A plaintiff in federal court, whether prosecuting a state or
federal cause of action, may not appeal from a remittitur order he
has accepted. Hence, where petitioner seaman in his action under
the Jones Act for injuries sustained on board ship accepted "under
protest" a reduced verdict when the District Court ordered a new
trial on damages unless petitioner agreed to a remittitur, the
Court of Appeal properly dismissed petitioner's appeal from such
order on the ground that a plaintiff cannot "protest" a remittitur
he has accepted in an attempt to open it to challenge on
appeal.
Certiorari granted; 536 F.2d 536, affirmed.
PER CURIAM.
The petitioner, while employed by the respondents as a seaman on
the
SS Penn Sailor, slipped on wet paint, injuring his
right wrist and elbow. He sued the respondents under the Jones Act,
46 U.S.C. § 688, and obtained a $90,000 verdict at his jury
trial. The respondents moved to set aside the verdict as excessive.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 50, 59. The District Court granted the motion,
and ordered a new trial on damages unless the petitioner agreed to
remit $25,000 of the $90,000 award.
After some time the petitioner submitted to the District Court a
proposed order stating that he accepted "under protest" the reduced
verdict of $65,000, but reserving nonetheless "his right to appeal
therefrom." This language was adopted by the District Court in
entering a judgment for the petitioner in the amount of
$65,000.
The petitioner sought appellate review of the District Court's
decision to order a conditional new trial. In so doing, he asked
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to
Page 429 U. S. 649
discard the settled rule that a plaintiff who has accepted a
remittitur may not appeal to seek reinstatement of the original
verdict. The Court of Appeals refused the petitioner's invitation,
and dismissed the appeal. 536 F.2d 536.
The Court of Appeals properly followed our precedents in holding
that a plaintiff cannot "protest" a remittitur he has accepted in
an attempt to open it to challenge on appeal. A line of decisions
stretching back to 1889 has firmly established that a plaintiff
cannot appeal the propriety of a remittitur order to which he has
agreed.
Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S.
22,
131 U. S. 29-30
(1889);
Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U. S. 551,
151 U. S.
554-555 (1894);
Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver
Mining Co., 158 U. S. 41,
158 U. S. 52
(1895);
Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U. S.
79,
244 U. S. 82
(1917).
There are decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals that depart
from these unbroken precedents. Those decisions held or intimated
that a plaintiff who accepts a remittitur "under protest" may
challenge on appeal the correctness of the remittitur order.
See, e.g., Bonn v. Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc., 518
F.2d 89, 94 (CA1 1975);
United States v. 1160.96 Acres of
Land, 432 F.2d 910 (CA5 1970);
Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (CA5 1970);
Steinberg v.
Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 364 F.2d 266 (CA5 1966);
Delta Engineering Corp. v. Scott, 322 F.2d 11, 15 (CA5
1963). Other decisions have suggested that, when entertaining cases
pursuant to its diversity jurisdiction, a federal court should look
to state practice to determine whether such an appeal is permitted.
See Burnett v. Coleman Co., 507 F.2d 726 (CA6 1974);
Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127 (CA6 1973);
Mooney v. Henderson Portion Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 (CA6
1964).
The proper role of the trial and appellate courts in the federal
system in reviewing the size of jury verdicts is, however, a matter
of federal law,
see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.
S. 460,
380 U. S.
466-469 (1965);
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Coop.,
Page 429 U. S. 650
356 U. S. 525
(1958), and that law has always prohibited appeals in the situation
at bar. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit correctly
adhered to the consistent rule established by this Court's
decision. In order to clarify whatever uncertainty might exist, we
now reaffirm the longstanding rule that a plaintiff in federal
court, whether prosecuting a state or federal cause of action, may
not appeal from a remittitur order he has accepted.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the
judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN would grant the petition
for certiorari, but would have the case argued and given plenary
consideration, rather than disposed of summarily