After respondents in No. 76-1596, who at the time were serving
state sentences in New York, were indicted on federal charges in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, that court issued writs of habeas corpus
ad
prosequendum directing the state prison wardens to produce
respondents in court. Subsequently, following their arraignments,
respondents were retained in federal custody in New York City, but
after trial dates had been set, they were returned to state prison.
Respondents then moved for dismissal of their indictments on the
ground that the United States, by returning them to state custody
without first trying them on the federal charges, violated Art
IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement), which
requires the dismissal of an indictment against a prisoner who is
obtained by a receiving State ("State" being defined by Art. II(a)
to include the United States) if he is returned to his original
place of imprisonment without first being tried on the indictment
underlying the detainer and request by which custody of the
prisoner was secured. The District Court granted the motion, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed. In No. 77-52, after being arrested
in Illinois on federal charges and being turned over to Illinois
authorities for extradition to Massachusetts on unrelated state
charges, respondent requested a speedy trial on the federal
charges. After he was transferred to Massachusetts, federal
officials lodged a detainer against him with state prison
authorities. Subsequently, following his conviction on the state
charges, respondent was indicted on the federal charges in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
and was produced from Massachusetts for arraignment before that
court pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum.
Thereafter, at his own request respondent was returned to the
Massachusetts prison to await the federal trial, which was
subsequently postponed several times. When the Government moved to
postpone the trial for the third time, respondent moved for
dismissal of the indictment on the ground that he had been denied
his right to a
Page 436 U. S. 341
speedy trial, alleging that the detainer was causing him to be
denied certain privileges at the state prison. Respondent's motion
was denied, and the Government secured his presence for trial from
the state prison by means of a writ of habeas corpus
ad
prosequendum. At the beginning of his trial, respondent again
moved unsuccessfully for dismissal of the indictment on speedy
trial grounds, and thereafter was convicted. On appeal, he argued
that his indictment should have been dismissed because,
inter
alia, he was not tried within 120 days of his initial arrival
in the Southern District of New York in violation of Art. IV(c) of
the Agreement. The Court of Appeals agreed that Art. IV(c) had been
violated and reversed and remanded for dismissal of the indictment
as required by Art. V(c), holding that the writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum utilized to bring respondent to federal
court was a "written request for temporary custody" within the
meaning of Art. IV(a) of the Agreement required to be filed by the
receiving State with the sending State in order to obtain temporary
custody of a prisoner.
Held:
1. As indicated by the statute itself as well as its legislative
history, the United States is a party to the Agreement as both a
sending and a receiving State, and the fact that the United States
already had the writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum as a
means of obtaining prisoners at the time the Agreement was enacted
does not show that Congress could not have intended to join the
United States as a receiving State. Pp.
436 U. S.
353-356.
2. A writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum issued by a
federal court to state authorities, directing the production of a
state prisoner for trial on federal criminal charges, is not a
detainer within the meaning of the Agreement, and thus does not
trigger the application of the Agreement. Therefore, because in No.
76-1596 the Government never filed a detainer against respondents,
the Agreement never became applicable so as to bind the Government
to its provisions, and the indictments should not have been
dismissed. Pp.
436 U. S.
357-361.
(a) The role and functioning of the writ of habeas corpus
ad
prosequendum to secure the presence, for purposes of trial, of
defendants in federal criminal cases, including defendants then in
state custody, are rooted in history and bear little resemblance to
the typical detainer that activates the Agreement. Unlike such a
writ issued by a federal district court, a detainer may be lodged
against a prisoner on the initiative of a prosecutor or law
enforcement officer, and, rather than requiring the prisoner's
immediate presence, as does such a writ, merely puts the officials
of the prison in which the prisoner is incarcerated on notice that
he is wanted in another jurisdiction for trial, further action
being
Page 436 U. S. 342
necessary by the receiving State in order to obtain the
prisoner. Pp.
436 U. S.
357-359.
(b) The concerns expressed by the drafters of the Agreement and
by the Congress that enacted it demonstrate that a writ of habeas
corpus
ad prosequendum was not intended to be included
within the definition of "detainer" as used in the Agreement. Pp.
436 U. S.
359-361.
3. The United States is bound by the Agreement when it activates
its provisions by filing a detainer against a state prisoner and
then obtains his custody by means of a writ of habeas corpus
ad
prosequendum, and hence. in No. 77-52. the indictment was
properly dismissed because the Government violated Art. IV(c) by
not trying respondent within 120 days of his arrival in federal
court. Pp.
436 U. S.
361-365.
(a) A writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum constitutes
a "written request for temporary custody" within the meaning of
Art. IV(a) of the Agreement. Because, at the point when a detainer
is lodged, the policies underlying the Agreement to encourage the
expeditious disposition of charges against a prisoner subject to a
detainer and to provide cooperative procedures among member States
to facilitate such disposition are fully implicated, there is no
reason to give an unduly restrictive meaning to the term "written
request for temporary custody." Whether the Government presents the
prison authorities in the sending State with a piece of paper
labeled "request for temporary custody" or with a writ of habeas
corpus
ad prosequendum demanding the prisoner's presence
in federal court, the United States is able to obtain temporary
custody of the prisoner, and the fact that the prisoner is brought
before the court pursuant to such a writ in no way reduces the need
for prompt disposition of the charges underlying the detainer. Pp.
436 U. S.
361-364.
(b) The failure of the respondent in No. 77-52 to invoke the
Agreement in specific terms in his speedy trial motions before the
District Court did not result in a waiver of his claim that the
Government violated Art. IV(c), since the record shows that from
the time he as arrested respondent persistently requested that he
be given a speedy trial, such requests being sufficient to put the
Government and the District Court on notice of the substance of his
claim. Pp.
436 U. S.
364-365.
No. 76-1596, 544 F.2d 588, reversed and remanded; No. 77-52, 550
F.2d 732, affirmed.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN,
STEWART, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in No.
76-1596 and dissenting in No. 77-52, in which BURGER, C.J., joined,
post, p.
436 U. S.
365.
Page 436 U. S. 343
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1970, Congress enacted the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
Act, 18 U.S.C.App. pp. 1395-1398 (1976 ed.), joining the United
States and the District of Columbia as parties to the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (Agreement). [
Footnote 1] The Agreement, which has also been enacted by
46 States, is designed
"to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of . . .
charges [outstanding against a prisoner] and determination of the
proper status of any and all detainers based on untried
indictments, informations, or complaints."
