Section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended by
the Trade Act of 1974, provides that, if the Secretary of the
Treasury finds that an
"article is being imported into the United States in such
quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the
national security,"
the President is authorized to
"take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to
adjust the imports of [the] article and its derivatives so that . .
. imports [of the article] will not threaten to impair the national
security."
When it appeared that a prior program established under §
232(b) for adjusting oil imports was not fulfilling its objectives,
the Secretary of the Treasury initiated an investigation. On the
basis of this investigation, the Secretary found that crude oil and
its derivatives and related products were being imported into the
United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security, and accordingly
recommended to the President that appropriate action be taken to
reduce the imports. Following this recommendation, the President
promptly issued a Proclamation,
inter alia, raising the
license fees on imported oil. Thereafter, respondents -- eight
States and their Governors, 10 utility companies, and a Congressman
-- brought suits against petitioners challenging the license fees
on the ground,
inter alia, that they were beyond the
President's authority under § 232(b). The District Court
denied relief, holding that § 232(b) is a valid delegation to
the President of the power to impose license fees on imports, and
that the procedures followed by the President and the Secretary in
imposing the fees fully complied with the statute. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that § 232(b) does not authorize the
President to impose a license fee scheme as a method of adjusting
imports, but encompasses only the use of "direct" controls such as
quotas.
Held: Section 232(b) authorizes the action taken by the
President. Pp.
426 U. S.
558-571.
(a) Section 232(b) does not constitute an improper
delegation
Page 426 U. S. 549
of power, since it establishes clear preconditions to
Presidential action, including a finding by the Secretary of the
Treasury that an article is being imported in such quantities or
under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national
security. Moreover, even if these preconditions are met, the
President can act only to the extent he deems necessary to adjust
the imports so that they will not threaten to impair the national
security, and § 32(c) sets forth specific factors for him to
consider in exercising his authority. Pp.
426 U. S.
558-560.
(b) In authorizing the President to "take such action and for
such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of [an]
article and its derivatives," § 232(b)'s language clearly
grants him a measure of discretion in determining the method used
to adjust imports, and there is no support in the statute's
language that the authorization to the President to "adjust"
imports should be read to encompass only quantitative methods,
i.e., quotas, as opposed to monetary methods,
i.e., license fees, of effecting such adjustments; so to
limit the word "adjust" would not comport with the range of factors
that can trigger the President's authority under § 232(b)'s
language. Pp.
426 U. S.
561-562.
(c) Furthermore, § 232(b)'s legislative history amply
indicates that the President's authority extends to the imposition
of monetary exactions,
i.e., license fees and duties, and
belies any suggestion that Congress, despite its use of broad
language in the statute itself, intended to confine the President's
authority to the imposition of quotas and to bar him from imposing
a license fee system such as the one in question. Pp.
426 U. S.
562-571.
171 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 518 F.2d 1051, reversed and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Page 426 U. S. 550
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion Of the Court.
Section 232(b) Of the Trade Expansion Act Of 1962, 76 Stat. 877,
as amended by § 127(d) of the Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat.1993,
19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), provides that, if
the Secretary of the Treasury finds that an "article is being
imported into the United States in such quantities or under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security," the
President is authorized to
"take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to
adjust the imports of [the] article and its derivatives so that . .
. imports [of the article] will not threaten to impair the national
security. [
Footnote 1] "
Page 426 U. S. 551
All parties to this case agree that § 232(b) authorizes the
President to adjust the imports of petroleum and petroleum products
by imposing quotas on such imports. What we must decide is whether
§ 232(b) also authorizes
Page 426 U. S. 552
the President to control such imports by imposing on them a
system of monetary exactions in the form of license fees.
I
The predecessor statute to § 232(b) was originally enacted
by Congress as § 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of
1955, c. 169, 69 Stat. 166 (
see n 21,
infra), and amended by § 8 of the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Pub.L. 85-686, 72 Stat.
678. The advisory function currently performed under § 232(b)
by the Secretary of the Treasury was performed by the Director of
the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) under the 1955 and 1958
statutes. But, like § 232(b), those statutes allowed the
President, on a finding that imports of an article were threatening
"to impair the national security," to "take such action as he
deem[ed] necessary to adjust the imports of [the] article. . . ."
