Under federal grants awarded by the National Institute of
Arthritis, Metabolism, and Digestive Diseases (NIAMDD) (a federal
agency), the University Group Diabetes Program (UGDP), a group of
private physicians and scientists, conducted a long-term study of
the effectiveness of certain diabetes treatment regimens. Pertinent
federal regulations authorized some supervision of UGDP and gave
NIAMDD the right of access to, or permanent custody of, the raw
data generated by UGDP. However, the day-to-day administration of
grant-supported activities was in UGDP's hands, and NIAMDD did not
exercise its right to review or obtain custody of the raw data,
which remained at all times in UGDP's possession and under its
ownership. The UGDP's reports on the results of its study,
indicating that the use of certain drugs in diabetes treatment
increased the risk of heart disease, ultimately resulted in
proceedings by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to restrict the
labeling and use of the drugs. After both UGDP and HEW denied
petitioners' request for access to the UGDP raw data underlying its
published reports, petitioners filed suit in Federal District Court
to require HEW to make the raw data available under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), which empowers federal courts to order an
"agency" to produce "agency records improperly withheld" from an
individual requesting access. The District Court granted summary
judgment for respondents, holding that HEW properly denied the
request on the ground that the data did not constitute "agency
records" under the FOIA. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: HEW need not produce the requested data because
they are not "agency records" within the meaning of the FOIA. Data
generated by a privately controlled organization which has received
federal grants (grantee), but which data has not at any time been
obtained by the agency, are not "agency records" accessible under
the FOIA. Pp
445 U. S.
177-187.
(a) There is no merit to petitioners' claim that the data were
at least records of UGDP, and that the federal funding and
supervision of UGDP alone provide the close connection necessary to
render its
Page 445 U. S. 170
records "agency records" as that term is used in the FOIA. While
"agency record" is not defined in the Act, Congress excluded
private grantees from FOIA disclosure obligations by excluding them
from the Act's definition of "agency," an action consistent with
its prevalent practice of preserving the autonomy of federal
grantees and their records. Since Congress found that federal
funding and supervision (short of Government control) did not
justify direct access to the grantee's records, it cannot be
concluded that those identical activities were intended to permit
indirect access through an expansive definition of "agency
records." Pp.
445 U. S.
178-182.
(b) Nor may a broad definition of "agency records" be invoked so
as to include all documents created by a private grantee to which
the Government has access and which the Government has used. Such a
broad definition is not supported by either the language,
structure, or legislative history of the FOIA. Instead, Congress
contemplated that an agency must first either create or obtain a
record as a prerequisite to its becoming an "agency record" within
the meaning of the FOIA. This conclusion is also supported by other
Acts in which Congress has associated creation or acquisition with
the concept of a governmental record. Although, in this case, HEW
has a right of access to the data, and a right if it so chooses to
obtain permanent custody of the UGDP records, in this context, the
FOIA applies to records which have been, in fact, obtained, and not
to records which merely
could have been obtained. Without
first establishing that the agency has created or obtained the
document, the agency's reliance on or use of the document is
similarly irrelevant. Pp.
445 U. S.
182-186.
190 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 587 F.2d 1128, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
MARSHALL, J., joined,
post, p.
445 U. S.
187.
Page 445 U. S. 171
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, empowers
federal courts to order an "agency" to produce "agency records
improperly withheld" from an individual requesting access. §
552(a)(4)(B). We hold here that written data generated, owned, and
possessed by a privately controlled organization receiving federal
study grants are not "agency records" within the meaning of the Act
when copies of those data have not been obtained by a federal
agency subject to the FOIA. Federal participation in the generation
of the data by means of a grant from the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) does not make the private organization
a federal "agency" within the terms of the Act. Nor does this
federal funding, in combination with a federal right of access,
render the data "agency records" of HEW, which is a federal
"agency" under the terms of the Act.
I
In 1959, a group of private physicians and scientists
specializing in the treatment of diabetes formed the University
Group Diabetes Program (UGDP). The UGDP conducted a long-term study
of the effectiveness of five diabetes treatment regimens. Two of
these treatment regimens involved diet control in combination with
the administration of either tolbutamide, or phenformin
hydrochloride, both "oral hypoglycemic" drugs. The UGDP's
participating physicians were located at 12 clinics nationwide, and
the study was coordinated at the Coordinating Center of the
University of Maryland.
Page 445 U. S. 172
The study generated more than 55 million records documenting the
treatment of over 1,000 diabetic patients who were monitored for a
5- to 8-year period. In 1970, the UGDP presented the initial
results of its study indicating that the treatment of adult-onset
diabetics with tolbutamide increased the risk of death from
cardiovascular disease over that present when diabetes was treated
by the other methods studied. The UGDP later expanded these
findings to report a similarly increased incidence of heart disease
when patients were treated with phenformin hydrochloride. These
findings have, in turn, generated substantial professional
debate.
The Committee on the Care of the Diabetic (CCD), a national
association of physicians involved in the treatment of diabetes
mellitus patients, have been among those critical of the UGDP
study. CCD requested the UGDP to grant it access to the raw data in
order to facilitate its review of the UGDP findings, but UGDP has
declined to comply with that request. CCD therefore sought to
obtain the information under the Freedom of Information Act. The
essential facts are not in dispute, and we hereafter set forth
those relevant to our decision.
