Petitioner was indicted for,
inter alia, aiding and
abetting a named Internal Revenue Service agent in accepting
unlawful compensation, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(2)
and 18 U.S.C. § 2, which provides that whoever commits an
offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal. Prior to the indictment, the IRS agent was acquitted of
certain of the § 7214(a)(2) violations which petitioner was
accused of aiding and abetting. Petitioner moved to dismiss his
indictment as to aiding and abetting these violations on the ground
that, since the agent had been acquitted of such violations,
petitioner could not be convicted of aiding and abetting them. The
District Court denied the motion, and after trial petitioner was
convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: A defendant accused of aiding and abetting in the
commission of a federal offense may properly be convicted despite
the prior acquittal of the alleged actual perpetrator of the
offense. Pp.
447 U. S.
14-26.
(a) Read against its common law background, 18 U.S.C. § 2
evinces a clear congressional intent to permit such a conviction.
The section gives general effect to what had always been the common
law rule for second-degree principals (principals who were actually
or constructively present at the scene of the crime and aided and
abetted its commission) and for all misdemeanants. The legislative
history of § 2 confirms this understanding. With the enactment
of § 2, all participants in conduct violating a federal
criminal statute are "principals," and, as such, they are
punishable for their criminal conduct, the fate of other
participants being irrelevant. Pp.
447 U. S.
15-20.
(b) The Government is not barred, under the doctrine of
nonmutual collateral estoppel, from relitigating the issue of
whether the IRS agent accepted unlawful compensation. Application
of that doctrine is not appropriate here. In a criminal case, the
Government is often without the kind of "full and fair opportunity
to litigate" that is a prerequisite of estoppel. The application of
collateral estoppel in criminal cases is also complicated by rules
of evidence and exclusion unique to criminal law. Finally, in this
case the important federal interest in the enforcement
Page 447 U. S. 11
of the criminal law outweighs the economy concerns undergirding
the collateral estoppel doctrine. Pp. 21-25.
610 F.2d 1076, affirmed.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether a defendant
accused of aiding and abetting in the commission of a federal
offense may be convicted after the named principal has been
acquitted of that offense.
I
In June, 1977, petitioner Standefer was indicted on four counts
of making gifts to a public official, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(f), and on five counts of aiding and abetting a revenue
official in accepting compensation in addition to that authorized
by law, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. [
Footnote 1] The
indictment charged that
Page 447 U. S. 12
petitioner, as head of Gulf Oil Corp.'s tax department, had
authorized payments for five vacation trips to Cyril Niederberger,
who then was the Internal Revenue Service agent in charge of the
audits of Gulf's federal income tax returns. [
Footnote 2] Specifically, the indictment alleged
that Gulf, on petitioner's authorization, had paid for vacations
for Niederberger in Pompano Beach (July 1971), Miami (January
1973), Absecon (August-September 1973), Pebble Beach (April 1974),
and Las Vegas (June 1974). The four counts under 18 U.S.C. §
201(f) related to the Miami, Absecon, Pebble Beach, and Las Vegas
vacations; the five counts under 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(2) and 18
U.S.C. § 2 were one for each vacation. [
Footnote 3]
Prior to the filing of this indictment, Niederberger was
separately charged in a 10-count indictment -- two counts for each
of the five vacations -- with violating 18 U.S.C. § 201(g)
[
Footnote 4] and 26 U.S.C.
§ 7214(a)(2). In February, 1977, Niederberger was tried on
these charges. He was convicted on four counts of violating §
201(g) in connection with the vacations in Miami, Absecon, Pebble
Beach, and Las Vegas, and of
Page 447 U. S. 13
two counts of violating § 7214(a)(2) for the Pebble Beach
and Las Vegas trips. He was acquitted on the § 201(g) count
involving the Pompano Beach trip and on the three counts under
§ 7214(a)(2) charging him with accepting payments from Gulf
for trips to Pompano Beach, Miami, and Absecon. [
Footnote 5]
In July, 1977, following Niederberger's trial and before the
trial in his own case commenced, petitioner moved to dismiss the
counts under § 7214(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 which charged
him with aiding and abetting Niederberger in connection with the
Pompano Beach, Miami, and Absecon vacations. Petitioner argued
that, because Niederberger, the only named principal, had been
acquitted of accepting unlawful compensation as to those vacations,
he could not be convicted of aiding and abetting in the commission
of those offenses. The District Court denied the motion.
