California, and not the United States, has dominion over the
submerged lands and waters within the one-mile belts surrounding
Santa Barbara and Anacapa Islands within the Channel Islands
National Monument. When, by Presidential Proclamation in 1949, the
Monument was enlarged to encompass areas within one nautical mile
of the shorelines of these islands, the submerged lands and waters
within the one-mile belts were under federal dominion as a result
of this Court's decision two years earlier in
United States v.
California, 332 U. S. 19. But,
assuming that the Proclamation intended to reserve such submerged
lands and waters, dominion over them was subsequently transferred
to California by the Submerged Lands Act, whose very purpose was to
undo that decision. The § 5(a) "claim of right" exemption from
the Act's broad grant, relied on by the Government, clearly does
not apply to claims based on the 1947 California decision. The
reservation for a national monument made by the 1949 Proclamation
could not enhance the Government's claim to the submerged lands and
waters in dispute, since the statutory authority under which such
monuments are created merely authorizes land to be shifted from one
federal use to another. Pp.
436 U. S.
36-41.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. WHITE, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN,
J., joined,
post, p.
436 U. S. 42.
MARSHALL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
Page 436 U. S. 33
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case, arising under our original
jurisdiction, is whether California or the United States has
dominion over the submerged lands and waters within the Channel
Islands National Monument, which is situated within the three-mile
marginal sea off the southern California mainland. [
Footnote 1] For the reasons that follow, we
hold that dominion lies with California and not the United
States.
The Antiquities Act of 1906 authorizes the President to reserve
lands "owned or controlled by the Government of the United States"
for use as national monuments. [
Footnote 2] Pursuant to this Act, President Franklin
Roosevelt, in 1938, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2281, 52
Stat. 1541. This Proclamation "reserved from all forms of
appropriation under the public land laws" most of Anacapa and Santa
Barbara Islands,
Page 436 U. S. 34
which were then federal lands, [
Footnote 3] and set them aside as the Channel Islands
National Monument. [
Footnote 4]
As the Proclamation recognized, these islands
"contain fossils of Pleistocene elephants and ancient trees, and
furnish noteworthy examples of ancient volcanism, deposition, and
active sea erosion. . . ."
Ibid.
The two large islands and the many smaller islets and rocks
surrounding them also shelter a variety of marine life, some rare
or endangered. Prompted by a desire to protect these species
[
Footnote 5] and other "objects
of geological and scientific interest," President Truman issued a
Proclamation in 1949, enlarging the Monument to encompass "the
areas within one nautical mile of the shoreline of Anacapa and
Santa Barbara Islands. . . ." Presidential Proclamation No. 2825,
63 Stat. 1258. It is undisputed that the islets and protruding
rocks
Page 436 U. S. 35
within these one-mile belts have long belonged to the United
States and, as a result of President Truman's Proclamation, are now
part of the Monument. [
Footnote
6] It is equally clear that the tidelands of Anacapa and Santa
Barbara Islands, as well as of the islets and rocks, belong to
California. [
Footnote 7] What
is disputed in this litigation is dominion over the submerged lands
and waters within the one-mile belts surrounding Anacapa and Santa
Barbara Islands. [
Footnote
8]
When President Truman issued Proclamation No. 2825 in 1949, the
submerged lands and waters within these belts were under federal
dominion and control, as a result of this Court's decision two
years earlier in
United States v.
California, 332
Page 436 U. S. 36
U.S. 19. That case had held that the United States was
"possessed of paramount rights in, and full dominion and power
over, the lands, minerals and other things underlying the Pacific
Ocean lying seaward of the ordinary low-water mark on the coast of
California, and outside of the inland waters, extending seaward
three nautical miles. . . ."
United States v. California, 332 U.
S. 804,
332 U. S.
805.
There can be no serious question, therefore, that the President
in 1949 had power under the Antiquities Act to reserve the
submerged lands and waters within the one-mile belts as a national
monument, since they were then "controlled by the Government of the
United States." [
Footnote 9]
Thus, whether Proclamation No. 2825 did in fact reserve these
submerged lands and waters, or only the islets and protruding
rocks, could be, at the time of the Proclamation, a question only
of Presidential intent, not of Presidential power.