In 1959, President Eisenhower, having been advised by the Director
of ODM that
"'crude oil and the principal crude oil derivatives and products
are being imported in such quantities and under such circumstances
as to threaten to impair the national security,'"
invoked the 1958 version of the provision and established the
Mandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP). Presidential Proclamation No.
3279, 3 CFR 11 (19591963 Comp.). The MOIP, designed to reduce.the
gap between domestic supply and demand by encouraging the
development of domestic production and refinery capacity, imposed a
system of quotas on the importation of petroleum and petroleum
products. The program was not wholly successful, however, and, in
the face of domestic consumption which continued to grow faster
than domestic production, Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon
each felt compelled to amend it by raising the permissible quota
levels. App. 211-212.
Page 426 U. S. 553
In light of a Cabinet task force conclusion that the MOIP, as
then constituted, was not fulfilling its objectives, [
Footnote 2] President Nixon, acting pursuant
to § 232(b), radically amended the program in 1973.
Presidential Proclamation No. 4210, 3 CFR 31 (1974). The President
suspended existing tariffs on oil imports and provided
"for a gradual transition from the existing quota method of
adjusting imports of petroleum and petroleum products to a
long-term program for adjustment of imports of petroleum and
petroleum products through . . . the institution of a system of
fees applicable to imports of crude oil, unfinished oils, and
finished products. . . ."
Id. at 32. This amended program established a gradually
increasing schedule of license fees for importers. With respect to
crude oil, the fee was scheduled to increase from an initial 10 1/2
cents per barrel on May 1, 1973, to 21 cents per barrel on May 1,
1975. With respect to most finished petroleum products, the fee was
to rise gradually from 15 cents per barrel on May 1, 1973, to 63
cents per barrel on November 1, 1975. [
Footnote 3]
Id. at 36. While initially some oil
imports were exempted from the license fee requirements, the
exemption levels were scheduled to decrease annually, so that, by
1980, the fees would be applicable to all oil imports.
President Nixon's 1973 program apparently did not wholly fulfill
the objectives to which it was directed. Accordingly, the Secretary
of the Treasury, acting pursuant to § 232(b),
see
n 1,
supra, initiated
an investigation on January 4, 1975, "to determine the effects on
the national security of imports of petroleum and petroleum
products." Memorandum from Secretary of the Treasury Simon to
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Page 426 U. S. 554
MacDonald (Simon Memorandum), App. 154. While § 232(b)
directs the Secretary,
"if it is appropriate [to do so, to] hold public hearings or
otherwise afford interested parties an opportunity to present
information and advice"
as part of such an investigation, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1970
ed., Supp. IV), the Secretary found that such procedures would
interfere with "national security interests," and were
"inappropriate" in this case. Simon Memorandum, App. 154. The
investigation therefore proceeded without any public hearing or
call for submissions from interested nongovernmental parties.
The Secretary submitted a report on his investigation to
President Ford on January 14, 1975. Intimating that the measures
then in force under § 232(b) had indeed not solved the
problems to which they were directed, the Secretary indicated that
the United States' dependence on foreign oil had continued to
increase since 1966, and that foreign sources currently accounted
for well over a third of domestic consumption. The Secretary
concluded that
"crude oil, principal crude oil derivatives and products, and
related products derived from natural gas and coal tar are being
imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten
to impair the national security [and] the foregoing products are
being imported into the United States under such circumstances as
to threaten to impair the national security."
App. 133.
On the basis of these findings, the Secretary recommended to the
President that
"appropriate action be taken to reduce imports of crude oil,
principal crude oil derivatives and products, and related products
derived from natural gas and coal tar into the United States. . .
."
Ibid.