The UGDP study has been solely funded by federal grants in the
neighborhood of $15 million between 1961 and 1978. These grants
were awarded UGDP by the National Institute of Arthritis,
Metabolism, and Digestive Diseases (NIAMDD), a federal agency,
[
Footnote 1] pursuant to the
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 241(c). NIAMDD has not
only awarded the federal grants to UGDP, but has exercised a
certain amount
Page 445 U. S. 173
of supervision over the funded activity. Federal regulations
governing supervision of grantees allow for the review of periodic
reports submitted by the grantee and on-site visits, and require
agency approval of major program or budgetary changes. 45 CFR
§§ 74.80-74.85 (1979); 42 CFR § 52.20(b) (1979). It
is undisputed, however, both that the day-to-day administration of
grant-supported activities is in the hands of a grantee, and that
NIAMDD's supervision of UGDP conformed to these regulations.
[
Footnote 2]
The grantee has also retained control of its records: the
patient records and raw data generated by UGDP have at all times
remained in the possession of that entity, and neither the NIAMDD
grants nor related regulations shift ownership of such data to the
Federal Government. NIAMDD does, however, have a right of access to
the data in order to insure compliance with the grant. 45 CFR
§ 74.24(a) (1979). And the Government may obtain permanent
custody of the documents upon request. § 74.21(c). But NIAMDD
has not exercised its right either to review or to obtain permanent
custody of the data.
Although no employees of the NIAMDD have reviewed the UGDP
records, the Institute did contract in 1972 with another private
grantee, the Biometric Society, for an assessment of the validity
of the UGDP study. The Biometric Society was given direct access to
the UGDP raw data by the terms of its contract with NIAMDD. The
contract with the Biometric Society, however, did not require the
Society to seek access to the UGDP raw data, nor did it require
that any data actually reviewed be transmitted to the NIAMDD. While
the Society did review some UGDP data, it did not submit any raw
data reviewed by it to the NIAMDD. The Society
Page 445 U. S. 174
issued a report to the Institute in 1974 concluding that the
UGDP results were "mixed," but "moderately strong."
An additional connection between the Federal Government and the
UGDP study has occurred through the activities of the Food and Drug
Administration. After the FDA was apprised of the UGDP results, the
agency issued a statement recommending that physicians use
tolbutamide in the treatment of diabetes only in limited
circumstances. After the UGDP reported finding a similarly higher
incidence of cardiovascular disease with the administration of
phenformin, the FDA proposed changes in the labeling of these oral
hypoglycemic drugs to warn patients of cardiovascular hazards. FDA
Drug Bulletin (June 23, 1971). The FDA deferred further action on
this labeling proposal, however, until the Biometric Society
completed its review of the UGDP study. [
Footnote 3]
After the Biometric study was issued, FDA renewed its proposal
to require a label warning that oral hypoglycemics should be used
only in cases of adult-onset, stable diabetes that could not be
treated adequately by a combination of diet and insulin. The FDA
clearly relied on the UGDP study in renewing this position. 40
Fed.Reg. 28587, 28591 (1975). At the time the proposal was
published, the FDA invited public comment. In response to criticism
of the UGDP study and the Biometric Society's audit, the FDA
conducted its own audit of the UGDP study pursuant to a delegation
of NIAMDD's authority to audit grantee records. In conducting this
audit, the FDA examined and copied a small sample of the UGDP raw
data. This audit report has been made available for public
inspection. 43 Fed.Reg. 52733 (1978).
Although this labeling proposal has not yet become final, other
FDA regulatory action has been taken. On July 25,
Page 445 U. S. 175
1977, the Secretary of HEW suspended the New Drug Application
for phenformin, one of the oral hypoglycemic medications studied by
the UGDP. The decision was premised in part on the findings of the
UGDP study.
See Order of the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, July 25, 1977. After the Secretary's
temporary order of suspension was issued, proceedings before the
FDA continued. The Administrative Law Judge ordered the FDA to
produce all UGDP data in its possession. The FDA then produced
those portions of the UGDP raw data which the agency had copied,
abstracted, or directly transferred to Government premises during
its audit. The ALJ found that the HEW suspension order was
supported by the evidence. On November 15, 1978, the Commissioner
of Food and Drugs affirmed the ALJ's finding that phenformin was
not shown to be safe, and ordered it withdrawn from the market. 44
Fed.Reg. 20967 (1979). This decision was not based substantially on
the UGDP study. [
Footnote
4]
Page 445 U. S. 176
Petitioners had long since initiated a series of FOIA requests
seeking access to the UGDP raw data. On August 7, 1975, HEW denied
their request for the UGDP data on the grounds that no branch of
HEW had ever reviewed or seen the raw data; that the FDA's proposed
relabeling action relied on the UGDP published reports and not on
an analysis of the underlying data; that the data were the property
of the UGDP, a private group; and that the agencies were not
required to acquire and produce those data under the FOIA.