Petitioner's case then proceeded to trial on all nine counts. At
trial, petitioner admitted authorizing payment for all five
vacation trips, but testified that the trips were purely social,
and not designed to influence Niederberger in the performance of
his official duties. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all nine
counts. [
Footnote 6] Petitioner
was sentenced to concurrent terms of six months' imprisonment
followed by two years' probation; he was fined a total of $18,000
-- $2,000 on each count.
Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, claiming,
inter alia, that he could
not
Page 447 U. S. 14
be convicted of aiding and abetting a principal, Niederberger,
when that principal had been acquitted of the charged offense. By a
divided vote, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, rejected that
contention. 610 F.2d 1076 (1979). It concluded that "the outcome of
Niederberger's prosecution has no effect on [petitioner's]
conviction."
Id. at 1078.
Because the question presented is one of importance to the
administration of criminal justice on which the Courts of Appeals
are in conflict, we granted certiorari. [
Footnote 7] 444 U.S. 1011. We affirm.
II
Petitioner makes two main arguments: first, that Congress, in
enacting 18 U.S.C. § 2, did not intend to authorize
prosecution of an aider and abettor after the principal has been
acquitted of the offense charged; second, that, even if § 2
permits such a prosecution, the Government should be barred from
relitigating the issue of whether Niederberger accepted unlawful
compensation in connection with the Pompano Beach, Miami, and
Absecon vacations. [
Footnote 8]
The first contention relies largely on the common law as it
prevailed before the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 2. The second
rests on the contemporary doctrine of nonmutual collateral
estoppel
Page 447 U. S. 15
A
At common law, the subject of principals and accessories was
riddled with "intricate" distinctions. 2 J. Stephen, A History of
the Criminal Law of England 231 (1883). In felony cases, parties to
a crime were divided into four distinct categories: (1) principals
in the first degree who actually perpetrated the offense; (2)
principals in the second degree who were actually or constructively
present at the scene of the crime and aided or abetted its
commission; (3) accessories before the fact who aided or abetted
the crime, but were not present at its commission; and (4)
accessories after the fact who rendered assistance after the crime
was complete.
See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law
§ 63 (1972); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *33; Perkins,
Parties to Crime, 89 U.Pa.L Rev. 581 (1941). By contrast,
misdemeanor cases "d[id] not admit of accessaries either before or
after the fact,"
United States v. Hartwell, 26 F. Cas.
196, 199 (No. 15,318) (CC Mass. 1869); instead, all parties to a
misdemeanor, whatever their roles, were principals.
United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277,
320 U. S. 281
(1943); 1 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 33 (14th
ed.1978).
Because, at early common law, all parties to a felony received
the death penalty, certain procedural rules developed tending to
shield accessories from punishment.
See LaFave &
Scott,
supra at 499. Among them was one of special
relevance to this case: the rule that an accessory could not be
convicted without the prior conviction of the principal offender.
See 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown *623-*624. Under this
rule, the principal's flight, death, or acquittal barred
prosecution of the accessory. And if the principal were pardoned or
his conviction reversed on appeal, the accessory's conviction could
not stand. In every way, "an accessory follow[ed], like a shadow,
his principal." 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Law § 666 (8th ed.
1892).
This procedural bar applied only to the prosecution of
accessories
Page 447 U. S. 16
in felony cases. In misdemeanor cases, where all participants
were deemed principals, a prior acquittal of the actual perpetrator
did not prevent the subsequent conviction of a person who rendered
assistance.