Page 426 U. S. 555
The President agreed with the findings of the Secretary's
investigation and concluded that it was "necessary and consistent
with the national security to. further discourage importation into
the United States of petroleum, petroleum products, and related
products. . . ." Presidential Proclamation No. 4341, 3A CFR 2
(1975). Invoking 232(b), he issued a Proclamation on January 23,
1975, which, effective immediately, raised the so-called
"first-tier" license fees that were imposed in 1973,
see
supra at
426 U. S. 553,
to the maximum levels previously scheduled to be reached only some
months later. [
Footnote 4]
Presidential Proclamation No. 4341,
supra. The
Proclamation also imposed on all imported oil, whether covered by
the first-tier fees or not, a supplemental fee of $1 per barrel for
oil entering the United States on or after February 1, 1975. The
supplemental fee was scheduled to rise to $2 a barrel for oil
entering after March 1, 1975, and to $3 per barrel for oil entering
after April 1, 1975. [
Footnote
5] Finally, the Proclamation reinstated the tariffs that had
been suspended in April, 1973. Soon after issuance of the
Proclamation, the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) amended its
oil import regulations in order to implement the new program. 40
Fed.Reg. 4771-4776 (1975).
Four days after the Proclamation was issued, respondents
Page 426 U. S. 556
-- eight States and their Governors, [
Footnote 6] 10 utility companies, [
Footnote 7] and Congressman Robert F. Drinan of
Massachusetts -- challenged the license fees in two suits filed
against the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the
FEA, and the Treasurer of the United States in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. Seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief, they alleged that the imposition of the fees
was beyond the President's constitutional and statutory authority,
that the fees were imposed without necessary procedural steps
having been taken, and that petitioners (hereinafter the
Government) violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA), 83 Stat 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321
et seq., by
failing to prepare an environmental impact statement prior to the
imposition of the fees.
The District Court denied respondents' motions for preliminary
injunctions and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
which, at the request of respondents, it later declared to be
final.
See 171 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 124, 126, 518 F.2d 1051,
1062, 1064 (1975) (appendix to dissenting opinion in Court of
Appeals). The court found that § 232(b) is a valid delegation
to the President of the power to impose license fees on oil
imports.
Id. at 128-129, 518 F.2d at 1066-1067. It further
ruled that the procedures followed by the President
Page 426 U. S. 557
and the Secretary of the Treasury in imposing the license fees
fully conformed to the requirements of the statute.
Id. at
130, 518 F.2d at 1068. Finally, the court held that, "in view of
the emergency nature of the problem and the need for prompt
action,"
id. at 131, 518 F.2d at 1069, the Government was
not required to file an environmental impact statement prior to
imposition of the fees, and hence was not in violation of the NEPA.
Ibid.
Respondents' appeals from these judgments were consolidated with
their petitions to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit for review of the FEA regulations implementing the
license fee program. The allegations in the challenges to the
regulations were substantially the same as those raised in the
District Court actions, adding only a contention that the FEA had
failed to follow certain procedural provisions of the Federal
Energy Administration Act, 88 Stat. 97, 15 U.S.C. §§ 761
et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The Court of Appeals, with
one judge dissenting, held that § 232(b) does not authorize
the President to impose a license fee scheme as a method of
adjusting imports. 171 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 518 F.2d 1051 (1975).
According to the court, reading the statute to authorize the action
taken by the President "would be an anomalous departure" from "the
consistently explicit, well defined manner in which Congress has
delegated control over foreign trade and tariffs."
Id. at
117, 518 F.2d at 1055. In the court's view, 232(b)'s legislative
history indicated that Congress' authorization of the President to
"adjust the imports of [an] article" encompassed only the use of
"direct" controls such as quotas, and did not encompass the use of
license fees.
Id. at 121, 518 F.2d at 1059. Finding no
need to address any of the other issues that were raised, the court
reversed the judgment of the District Court, instructed
Page 426 U. S. 558
that court to enter appropriate relief for respondents, and set
aside the challenged FEA regulations.
We granted the Government's petition for certiorari, 423 U.S.
923 (1976), [
Footnote 8] and
now reverse. Both the language of § 232(b) and its legislative
history lead us to conclude that it authorizes the action taken by
the President in this case. [
Footnote 9]
II
A
Preliminarily, we reject respondents' suggestion that we must
construe § 232(b) narrowly in order to avoid
Page 426 U. S. 559
"a serious question of unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power." Brief for Respondents 42. Even if § 232(b)
is read to authorize the imposition of a license fee system, the
standards that it provides the President in its implementation are
clearly sufficient to meet any delegation doctrine attack.
In
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.