[
Footnote 5] The following
month, petitioners filed this FOIA suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia to require HEW to make
available all of the raw data compiled by UGDP. The District Court
granted summary judgment in favor of respondents, holding that HEW
properly denied the request on the ground that the patient data did
not constitute "agency records" under the FOIA.
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same rationale.
Forsham
v. Califano, 190 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 587 F.2d 1128 (1978). The
court found that, although NIAMDD is a federal agency, its grantees
are not federal agencies. The court rejected the petitioners
argument that the UGDP's records were nevertheless also the federal
agency's records. Although HEW has a right of access to the
documents, the court reasoned that this right did not render the
documents "agency records," since the FOIA only applies to records
which have been "created or obtained . . . in the course of doing
its work." [
Footnote 6]
Id. at 239, 587 F.2d at 1136. The dissenting
Page 445 U. S. 177
judge concluded that the UGDP data were "agency records" under
the FOIA, since the Government had been "significantly involved" in
the study through its funding, access to the raw data, and reliance
on the study in its regulatory actions.
II
As we hold in the companion case of
Kissinger v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, ante p.
445 U. S. 136, it
must be established that an "agency" has "improperly withheld
agency records" for an individual to obtain access to documents
through an FOIA action. We hold here that HEW need not produce the
requested data because they are not "agency records" within the
meaning of the FOIA. In so holding, we reject three separate but
related claims of petitioners: (1) the data they seek are "agency
records" because they were at least "records" of UGDP, and UGDP, in
turn, received its funds from a federal agency, and was subject to
some supervision by the agency in its use of those funds; (2) the
data they seek are "agency records" because HEW, concededly a
federal agency, had sufficient authority under its grant agreement
to have obtained the data had it chosen to do so; and (3) the data
are "agency records" because they formed the basis for the
published reports of UGDP, which, in turn, were relied upon by the
FDA in the actions described above. [
Footnote 7]
Page 445 U. S. 178
Congress undoubtedly sought to expand public rights of access to
Government information when it enacted the Freedom of Information
Act, but that expansion was a finite one. Congress limited access
to "agency records," 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), [
Footnote 8] but did not provide any
definition of "agency records" in that Act. The use of the word
"agency" as a modifier demonstrates that Congress contemplated some
relationship between an "agency" and the "record" requested under
the FOIA. With due regard for the policies and language of the
FOIA, we conclude that data generated by a privately controlled
organization which has received grant funds from an agency
(hereafter grantee), [
Footnote
9] but which data has not at any time been obtained by the
agency, are not "agency records" accessible under the FOIA.
A
We first examine petitioners' claim that the data were at least
records of UGDP, and that the federal funding and supervision of
UGDP alone provides the close connection necessary to render its
records "agency records" as that term is used in the Freedom of
Information Act. Congress did not define "agency record" under the
FOIA, but it did define "agency." The definition of "agency"
reveals a great deal about congressional intent as to the
availability of records
Page 445 U. S. 179
from private grantees under the FOIA, and thus, a great deal
about the relevance of federal funding and supervision to the
definitional scope of "agency records." Congress excluded private
grantees from FOIA disclosure obligations by excluding them from
the definition of "agency," an action consistent with its prevalent
practice of preserving grantee autonomy. It has, for example,
disclaimed any federal property rights in grantee records by virtue
of its funding. We cannot agree with petitioners, in light of these
circumstances, that the very federal funding and supervision which
Congress found insufficient to make the grantee an agency subject
to the FOIA nevertheless makes its records accessible under the
same Act. Under 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) an "agency" is defined
as
"any executive department, military department, Government
corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other
establishment in the executive branch of the Government . . or any
independent regulatory agency."
The legislative history indicates unequivocally that private
organizations receiving federal financial assistance grants are not
within the definition of "agency." In their Report, the conferees
stated that they did
"not intend to include corporations which receive appropriated
funds but are neither chartered by the Federal Government nor
controlled by it, such as the Corporation for Public
Broadcasting."
H.Conf.Rep. No. 93-1380, pp. 14 15 (1974), reprinted in Freedom
of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 Source Book 231-232 (Jt.
Comm.Print 1975). Through operation of this exclusion, Congress
chose not to confer any direct public rights of access to such
federally funded project information. [
Footnote 10]
Page 445 U. S. 180
This treatment of federal grantees under the FOIA is consistent
with congressional treatment of them in other areas of federal law.
Grants of federal funds generally do not create a partnership or
joint venture with the recipient, nor do they serve to convert the
acts of the recipient from private acts to governmental acts,
absent extensive, detailed, and virtually day-to-day supervision.
United States v. Orleans, 425 U.
S. 807,
425 U. S. 818
(1976). Measured by these standards, the UGDP is not a federal
instrumentality or an FOIA agency. [
Footnote 11]
Congress could have provided that the records generated by a
federally funded grantee were federal property even though the
grantee has not been adopted as a federal entity. But Congress has
not done so, reflecting the same regard for the autonomy of the
grantee's records as for the grantee itself. Congress expressly
requires an agency to use "procurement contracts" when the
"principal purpose of the instrument is the acquisition . . . of
property or services for the direct benefit or use of the Federal
Government. . . ." Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of
1977, § 4, 92 Stat. 4, 41 U.S.C. § 503 (1976 ed., Supp.