Queen v. Humphreys and Turner, [1965] 3 All
E.R. 689;
Queen v. Burton, 13 Cox C.C. 71, 75 (Crim.App.
1875). And in felony cases, a principal in the second degree could
be convicted notwithstanding the prior acquittal of the
first-degree principal.
King v. Taylor and Shaw, 168
Eng.Rep. 283 (1785); Queen v. Wallis,
1 Salk. 334, 91 Eng.Rep.
294 (K.B. 1703); Brown v. State, 28 Ga.199 (1859);
State v. Whitt, 113 N.C. 716, 18 S.E. 715 (1893). Not
surprisingly, considerable effort was expended in defining the
categories -- in determining, for instance, when a person was
"constructively present" so as to be a second-degree principal. 4
Blackstone, supra, at *34. In the process, justice all too
frequently was defeated.
To overcome these judge-made rules, statutes were enacted in
England and in the United States. In 1848, the Parliament enacted a
statute providing that an accessory before the fact could be
"indicted, tried, convicted, and punished in all respects
like
the Principal." 11 & 12 Vic. ch. 46, § 1 (emphasis
added). As interpreted, the statute permitted an accessory to be
convicted "although the principal be acquitted."
Queen v.
Hughes, Bell 242, 248, 169 Eng.Rep. 1245, 1248 (1860). Several
state legislatures followed suit. [
Footnote 9] In 1899,
Page 447 U. S. 17
Congress joined this growing reform movement with the enactment
of a general penal code for Alaska which abrogated the common law
distinctions and provided that
"all persons
Page 447 U. S. 18
concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or
misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting
the crime or aid and abet in its commission, though not present,
are principals, and to be tried and punished as such."
Act of Mar. 3, 1899, § 186, 30 Stat. 1282 In 1901, Congress
enacted a similar provision for the District of Columbia. [
Footnote 10]
The enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 2 in 1909 was part and parcel
of this same reform movement. The language of the statute, as
enacted, unmistakably demonstrates the point:
"Whoever directly commits any act constituting an offense
defined in any law of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces, or procures its commission, is a principal."
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, § 332, 35 Stat. 1152 (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 11]
Page 447 U. S. 19
The statute "abolishe[d] the distinction between principals and
accessories and [made] them all principals."
Hammer v. United
States, 271 U. S. 620,
271 U. S. 628
(1926). Read against its common law background, the provision
evinces a clear intent to permit the conviction of accessories to
federal criminal offenses despite the prior acquittal of the actual
perpetrator of the offense. It gives general effect to what had
always been the rule for second-degree principals and for all
misdemeanants.
The legislative history of § 2 confirms this understanding.
The provision was recommended by the Commission to Revise and
Codify the Criminal and Penal Laws of the United States as "[i]n
accordance with the policy of recent legislation" by which "those
whose relations to a crime would be that of accessories before the
fact according to the common law are made principals." 1 Final
Report of the Commission to Revise and Codify the Laws of the
United States 118-119 (1906). The Commission's recommendation was
adopted without change. The House and Senate Committee Reports, in
identical language, stated its intended effect:
"The committee has deemed it wise to make those who are
accessories before the fact at common law principal offenders,
thereby permitting their indictment and conviction for a
substantive offense."
"At common law, an accessory cannot be tried without his consent
before the conviction or outlawry of the principal except where the
principal and accessory are tried together; if the principal could
not be found or if he had been indicted and refused to plead, had
been pardoned or died before conviction, the accessory could not be
tried at all. This change of the existing law renders these
obstacles to justice impossible."
S.Rep. No. 10, 60th
Page 447 U. S. 20
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 13 (1908); H.R.Rep. No. 2, 60th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 13 (1908). [
Footnote 12] And on the floor of the House of
Representatives, Representative Moon, the Chairman of the Joint
Select Committee, put the point simply: "We . . . have abolished
the existing arbitrary distinction between felonies and
misdemeanors." 42 Cong.Rec. 585 (1908).