S. 394 (1928), this Court upheld the constitutionality
of a provision empowering the President to increase or decrease
import duties in order to equalize the differences between foreign
and domestic production costs for similar articles. There, the
Court stated:
"If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the [President] is directed to conform, such
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power."
Id. at
276 U. S. 409.
Section 232(b) easily fulfills that test. It establishes clear
preconditions to Presidential action --
inter alia, a
finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that an "article is being
imported into the United States in such quantities or under such
circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security."
Moreover, the leeway that the statute gives the President in
deciding what action to take in the event the preconditions are
fulfilled is far from unbounded. The President can act only to the
extent
"he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and
its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair
the national security."
And § 232(c),
see n 1,
supra, articulates a series of specific
factors to be considered by the President in exercising his
authority under § 232(b). [
Footnote 10] In light of these factors and
Page 426 U. S. 560
our recognition that "[n]ecessity . . . fixes a point beyond
which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to
prescribe detailed rules . . . ,"
American Power & Light
Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90,
329 U. S. 105
(1946), we see no looming problem of improper delegation that
should affect our reading of § 232(b). [
Footnote 11]
Page 426 U. S. 561
B
In authorizing the President to "take such action, and for such
time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of [an] article
and its derivatives," the language of § 232(b) seems clearly
to grant him a measure of discretion in determining the method to
be used to adjust imports. We find no support in the language of
the statute for respondents' contention that the authorization to
the President to "adjust" imports should be read to encompass only
quantitative methods --
i.e., quotas -- as opposed to
monetary methods --
i.e., license fees -- of effecting
such adjustments.
Indeed, reading respondents' suggested limitation into the word
"adjust" would be inconsistent with the range of factors that can
trigger the President's authority under 232(b)'s language. Section
232(b) authorizes the President to act after a finding by the
Secretary of the Treasury that a given article is being imported
"in such quantities or
under such circumstances as to
threaten to impair the national security." (Emphasis added.) The
emphasized language reflects Congress' judgment that "not only the
quantity of imports . . . but also the circumstances under which
they are coming in: their use, their availability, their character"
could endanger the national security, and hence should be a
potential basis for Presidential action. 104 Cong.Rec. 10542-10543
(1958) (remarks of Rep. Mills). It is most unlikely that Congress
would have provided that dangers posed by factors other than the
strict quantitative level of imports can justify Presidential
action, but that that action must be confined to the imposition of
quotas. Unless one assumes, and we do not, that quotas will always
be a feasible method of dealing directly with national security
threats posed by the "circumstances" under which imports are
entering the country, limiting the President to the use of quotas
would effectively
Page 426 U. S. 562
and artificially prohibit him from directly dealing with some of
the very problems against which § 232(b) is directed.
Turning from § 232's language to its legislative history,
again there is much to suggest that the President's authority
extends to the imposition of monetary exactions --
i.e.,
license fees and duties. The original enactment of the provision in
1955, as well as Congress' periodic reconsideration of it in
subsequent years, gives us substantial grounds on which to conclude
that its authorization extends beyond the imposition of quotas to
the type of action challenged here.
During congressional hearings on the Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1955, there was substantial testimony that increased imports
were threatening to damage various domestic industries whose
viability was perceived to be critical to the national security.
[
Footnote 12] In an effort
to deal with the problem, the Senate Committee on Finance
considered several proposals designed to supplement the existing
statutory provision, known as the Symington Amendment, [
Footnote 13] that barred reductions
in duties
"on any article if the President finds that such reduction would
threaten domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements."
Act of July 1, 1954, Pub.L. 464, § 2, 68 Stat. 360.
[
Footnote 14] Among these
amendments
Page 426 U. S. 563
was one proposed by Senator Neely which provided in relevant
part:
"[T]he President shall take
such action as is necessary
to restrict imports of commodities whenever such imports threaten
to retard the domestic development and expansion or maintenance of
domestic production of natural resource commodities or any other
commodities which he determines to be essential to the national
security. . . ."
Hearings on H.R. 1 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess., 1033 (1955) (emphasis added). [
Footnote 15] In explaining what action
would be authorized under the Neely Amendment, Senator Martin, one
of its cosponsors, explained that it authorized the President
"to take such action as is necessary, including the imposition
of import quotas
or the increase in duties, to protect the
domestic industry concerned."