Art. I. It prescribes procedures by which a member State may
obtain for trial a prisoner incarcerated in another member
jurisdiction and by which the prisoner may demand the speedy
disposition of certain charges pending against him in another
jurisdiction. In either case, however, the provisions of the
Agreement are triggered only when a "detainer" is filed with the
custodial (sending) State by another State (receiving) having
untried charges pending against the prisoner; to obtain
Page 436 U. S. 344
temporary custody, the receiving State must also file an
appropriate "request" with the sending State. The present cases
concern the scope of the United States' obligations under the
Agreement, and, in particular, pose the question whether a writ of
habeas corpus
ad prosequendum, used by the United States
to secure the presence in federal court of state prisoners, may be
considered either a "detainer" or a "request" within the meaning of
the Agreement
I
A
Respondents in No. 7159, Mauro and Fusco, were indicted for
criminal contempt in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York on November 3, 1975. [
Footnote 2] At the time of their idictments,
both men were serving state sentences at New York correctional
facilities. [
Footnote 3] On
November 5, 1975, the District Court issued separate writs of
habeas corpus
ad prosequendum, directing the wardens of
the prisons where Mauro and Fusco were incarcerated to produce them
before the District Court on November 19, 1975. Mauro and Fusco
were arraigned in the District Court on November 24, 1975, at which
time they both entered pleas of not guilty. Following their
arraignment, they were retained in federal custody at the
Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City.
On December 2, 1975, respondents again appeared before the
District Court, this time for the purpose of setting a trial date.
After trial dates had been established, the court, noting
Page 436 U. S. 345
the overcrowded conditions at the federal Metropolitan
Correctional Center, directed that Mauro and Fusco be returned to
their respective state prisons until shortly before their
trials.
On April 26, 1976, Mauro was again removed from state prison and
taken before the District Court pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum, as was Fusco on April 29, 1976. Prior to
these appearances, respondents had moved for dismissal of their
indictments on the ground that the United States had violated Art.
IV(e) of the Agreement by returning them to state custody without
first trying them on the federal indictment. [
Footnote 4] The District Court granted their
motions to dismiss the indictments, finding that the Agreement
governed their removal from state custody by means of the writs of
habeas corpus
ad prosequendum, and that the Government had
violated the provisions of Art. IV(e).
On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the dismissals of respondents' indictments.
544 F.2d 588 (1976). It held that a
"writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum is a detainer
entitling the state inmate to the protection provided in Article IV
[of the Agreement] and specifically to a trial before his return to
the state institution."
Id. at 592 (foot.note omitted). To hold that a writ of
habeas corpus
ad prosequendum was not a detainer within
the meaning of the Agreement, reasoned the court, would permit the
United States to circumvent its obligations under the
Agreement.
B
Respondent in No. 77-52, Ford, was arrested in Chicago on
October 11, 1973, on two federal warrants. [
Footnote 5] Shortly after his
Page 436 U. S. 346
arrest, he was turned over to Illinois authorities for
extradition to Massachusetts on older, unrelated state charges.
While in the custody of the Illinois authorities, Ford requested a
speedy trial on the federal bank robbery charge by means of letters
sent to the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York and the United States District Court for that District.
[
Footnote 6] After he was
transferred to Massachusetts, federal officials lodged the federal
bank robbery warrant as a detainer against him with the state
prison authorities.
Following Ford's conviction on the Massachusetts charges, an
indictment was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, charging Ford with bank robbery and
aggravated bank robbery. On April 1, 1974, he was produced from
Massachusetts for arraignment before the District Court pursuant to
a writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum issued by the
court on March 25, 1974. Because Ford was not represented by
counsel, the proceedings were adjourned until April 15, at which
time he pleaded at guilty to a superseding indictment. [
Footnote 7] Trial was set for May 28,
1974.
The trial did not commence, however, until September 2, 1976,
having been postponed on five separate occasions either at the
request of the Government or on the court's own initiative.
[
Footnote 8]
Page 436 U. S. 347
During the period while he was awaiting his federal trial, Ford
was incarcerated in the Massachusetts state prison; he had
requested and received permission to return there in order to
facilitate preparation for trial. On November 4, 1974, in response
to the Government's motion to postpone the trial for a third time,
Ford moved in the District Court for the dismissal of his
indictment on the ground that he had been denied his right to a
speedy trial. [
Footnote 9] In
support of his motion, he alleged that he was being denied furlough
privileges at the state prison as a result of the federal detainer
that remained lodged against him. His motion to dismiss the
indictment was denied.
On August 8, 1975, the Government secured Ford's presence for
trial from the Massachusetts prison authorities by means of a writ
of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum issued by the District
Court. At the beginning of his trial, Ford again moved
unsuccessfully for a dismissal of the indictment on speedy trial
grounds. His jury trial resulted in verdicts of guilty on all
counts.
Page 436 U. S. 348
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Ford
argued, among other things, that his indictment should have been
dismissed with prejudice because he was not tried within 120 days
of his initial arrival in the Southern District of New York, in
violation of Art. IV(c) of the Agreement, [
Footnote 10] and because he was returned to
state prison without first being tried on the federal charges, in
violation of Art. IV(e). The panel, [
Footnote 11] with one judge dissenting, agreed with
Ford's contention that dismissal of the indictment was required as
a result of the Government's failure to comply with the speedy
trial provisions of Art. IV(c). [
Footnote 12] 550 F.2d 732 (1977). The court reasoned
that, regardless of whether a writ of habeas corpus
ad
prosequendum issued by a federal court to obtain a state
prisoner is, by itself, sufficient to trigger the provisions of the
Agreement, the Agreement clearly governs situations such as Ford's,
in which a federal detainer is first filed with the state
authorities and the writ is then used to secure the prisoner's
presence in federal court. In the view of the Court of Appeals, the
writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum utilized to bring
Ford to federal court was a "written request for temporary custody
or availability" within the meaning of Art. IV(a). Having concluded
that the Agreement was applicable and that the provisions of Art.
IV(c) had been violated, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
for the dismissal of Ford's indictment with prejudice, as required
by Art. V(c) of the Agreement. [
Footnote 13]
Page 436 U. S. 349
C
Because there i a conflict among the Federal Courts of Appeals
on the issue, [
Footnote 14]
we granted certiorari [
Footnote
15] in these cases to consider whether the Agreement governs
the use of writs of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum by the
United States to obtain state prisoners. In No. 76-1596 we hold
that such a writ issued by a federal court to state authorities,
directing the production of a state prisoner for trial on criminal
charges, is not a detainer within the meaning of the Agreement, and
thus does not trigger the application of the Agreement. In No.