In addressing the controversy now before us, the parties have
devoted large parts of their briefs to canvassing this question of
intent: what did the Proclamation mean by the use of the word
"areas"? [
Footnote 10] We
find it unnecessary, however,
Page 436 U. S. 37
to decide this question. For even assuming that President Truman
intended to reserve the submerged lands and waters within the
one-mile belts for Monument purposes, we have concluded that the
Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. § 1301
et
seq., subsequently transferred dominion over them to
California.
The very purpose of the Submerged Lands Act was to undo the
effect of this Court's 1947 decision in
United States v.
California, 332 U. S. 19. In
enacting it, Congress "recognized, confirmed, established, and
vested in and assigned to," § 6(a), 67 Stat. 32, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1314(a), the States
"(1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable
waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the
natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right
and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said
lands and natural resources. . . ."
§ 3(a), 67 Stat. 30, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The
submerged lands and waters within one mile of Anacapa and Santa
Barbara Islands plainly fall within this general grant. [
Footnote 11]
Page 436 U. S. 38
The United States contends, however, that the Submerged Lands
Act did not operate to relinquish these submerged lands and waters
to California because of an exception to the broad statutory grant
that Congress provided in § 5(a) of the Act. [
Footnote 12] The final clause of §
5(a), upon which the United States relies, exempted from the grant
"any rights the United States has in lands presently and actually
occupied by the United States under claim of right." [
Footnote 13] The legislative history
shows that this "claim of right" clause was added to preserve
unperfected claims of federal title from extinction under §
3's general "conveyance or quitclaim or assignment." [
Footnote 14] In the words of the
Acting Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and
Page 436 U. S. 39
Insular Affairs, the clause "neither validates the claim nor
prejudices it," but merely "leaves it where we found it" for
eventual adjudication. [
Footnote
15]
The entire purpose of the Submerged Lands Act would have been
nullified, however, if the "claim of right" exemption saved claims
of the United States based solely upon this Court's 1947 decision
in
United States v. California. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the legislative history unmistakably shows that the
"claim of right" must be "other than the claim arising by virtue of
the decision in [that case]. . . ." [
Footnote 16] Thus, this exception applies to the
submerged lands and waters in controversy here only if the United
States' claim to them ultimately rests on some basis other than the
"paramount rights" doctrine of this Court's 1947
California decision.
The United States has pointed to no other basis for believing
that the submerged lands and waters in question were owned
Page 436 U. S. 40
or controlled by the United States in 1949. The crucial
question, then, is whether the 1949 reservation of the submerged
lands and waters for Monument purposes (assuming that was the
intent of the Proclamation) somehow changed the nature of the
Government's claim. If it did not -- if the ownership or control of
these areas by the United States in 1953 existed solely by virtue
of this Court's 1947 decision in
United States v.
California -- then § 3(a) of the Submerged Lands Act
transferred "title to and ownership of" the submerged lands and
waters to California, along with "the right and power to manage,
administer, lease, develop, and use" them. 67 Stat. 30, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a).
We have concluded that the 1949 Proclamation did not and could
not enhance the strength of the Government's basic claim to a
property interest in the submerged lands and waters in controversy.
Reservation of federally controlled public lands for national
monument purposes has the effect of placing the area reserved under
the "supervision, management, and control" of the Director of the
National Park Service. 39 Stat. 535, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-3
(1976 ed.). Without such reservation, the federal lands would
remain subject to "private appropriation and disposal under the
public land laws," 78 Stat. 985, 43 U.S.C. § 1400(c), or to
continued federal management for other designated purposes,
see, e.g., ibid.; 78 Stat. 986, 43 U.S.C. § 1411. The
Antiquities Act of 1906 permits the President, "in his discretion,"
to create a national monument and reserve land for its use simply
by issuing a proclamation with respect to land "owned or controlled
by the Government of the United States." 34 Stat. 225, 16 U.S.C.
§ 431 (1976 ed.). A reservation under the Antiquities Act thus
means no more than that the land is shifted from one federal use,
and perhaps from one federal managing agency, to another. [
Footnote 17]
Page 436 U. S. 41
A reservation for a national monument purpose cannot operate to
escalate the underlying claim of the United States to the land in
question.