Id. at 2097 (emphasis added). Thus, the Neely Amendment
clearly would have given the President the authority to impose
monetary exactions as a method of restricting imports.
While the Neely Amendment was not reported out of committee, it
is strikingly similar in language to the Byrd-Millikin Amendment --
the substitute provision that was reported out and eventually
enacted into law. The Byrd-Millikin Amendment authorized the
President, after appropriate recommendations had been made by the
Director of the ODM, to "take such action as he deems necessary to
adjust the import of [an] article to a level that will not threaten
to impair the national security." S.Rep. No. 232, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess., 14
Page 426 U. S. 564
(1955). [
Footnote 16]
Given the similarity in the operative language of the two
proposals, it is fair to infer that, if, as Senator Martin stated,
the Neely Amendment was intended to authorize the imposition of
monetary exactions, so too was the Byrd-Millikin Amendment.
The debate on the Senate floor lends further support to this
reading of the Byrd-Millikin Amendment. Senator Millikin himself
stated without contradiction that the Amendment authorized the
President
"to take whatever action he deems necessary to adjust imports .
. . [including the use of] tariffs, quotas, import taxes or other
methods of import restriction."
101 Cong.Rec. 5299 (1955). As a statement of one of the
legislation's sponsors, this explanation deserves to be accorded
substantial weight in interpreting the statute.
National
Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U.
S. 612,
386 U. S. 640
(1967);
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
341 U. S. 384,
341 U. S.
394-395 (1951). [
Footnote 17]
Senator Millikin's statement does not stand alone. Senator Byrd,
another of the Amendment's sponsors, explained in colloquy with
Senator Saltonstall that the Amendment put all commodities
"
on the same basis as agricultural commodities. It
simply leaves to the President the power, in his discretion, to
decide whether to impose a quota or to reduce the imports."
101 Cong.Rec.
Page 426 U. S. 565
5297 (1955) (emphasis added). The reference in the emphasized
phrase is to § 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the
subject of an earlier exchange between Senator Byrd and Senator
Thye. 101 Cong.Rec. 5296 (1955). Section 22 allows the President
under certain circumstances to "
impose such fees . . . or
such quantitative limitations" as he finds necessary to protect the
domestic production of an agricultural commodity. 49 Stat. 773, as
amended, 7 U.S.C. § 624(b) (emphasis added). Senator Byrd's
comparison of § 22 and the Byrd-Millikin Amendment thus
appears to reflect his understanding that Presidential authority
under the Amendment extended to the imposition of fees. [
Footnote 18]
Finally, we note two other statements on the floor of the Senate
which lend direct support to the Government's reading of the
Byrd-Millikin Amendment. Senator Bennett stated that it was his
understanding that the amendment would authorize use of "the entire
scope of tariffs, quotas, restrictions, stockpiling, and any other
variation of these programs in order to protect a particular
industry." 101 Cong.Rec. 5588 (1955). [
Footnote 19] And Senator Barkley, a member of the
Senate Committee on Finance, expressed his understanding that the
Amendment would allow the President to "impose such quotas
or
take such other steps as he may believe to be desirable in
order to
Page 426 U. S. 566
maintain the national security."
Id. at 5298 (emphasis
added).
In the House debate following Senate passage of the
Byrd-Millikin Amendment,
id. at 5655, and its acceptance
with a minor modification by the House conferees, H.R.Conf.Rep. No.
745, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2, 6-7 (1955), we find further
indications that the Amendment authorized the imposition of
monetary exactions. In explaining the provisions of the Amendment,
Congressman Cooper, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee
and a member of the Conference Committee, indicated his concern
that
"
any modification of a duty on imports or a quota would
[because of retaliation from abroad] inevitably result in a
curtailment of exports by the United States."
101 Cong.Rec. 8161 (1955) (emphasis added). Furthermore, as part
of his explanation of the Amendment, Cooper presented a letter he
had received from Gerald D. Morgan, Special Counsel to the
President, which expressed the administration's understanding that,
under the Amendment, the President's action to adjust imports
"could take any form that was appropriate to the situation."