77-52 we hold that the United States is bound by the Agreement when
it activate its provisions by filing a detainer against a state
prisoner and then obtains his custody by means of a writ of habeas
corpus
ad prosequendum.
II
The origins of the Agreement date back to 1948, when a group
known as the Joint Committee on Detainers [
Footnote 16] issued a report concerning the
problems arising from the use of detainers and expressing five aims
or principles for the guidance of
Page 436 U. S. 350
prosecuting authorities, prison officials, and parole
authorities. These guiding principles, which later served as the
underpinnings of the Agreement, were as follows:
"1. Every effort should be made to accomplish the disposition of
detainers as promptly as possible."
"2. There should be assurance that any prisoner released to
stand trial in another jurisdiction will be returned to the
institution from which he was released."
"3. Prison and parole authorities should take prompt action to
settle detainers which have been filed by them."
"4. No prisoner should be penalized because of a detainer
pending against him unless a thorough investigation of the detainer
has been made and it has been found valid."
"5. All jurisdictions should observe the principles of
interstate comity in the settlement of detainers, and each should
bear its own proper burden of the expenses and effort involved in
disposing of the charges and settling detainers."
Bennett, The Last Full Ounce, 23 Fed.Prob. 20, 22 (June
1959).
The Joint Committee on Detainers was later reconstituted under
the auspices of the Council of State Governments. Then known as the
Committee on Detainers and Sentencing and Release of Persons
Accused of Multiple Offenses, it held meetings in 1955 and 1956,
which resulted in the development and approval of several proposals
concerning detainers. Among the proposals was a draft version of
the Agreement. In April, 1956, this proposal was reviewed and
approved by a conference jointly sponsored by the American
Correctional Association, the Council of State Governments, the
National Probation and Parole Association, and the New York Joint
Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation. [
Footnote 17] Following
Page 436 U. S. 351
the endorsement of the Agreement by this conference, the Council
of State Governments included it within its Suggested State
Legislation Program for 1957.
The Agreement, in the form adopted by the United States and
other member jurisdictions, sets forth the findings upon which it
is based and its purpose in Art. I. It notes that
"charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on
untried indictments, informations, or complaints and difficulties
in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other
jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of
prisoner treatment and rehabilitation."
Accordingly, its purpose is to encourage the expeditious
disposition of such charges and to provide cooperative procedures
among member States to facilitate such disposition.
The central provisions of the Agreement are Art. III and Art.
IV. Article III provides a procedure by which a prisoner against
whom a detainer has been filed can demand a speedy disposition of
the charges giving rise to the detainer. The warden of the
institution in which the prisoner is incarcerated is required to
inform him promptly of the source and contents of any detainer
lodged against him and of his right to request final disposition of
the charges. Art. III(c). If the prisoner does make such a request,
the jurisdiction that filed the detainer must bring him to trial
within 180 days. [
Footnote
18] Art. III(a). The prisoner's request operates as a request
for the final disposition of all untried charges underlying
detainers filed against him by that State, Art. III(d), and is
deemed to be a waiver of extradition. Art. III(e).
Article IV provides the means by which a prosecutor who has
lodged a detainer against a prisoner in another State can secure
the prisoner's presence for disposition of the outstanding charges.
Once he has filed a detainer against the prisoner,
Page 436 U. S. 352
the prosecutor can have him made available by presenting to the
officials of the State in which the prisoner is incarcerated "a
written request for temporary custody or availability. . . ."
[
Footnote 19] Art.
IV(a).
Two important limitations, previously referred to, are placed on
a prosecuting authority once it has obtained the presence of a
prisoner pursuant to Art. IV. Article IV(c) states that
"[i]n respect of any proceeding made possible by this article,
trial shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days of the
arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State, but for good cause
shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance."
And Art. IV(e) requires the receiving State to try the prisoner
on the outstanding charge before returning him to the State in
which he was previously imprisoned:
"If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being
returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article
V(e) hereof, such indictment, information,
Page 436 U. S. 353
or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and
the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with
prejudice."
Article V(c) similarly provides that the "indictment,
information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has
been lodged" shall be dismissed if the prisoner is not brought to
trial within the period specified in Art. IV(c).
III
Congress enacted the Agreement into law and entered into it on
behalf of the United States and the District of Columbia with
relatively little discussion and no apparent opposition.
See 116 Cong.Rec. 13997-14000, 38840-38842 (1970). The
legislation had been previously introduced in the 90th Congress at
the request of the Attorney General; on that occasion, it had
passed the House, but the Senate had failed to approve it. When it
was introduced again in the 91st Congress, the need for the
legislation was noted in both the House and Senate Reports:
"The Attorney General has advised the committee that a prisoner
who has had a detainer lodged against him is seriously
disadvantaged by such action. He is in custody, and therefore in no
position to seek witnesses or to preserve his defense. He must
often be kept in close custody, and is ineligible for desirable
work assignments. What is more, when detainers are filed against a
prisoner, he sometimes loses interest in institutional
opportunities because he must serve his sentence without knowing
what additional sentences may lie before him, or when, if ever, he
will be in a position to employ the education and skills he may be
developing."
H.R.Rep. No. 91-1018, p. 3 (1970); S.Rep. No. 91-1356, p. 3
(1970).
The Government now vigorously argues that, when Congress enacted
the Agreement into law, the United States became a
Page 436 U. S. 354
party to the Agreement only in its capacity as a "sending
State." It contends that
"Congress intended the United States to participate in the
Agreement only for the purposes of allowing states more readily to
obtain federal prisoners and allowing such prisoners to seek trial
on outstanding detainers lodged against them with their federal
custodian."
Brief for United States in No. 77-52, p. 16. Thus, it argues,
the Agreement has no relevance to the present cases, for here the
Federal Government was the recipient of state prisoners. We have
considered the grounds offered by the Government in support of this
contention and conclude, as have all of the Courts of Appeals that
have considered the question, [
Footnote 20] that the United States is a party to the
Agreement as both a sending and a receiving State.
As even the Government concedes, the Agreement as enacted by
Congress expressly includes the United States within the definition
of "State" [
Footnote 21] and
defines "Receiving State" as "the State in which trial is to be had
on an indictment, information, or complaint pursuant to article III
or article IV hereof." Art. II(c). The statute itself gives no
indication that the United States is to be exempted from the
category of receiving States. To the contrary, Art. VIII states
that "[t]his agreement shall enter into
full force and
effect as to a party State when such State has enacted the same
into law" (emphasis added). [
Footnote 22]
Page 436 U. S. 355
The brief legislative history that exists provides no further
support for the Government's contention. It is true, as the
Government points out, that most of the comment on the proposed
legislation referred to problems encountered by States in obtaining
federal prisoners, but there is no indication whatsoever that the
United States' participation in the Agreement was to be a limited
one. Senator Hruska, for example, spoke in favor of the Agreement
on the floor of the Senate, saying:
"By enactment of this bill the United States and the District of
Columbia would become signatories to this agreement which has
already been adopted by 28 States. By approving this measure today,
we can insure that the United States will become part of this
vitally needed system of simplified and uniform rules for the
disposition of pending criminal charges and the exchange of
prisoners."