Congress was well aware of its power to transfer to the States
as much or as little of the submerged lands in which the Government
held "paramount rights" as it deemed wise. With that knowledge,
Congress expressly
"emphasize[d] that the exceptions spelled out in [§ 5] do
not in anywise include any claim resting solely upon the doctrine
of 'paramount rights' enunciated by the Supreme Court with respect
to the Federal Government's status in the areas beyond inland
waters and mean low tide."
S.Rep. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 20 (1953). A
plainer statement of congressional intent would be hard to
find.
Because the United States' claim to the submerged lands and
waters within one mile of Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands derives
solely from the doctrine of "paramount rights" announced in this
Court's 1947
California decision, we hold that, by
operation of the Submerged Lands Act, the Government's proprietary
and administrative interests in these areas passed to the State of
California in 1953. [
Footnote
18]
Page 436 U. S. 42
The parties are requested to submit an appropriate decree within
90 days
So ordered.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
[
Footnote 1]
This case is part of ongoing litigation stemming from an action
brought in this Court more than three decades ago.
United
States v. California, 332 U. S. 19. The
first decree was entered in 1947,
332 U. S. 332 U.S.
804; a supplemental decree was entered in 1966,
382 U. S. 382 U.S.
448; and a second supplemental decree in 1977,
432 U. S. 432 U.S.
40. In each instance, jurisdiction was reserved to enter further
orders necessary to effectuate the decrees. California initiated
the present suit under the 1966 reservation of jurisdiction:
"As to any portion of such boundary line or of any areas claimed
to have been reserved under § 5 of the Submerged Lands Act as
to which the parties may be unable to agree, either party may apply
to the Court at any time for entry of a further supplemental
decree."
382 U.S. at
382 U. S.
453.
[
Footnote 2]
Section 2 of the Act, 34 Stat. 225, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976
ed.), provides in pertinent part as follows:
"The President of the United States is authorized, in his
discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks,
historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic
or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or
controlled by the Government of the United States to be national
monuments, and may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the
limits of which in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be
protected."
[
Footnote 3]
Federal title to the islands can be traced to the 1848 Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922, by which Mexico ceded to the United
States the islands lying off the coast of California, along with
the adjacent mainland.
See Bowman, The Question of
Sovereignty over California's Off-Shore Islands, 31 Pac.Hist.Rev.
291 (1962). While the Treaty obligated the United States to respect
private property rights derived from Mexican land grants, all
nongranted lands previously held by the Government of Mexico passed
into the federal public domain. When California was admitted to the
Union in 1850, the United States retained ownership of these public
lands.
See An Act for the Admission of the State of
California into the Union, 9 Stat. 452.
[
Footnote 4]
The 1938 Proclamation did not reserve as a national monument the
entire land area of these two islands. Portions were exempted for
continued lighthouse purposes, for which the entire islands had
previously been reserved. 52 Stat. 1541.
[
Footnote 5]
As early as 1940, Government officials recognized that
enlargement of the Monument would be desirable to protect the
birds, sea otters, elephant seals, and fur seals that inhabit the
rocks and islets encircling the two large islands, and early drafts
of the 1949 Proclamation acknowledged all intent to protect marine
life. But after a representative of the Department of Justice
expressed the view that the Antiquities Act did not permit
establishment or enlargement of a national monument to protect
plant and animal life, all references to marine life were dropped
from the Proclamation.
[
Footnote 6]
As noted previously, the Antiquities Act authorizes the
President to set aside only "lands owned or controlled by the
Government of the United States. . . ." 34 Stat. 225, 16 U.S.C.
§ 431 (1976 ed.). Like Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands, the
islets and rocks protruding above the water within the boundaries
of the extended Monument were, in 1949, public lands owned by the
Federal Government.
See n 3,
supra.
[
Footnote 7]
The term "tidelands" is "defined as the shore of the mainland
and of islands, between the line of mean high water and the line of
mean lower low water. . . ."
United States v. California,
382 U.S. at
382 U. S. 452.
Those tidelands in California that had not been subject to Mexican
land grants entered the federal public domain in 1848, where they
remained in trust until California gained statehood in 1850. At
that time, they passed to the State under the "equal footing"
doctrine.