Id. at 8162. [
Footnote
20] Thus, when Congress finally enacted the Byrd-Millikin
Amendment's national security provision, 69 Stat. 166, [
Footnote 21] as part of the
Page 426 U. S. 567
Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1955, not only had Members of
both Houses indicated that the provision authorized the imposition
of monetary exactions, but the Executive Branch, too, had advised
the Congress of its understanding of the broad scope of the
authority granted by the Amendment. [
Footnote 22]
Three years later, in the context of its consideration of the
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958, Congress reexamined the
Byrd-Millikin national security provision. In the course of its
deliberations, the Subcommittee on Foreign Trade Policy of the
House Ways and Means Committee had before it a 1957 report
submitted to it by the ODM, expressing the views of the Executive
Branch that "the imposition of new or increased tariff duties on
imports . . . [was] authorized by the language adopted." [
Footnote 23] Fully aware that the
Executive
Page 426 U. S. 568
Branch then, as in 1955, understood the provision as authorizing
the imposition of monetary exactions, the Committee did not
recommend an change in its wording to confine more narrowly the
bounds of its authorization. On the contrary, the Committee, in its
report, indicated with approval its own understanding that the
statute provided
"those best able to judge national security needs . . . [with] a
way of taking
whatever action is needed to avoid a threat
to the national security through imports."
H.R.Rep. No. 1761, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1958) (emphasis
added).
While Congress, in 1958, made several procedural changes in the
statute and established criteria to guide the President's
determination as to whether action under the provision might be
necessary, it added no limitations with respect to the type of
action that the President was authorized to take. [
Footnote 24] § 8, 72 Stat. 678. The
1958 reenactment, like the 1955 provision, authorized the
President, under appropriate conditions, to "take such action" "as
he deems necessary to adjust the imports. . . ."
Ibid.
When the national security provision next came up for
reexamination, it was reenacted without material change as §
232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. In its analysis, the
Court of Appeals placed great emphasis on the fact that, in the
course of Congress' deliberations, the Senate passed and the
Conference Committee deleted, H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 2518, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess., 13 (1962), an amendment which provided:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Page 426 U. S. 569
President may, when he finds it in the national interest,
proclaim with respect to any article imported into the United
States -- "
"(1) the increase of any existing duty on such article to such
rate as he finds necessary;"
"(2) the imposition of a duty on such article (if it is not
otherwise subject to duty) at such rate as he finds necessary,
and"
"(3) the imposition of such other import restrictions as he
finds necessary."
108 Cong.Rec.19573 (1962). The Court of Appeals inferred from
the rejection of this amendment that Congress understood the then
existing grant of authority to be limited to the imposition of
quotas. According to the court, the amendment would have
"explicitly [given] the President the same authority he claims
derives implicitly from § [232(b),]" 171 U.S.App.D.C. at 121,
518 F.2d at 1059, and Congress' refusal to enact the amendment was
tantamount to a rejection of the Government's interpretation of the
statute.
We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeals' assessment of
the proposed amendment. The amendment was, in reality, far more
than an articulation of the authority that the Government finds to
be contained in § 232(b). Unlike § 232(b), the rejected
proposal would not have required a prior investigation and findings
by an executive department as a prerequisite to Presidential
action. Moreover, the broad "national interest" language of the
proposal, together with its lack of any standards for implementing
that language, stands in stark contrast with § 22(b)'s
narrower criterion of "national security" and § 232(c)'s
articulation of standards to guide the invocation of the
President's powers under § 232(b). In light of these clear
differences between
Page 426 U. S. 570
the rejected proposal and § 232(b), we decline to infer
from the fact that the Senate amendment was proposed, or from the
fact that it was rejected, that Congress felt that the President
had no power to impose monetary exactions under § 232(b).
Only a few months after President Nixon invoked the provision to
initiate the import license fee system challenged here, Congress
once again reenacted the Presidential authorization encompassed in
§ 232(b) without material change. Trade Act of 1974, Pub.L.
93-618, 88 Stat.1993. Making no mention of the President's action,
both the Senate Committee report and the conference report recited
the language of the statute itself to reaffirm that, under §
232(b), the President "may . . . take such action, and for such
time, as he deems necessary, to adjust imports so as to prevent
impairment of the national security." H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 93-1644, p.