116 Cong.Rec. 38840 (1970). Neither he nor anyone else in
Congress drew a distinction be tween the extent of the United
States' participation in the Agreement and that of the other member
States, an observation that one would expect had the Federal
Government entered into the Agreement as only a sending State.
Nor are we persuaded by the Government's argument that, because
the United States already had an efficient means of obtaining
prisoners -- the writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum --
Congress could not have intended to join the United States as a
receiving State. Although the United States perhaps did not gain as
much from its entry into the Agreement as did some of the other
member States, [
Footnote 23]
the fact remains that
Page 436 U. S. 356
Congress did enact the Agreement into law in its entirety, and
it placed no qualification upon the membership of the United
States. The reference in the Committee Reports to the
recommendation of the Attorney General,
see supra at
436 U. S. 353,
indicates that Congress was motivated not only by the desire to aid
States in obtaining federal prisoners, but also by the desire to
alleviate the problems encountered by prisoners and prison systems
as a result of the lodging of detainers. There is no reason to
assume that Congress was any less concerned about the effects of
federal detainers filed against state prisoners than it was about
state detainers filed against federal prisoners. While the
Government argues that a writ of habeas corpus
ad
prosequendum leads to none of the problems about which the
drafters of the Agreement were concerned, we think that this
argument is more properly addressed to the question whether such a
writ constitutes a detainer for purposes of the Agreement, which we
discuss below. [
Footnote
24]
Page 436 U. S. 357
IV
A
United States district court are authorized by 8 U.S.C. §
2241(a) to grant writs of habeas corpus; expressly included within
this authority is the power to issue such a writ when it is
necessary to bring a prisoner into court to testify or for trial.
§ 2241(c)(5). This Court has previously examined in great
detail the history of the writ of habeas corpus
ad
prosequendum, observing that § 14 of the first Judiciary
Act, 1 Stat. 81, authorized courts of the United States to issue
writs of habeas corpus.
Carbo v. United States,
364 U. S. 611,
364 U. S. 614
(1961). Although § 14 did not expressly state that the courts
could issue
ad prosequendum writs, the Court, in an
opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall,
Ex parte
Bollman, 4 Cranch 75 (1807), interpreted the words
"habeas corpus" as being a generic term including the writ
"necessary to remove a prisoner in order to prosecute him in the
proper jurisdiction wherein the offense was committed."
Carbo,
supra at
364 U. S. 615
(emphasis omitted). Since the time of
Ex parte
Bollman,
Page 436 U. S. 358
the statutory authority of federal courts to issue writs of
habeas corpus
ad prosequendum to secure the presence, for
purposes of trial, of defendants in federal criminal cases,
including defendants then in state custody, has never been doubted.
In 1948, this authority was made explicit with the enactment of 28
U.S.C. § 2241, and, in 1961, the Court held that this
authority was not limited by the territorial boundaries of the
federal district court.
Carbo, supra. The role and
functioning of the
ad prosequendum writ are rooted in
history, and they bear little resemblance to the typical detainer
which activates the provisions of the Agreement.
Unlike a writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum issued
by a federal district court, a detainer may be lodged against a
prisoner on the initiative of a prosecutor or law enforcement
officer. [
Footnote 25]
Rather than requiring the immediate presence of the prisoner, a
detainer merely puts the officials of the institution in which the
prisoner is incarcerated on notice that the prisoner is wanted in
another jurisdiction for trial upon his release from prison.
Further action must be taken by the receiving State in order to
obtain the prisoner. Before it was made clear that a prosecuting
authority is not relieved of its obligation to provide a defendant
a speedy trial just because he is in custody elsewhere,
see
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374
Page 436 U. S. 359
(1969), detainers were allowed to remain lodged against
prisoners for lengthy periods of time, quite often for the duration
of a prisoner's sentence.
B
The Agreement itself contains no definition of the word
"detainer." The House and Senate Reports, however, explain that
"[a] detainer is a notification filed with the institution in
which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted
to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction."
H.R.Rep. No. 91-1018, p. 2 (1970); S.Rep. No. 911356, p. 2
(1970). While the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded
that this definition is broad enough to include within its scope a
federal writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum, the
concerns expressed by the drafters of the Agreement and by the
Congress that enacted it demonstrate that the word "detainer" was
not so intended.
In recommending the adoption of the Agreement, the Council of
State Governments outlined some of the problems caused by detainers
that the Agreement was designed to address. It noted that prison
administrators were
"thwarted in [their] effort[s] toward rehabilitation [because
t]he inmate who has a detainer against him is filled with anxiety
and apprehension, and frequently does not respond to a training
program."
Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation
Program for 1957, p. 74 (1956). Furthermore, the prisoner was often
deprived of the ability to take advantage of many of the prison's
programs aimed at rehabilitation, merely because there was a
detainer lodged against him. This problem was noted by the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, who, in 1959, stated that he
"remember[ed] the day when the presence of a detainer
automatically guaranteed that the inmate would be held in close
custody and denied training and work experiences in more relaxed
situations, such as the farm, which frequently represent a valuable
resource in treating prisoners and testing their progress."
Bennett, The Last
Page 436 U. S. 360
Full Ounce, 23 Fed. Prob. 20, 21 (June 1959). The Council of
State Governments also pointed out that the existence of detainers
presented problems in sentencing; when detainers had previously
been filed against the defendant, the sentencing judge would
hesitate to give as long a sentence as he thought might otherwise
be indicated, there being a possibility that the defendant would be
required to serve subsequent sentences. The Council stated that
"proper sentencing, as well as proper correctional treatment, is
not possible until the detainer system is modified." Council of
State Governments,
supra at 74. Similar concerns were
expressed by the Attorney General in his recommendation to
Congress.
See supra at
436 U. S.
353.
The adverse effects of detainers that prompted the drafting and
enactment of the Agreement are thus, for the most part, the
consequence of the lengthy duration of detainers. Because a
detainer remains lodged against a prisoner without any action's
being taken on it, he is denied certain privileges within the
prison, and rehabilitation efforts may be frustrated. For these
reasons, the stated purpose of the Agreement is
"to encourage the
expeditious and orderly disposition
of [outstanding] charges and determination of the proper status of
any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations,
or complaints."