See Borax, Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U. S.
10;
United States v. California, 382 U.
S. 448. Because the tidelands within the Monument were
not "owned or controlled" by the United States in 1938 or in 1949,
Presidents Roosevelt and Truman could not have reserved them by
simply issuing proclamations pursuant to the Antiquities Act.
[
Footnote 8]
The present controversy apparently arose when California was
frustrated in carrying out its program of leases for the harvesting
of kelp in these waters. Giant kelp known as Macrocystis grows in
the water along portions of the California coast and is harvested
to obtain various substances, including algin, a chemical with many
commercial uses.
See North, Giant Kelp, Sequoias of the
Sea, National Geographic (Aug.1972), and Zahl, Algae: the
Life-givers, National Geographic (Mar.1974).
[
Footnote 9]
Although the Antiquities Act refers to "lands," this Court has
recognized that it also authorizes the reservation of waters
located on or over federal lands.
See Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U. S. 128,
426 U. S.
138-142;
United States v. Oregon, 295 U. S.
1,
295 U. S. 14.
[
Footnote 10]
In preparation for the Proclamation, memoranda were circulated
within and among Government agencies, many of which proposed adding
to the Monument "all islets, rocks, and waters" within one nautical
mile of Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands. The final version of the
1949 Proclamation, however, was not so clear. It began:
"WHEREAS it appears that certain
islets and
rocks situated near Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands . .
. are required for the proper care, management, and protection of
the objects of geological and scientific interest located on lands
within [the Channel Islands National Monument] . . ."
(Emphasis added.) The Proclamation then went on to reserve "the
areas within one nautical mile" of each of the two large islands,
"as indicated on the diagram hereto attached. . . ." The diagram
showed Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands, each encircled by a
broken line at a distance of one mile from the island's shoreline.
At the bottom of the two maps appeared acreage figures that,
according to stipulations filed by the parties, described
approximately the entire surface area circumscribed by the broken
lines.
[
Footnote 11]
Section 2(a)(2) of the Act, 7 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. §
1301(a)(2), defines "lands beneath navigable waters" as
"all lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal waters
up to but not above the line of mean high tide and seaward to a
line three geographical miles distant from the coast line of each
such State and to the boundary line of each such State where in any
case such boundary as it existed at the time such State became a
member of the Union, or as heretofore approved by Congress, extends
seaward (or into the Gulf of Mexico) beyond three geographical
miles. . . ."
The term "natural resources" is defined in § 2(e), 43
U.S.C. § 1301(e), to "includ[e], without limiting the
generality thereof, oil, gas, and all other minerals, and fish,
shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges, kelp, and other
marine animal and plant life," but not "water power, or the use of
water for the production of power. . . ."
[
Footnote 12]
Section 5(a) of the Act, 67 Stat. 32, 43 U.S.C. § 1313(a),
provides:
"There is excepted from the operation of section 3 of this Act
-- "
"(a) all tracts or parcels of land together with all accretions
thereto, resources therein, or improvements thereon, title to which
has been lawfully and expressly acquired by the United States from
any State or from any person in whom title had vested under the law
of the State or of the United States, and all lands which the
United States lawfully holds under the law of the State; all lands
expressly retained by or ceded to the United States when the State
entered the Union (otherwise than by a general retention or cession
of lands underlying the marginal sea); all lands acquired by the
United States by eminent domain proceedings, purchase, cession,
gift, or otherwise in a proprietary capacity; all lands filled in,
built up, or otherwise reclaimed by the United States for its own
use; and any rights the United States has in lands presently and
actually occupied by the United States under claim of right."
[
Footnote 13]
The parties have stipulated that
"the United States 'presently and actually occupied' the areas
within one nautical mile of the shoreline of Anacapa and Santa
Barbara Islands for purposes of Section 5 of the Submerged Lands
Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1313."
Thus, the question is simply what "rights" the United States had
in these submerged lands and waters in 1953.
[
Footnote 14]
Remarks of Senator Cordon, Hearings on S.J.Res. 13
et
al. before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1322 (1953). During Committee
hearings on the bill, the following exchange occurred between
Senator Kuchel and Senator Cordon, who was Acting Chairman of the
Committee:
"Senator KUCHEL. What does 'claim of right' mean?"
