A state court's pretrial order enjoining the news media from
publishing the name or photograph of an 11-year-old boy in
connection with a pending juvenile proceeding charging the boy with
delinquency by second-degree murder held to abridge the freedom of
the press in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.
S. 539;
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U. S. 469.
These Amendments will not permit a state court to prohibit the
publication of widely disseminated information obtained at court
proceedings that were, in fact, open to the public. Here,
notwithstanding that a state statute provided for closed juvenile
hearings unless specifically opened to the public by court order,
it appears that whether or not the presiding judge made such an
order, members of the press were in fact present at the boy's
detention hearing with full knowledge of, and without objection by,
the judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel, and there is no
evidence that petitioner newspaper publisher acquired the boy's
name and photograph unlawfully, or even without the State's
implicit approval.
Certiorari granted;
555 P.2d 1286,
reversed.
PER CURIAM.
A pretrial order entered by the District Court of Oklahoma
County enjoined members of the news media from "publishing,
broadcasting, or disseminating, in any manner, the name or picture
of [a] minor child" in connection with a juvenile proceeding
involving that child then pending in that court. On application for
prohibition and mandamus challenging the order as a prior restraint
on the press violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the
Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma sustained the order. This
Court entered a stay pending the timely filing and disposition of a
petition for certiorari.
Page 430 U. S. 309
429 U.S. 967 (1976). We now grant the petition for certiorari
and reverse the decision below.
A railroad switchman was fatally shot on July 26, 1976. On July
29, 1976, an 11-year-old boy, Larry Donnell Brewer, appeared at a
detention hearing in Oklahoma County Juvenile Court on charges
filed by state juvenile authorities alleging delinquency by
second-degree murder in the shooting of this switchman. Reporters,
including one from petitioner's newspapers, were present in the
courtroom during the hearing, and learned the juvenile's name. As
the boy was escorted from the courthouse to a vehicle, one of
petitioner's photographers took his picture. Thereafter, a number
of stories using the boy's name and photograph were printed in
newspapers within the county, including petitioner's three
newspapers in Oklahoma City; radio stations broadcast his name and
television stations showed film footage of him and identified him
by name.
On August 3, 1976, the juvenile was arraigned at a closed
hearing, at which the judge entered the pretrial order involved in
this case. [
Footnote 1]
Additional news reports identifying the juvenile appeared on August
4 and 5. On August 16, the District Court denied petitioner's
motion to quash the order. The Oklahoma Supreme Court then denied
petitioner's writ of prohibition and mandamus, relying on Oklahoma
statutes providing that juvenile proceedings are to be held in
private "unless specifically ordered by the judge to be conducted
in public," and that juvenile records are open to public inspection
"only by order of the court to persons having a legitimate
Page 430 U. S. 310
interest - therein." Okla.Stat.Ann., Tit. 10, §§ 1111,
1125 (Supp. 1976).
As we noted in entering our stay of the pretrial order,
petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of the Oklahoma
statutes relied on by the court below. Petitioner asks us only to
hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a
state court to prohibit the publication of widely disseminated
information obtained at court proceedings which were in fact open
to the public. We think this result is compelled by our recent
decisions in
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.
S. 539 (1976), and
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U. S. 469
(1975).
In
Cox Broadcasting, the Court held that a State could
not impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a
rape victim "which was publicly revealed in connection with the
prosecution of the crime."
Id. at
420 U. S. 471.
There, a reporter learned the identity of the victim from an
examination of indictments made available by a clerk for his
inspection in the courtroom during a recess of court proceedings
against the alleged rapists. The Court expressly refrained from
intimating a view on any constitutional questions arising from a
state policy of denying the public or the press access to official
records of juvenile proceedings,
id. at
420 U. S. 496
n. 26, but made clear that the press may not be prohibited from
"truthfully publishing information released to the public in
official court records."
Id. at
420 U. S.
496.
This principle was reaffirmed last Term in
Nebraska Press
Assn. v. Stuart, supra, which held unconstitutional an order
prohibiting the press from publishing certain information tending
to show the guilt of a defendant in an impending criminal trial. In
Part VI-D of its opinion, the Court focused on the information
covered by the order that had been adduced as evidence in a
preliminary hearing open to the public and the press; we concluded
that, to the extent the order prohibited the publication of such
evidence, "it plainly violated settled principles," 427 U.S. at
427 U. S. 568,
citing
Cox Broadcasting
Page 430 U. S. 311
Corp. v. Cohn, supra; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.
S. 333,
384 U. S.
362-363 (1966) ("[T]here is nothing that proscribes the
press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom"); and
Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367,
331 U. S. 374
(147) ("Those who see and hear what transpired [in the courtroom]
can report it with impunity"). The Court noted that, under state
law, the trial court was permitted in certain circumstances to
close pretrial proceedings to the public, but indicated that such
an option did not allow the trial judge to suppress publication of
information from the hearing if the public was allowed to attend:
"[O]nce a public hearing had been held, what transpired there could
not be subject to prior restraint." 427 U.S. at
427 U. S.
568.
The court below found the rationale of these decisions to be
inapplicable here because a state statute provided for closed
juvenile hearings unless specifically opened to the public by court
order, and because "there is no indication that the judge
distinctly and expressly ordered the hearing to be public." We
think
Cox and
Nebraska Press are controlling
nonetheless. Whether or not the trial judge expressly made such an
order, members of the press were, in fact, present at the hearing
with the full knowledge of the presiding judge, the prosecutor, and
the defense counsel. No objection was made to the presence of the
press in the courtroom or to the photographing of the juvenile as
he left the courthouse. There is no evidence that petitioner
acquired the information unlawfully, or even without the State's
implicit approval. The name and picture of the juvenile here were
"publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of the
crime," 420 U.S. at
420 U. S. 471,
much as the name of the rape victim in
Cox Broadcasting
was placed in the public domain. [
Footnote 2] Under these circumstances, the District
Page 430 U. S. 312
Court's order abridges the freedom of the press in violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
In addition to enjoining publication of the name and picture of
the juvenile, the order also enjoined law enforcement officials,
juvenile authorities, and prosecution and defense counsel "from
disclosing any information or making an comments concerning" the
delinquency proceeding pending against the juvenile. Petitioner
does not now challenge the restraints on counsel (which were
rescinded in a modification of the order on August 5) or on public
officials.
[
Footnote 2]
In
Cox Broadcasting, the Court quoted the following
description by the reporter of the manner in which the name of the
rape victim was revealed to him:
"'[D]uring a recess of the said trial, I approached the clerk of
the court, who was sitting directly in front of the bench, and
requested to see a copy of the indictments. In open court, I was
handed the indictments, both the murder and the rape indictments,
and was allowed to examine fully this document. . . . Moreover, no
attempt was made by the clerk or anyone else to withhold the name
and identity of the victim from me or from anyone else, and the
said indictments apparently were available for public inspection
upon request.'"
420 U.S. at
420 U. S. 473
n. 3.