Art. I (emphasis added).
Because writs of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum issued
by a federal court pursuant to the express authority of a federal
statute are immediately executed, enactment of the Agreement was
not necessary to achieve their expeditious disposition.
Furthermore, as noted above, the issuance of
ad
prosequendum writs by federal courts has a long history,
dating back to the first Judiciary Act. We can therefore assume
that Congress was well aware of the use of such writs by the
Federal Government to obtain state prisoners and that, when it used
the word "detainer," it meant something quite different from a writ
of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum. Contrary
Page 436 U. S. 361
to the contention of the Court of Appeals in No 76-1596, it is
not necessary to construe "detainer" as including these writs in
order to keep the United States from evading its duties under the
Agreement. When the United States obtains state prisoners by means
of a writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum, the problems
that the Agreement seeks to eliminate do not arise; [
Footnote 26] accordingly, the Government is
in no sense circumventing the Agreement by means of the writ. We
therefore conclude that a writ of habeas corpus
ad
prosequendum is not a detainer for purposes of the
Agreement.
Because in No. 76-1596 the Government never filed a detainer
against Mauro and Fusco, the Agreement never became applicable and
the United States was never bound by its provisions. The Court of
Appeals therefore erred in affirming the dismissal of the
indictments against the respondents.
V
Our analysis of the purposes of the Agreement and the reasons
for its adoption by Congress leads us to reject the Government's
argument in No. 77-52 that a writ of habeas corpus
ad
prosequendum may not be considered a "written request for
temporary custody" within the meaning of Art. IV of the Agreement.
Once the Federal Government lodges a detainer
Page 436 U. S. 362
against a prisoner with state prison officials, the Agreement,
by its express terms, becomes applicable, and the United States
must comply with its provisions. And once a detainer has been
lodged, the United States has precipitated the very problems with
which the Agreement is concerned. Because, at that point, the
policies underlying the Agreement are fully implicated, we see no
reason to give an unduly restrictive meaning to the term "written
request for temporary custody." It matters not whether the
Government presents the prison authorities in the sending State
with a piece of paper labeled "request for temporary custody" or
with a writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum demanding the
prisoner's presence in federal court on a certain day; in either
case, the United States is able to obtain temporary custody of the
prisoner. Because the detainer remains lodged against the prisoner
until the underlying charges are finally resolved, the Agreement
requires that the disposition be speedy, and that it be obtained
before the prisoner is returned to the sending State. The fact that
the prisoner is brought before the district court by means of a
writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum in no way reduces
the need for this prompt disposition of the charges underlying the
detainer. In this situation, it clearly would permit the United
States to circumvent its obligations under the Agreement to hold
that an
ad prosequendum writ may not be considered a
written request for temporary custody. [
Footnote 27]
The Government points to two provisions of the Agreement
Page 436 U. S. 363
which it contends demonstrate that "written request" was not
meant to include
ad prosequendum writs; neither argument
is persuasive. First the Government notes that, under Art. IV(a),
there is to be a 30-day waiting period after the request is
presented during which the Governor of the sending State may
disapprove the receiving State's request. Because a writ of habeas
corpus
ad prosequendum is a federal court order, it would
be contrary to the Supremacy Clause, the United States argues, to
permit a State to refuse to obey it. We are unimpressed. The
proviso of Art. IV(a) does not purport to augment the State's
authority to dishonor such a writ. As the history of the provision
makes clear, it was meant to do no more than preserve previously
existing rights of the sending States, not to expand them.
[
Footnote 28] If a State has
never had authority to dishonor an
ad prosequendum writ
issued by a federal court, then this provision could not be read as
providing such authority. Accordingly, we do not view the provision
as being inconsistent with the inclusion of writs of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum within the meaning of "written
requests."
The Government also points out that the speedy trial requirement
of Art. IV(c), by its terms, applies only to a "proceeding made
possible by this article. . . ." When a prisoner is brought before
a district court by means of an
ad prosequendum writ, the
Government argues, the subsequent proceedings are not
made
possible by Art. IV, because the United States was able to
obtain prisoners in that manner long before it entered into the
Agreement. We do not accept the Government's
Page 436 U. S. 364
narrow reading of this provision; rather, we view Art. IV(c) as
requiring commencement of trial within 120 days whenever the
receiving State initiates the disposition of charges underlying a
detainer it has previously lodged against a state prisoner. Any
other reading of this section would allow the Government to gain
the advantages of lodging a detainer against a prisoner [
Footnote 29] without assuming the
responsibilities that the Agreement intended to arise from such an
action. [
Footnote 30]
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in No. 77-52 that
respondent Ford's failure to invoke the Agreement in specific terms
in his speedy trial motions before the District Court did not
result in a waiver of his claim that the Government violated Art.
IV(c). The record shows that from the time he was arrested Ford
persistently requested that he
Page 436 U. S. 365
be given a speedy trial. After his trial date had been continued
for the third time, he sought the dismissal of his indictment on
the ground that the delay in bringing him to trial while the
detainer remained lodged against him was causing him to be denied
certain privileges at the state prison. We deem these actions on
Ford's part sufficient to put the Government and the District Court
on notice of the substance of his claim.
The United States does not challenge the conclusion of the Court
of Appeals that, if Art. IV(c) was applicable, it was violated by
the extensive delay in bringing Ford to trial. Accordingly, we
conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the judgment
of the District Court and ordered that the indictment against Ford
be dismissed.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 76-1596 is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. In No. 77-52, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 77-52,
United States v. Ford, also
on certiorari to the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act contains eight
sections. Section 2 sets forth the Agreement as adopted by the
United States and by other member jurisdictions. Provisions of the
Agreement will be referred to herein by their original article
numbers, as set forth in § 2 of the enactment of Congress.
[
Footnote 2]
The criminal contempt charges arose out of the refusal of Mauro
and Fusco, despite a judicial grant of immunity, to testify before
a federal grand jury investigating violations of the federal drug
laws.
[
Footnote 3]
Mauro was serving a sentence of three years to life imprisonment
at the Auburn, N.Y. Correctional Facility, and Fusco was serving a
sentence of one year to life imprisonment at the Clinton
Correctional Facility in Dannemora, N.Y.
[
Footnote 4]
Article IV(e) requires the dismissal of the indictment against a
prisoner who is obtained by a receiving State if he is returned to
his original place of imprisonment without first being tried on the
indictment underlying the detainer and request by which custody of
the prisoner was secured.