"Senator CORDON. Well, it means that the United States is in
actual occupancy and claims it has a right to the occupancy."
"Senator KUCHEL. And it permits the United States to keep the
property in the absence of a title?"
"Senator CORDON. No; it does not. It leaves the question of
whether it is a good claim or not a good claim exactly where it was
before. This is simply an exception by the United States of a
voluntary release of its claim, whatever it is. It does not, in
anywise, validate the claim or prejudice it."
"Senator KUCHEL. Why should we recognize it, Senator, any more
than any other so-called color or title of claim . . . ?"
"Senator CORDON. For the reason that, in my opinion, Senator,
this land now is not land to which the State has title, and we are
conveying title. We may except what we will."
Id. at 1321.
[
Footnote 15]
Id. at 1321, 1322.
[
Footnote 16]
Id. at 1322.
[
Footnote 17]
This view is reflected in a memorandum written by the Director
of the Bureau of Land Management to the Director of the National
Park Service in 1947, in response to the latter's proposal that the
Channel Islands National Monument be enlarged:
"If you wish to have these islands added to the Channel Islands
National Monument, the bureau will be glad to prepare and
appropriate proclamation. In the event you desire at this time to
have the islands withdrawn for national monument classification, a
public land order to accomplish this purpose will be prepared."
[
Footnote 18]
With the exception, of course, of any interests retained by the
United States via provisions other than the last clause of §
5(a) of the Submerged Lands Act. For example, § 6 (n) provides
for the retention by the United States of its navigational
servitude and its
"rights in and powers of regulation and control of said lands
and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce,
navigation, national defense, and international affairs. . . ."
67 Stat. 32, 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a).
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE
BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
Although the majority lucidly states the issue in this case, it
plainly errs in deciding it.
Section 5(a) of the Submerged Lands Act excepted from its
general cession of land to the States those "rights the United
States has in lands presently and actually occupied by the United
States under claim of right." [
Footnote
2/1] Actual title to the lands as not required; lands to which
the United States held title were already excepted by the previous
language in 5(a). The reference to claims of right was critical for
the United States' stake in submerged lands, since
United
States v. California, 332 U. S. 19
(1947), and
332 U. S. 332 U.S.
804 (1947), did not actually vest the United States with title to
the submerged lands. While specifically denying California title,
the Court fell short of declaring title in the United States,
recognizing instead the federal "paramount rights" in the lands.
Id. at 805.
Section 5(a) was added at the suggestion of the Attorney
General. His purpose was to guarantee "that all installations and
acquisitions of the Federal Government within such area [as was to
be ceded] belong to it." [
Footnote
2/2] Senator Holland's original Joint Resolution No. 13 had
provided:
"There is excepted from the operation of section 3 of this Act
-- "
"(a) all specifically described tracts or parcels of land
Page 436 U. S. 43
and resources therein or improvements thereon title to which has
been lawfully and expressly acquired by the United States from any
State or from any person in whom title had vested under the
decisions of the courts of such State, or their respective
grantees, or successors in interest, by cession, grant, quitclaim,
or condemnation or from any other owner or owners thereof by
conveyance or by condemnation, provided such owner or owners had
lawfully acquired the title to such lands and resources in
accordance with the statutes or decisions of the courts of the
State in which the lands are located. . . ."
Hearings 14. The Attorney General's substitute read as
follows:
"There is excepted from the operation of section 3 of this Joint
Resolution:"
"(a) all tracts or parcels of land together with all accretions
thereto, resources therein, or improvements thereon, title to which
has been lawfully and expressly acquired by the United States from
any State or from any person in whom title had vested under the law
of the State or of the United States, and all lands which the
United States lawfully holds under the law of the State; all lands
expressly retained by the United States when the State entered the
Union; all lands acquired by the United States by eminent domain
proceedings; all lands filled in, built up, or otherwise reclaimed
by the United States for its own use; and all lands presently
occupied by the United States under claim of right. . . ."
Id. at 935.