This history plainly rebuts petitioner's contention that §
2 was not intended to authorize conviction of an aider and abettor
after the principal had been acquitted of the offense charged.
[
Footnote 13] With the
enactment of that section, all participants in conduct violating a
federal criminal statute are "principals." As such, they are
punishable for their criminal conduct; the fate of other
participants is irrelevant. [
Footnote 14]
Page 447 U. S. 21
B
The doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel was unknown to the
common law and to the Congress when it enacted § 2 in 1909.
[
Footnote 15] It emerged in
a civil case in 1942,
Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust
Savings Assn., 19 Cal. 2d
807, 122 P.2d 892. This Court first applied the doctrine in
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation, 402 U. S. 313
(1971). There, we held that a determination of patent invalidity in
a prior infringement action was entitled to preclusive effect
against the patentee in subsequent litigation against a different
defendant. Just this past Term, we again applied the doctrine this
time "offensively" -- to hold that a defendant who had had a "full
and fair" opportunity to litigate issues of fact in a civil
proceeding initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
could be estopped from relitigating those issues in a subsequent
action brought by a private plaintiff.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U. S. 322
(1979). In both cases, application of nonmutual estoppel promoted
judicial economy and conserved private resources without unfairness
to the litigant against whom estoppel was invoked.
Here, petitioner urges us to apply nonmutual estoppel against
the Government; specifically he argues that the Government
Page 447 U. S. 22
should be barred from relitigating Niederberger's guilt under
§ 7214(a)(2) in connection with the vacation trips to Pompano
Beach, Miami, and Absecon. That issue, he notes, was an element of
his offense which was determined adversely to the Government at
Niederberger's trial. [
Footnote
16]
This, however, is a criminal case, presenting considerations
different from those in
Blonder-Tongue or
Parklane
Hosiery. First, in a criminal case, the Government is often
without the kind of "full and fair opportunity to litigate" that is
a prerequisite of estoppel. Several aspects of our criminal law
make this so: the prosecution's discovery rights in criminal cases
are limited, both by rules of court and constitutional privileges;
it is prohibited from being granted a directed verdict or from
obtaining a judgment notwithstanding the verdict no matter how
clear the evidence in support of guilt,
cf. Fed.Rule
Civ.Proc. 50; it cannot secure a new trial on the ground that an
acquittal was plainly contrary to the weight of the evidence,
cf. Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 59; and it cannot secure appellate
review where a defendant has been acquitted.
See United States
v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662,
163 U. S. 671
(1896).
The absence of these remedial procedures in criminal cases
permits juries to acquit out of compassion or compromise or because
of "
their assumption of a power which they had no right to
exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity.'"
Dunn v. United States, 284 U. S. 390,
284 U. S. 393
(1932), quoting Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60
(CA2 1925). See generally H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The
American Jury
Page 447 U. S. 23
193-347 (ed.1976). [
Footnote
17] It is, of course, true that verdicts induced by passion and
prejudice are not unknown in civil suits. But in civil cases,
post-trial motions and appellate review provide an aggrieved
litigant a remedy; in a criminal case the Government has no similar
avenue to correct errors. Under contemporary principles of
collateral estoppel, this factor strongly militates against giving
an acquittal preclusive effect.
See Restatement (Second)
of Judgments § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) (denying
preclusive effect to an unreviewable judgment). [
Footnote 18]
The application of nonmutual estoppel in criminal cases is also
complicated by the existence of rules of evidence and exclusion
unique to our criminal law. It is frequently true in criminal cases
that evidence inadmissible against one defendant is admissible
against another. The exclusionary rule, for example, may bar the
Government from introducing evidence against one defendant because
that evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights. And the suppression of that evidence may result in an
acquittal.
Page 447 U. S. 24
The same evidence, however, may be admissible against other
parties to the crime "whose rights were [not] violated."
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.
S. 165,
394 U. S.
171-172 (1969).