II). In contrast, "grant agreements" must be used when money is
given to a recipient
"in order to accomplish a public purpose of support or
stimulation authorized by Federal statute, rather than acquisition
. . . of property or services. . . ."
§ 5, 41 U.S.C. § 504 (1976 ed., Supp. II). As in this
case, where a grant was used,
Page 445 U. S. 181
there is no dispute that the documents created are the property
of the recipient, and not the Federal Government.
See 45
CFR § 74.133 (1979). The HEW regulations do retain a right to
acquire the documents. Those regulations however, clearly
demonstrate that, unless and until that right is exercised, the
records are only the "records of grantees." 45 CFR § 74.24
(1979). [
Footnote 12]
Therefore, were petitioners to prevail in this action, they would
have obtained a right of access to some 55 million documents
created, owned, and possessed by a private recipient of federal
funds. While this fact itself is not dispositive of the outcome, it
is nonetheless an important consideration when viewed in light of
these congressional attempts to maintain the autonomy of federal
grantees and their records.
The fact that Congress has chosen not to make a federal grantee
an "agency" or to vest ownership of the records in the Government
does not resolve with mathematical precision the question of
whether the granting agency's funding and supervisory activities
nevertheless make the grantee's records "agency records." Records
of a nonagency certainly could become records of an agency as well.
But if Congress found that federal funding and supervision did not
justify direct access to the grantee's records, as it clearly did,
we fail to see why we should nevertheless conclude that those
identical activities were intended to permit indirect access
through an expansive definition of "agency records." [
Footnote 13] Such a conclusion
Page 445 U. S. 182
would not implement the intent of Congress; it would defeat
it.
These considerations do not finally conclude the inquiry, for
conceivably other facts might indicate that the documents could be
"agency records" even though generated by a private grantee. The
definition of "agency" and congressional policy towards grantee
records indicate, however, that Congress did not intend that grant
supervision short of Government control serve as a sufficient basis
to make the private records "agency records" under the Act, and
reveal a congressional determination to keep federal grantees free
from the direct obligations imposed by the FOIA. In ascertaining
the intended expanse of the term "agency records" then, we must, of
course, construe the Act with regard both for the congressional
purpose of increasing public access to governmental records and for
this equally explicit purpose of retaining grantee autonomy.
B
Petitioners seek to prevail on their second and third theories,
even though their first be rejected, by invoking a broad definition
of "agency records," so as to include all documents created by a
private grantee to which the Government has access, and which the
Government has used. We do not believe that this broad definition
of "agency records," a term undefined in the FOIA, is supported by
either the language of that Act or its legislative history. We
instead agree with the opinions of the courts below that Congress
contemplated that an agency must first either create or obtain a
record as a prerequisite to its becoming an "agency record" within
the meaning of the FOIA. While it would be stretching the ordinary
meaning of the words to call the data in question here "agency
records," we need not rest our conclusions solely on the "plain
language" rule of statutory construction. The use of the term
"record" by Congress in two other Acts, and the structure
Page 445 U. S. 183
and legislative history of the FOIA alike support the same
conclusion.
Although Congress has supplied no definition of agency records
in the FOIA, it has formulated a definition in other Acts. The
Records Disposal Act, in effect at the time Congress enacted the
Freedom of Information Act, provides the following threshold
requirement for agency records:
"'records' includes all books, papers, maps, photographs,
machine readable materials, or other documentary materials,
regardless of physical form or characteristics,
made or
received by an agency of the United States Government under
Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public
business. . . ."
44 U.S.C. § 3301. [
Footnote 14] (Emphasis added.) The Attorney General's
Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative
Procedure Act 23-24 (1967), S. Doc. No. 93-82, pp. 222-223 (1974),
concludes that Congress intended this aspect of the Records Act
definition to apply to the Freedom of Information Act.
The same standard emerges in the Presidential Records Act of
1978. The term "presidential records" is defined as "documentary
materials . . .
created or received by the President. . .
." 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (1976 ed., Supp. II). (Emphasis added.)
While these definitions are not dispositive
Page 445 U. S. 184
of the proper interpretation of congressional use of the word in
the FOIA, it is not insignificant that Congress has associated
creation or acquisition with the concept of a governmental record.
The text, structure, and legislative history of the FOIA itself
reinforce that significance in this case.
The only direct reference to a definition of records in the
legislative history, of which we are aware, occurred during the
Senate hearings leading to the enactment of FOIA. A representative
of the Interstate Commerce Commission commented that,
"[s]ince the word 'records' . . . is not defined, we assume that
it includes all papers which an agency preserves in the performance
of its functions."
Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings on S. 1160
et
al. before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., 244 (1965). [
Footnote
15] The legislative history of the FOIA abounds with other
references to records acquired by an agency. For example, the
legislative Reports clarify that confidential information
"submitted . . . to a Government . . . agency," "obtained by the
Government," or "given to an agency" otherwise subject to
disclosure, was made exempt. S.Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
9 (1965), reprinted in Freedom of Information Act Source Book, S.