The clearest, most observable difference between the original
draft and the language proposed by the Attorney General is this
final statement about "lands presently occupied by the United
States under claim of right." [
Footnote
2/3] The conclusion is that
Page 436 U. S. 44
some lands to which the United States did not possess outright
title might be part of federal installations, and, if so, they were
to be preserved in federal control. his inference is strongly
supported in further legislative history.
The Acting Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs explained to the Joint Resolution's author why the
Committee had added the phrase concerning claim of right:
"I should like to add that the last language quoted, namely,
'any rights the United States has in lands presently and actually
occupied by the United States under claim of right,' came into the
bill at the request of the Department of Justice. It was presented
to the committee and explained by the Department of Justice as
being for the purpose of reserving to the Federal Government the
area of any installation, or part of an installation -- and I use
the term 'installation' to distinguish a specific area, used for a
specific purpose, from any vast area that might be claimed under
the paramount right doctrine -- actually occupied by the Government
under a claim of right."
99 Cong.Rec. 2619 (1953) (Sen. Cordon).
The resolution's author, Senator Holland, asked the Acting
Chairman:
"Am I correct in understanding that, under that particular
provision, the mere fact that the Supreme Court might have held
that the United States has paramount rights in submerged lands
beyond mean low water, and within State boundaries, would not in
any way give the United States the right to claim exceptions of
such lands from the joint resolution,
in view of the fact that
such
Page 436 U. S. 45
lands would not be 'presently and actually occupied by the
United States'? Am I correct in that understanding?"
"Mr. CORDON: The Senator is correct in his understanding."
Ibid. (emphasis added).
Hence, the test is whether the lands held under some claim of
right are "actually occupied" by the Federal Government. If so,
they are not relinquished.
The same issue arose in the hearings, with identical resolution.
The Acting Chairman explained:
"[A]ny land occupied by the United States under claim by the
United States that it has a right there is excluded from this
conveyance or quitclaim or assignment. . . . It is general language
that . . . protects every installation of every kind."
Hearings 1322.
Senator Long summarized, to the Acting Chairman's agreement:
"That, in effect, says that this act does not at all affect any
land which the United States is actually occupying. And that means
that a representative of the United States Government, in one
capacity or another, is occupying that land."
Ibid.
Senator Long was concerned that the definition of occupied lands
might be stretched to include submerged lands over which the
Federal Government had been given dominion in
United States v.
California, 332 U. S. 19
(1947), by reason of the fact that the United States Navy from time
to time might sail across them. It was in response to
that
suggestion that the Acting Chairman made the statement quoted by
the majority that "
the claim of right' [is] `other than the
claim arising by virtue of the decision in [that case]. . . .'"
[Footnote 2/4] Such a construction
was, of course, barred, for it would eviscerate the purpose of
returning any submerged
Page 436 U. S.
46
lands. Ante at 436 U. S. 39.
But this ignores the much narrower meaning of "submerged lands
occupied by the United States under claim of right" which was
intended: the submerged lands that were actually occupied as part
of a federal "installation," meaning "a specific area, used for a
specific purpose." The distinction is between a general claim under
United States v. California to paramount rights, and a
very specific claim associated with a federal installation actually
occupied. Recalling the Acting Chairman's words:
"Occupancy to me is some type of actual either continuous
possession or possession in such way as to indicate that the
individual claims some special right there different from a vast
unoccupied area. [
Footnote
2/5]"
"[The language is] for the purpose of reserving to the Federal
Government the area of any installation, or part of an installation
-- and I use the term 'installation' to distinguish a specific
area, used for a specific purpose, from any vast area that might be
claimed under the paramount right doctrine. . . . [
Footnote 2/6]"
The Channel Islands National Monument includes the submerged
lands within a one-mile radius of Anacapa and Santa Barbara
Islands. [
Footnote 2/7] The parties
have stipulated that
"the United States 'presently and actually occupied' the areas
within one nautical mile of the shoreline of Anacapa and Santa
Page 436 U. S. 47
Barbara Islands for purposes of Section 5 of the Submerged Lands
Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1313. [
Footnote 2/8]"
The federal occupation is to fulfill the specific purpose of
providing for "the proper care, management, and protection of the
objects of geological and scientific interest located on lands
within the said monument." Presidential Proclamation No. 2825, 63
Stat. 1258. The federal occupation is under claim of right, since
only federally "owned or controlled" property can be made into a
national monument. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1976 ed.).