See infra at
436 U. S.
352-353.
[
Footnote 5]
One of the warrants, issued in the Southern District of New
York, was for bank robbery; the other, issued in the District of
Massachusetts, was for unlawful flight. The latter charge was
eventually dismissed.
[
Footnote 6]
In these letters, Ford stated that he was in the custody of
state officials in Illinois, awaiting extradition to Massachusetts
to stand trial for escape. He requested the court and the United
States Attorney to take action on the federal bank robbery charge
against him, either bringing him to trial or dropping the charge.
This request, said Ford, was based on his constitutional right to a
speedy trial.
[
Footnote 7]
The superseding indictment was filed against Ford on April 3,
1974. It charged him and one James R. Flynn with the same bank
robbery that had been charged in the first indictment and also with
use of a firearm in the commission of a bank robbery, interstate
transportation of a stolen vehicle, and conspiracy to commit the
above offenses.
[
Footnote 8]
On May 17, 1974, the Government moved to adjourn the trial for a
period of 90 days or until codefendant Flynn could be apprehended,
whichever occurred first. The motion was granted, and the trial was
rescheduled for August 21, 1974. The second postponement resulted
from the reassignment of the case to a different judge in August,
1974; trial was then reset for November 18, 1974. On November 1,
however, the Government requested an additional 90-day adjournment
in order to apprehend Flynn. The District Court granted the
Government's motion, over Ford's objections, and set a new trial
date of February 18, 1975. Because the District Judge was engaged
in a lengthy stock fraud trial on February 18, the trial was again
postponed; it was rescheduled for June 11, 1975. The trial was
postponed for a final time, until September 2, 1975, because of the
District Court's decision to undertake a "crash" program for the
disposition of pending civil cases.
[
Footnote 9]
In his motion, Ford contended that he had been denied his rights
to a speedy trial as guaranteed to him by the Federal Constitution
and the Rules of the Southern District of New York.
[
Footnote 10]
For the text of Art. IV(c),
see infra at
436 U. S.
352.
[
Footnote 11]
The opinion for the Court of Appeals was written by Judge
Mansfield, who had dissented from the Second Circuit's disposition
of the
Mauro and
Fusco cases.
[
Footnote 12]
The Court of Appeals held that, while Ford had waived his claim
under Art. IV(e) by requesting the return to state prison, he had
not waived his Art. IV(c) claim, for he had repeatedly insisted on
a prompt trial.
[
Footnote 13]
See infra at
436 U. S.
353
[
Footnote 14]
In addition to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that a writ of
habeas corpus
ad prosequendum is a detainer within the
meaning of the Agreement.
United States v. Sorrell, 562
F.2d 227 (1977) (en banc),
cert. pending, No. 77-593. The
other Courts of Appeals that have considered the question have
concluded that an
ad prosequendum writ does not, by
itself, trigger the application of the Agreement.
Ridgeway v.
United States, 558 F.2d 357 (CA6 1977),
cert.
pending, No. 77-5252;
United States v. Kenaan, 557
F.2d 912 (CA1 1977),
cert. pending, No. 77-206;
United
States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d 1168 (CA5 1977),
cert.
pending, No. 76-6559.
[
Footnote 15]
434 U.S. 816 (1977)
[
Footnote 16]
This committee was made up of representatives from the following
organizations: Parole and Probation Compact Administrators
Association, National Association of Attorneys General, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, American Prison
Association, and the Section on Criminal Law of the American Bar
Association.
[
Footnote 17]
Among the 60 persons in attendance at the conference were
representatives of the United States Department of Justice.
[
Footnote 18]
For good cause shown in open court, with either the prisoner or
his counsel present, the court having jurisdiction over the matter
may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.
[
Footnote 19]
Article IV(a) states:
"The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried
indictment, information, or complaint is pending shall be entitled
to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is
serving a term of imprisonment in any party State made available in
accordance with article V(a) hereof upon presentation of a written
request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate
authorities of the State in which the prisoner is incarcerated:
Provided, That the court having jurisdiction of such
indictment, information, or complaint shall have duly approved,
recorded, and transmitted the request:
And provided
further, That there shall be a period of thirty days after
receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be
honored, within which period the Governor of the sending State may
disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability,
either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner."
[
Footnote 20]
In addition to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the
following Courts of Appeals have rejected the Government's argument
that it is only a sending State: the Third Circuit in
United
States v. Sorrell, 562 F.2d at 232 n. 7; the First Circuit in
United States v. Kenaan, 557 F.2d at 915 n. 6; and the
Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Scallion, 548 F.2d at
1174.
[
Footnote 21]
Under the Agreement, "State" means
"a State of the United States; the United States of America; a
territory or possession of the United States; the District of
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico."
Art. II(a).
[
Footnote 22]
Both Committee Reports made express reference to the fact. that
the Agreement would enter into full force and effect upon passage.
See H.R.Rep. No. 91-1018, p. 3 (1970); S.Rep. No. 91-1356,
p. 3 (1970).
[
Footnote 23]
Prior to the Agreement, there were several means by which States
could obtain prisoners from other jurisdictions, none of which was
entirely satisfactory. The traditional method was the use of formal
extradition proceedings. This required a request for the prisoner
by the Governor of the receiving State. It was sent to the Governor
of the State that had custody of the prisoner, and he was permitted
to investigate the situation to determine if the prisoner should be
surrendered. If the Governor agreed to the extradition, he issued
an arrest warrant against the prisoner, who was then permitted to
challenge the legality of his arrest.
Rather than going through this formal procedure, some States
entered into special contracts controlling the transfer of
prisoners. The effort involved in arriving at such a contract,
however, was often thought to outweigh the benefit of the
simplified procedures unless there were frequent prisoner transfers
between two States.
Because of problems with both of these methods, law enforcement
authorities developed the informal practice of filing detainers
against the prisoners; rather than seeking immediate transfer, the
State would merely notify the State having custody of the prisoner
that he was wanted at the completion of his sentence. This practice
led to various problems, discussed in the text and
n 25,
infra, that the Agreement
sought to overcome. The Agreement also provided States with a
simple and efficient means of obtaining prisoners from other
States.
[
Footnote 24]
The subsequent administrative and congressional actions cited by
the Government do not convince us that the United States was meant
to be only a sending State. Neither the Justice Department's
opinion, then or now, that the United States is not a receiving
State under the Agreement nor the statement of a subsequent
Congress (in a draft Committee Report concerning a bill never
enacted) that the Agreement did not limit the scope and
applicability of the writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum
warrants our departing from the clear wording of the Agreement. Nor
do we view the subsequently enacted Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18
U.S.C. § 3161
et seq. (1976 ed.), as being
inconsistent with the United States' status as a receiving State.
