. S. 833;
see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.
S. 294,
379 U. S. 304
(1964);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U. S. 241,
379 U. S.
257-258 (1964).
[
Footnote 15]
The Klan's goal was to overthrow Republican Reconstruction
policies both by terrorizing local supporters of those policies in
order to place sympathetic Democrats in office, and, when that
failed, by supplanting the authority of local officials directly
with mob violence.
See Comment, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. at
408-410. Although Negroes frequently were the objects of this
terrorism, they were simply one symbol of the hated Reconstruction
policies. According to Senator Pool,
"[t]he real question is whether the reconstruction policy of
Congress, which was adopted after the close of war and announced as
necessary to the future peace and security of this nation, shall be
carried into practical effect, or whether it shall practically be
nullified by local violence."
Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 101 (Mar. 31, 1871);
see id. at 333 (Mar. 29, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Hoar);
id. at 390-391 (Apr. 1, 1871) (remarks of Rep. Elliot);
id. at App. 252-253 (Apr. 4, 1871) (remarks of Sen.
Morton).
[
Footnote 16]
That vulnerability is a factor is indicated by Representative
Roberts' description of the distribution of mob violence:
"Take the political census of the States lately in rebellion by
districts. Mark those which are strongly Republican and those which
are decidedly Democratic. In neither of them will you find
systematic assaults upon citizens. The districts which are
politically doubtful are scarlet with human gore."
Id. at 413 (Apr. 3, 1871);
see id. at 607
(Apr. 12, 1871) (remarks of Sen. Pool). Senator Edmunds' frequently
quoted remark about Democrats, Vermonters, Catholics, and
Methodists,
id. at 567 (Apr. 11, 1871), quoted
ante at
463 U. S. 837,
indicates classes that, in particular circumstances or in
geographic regions, might qualify for protection because of their
vulnerability.
[
Footnote 17]
Representative Swan viewed Reconstruction simply as opening the
South to economic exploitation by Northerners under the pretext of
aiding Negroes. Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 362 (Mar. 31,
1871);
see id. at 354 (Mar. 30, 1871) (remarks of Rep.
Beck).
[
Footnote 18]
See id. at 368 (Mar. 31, 1871) (remarks of Sen.
Sheldon) (right of persons to migrate and engage in legitimate
traffic);
id. at 414 (Apr. 1, 1871) (remarks of Rep.
Roberts) ("The carpet-bag is a sign of the vitality of our
people");
id. at 500 (Apr. 6, 1871) (remarks of Sen.
Frelinghuysen) (Constitution protects migration of workers).
[
Footnote 19]
See id. at 653 (Apr. 13, 1871) (remarks of Sen. Osborn)
(violence harms men who have migrated to the South for economic
reasons). Senator Morton echoed this theme, stating that the
purpose of Klan violence was to drive out Republicans; this
effectively barred Northern capital and immigration.
Id.
at App. 252 (Apr. 4, 1871).
[
Footnote 20]
Although it is not necessary to plead ineffectiveness of local
law enforcement in order to maintain a 1986(3) action, some victims
of the Port Arthur incident experienced difficulty in obtaining an
injunction from a state court against future episodes of violence.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.