Doc. No. 93-82, p. 44 (Comm.Print 1974); H.R.Rep. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in Source Book, at 31.
Section 552(b)(4) provides the strongest structural support for
this construction. This section exempts trade secrets and
commercial or financial information "obtained from a person." This
exemption was designed to protect confidential information
"submitted" by a borrower to a lending agency or "obtained by the
Government" through questionnaires or other inquiries, where such
information "would customarily not be released to the public by the
person from whom it was
Page 445 U. S. 185
obtained." S.Rep. No. 813,
supra at 9; H.R.Rep. No.
1497,
supra at 10. It is significant that Congress did not
include a similar exemption for confidential information contained
in records which had never been "obtained from a person." It is
obvious that this omission does not reflect a congressional
judgment that records remaining in private control are not
similarly deserving of this exemption, but rather a judgment that
records which have never passed from private to agency control are
not agency records which would require any such exemption. This
possessory emphasis is buttressed by similar considerations
implicit in the use of the word "withholding" in the statutory
framework.
See Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press, ante p.
445 U. S. 136.
[
Footnote 16]
The same focus emerges in a congressional amendment to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. That Act had provided its own
standards for public access to documents generated by the Act.
Congress amended the Act to provide:
"For purposes of [the FOIA] the term 'records' includes all
applications, statements, reports, contracts, correspondence,
notices, and other documents filed with or otherwise
obtained by the Commission pursuant to this chapter or
otherwise."
(Emphasis added.) 15 U.S.C. § 78x.
We think that the weight this construction lends to our
conclusion is overborne neither by an agency's potential access to
the grantee's information nor by its reliance on that information
in carrying out the various duties entrusted to it by Congress. The
Freedom of Information Act deals with "agency records," not
information in the abstract. Petitioners place great reliance on
the fact that HEW has a right of access to the data, and a right if
it so chooses to obtain permanent custody of the UGDP records. 45
CFR §§ 74.24,
Page 445 U. S. 186
74.21 (1979). But in this context, the FOIA applies to records
which have been
in fact obtained, and not to records which
merely
could have been obtained. [
Footnote 17] To construe the FOIA to embrace the
latter class of documents would be to extend the reach of the Act
beyond what we believe Congress intended. We rejected a similar
argument in
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.
S. 132,
421 U. S.
161-162 (1975), by holding that the FOIA imposes no duty
on the agency to create records. By ordering HEW to exercise its
right of access, we effectively would be compelling the agency to
"create" an agency record, since, prior to that exercise, the
record was not a record of the agency. Thus, without first
establishing that the agency has created or obtained the document,
reliance or use is similarly irrelevant.
We think the foregoing reasons dispose of all petitioners'
arguments. We therefore conclude that the data petitioners seek are
not "agency records" within the meaning of the FOIA. UGDP is not a
"federal agency" as that term is defined in the FOIA, and the data
petitioners seek have not been created or obtained by a federal
agency. Having failed to establish
Page 445 U. S. 187
this threshold requirement, petitioners' FOIA claim must fail,
and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
The NIAMDD is one of several Institutes of the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). It is authorized by statute to conduct
and fund research on diabetes and other diseases. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 289a, 289c-1. The NIH are a component of the federal
Public Health Service, which is itself a part of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare.
See Reorg. Plan No. 3 of
1966, 3 CFR 1023 (1966-1970 Comp.), note following 42 U.S.C. §
202, and Reorganization Order of April 1, 1968, 33 Fed.Reg.
5426.
[
Footnote 2]
Petitioners do contend that the federal supervision of the UGDP
study was substantial, and more extensive than that ordinarily
exercised. They do not, however, maintain that there was day-to-day
supervision.
See infra at
445 U. S. 180,
and n. 11.
[
Footnote 3]
Prior to the FDA's decision to defer action, petitioners in this
case sued the FDA to enjoin the proposed labeling, contesting the
validity of the UGDP study. The First Circuit remanded the case to
the FDA for exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Bradley v.
Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410 (1973).
[
Footnote 4]
The order of the Commissioner discounts reliance on the UGDP
study. The order states that the ALJ was correct in concluding
that, from "an evidentiary standpoint," the "lack of availability
of underlying data casts considerable doubt on the reliability of
the UGDP conclusions." 44 Fed.Reg. 20969 (1979). The ALJ did permit
reference to the UGDP study as a basis for expert opinion. The
Commissioner concluded that this use of the study was permissible,
since the data underlying expert opinions need not always be
admitted to substantiate the opinions. Nearly 400 published
articles were included in the record of the phenformin proceeding,
and none of the articles was accompanied by the raw data on which
it was based. The Commissioner noted that the ALJ referenced the
UGDP study in only one paragraph of his eight-page summary.
The Commissioner concluded that the agency was not required to
submit the UGDP data, since it had not relied upon that data, but
only upon the actual study. 21 CFR § 12.85 (1979).
Nevertheless, the Commissioner stated that he
"reviewed the testimony of the Bureau of Drug's expert witnesses
and [found] that their reliance upon the UGDP study was not
substantial, and cannot reasonably be characterized as pivotal to
the opinions expressed by those witnesses."