In situations in which two different sets of time limitations are
prescribed, the more stringent limitation may simply be applied.
Finally, we deem it irrelevant that bills currently pending in
Congress, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3201 (1977); H.R.
6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3201 (1977), would limit the
United States' participation as a receiving State to proceedings
under only Art. III of the Agreement. That action demonstrates a
view contrary to the Government's position that the United States
should be a receiving State for no purposes; furthermore, it may be
read as confirming the conclusion that the United States is
currently a receiving State for all purposes.
[
Footnote 25]
Problems possibly resulting from this lack of judicial
supervision have been described by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit:
"Detainers, informal aides [
sic] in interstate and
intrastate criminal administration, often produce serious adverse
side effects. The very informality is one source of the difficulty.
Requests to an imprisoning jurisdiction to detain a person upon his
release so that another jurisdiction may prosecute or incarcerate
him may be filed groundlessly, or even in bad faith, as suspected
by the appellant in this case. The accusation in a detainer need
not be proved; no judicial officer is involved in issuing a
detainer. As often happens, the result of the then unestablished
charge upon which the detainer in this case rested was that the
detainee was seriously hampered in his quest for a parole or
commutation."
Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182, 187 (1968)
(footnote omitted).
[
Footnote 26]
The Court of Appeals concluded that Art. IV's requirement that
the prisoner be tried before he is returned to the sending State
demonstrates a concern of the Agreement that prisoners not be
shuttled back and forth between penal institutions. This problem,
the court noted, is one that arises from the use of writs of habeas
corpus
ad prosequendum as well as from detainers. We agree
with Judge Mansfield, however, that the real concern of this
provision was that, if the prisoner were returned to the sending
State prior to the disposition of the charges in the receiving
State, the detainer previously lodged against him would remain in
effect with all its attendant problems. These problems, of course,
would not arise if a detainer had never been lodged and the writ
alone had been used to remove the prisoner, for the writ would have
run its course, and would no longer be operative upon the
prisoner's return to state custody.
[
Footnote 27]
The Government admits that a similar provision of the Speedy
Trial Act referring to "a properly supported request for temporary
custody of such prisoner for trial," 18 U.S.C. § 3161(j)(4)
(1976 ed.), is properly interpreted as including an
ad
prosequendum writ. Brief for United States in No. 77-52, p. 48
n. 35. The difference, it says, is that the legislative history of
the Speedy Trial Act shows that its provisions are to have broad
applicability. This argument overlooks the fact that the Agreement,
on its face, contains a similar expression of intent. Article IX
states that "[t]his agreement shall be liberally construed so as to
effectuate its purposes."
[
Footnote 28]
Both Committee Reports note that "a Governor's right to refuse
to make a prisoner available is
preserved. . . ." H.R.Rep.
No. 91-1018, p. 2 (1970) (emphasis added); S. Rep No. 91-1356, p. 2
(1970) (emphasis added). The Council of State Governments discussed
the provision in similar terms: "[A] Governor's right to refuse to
make the prisoner available (on public policy grounds) is
retained." Council of State Governments, Suggested State
Legislation Program for 1957, p. 78 (1956) (emphasis added).
[
Footnote 29]
The Government made it quite clear during oral argument that,
despite the availability of writs of habeas corpus
ad
prosequendum, the United States makes great use of detainers,
and considers them to play an important function.
See Tr.
of Oral Arg. in No. 76-1596, p. 37. They serve to put the state
prison officials on notice that the Federal Government has charges
pending against a prisoner, even though his immediate prosecution
may not be contemplated, and that he should not be released without
the Government's being notified. We were informed that, during a
typical year, federal courts issue approximately 5,000
ad
prosequendum writs, and that about 3,000 of those are in cases
in which a detainer has previously been lodged against the
prisoner. Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 77-52, p. 13.
[
Footnote 30]
In arguing that Congress did not intend the word "request" to
encompass writs of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum, the
dissent refers to legislative history indicating that the Agreement
was not meant to be the exclusive means of effecting a transfer of
a prisoner for purposes of prosecution. Nothing we have said today,
however, is contrary to this intent. As our judgment in No. 76-1596
indicates, the Government need not proceed by way of the Agreement.
It may obtain a state prisoner by means of an
ad
prosequendum writ without ever filing a detainer; in such a
case, the Agreement is inapplicable. It is only when the Government
does file a detainer that it becomes bound by the Agreement's
provisions.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
concurring in the judgment in No. 76-1596 and dissenting in No.
77-52.
I agree with the Court's conclusion in No. 76-1596 that a writ
of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum is not a detainer within
the meaning of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. As the Court
observes,
ante at
436 U. S. 360:
"[T]he issuance of
ad prosequendum writs by federal
courts has a long history, dating back to the first Judiciary Act.
We can therefore assume that Congress was well aware of the use of
such writs by the Federal Government to obtain state prisoners, and
that, when it used the word 'detainer,' it meant something quite
different from a writ of habeas corpus
ad
prosequendum."
Indeed, there is simply nothing in the language or legislative
history of the Agreement to indicate that Congress intended to
cut
Page 436 U. S. 366
back in any way on the scope and use of the writ. But for these
very reasons, I cannot agree with the result in No. 77-52.
I am first struck by the Court's interesting approach to
statutory construction, the significance of which cannot be lost on
even the most casual reader. The Court considers
ad
prosequendum writs to be "written requests for temporary
custody" not because the language of the Agreement compels, or
indeed even supports, that result, but rather because the "purposes
of the Agreement and the reasons for its adoption by Congress"
supposedly lead to that result.
Ante at
436 U. S. 361.
One certainly may find it necessary to resort to interpretative
aids other than the language of the statute when difficult
questions of construction arise. I would have thought, however,
that one would
first turn to the language of the statute
before resorting to such extra-statutory interpretative aids.
See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.
S. 143,
415 U. S. 151
(1974).
The reason, indeed the necessity, for the Court's pursuing the
opposite course in this case is readily apparent, however. The
language of the Agreement simply does not support the Court's
conclusion. The Agreement speaks only of "requests" for custody. In
the writ in the instant case, on the other hand, the warden of the
Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole was "HEREBY
COMMANDED to have the body of RICHARD THOMSON FORD . . . before the
Judges of our District Court" on a date certain. App. in No. 77-52,
p. 8. The Massachusetts warden would no doubt be surprised to hear
that the United States had only "requested" the custody of his
prisoner.