Accord, Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U. S. 128,
439 U. S. 134
(1978). In such circumstances, where evidentiary rules prevent the
Government from presenting all its proof in the first case,
application of nonmutual estoppel would be plainly unwarranted.
[
Footnote 19]
It is argued that this concern could be met on a case-by-case
basis by conducting a pretrial hearing to determine whether any
such evidentiary ruling had deprived the Government of an
opportunity to present its case fully the first time around. That
process, however, could prove protracted and burdensome. Under such
a scheme, the Government presumably would be entitled to seek
review of any adverse evidentiary ruling rendered in the first
proceeding and of any aspect of the jury charge in that case that
worked to its detriment. Nothing short of that would insure that
its opportunity to litigate had been "full and fair." If so, the
"pretrial hearing" would fast become a substitute for appellate
review, and the very purpose of litigation economy that estoppel is
designed to promote would be frustrated.
Finally, this case involves an ingredient not present in either
Blonder-Tongue or
Parklane Hosiery: the important
federal interest in the enforcement of the criminal law.
Blonder-Tongue and
Parklane Hosiery were disputes
over private rights between private litigants. In such cass, no
significant harm flows from enforcing a rule that affords a
litigant only one full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue,
and there is no sound reason for burdening the courts with
repetitive litigation.
Page 447 U. S. 25
That is not so here. The Court of Appeals opinion put the point
well:
"[T]he purpose of a criminal court is not to provide a forum for
the ascertainment of private rights. Rather, it is to vindicate the
public interest in the enforcement of the criminal law, while at
the same time safeguarding the rights of the individual defendant.
The public interest in the accuracy and justice of criminal results
is greater than the concern for judicial economy professed in civil
cases, and we are thus inclined to reject, at least as a general
matter, a rule that would spread the effect of an erroneous
acquittal to all those who participated in a particular criminal
transaction. To plead crowded dockets as an excuse for not trying
criminal defendants is, in our view, neither in the best interests
of the courts nor the public."
610 F.2d at 1093. In short, this criminal case involves
"competing policy considerations" that outweigh the economy
concerns that undergird the estoppel doctrine.
See
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 68.1(e) and comments
thereto (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976);
cf. Commissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591
(1948).
III
In denying preclusive effect to Niederberger's acquittal, we do
not deviate from the sound teaching that "justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice."
Offutt v. United States,
348 U. S. 11,
348 U. S. 14
(1954). This case does no more than manifest the simple, if
discomforting, reality that "different juries may reach different
results under any criminal statute. That is one of the consequences
we accept under our jury system."
Roth v. United States,
354 U. S. 476,
354 U. S. 492,
n. 30 (1957). While symmetry of results may be intellectually
satisfying, it is not required.
See Hamling v. United
States, 418 U. S. 87,
418 U. S. 101
(1974).
Page 447 U. S. 26
Here, petitioner received a fair trial at which the Government
bore the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that
Niederberger violated 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(2) and that
petitioner aided and abetted him in that venture. He was entitled
to no less -- and to no more.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Title 18 U.S.C. § 201(f) provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
"Whoever, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper
discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly gives, offers,
or promises anything of value to any public official . . . for or
because of any official act performed or to be performed by such
public official . . . [is guilty of an offense]."
Title 26 U.S.C. § 214(a)(2) punishes:
"Any officer or employee of the United States acting in
connection with any revenue law of the United States . . . who
knowingly demands other or greater sums than are authorized by law,
or receives any fee, compensation, or reward, except as by law
prescribed, for the performance of any duty."
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2 provides in relevant part:
"Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal."
[
Footnote 2]
The indictment also named Gulf Oil Corp. and Joseph Fitzgerald,
a manager in Gulf's tax department, as defendants. Gulf pleaded
guilty, and Fitzgerald
nolo contendere to all nine
counts.
[
Footnote 3]
It appears that the statute of limitations had run on any
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(f) in connection with the Pompano
Beach vacation.