44 Fed.Reg. 20969 (1979).
[
Footnote 5]
The denial of this FOIA request preceded the FDA's audit of the
UGDP data.
[
Footnote 6]
The court opinion also suggested that a document is an "agency
record" if the federal agency has a duty to obtain the record. 190
U.S.App.D.C. at 239, and n. 18, 587 F.2d at 1136, and n. 18
(Leventhal, J.). Judge MacKinnon concurred separately to reserve
the question of whether or not records which an agency had a duty
to obtain were recoverable under the FOIA. We side with Judge
MacKinnon on the breadth of the principle necessary to the decision
in this case.
Id. at 242, 587 F.2d at 1139.
[
Footnote 7]
Petitioners maintain that the FDA has relied on all the raw data
through reliance on the report and through reliance on information
obtained pursuant to its audit of a sample of the data. The Court
of Appeals found, however, that data reviewed by the FDA have been
made available to petitioners.
Id. at 236, 587 F.2d at
1133. As we indicate
infra, reliance on a document does
not make it an agency record if it has not been created or obtained
by a federal agency. Reliance or use may well be relevant, however,
to the question of whether a record in the possession of an agency
is an "agency record."
See Kissinger, ante at
445 U. S.
157.
[
Footnote 8]
In § 552(a)(3), Congress did not use the term "agency
records." That section provides: "[E]ach agency, upon any request
for records . . . shall make the records promptly available to any
person." Since the enforcement provision of the Act, §
552(a)(4)(b), refers only to "agency records," it is certain that
the disclosure obligations imposed by § 552(a)(3) were only
intended to extend to agency records. That limitation is implicit
throughout the Act.
[
Footnote 9]
We use the term "grantee" or "private grantee" to describe
private recipients of federal funds not subjected to sufficient
Government control to render them federal agencies. We do not
suggest, by use of this term, that an organization receiving
federal grant funds could never be found to be a federal agency.
See infra at
445 U. S. 180,
and n. 11.
[
Footnote 10]
Numerous bills seeking to extend the FOIA to federal grantees
have been introduced in each Congress since the 92d, but none has
yet been reported out of committee.
See H.R. 11013, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 1291, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973);
H.R. 1205, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 3207, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977); H.R. 1465, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
[
Footnote 11]
Before characterizing an entity as "federal" for some purpose,
this Court has required a threshold showing of substantial federal
supervision of the private activities, and not just the exercise of
regulatory authority necessary to assure compliance with the goals
of the federal grant.
See United States v. Orleans,
425 U. S. 807
(1976). While the petitioners emphasize the Government's interest
in monitoring the UGDP's study, they do not contend that this
supervision is sufficient to render UGDP a satellite federal
agency. The funding and supervision indicated by the facts of this
case are consistent with the usual grantor-grantee relationship,
and do not suggest the requisite magnitude of Government control.
Orleans, supra at
425 U. S. 815-816.
[
Footnote 12]
The particular grant agreement in issue similarly confers on the
NIAMDD a limited right of access to "records of the grantee."
[
Footnote 13]
Nor could this distinction be explained by a hypothetical
congressional preference for placing the burdens of production on
the agency, rather than the private grantee. Although, under the
petitioners' construction of the Act, the request would have to be
made by the agency, the administrative burdens of searching and
producing, or providing access would necessarily accrue
substantially to the party in possession,
i.e., the
private grantee.
[
Footnote 14]
The definition of "records" under the Records Disposal Act
further requires that records made or received by the agency also
be
"preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency . . .
as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions,
procedures, operations, or other activities of the Government or
because of the informational value of data in them."
Government documents made or received by an agency that are not
appropriate for preservation are referred to as "nonrecord
materials." 41 CFR § 101-11.401-3(d) (1979). It has not been
settled whether the FOIA definition of agency records extends to
"nonrecord materials." We need not reach that question, since the
documents sought by petitioners do not meet the threshold
requirement that they be "made or received" by a federal
agency.
[
Footnote 15]
It is interesting to note that the witness expressed concern
that such an "all-expansive meaning" necessitated clear categorical
exemptions.
[
Footnote 16]
We certainly do not indicate, however, that physical possession,
or initial creation, is, by itself, always sufficient.
See
Kissinger, ante at
445 U. S.
157.
[
Footnote 17]
We need not categorize what agency conduct is necessary to
support a finding that it has "obtained" documents, since an
unexercised right of access clearly does not satisfy this
requirement. Government access to documents clearly could not be
the central component of the definition of agency records
contemplated by Congress, since the Federal Government has access
to near astronomical numbers of private documents. A mere sampling
of access statutes includes: Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §
7602, 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (taxpayers or potential taxpayers); 15
U.S.C. §§ 78q, 78u (persons subject to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934); 29 U.S.C. § 657 (each employer subject
to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970).
Even if the Court were to accept petitioners' argument that only
contractual access should give rise to "agency record" status, a
limitation which does not appear readily supportable, the class of
documents subject to FOIA disclosure would still be staggering. The
record in this case indicates that NIAMDD alone has some 18,000
research grants outstanding.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.
I agree with the Court that "[r]ecords of a nonagency certainly
could become records of an agency as well."