But even if the language of the Agreement were broad enough to
encompass a writ of habeas corpus, it seems to me that, for the
same reasons the Court does not consider a writ to be a "detainer,"
it cannot view a writ as a request. The writ has a long history, of
which Congress must have been aware when it enacted the Agreement.
It is inconceivable to me that Congress intended to include the
writ in the operation
Page 436 U. S. 367
of the Agreement, and thereby make new and different conditions
flow from its use, simply by use of the phrase "written request for
temporary custody." In fact,the intimations in the legislative
history are to the contrary. The Reports of both the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees suggest that Congress did not intend
the procedures established by the Agreement to be the exclusive
means of effecting a transfer of a prisoner for purposes of
prosecution.
"The agreement also provides
a method whereby
prosecuting authorities may secure prisoners serving sentences in
other jurisdictions for trial before the expiration of their
sentences and before the passage of time has dulled the memory or
made witnesses unavailable."
H.R.Rep. No. 91-1018, p. 2 (1970); S.Rep. No. 91-1356, p. 2
(1970). (Emphasis added.) A draft of the Senate Judiciary Committee
Report on S. 1 in 1975 also leaves no doubt that many of the
Congressmen directly involved in the passage of the Agreement did
not think they were in any way limiting the scope or application of
the writ. The Report states:
"Federal prosecution authorities and all Federal defendants have
always had and continue to have recourse to a speedy trial in a
Federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5), the Federal
writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum. The Committee does
not intend, nor does it believe that the Congress, in enacting the
Agreement in 1970, intended, to limit the scope and applicability
of that writ."
S.Rep. No. 900, p. 984 (1975).*
Page 436 U. S. 368
I likewise find myself at a loss to discover exactly what
problems the United States has "precipitated" by lodging a detainer
against a prisoner and then securing his custody by use of the writ
or how this process allows the Government "to circumvent its
obligations under the Agreement. . . ."
Ante at
436 U. S. 362.
The Court correctly recognizes that the primary purpose of the
Agreement was to provide a solution to the problems encountered by
prisoners and prison systems as a result of the lodging of
detainers.
Ante at
436 U. S. 356,
436 U. S.
359-360. Upon the mere filing of a detainer by the
United States, however, the prisoner clearly has the right under
the Agreement to request speedy disposition of the underlying
charges if he so desires.
Ante at
436 U. S. 351.
The Government in no way excuses itself from this obligation by
later using a writ of habeas corpus to secure the prisoner's
custody. But, by the same token, when the Government chooses
not to take advantage of the remaining procedures
specified in the Agreement after it files a detainer, I see nothing
in the Agreement to suggest that the Government is still bound by
all of the conditions which attach when it does choose to take full
advantage of those procedures. Neither do I see anything in this
procedure which precipitates any of the problems the Agreement was
intended to alleviate. And to the extent any of the concerns
expressed by the Court relate to the possibility of pretrial delay,
the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 1361
et
seq. (1976 ed.), which creates specific time limits within
which all federal defendants must he tried, must lessen, if not
totally dissipate, those concerns.
Neither can I shrug off as cavalierly as the Court the
Government's arguments with respect to other related language of
the Agreement. The Government argues that, since
Page 436 U. S. 369
Art. IV(a) gives the Governor of a sending State the opportunity
to disapprove the receiving State's "request," the term "request"
cannot include the writ of habeas corpus, with which a State
clearly has no right to refuse to comply. The Court responds that
this provision was meant to do no more than preserve existing
rights, and if the States did not previously have the right to
refuse writs, then this provision cannot be read as providing such
authority.
Ante at
436 U. S. 363.
But that is no response at all. The Court is simply picking and
choosing which provisions it will apply to the United States and
which it will not, in order to consistently construe a statutory
scheme which has been made facially inconsistent by the Court's
wrong turn at the outset. I see no justification, and, perhaps more
importantly, no standards, for engaging in this sort of
gerrymandering of a statute. Rather, if, as the Court admits, this
statutory provision was intended only to "preserve" a Governor's
right to refuse a "request," then the only logical and consistent
inference therefrom is that the term "request" does not include
writs of habeas corpus, which cannot be refused.
The Government also argues that the speedy trial provision of
Art. IV(c) applies only to "proceeding[s] made possible by this
article. . . ." Since proceedings against a prisoner whose presence
has been secured by an
ad prosequendum writ are not "made
possible" by Art. IV, the speedy trial provision contained therein
must not be applicable in this case. The Court's response to this
argument is even less persuasive. It primly refuses to "accept the
Government's narrow reading of this provision,"
ante at
436 U. S.
363-364, but ventures no alternative reading, narrow or
broad, which is a defensible alternative to that offered by the
Government.
Finally, the Court admits that the Agreement was introduced into
Congress by, and, one can fairly surmise given the paucity of
legislative history, enacted into law largely at the behest of the
Department of Justice, which unequivocally endorsed
Page 436 U. S. 370
the legislation. S.Rep. No. 91-1356,
supra at 1, 5-6;
H.R.Rep. No. 91-1018,
supra at 1, 5-6. Thereafter, the
Department has consistently taken the position through its actions,
though perhaps not its words, that writs of habeas corpus do not
fall within the terms of the Agreement. This administrative
construction certainly may be entitled to less weight than if it
had been accompanied by a contemporaneous, well reasoned
explanation. But I would have thought, at least until today, that
it was entitled to some weight, particularly in a case such as
this, where the language of the statute is not entirely clear on
its face or, to the extent it is, supports, rather than undermines,
the administrative construction.
Cf. United States v.
Correll, 389 U. S. 299,
389 U. S. 304
(1967).
In sum, I am left with the distinct impression that the Court is
stretching to reach the result it considers most desirable from a
policy standpoint. Since I see little in the normal tools of
statutory construction to justify the interpretation adopted by the
Court today, and much in them to condemn it, I dissent from the
Court's disposition of No. 77-52.
* This Report is, of course, not overwhelmingly persuasive,
given that it postedates the enactment of the Agreement and
concerns a measure which was not even enacted into law at that
time. Such so-called "subsequent legislative history" cannot "serve
to change the legislative intent of Congress expressed before the
Act's passage."
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
419 U. S. 102,
419 U. S. 132
(1974). It does, however, represent the personal views of these
legislators,
ibid., and thus is not totally without
significance, given that 12 of the 15 members of the Committee who
issued the draft Report had been members of the same Committee
which issued the original Report recommending adoption of the
Agreement.