[
Footnote 4]
Title 18 U.S.C. § 201(g) punishes:
"Whoever, being a public official . . . otherwise than as
provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly
or indirectly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts,
receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself for or
because of any official act performed or to be performed by
him."
[
Footnote 5]
Niederberger was sentenced to six months' imprisonment followed
by a five-year period of probation, and he was fined $5,000. His
convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
United
States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63 (CA3 1978).
[
Footnote 6]
The jury was instructed that, in order to render a guilty
verdict on the § 7214(a) counts, it must determine (1) that
Niederberger knowingly "received a fee, compensation or reward
except as prescribed by law . . . for the performance . . . of any
duty" and (2) that petitioner "willfully aided and abetted [him]."
App. 53a-54a, 57a.
[
Footnote 7]
The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit,
and the District of Columbia Circuit have reached the same
conclusion as the Third Circuit.
See United States v.
Musgrave, 483 F.2d 327, 331-332 (CA5 1973);
United States
v Azadian, 436 F.2d 81 (CA9 1971);
Perkins v. United
States, 315 F.2d 120, 122 (CA9 1963);
Gray v. United
States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 153, 260 F.2d 483 (1958). The Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has taken the contrary view
that,
"where the only potential principal has been acquitted, no crime
has been established and the conviction of an aider and abettor
cannot be sustained."
United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 779 (1971).
Accord, United States v. Prince, 430 F.2d 1324 (CA4 1970).
See also n 11,
infra.
[
Footnote 8]
Petitioner also challenges the instructions to the jury on
criminal intent. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
instructions were correct.
[
Footnote 9]
By 1909, when § 2 was enacted, 13 States had enacted
legislation providing that the acquittal of the actual perpetrator
was not a bar to the conviction of one charged with giving him aid.
See Cal.Stat., ch. 99, §§ 11, 12 (1850) (
see
People v. Bearss, 10 Cal. 68, 70 (1858)); Del.Rev.Stat., ch.
133, § 1 (1893); Iowa Rev.Code Ann. § 4314 (1885)
(
see State v. Lee, 91 Iowa 499, 501-502, 60 N.W. 119, 120
(1894)); Kan.Gen.Stat. § 5180 (1889) (
see State v.
Bogue, 52 Kan. 79, 86-87, 34 P. 410, 412 (1893)); Ky.Stat.
§ 1128 (1903) (
see Commonwealth v. Hicks, 118 Ky.
637, 642, 82 S.W. 265, 266 (1904)); Miss.Code § 1026 (1906)
(
see Fleming v. State, 142 Miss. 872, 880-881, 108 So.
143, 144-145 (1926)); Mont.Penal Code Ann. § 1854 (1895);
N.Y.Penal Code § 29 (1895) (
see People v. Kief, 126
N.Y. 661, 663-664, 27 N.E. 556, 557 (1891)); N.D.Rev.Code
Crim.Proc. § 8060 (1895); Okla.Stat. § 5523 (1890);
S.D.Stat.Ann. § 8520 (1899); Utah Comp.Laws § 4752
(1907); Wash.Code of Proc. § 1189 (1891) (
see State v.
Gifford, 19 Wash. 464, 467-468, 53 P. 709, 710 (1898)).
Since then, at least 21 other States have enacted legislation
with that effect.
See 1977 Ala.Act No. 607, § 425;
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-304-1 (1978); Ark.Stat.Ann. §
41-304 (1977); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-1-605 (1973) (
see
Roberts v. People, 103 Colo. 250, 87 P.2d 251 (1938));
Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53a-9 (1979); Fla.Stat. § 777.011 (1979)
(
see Butts v. State, 286 So. 2d 28 (1973)); Ga.Code §
26-802 (1978); Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, § 5-3 (1979); Ind.Code
§ 35-41-2-4 (Supp. 1978); La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14.24 (West
1974) (
see State v. McAllister, 366 So.