Ante at
445 U. S. 181.
But the Court does not explain why such a conversion does not occur
in this case. [
Footnote 2/1]
Because I believe we should articulate standards under which to
analyze such cases, and because I believe that, under a proper
test, UGDP's data should be treated as "agency records," I
dissent.
I
The Court argues at length that UGDP is not an agency. But
whether or not UGDP is an "agency" is simply not at issue in this
case. Rather, the only question is whether data generated in the
course of this UGDP study are "agency records."
The Court concedes, of course, that the statute itself does not
define "agency records." [
Footnote
2/2] Therefore, our task is to construe
Page 445 U. S. 188
the statutory language consistently with the purposes of FOIA.
[
Footnote 2/3] As detailed in the
dissenting opinion below,
Forsham v. Califano, 190
U.S.App.D.C. 231, 244-245, 587 F.2d 1128, 1141-1142 (1978)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting), FOIA is a broad enactment meant to open
the processes of Government to public inspection. It reflects a
finding that, if left to themselves, agencies would operate in near
secrecy. [
Footnote 2/4] FOIA was,
therefore, enacted to provide access to information to enable "an
informed electorate," so "vital to the proper operation of a
democracy," to govern itself. S.Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., 3 (1965). Nothing whatever in the legislative history
suggests that Congress meant to allow agencies to insulate
important steps in decisionmaking on the basis of the technical
niceties of who "owns" crucial documents.
Where the nexus between the agency and the requested information
is close, and where the importance of the information to public
understanding of the decisions or the operation
Page 445 U. S. 189
of the agency is great, I believe the congressional purposes
require us to hold that the information sought is an "agency
record" within the meaning of FOIA.
Admittedly, this test does not establish a bright line, but the
evaluation of a calculus of relevant factors is nothing new to the
law. [
Footnote 2/5] The first such
factor is the importance of the record to an understanding of
Government activities. If, for instance, the significance of the
record is limited to understanding the workings of the nonagency,
the public has no FOIA-protected interest in access. The weight to
be given this factor can be tested by examining the role accorded
the material in agency writings and the extent to which the agency
reached its conclusions in reliance upon the particular source.
Mere materiality of information, standing alone, of course, is
not enough. [
Footnote 2/6] FOIA
does not give the public any unrestricted right to examine all data
relied on by an agency. Congress required that the information
constitute an "agency record." Thus, another necessary factor is
that there be a link between the agency and the record. [
Footnote 2/7] Nothing in FOIA or its
history suggests, however, that the connection must amount to
outright possession or creation. Instead, again drawing from the
legislative purposes, I believe the link must be such that the
agency has treated the record as if it were
Page 445 U. S. 190
part of the regulatory process, as if it were, in effect, a
record which exists to serve the regulatory process. Government by
secrecy is no less destructive of democracy if it is carried on
within agencies or within private organizations serving agencies.
The value of the record to the electorate is not affected by
whether the relationship between the agency and the private
organization is governed formally by a procurement contract, a
"joint venture" agreement, or a grant. [
Footnote 2/8] The existence of this factor can be tested
by examining,
inter alia, the degree to which the impetus
for the creation of the record came from the agency or was
developed independently, the degree to which the creation of the
record was funded publicly or privately, the extent of governmental
supervision of the creation of the record, and the extent of
continuing governmental control over the record.
II
On the facts of this case, I would conclude that UGDP's raw data
are records of HEW. Both HEW and the FDA have taken significant
actions in complete reliance on the UGDP study. The FDA has
directly endorsed the study's conclusions and, in reliance thereon,
sought mandatory labeling warnings on the drugs criticized by the
UGDP. HEW cited the UGDP study as one of its basic sources when it
suspended one of the drugs as an immediate hazard. The suggestion
that these administrative actions relied solely on the published
reports, and not on the underlying raw data at issue here, is
unrealistic. The conclusions can be no stronger or weaker than the
data on which they are based. One cannot even begin to evaluate an
agency action without access to the raw data on which the
conclusions were based, especially in a case, such as this, where
the data are nonduplicable. The importance of the raw data in
evaluating derivative conclusions was
Page 445 U. S. 191
recognized by the FDA when it employed another independent
organization, the Biometric Society, to check UGDP's work. FDA
secured access for the Society to the raw data, and the Society
used a sample of the data.
This case is set against the background of an intense, often
bitter, [
Footnote 2/9] battle being
waged in the medical community over the validity of the UGDP study
and the correct treatment regimen for diabetes. By endorsing the
UGDP study, the Federal Government has aligned itself on one side
of the fight, and has all but outlawed the regimen recommended by
the other side. Petitioners in this case are medical scientists
seeking to resolve questions that have been raised about the
scientific and statistical methods underlying an agency's
conclusions. This seems to me to be an archetypical instance of the
need for public dissemination of the information.
Even so, I doubt that the information could be held to be an
"agency record" had the Government not been so deeply involved in
its creation. Petitioners have argued that the National Institutes
of Health, in effect, did create these records. The agency not only
completely funded the project's operation, but initiated the
project and took responsibility for developing its research
protocol as well.