The majority opinion stresses that the United States' occupation
of the submerged lands within the Channel Islands National Monument
[
Footnote 2/9] was originally
premised on federal control of those areas as granted in
United
States v. California, supra. This is true. The paramount
rights of the United States to these submerged lands, and the
absence of California title to them, were recognized in that 1947
decision. In 1949, President Truman allocated a small portion of
all the submerged lands within the Federal Government's paramount
rights to become part of the Channel Islands National Monument. And
in 1953, all the submerged lands not actually occupied by the
Federal Government were ceded to the States. But the Channel
Islands National Monument remained.
Submerged lands for which the federal claim rested "solely upon
the doctrine of
paramount rights'" [Footnote 2/10] were given up by the Federal Government.
The majority's quotation of that statement comes from that part of
the Senate Report explaining why the Attorney General's language
was accepted, the language that included, for the first time,
"rights . . . in
Page 436 U. S.
48
lands presently and actually occupied by the United States
under claim of right. . . ." It says "any claim resting
solely upon the doctrine of `paramount rights'" (emphasis
added) is lost to the Federal Government, but the majority holds
that any claim originating in the doctrine of paramount
rights is lost. The majority does not recognize that some rights
can originate in the paramount rights doctrine, yet rest on actual
occupation under claim of right as part of a federal installation,
annexed before the doctrine of paramount rights was waived in
1953.
That, I respectfully submit, is an erroneous interpretation of
even that one bit of legislative history. [
Footnote 2/11] It is also contrary to the dominant
theme in the legislative history that general, amorphous paramount
rights claims were lost, but specific claims coupled with actual
occupation of an installation were not. And, most critically, the
majority view is without support in the statute's plain language
that "all lands presently occupied by the United States under claim
of right" were preserved. It is stipulated that the lands were
occupied, and a
claim of right certainly arises when a
President treats property in a manner to which only United States
property is subject. [
Footnote
2/12]
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
43 U.S.C. § 1313(a).
[
Footnote 2/2]
Letter of Attorney General Brownell, Hearings on S.J.Res. 13
et al. before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 935 (1953) (hereafter Hearings).
[
Footnote 2/3]
There is no quarrel that the use of the word "lands" in this
context extends to submerged lands. The Act concerns submerged
lands in its section ceding the are to the States, 43 U.S.C. §
1311, and similarly in this section concerning exceptions to that
cession.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Ante at 39, quoting Hearings 1322.
[
Footnote 2/5]
Ibid.
[
Footnote 2/6]
99 Cong.Rec. 2619 (1953).
[
Footnote 2/7]
Although the point is contested, there is little left to decide
upon reading in President Truman's Presidential Proclamation No.
2825 of February 9, 1949, 63 Stat. 1258, that "the areas within one
nautical mile of the shoreline of Anacapa and Santa Barbara
Islands" were added to the National Monument. The parties have
stipulated that
"the acreage figures shown on the diagram accompanying
Presidential Proclamation No. 2825 are figures which approximate
the total surface area of Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands and one
nautical mile of waters surrounding those islands."
App. 2. This leaves no force at all to defendant's reliance on
the Proclamation's preamble which refers to "certain islets and
rocks" but not specifically to submerged lands or water.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Id. at 1. The stipulation was made contingent upon a
finding that the submerged lands and waters within the one-mile
radius were found to be part of the National Monument.
[
Footnote 2/9]
The majority does not reach whether the submerged lands are
actually within the Monument.
[
Footnote 2/10]
S.Rep. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 20 (1953).
[
Footnote 2/11]
The purpose of the Attorney General's proposed amendment was to
preserve federal control over "all installations and acquisitions
of the Federal Government within such area." Hearings 935. The
submerged lands within a one nautical mile radius became an
"acquisition" of the Channel Islands National Monument
"installation" in 1949.
[
Footnote 2/12]
On the face of the statute, it might be asked how any claim of
right could arise more clearly than for a President to incorporate
the property within a national monument. If President Truman did
not act under claim of right, it is hard to surmise how he did
act.