2d 1340 (1978)); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 57 (1979);
Mich.Comp.Laws § 767.39 (1970) (
People v.Smith, 271
Mich. 553, 260 N.W. 911 (1935)); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 562.046
(1978); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-206 (Supp. 1978) (State v. Rice,
188 Neb. 728,
199 N.W.2d
480 (1972)); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 626.8 (1974);
N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2C: 2-6 (West Spec.Pamph.1979); N.M.Stat.Ann.
§ 30-1-13 (1978); Pa.Cons.Stat., Tit. 18, § 306 (Supp.
1979); S.C.Code § 16-1-50 (1976) (
State v.
Massey, 229 S.E.2d
332 (1976)); Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 7.03 (Vernon 1974);
Wis.Stat. § 939.05 (1977).
Eleven other States have enacted statutes that modify the common
law rule; these statutes have not been authoritatively construed on
whether an accessory can be prosecuted after his principal's
acquittal.
See Haw.Rev.Stat. § 702-225 (1976); Idaho
Code § 19-1431 (1979); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., ch. 274, § 3
(West 1970); Minn.Stat. § 609.05 (1978); Nev.Rev.Stat. §
195.040 (1979); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2923.03 (1979);
Ore.Rev.Stat. § 161.160 (1979); Vt.Stat.Ann., Tit. 13, §
3 (1974); Va.Code § 18.21 (1975); W.Va.Code § 61 7
(1977); Wyo.Stat. § 6-1-114 (1977) .
Only four States -- Maryland, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and
Tennessee -- clearly retain the common law bar.
See State v.
Ward, 284 Md. 189, 396 A.2d 1041 (1978);
State v.
Jones, 101 N.C. 719, 8 S.E. 147 (1888) (interpreting
N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-5 (1969)); R.I.Gen.Laws § 11-1-3
(1970);
Pierce v. State, 130 Tenn. 24, 168 S.W. 851
(1914).
The Model Penal Code provides that an accomplice may be
convicted "though the person claimed to have committed the offense
. . . has been acquitted." § 2.06 (7) (Tent. Draft No. 3,
1955),
and see comments 38-39 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1953).
[
Footnote 10]
The provision is still in effect; it provides that all
persons
"aiding or abetting the principal offender, shall be charged as
principals and not as accessories, the
intent of this section
being that as to all accessories before the fact the law heretofore
applicable in cases of misdemeanor only shall apply to all crimes.
. . ."
Act of Mar. 3, 1901, § 908, 31 Stat. 1337; D.C.Code §
22-105 (1973) (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 11]
In 1951, the words "is a principal" were altered to read "is
punishable as a principal." That change was designed to eliminate
all doubt that in the case of offenses whose prohibition is
directed at members of specified classes (
e.g., federal
employees) a person who is not himself a member of that class may
nonetheless be punished as a principal if he induces a person in
that class to violate the prohibition.
See S.Rep. No.
1020, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8 (1951). The change was fully
consistent with congressional intent to treat accessories before
the fact as principals and to abolish the common law procedural
bar. Indeed, by the time of the 1951 reenactment, the Circuit
Courts that had addressed the question had concluded that § 2
authorizes conviction of an aider and abettor notwithstanding the
prior acquittal of the perpetrator of the offense.
See United
States v. Klass, 166 F.2d 373, 380 (CA3 1948);
Von Patzoll
v. United States, 163 F.2d 216, 219 (CA10 1947);
Kelly v.
United States, 258 F. 392, 402 (CA6 1919);
Rooney v.
United States, 203 F. 928, 931-932 (CA9 1913). Congress
manifested no intent to disturb this interpretation.
See
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575,
434 U. S. 580
(1978).
[
Footnote 12]
Petitioner emphasizes the fact that the Committee Report fails
to mention the common law rule that the prior acquittal of a
principal barred conviction of an accessory, and argues accordingly
that Congress did not view that rule as an "obstacle to justice."