See Forsham v. Califano, 190
U.S.App.D.C. at 251, 587 F.2d at 1148 (Bazelon, J., voting for
rehearing). They contend further that, beyond the normal level of
NIH involvement in its grantees' studies set out by the Court,
ante at
445 U. S. 173,
the NIH exercised continuing supervision over his study through a
"Policy Advisory Board" as a condition of the grant renewals.
[
Footnote 2/10]
Forsham v.
Califano, supra. Finally, as the Court also
Page 445 U. S. 192
acknowledges, there is no question that the Government has full
access to the data under the terms of the grant and under federal
regulations. Indeed, if it so chose, the Government could obtain
permanent custody of the data merely by requesting it from UGDP.
Thus, the data remain with the grantee only at the pleasure of the
Government. In my view, the record abundantly establishes that
these data were developed with public funds and with Government
assistance and, in large part, for governmental purposes.
Therefore, I would hold that they are agency records, and I
respectfully dissent.
III
I emphasize that the standards I suggest do not mean opening to
the public the files of all grantees or of all who submit
information to the Government. In many cases, grantees' records
should not be treated as agency records. But the Court's approach
must inevitably undermine FOIA's great purpose of exposing
Government to the people. It is unavoidable that, as the work of
federal agencies mushrooms both in quantity and complexity, the
agencies must look to outside organizations to assist in
governmental tasks. Just as the explosion of federal agencies,
which are not directly responsible to the electorate, worked to
hide the workings of the Federal Government from voters before
enactment of FOIA, S.Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965),
the understandable tendency of agencies to rely on nongovernmental
grantees to perform myriad projects distances the electorate from
important information by one more step. If the records of such
organizations, when drawn directly into the regulatory process, are
immune from public inspection, then government by secrecy must
surely return.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The Court suggests that, if a federal grant created a
partnership or joint venture between the agency and the grantee,
the grantee might become an agency, and thus its records might
become agency records.
Ante at
445 U. S. 180.
Likewise, the Court might reach a different result where the agency
has chosen to buy data through a procurement contract instead of a
grant.
Ibid. But neither of these is an instance involving
records of a nonagency. In the first, the grantee becomes an
agency, and in the second, the records do not belong to the
nonagency.
[
Footnote 2/2]
Therefore, the Court surely overstates the fact in saying that
Congress "clearly" found that federal funding and supervision are
not relevant to whether direct access to grantee's records is
justified,
ante at
445 U. S. 181,
and the Court does not explain why Congress' silence "reflect[s]
the same regard for the autonomy of the grantee's records as for
the grantee itself,"
ante at
445 U. S. 180.
Moreover, nothing whatever is cited in the legislative history to
support the Court's claim that the "purpose of retaining grantee
autonomy" was "equally explicit" as a purpose of FOIA as was
increasing public access to governmental records.
Ante at
445 U. S.
182.
[
Footnote 2/3]
I find the Court's references to other statutes unenlightening.
The Records Disposal Act and Presidential Records Act of 1978 are
properly limited to records created or received because the
agencies or the Executive cannot physically dispose of what they do
not possess. These Acts are aimed at monitoring the physical
destruction of agency documents and settling claims of ownership of
Presidential documents. The agencies and the Executive cannot
destroy or take for private use what they have never possessed.
As for the "structural" argument drawn from 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(4), I cannot imagine that trade secrets or commercial
information not submitted to the Government would have been created
or used for governmental purposes or with governmental funds. In
short, the Government would have no claim of any kind on the
information if it had not been submitted .
[
Footnote 2/4]
FOIA was enacted because agencies had turned the predecessor
statute on its head, transforming a public information statute into
a secrecy statute. H.R.Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966),
reprinted in Freedom of Information Act Source Book, S. Doc. No.
93-82, pp. 22, 25-27 (Comm.Print 1974).
[
Footnote 2/5]
The Court offers no manageable standards of any kind. No
guidance is given to the decisionmaker as to how to determine at
what point a relationship between an agency and another
organization ripens into a "joint venture." And, of course, we are
given no key to guide the determination of what nonagency records
"become records of an agency as well."
Ante at
445 U. S.
181.
[
Footnote 2/6]
The Court, by insisting on analyzing petitioners' contentions
separately, never addresses the full, combined force of the
arguments. It is only in combination that the various factors
alluded to by petitioners tell the full story of governmental
reliance on and involvement with the data, and thus the importance
to the success of Congress' FOIA scheme of disclosing this
information.
[
Footnote 2/7]
See Note, The Definition of "Agency Records" Under the
Freedom of Information Act, 31 Stan.L.Rev. 1093, 1106-1114
(1979).
[
Footnote 2/8]
Certainly the agency cannot control the legal consequences
simply by the label it attaches to a relationship.
[
Footnote 2/9]
one former UGDP investigator has challenged the scientific
honesty of the research coordinator, who is also the current
custodian of the raw data.
[
Footnote 2/10]
Because the case comes to us on affirmance of the grant of
respondents' motion for summary judgment, we must accept
petitioners' version of any disputed facts. Thus, for instance, we
are not free to de-emphasize the extent of federal supervision of
the UGDP study alleged by petitioners.