The Court of Appeals correctly rejected this argument, being
unwilling to "apply the canon of statutory interpretation . . .
expressio unius, exclusio alterius . . . to the language
employed in a
committee report." 610 F.2d 1076, 1084 (CA3
1979) (emphasis added). We agree. Petitioner's argument would
permit an omission in the legislative history to nullify the plain
meaning of a statute. The language of § 2 abolishes the common
law categories and treats all parties as principals. It is not
necessary for Congress, in its committee reports, to identify all
of the "weeds" which are being excised from the garden.
[
Footnote 13]
It bears mention that, even prior to 1909, petitioner would not
have prevailed in his attempt to bar prosecution on the §
7214(a)(2) counts. As the Government notes, the version of 26
U.S.C. § 7214 then in effect defined the offense to be a
misdemeanor.
See Rev.Stat. § 3169 (1878). Hence, the
prior acquittal of his principal would not have barred petitioner's
prosecution. And because petitioner accompanied Niederberger on
four of five trips, and therefore was "present" at the scene of the
crime,
see Tr. 1018-1020, 1024-1027, 1034-1036, 1096, he
could have been convicted at common law for those crimes even if
the offense had been designated a felony.
[
Footnote 14]
Nothing in
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 373 U.
S. 262 (1963), relied on by petitioner, is to the
contrary. There, petitioner had been convicted of aiding and
abetting other to violate a city trespass ordinance which
subsequently was declared constitutionally invalid.
See Gober
v. Birmingham, 373 U. S. 374
(1963). Shuttlesworth's case merely applied the rule that "there
can be no conviction for aiding and abetting someone to do an
innocent act." 373 U.S. at
373 U. S. 265. Here, by contrast, the Government proved
in petitioner's case that Niederberger had violated §
7214(a)(2) in connection with each of the five trips.
See
n 6,
supra.
[
Footnote 15]
In 1912, in
Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co.,
225 U. S. 111,
225 U. S. 127,
this Court stated that it was "a principle of general elementary
law that the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual."
See also
Stone v. Farmers Bank of Kentucky, 174 U.
S. 409 (1899);
Keokuk & Western R. Co. v.
Missouri, 152 U. S. 301,
152 U. S. 317
(1894);
Litchfield v. Goodnow, 123 U.
S. 549,
123 U. S. 552
(1887).
[
Footnote 16]
Petitioner does not contend that the Constitution prevents the
Government from prosecuting him on the three § 7214(a)(2)
counts as to which Niederberger was acquitted. Nothing in the
Double Jeopardy Clause or the Due Process Clause forecloses putting
petitioner on trial as an aider and abettor simply because another
jury has determined that his principal was not guilty of the
offenses charged.
Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.
S. 436 (1970).
[
Footnote 17]
Niederberger's case demonstrates the point. As to the Absecon
and Miami vacations, the jury convicted Niederberger of receiving
something of value "because of any official act performed . . . by
him," 18 U.S.C. § 201(g), but acquitted him of receiving "any
fee, compensation, or reward . . . for the performance of any
duty," 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(2). No explanation has been offered
for these seemingly irreconcilable determinations. This
inconsistency is reason, in itself, for not giving preclusive
effect to the acquittals on the Absecon and Miami counts.
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 88(4) (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1976).
See also 610 F.2d at 1112 (Gibbons,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Harary v.
Blumenthal, 555 F.2d 1113, 1116-1117 (CA2 1977).
[
Footnote 18]
This is not to suggest that the availability of appellate review
is always an essential predicate of estoppel.
See Johnson Co.
v. Wharton, 152 U. S. 252
(1894);
see generally 1B J. Moore & T. Currier,
Moore's Federal Practice � 0.416[5] (2d ed.1974). The
estoppel doctrine, however, is premised upon an underlying
confidence that the result achieved in the initial litigation was
substantially correct. In the absence of appellate review, or of
similar procedures, such confidence is often unwarranted.
[
Footnote 19]
Indeed, as the Court of Appeals observed, to give the first case
preclusive effect would undermine the
Alderman rule by
affording a defendant whose rights were not violated the benefits
of suppression.
See 610 F.2d at 1094, n. 51.