29 (1974); S.Rep. No. 93-1298, pp. 96-97 (1974). The congressional
acquiescence in President Nixon's action manifested by the
reenactment of § 232(b) provides yet further corroboration
that § 232(b) was understood and intended to authorize the
imposition of monetary exactions as a means of adjusting
imports.
Taken as a whole then, the legislative history of § 232(b)
belies any suggestion that Congress, despite its use of broad
language in the statute itself, intended to limit the President's
authority to the imposition of quotas, and to bar the President
from imposing a license fee system like the one challenged here. To
the contrary, the provision's original enactment, and its
subsequent reenactment in 1958, 1962, and 1974 in the face of
repeated expressions from Members of Congress and the Executive
Branch as to their broad understanding of its language, all lead to
the conclusion that § 232(b) does, in fact,
Page 426 U. S. 571
authorize the actions of the President challenged here.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the contrary
cannot stand.
C
A final word is in order. Our holding today is a limited one. As
respondents themselves acknowledge, a license fee, as much as a
quota, has its initial and direct impact on imports, albeit on
their price, as opposed to their quantity. Brief for Respondents
26. As a consequence, our conclusion here, fully supported by the
relevant legislative history, that the imposition of a license fee
is authorized by § 232(b) in no way compels the further
conclusion that any action the President might take, as long as it
has even a remote impact on imports, is also so authorized.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case
is remanded to that court for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
So ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 232(b) provides in full:
"Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon
application of an interested party, or upon his own motion, the
Secretary of the Treasury (hereinafter referred to as the
'Secretary') shall immediately make an appropriate investigation,
in the course of which he shall seek information and advice from,
and shall consult with, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
Commerce, and other appropriate officers of the United States, to
determine the effects on the national security of imports of the
article which is the subject of such request, application, or
motion. The Secretary shall, if it is appropriate and after
reasonable notice, hold public hearings or otherwise afford
interested parties an opportunity to present information and advice
relevant to such investigation. The Secretary shall report the
findings of his investigation under this subsection with respect to
the effect of the importation of such article in such quantities or
under such circumstances upon the national security and, based on
such findings, his recommendation for action or inaction under this
section to the President within one year after receiving an
application from an interested party or otherwise beginning an
investigation under this subsection. If the Secretary finds that
such article is being imported into the United States in such
quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the
national security, he shall so advise the President and the
President shall take such action, and for such time, as he deems
necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives
so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national
security, unless the President determines that the article is not
being imported into the United States in such quantities or under
such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national
security."
Section 232 7(c) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c) (1970 ed.,
Supp. IV) provides the President and the Secretary of the Treasury
with guidance as to some of the factors to be considered in
implementing § 232(b). It provides: .
"For the purposes of this section, the Secretary and the
President shall, in the light of the requirements of national
security and without excluding other relevant factors, give
consideration to domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements, the capacity of domestic industries to meet
such requirements, existing and anticipated availabilities of the
human resources, products, raw materials, and other supplies and
services essential to the national defense, the requirements of
growth of such industries and such supplies and services including
the investment, exploration, and development necessary to assure
such growth, and the importation of goods in terms of their
quantities, availabilities, character, and use as those affect such
industries and the capacity of the United States to meet national
security requirements. In the administration of this section, the
Secretary and the President shall further recognize the close
relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national
security, and shall take into consideration the impact of foreign
competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic
industries; and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues
of government, loss of skills or investment, or other serious
effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic products by
excessive imports shall be considered, without excluding other
factors, in determining whether such weakening of our internal
economy may impair the national security."
[
Footnote 2]
See Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, The Oil
Import Question 128 (1970).
[
Footnote 3]
Under President Nixon's plan, the fee for motor gasoline was
scheduled to reach its maximum of 63 cents on May 1, 1975. App.
97.
[
Footnote 4]
The Proclamation did not alter the schedule by which exemptions
from the first-tier fees were not to be eliminated until 1980.
[
Footnote 5]
The supplemental fee increases scheduled to go into effect in
March and April were twice deferred.
See Presidential
Proclamation No. 4355, 3A CFR 26 (1975); Presidential Proclamation
No. 4370, 3A CFR 45 (1975). While the $2 fee finally went into
effect on June 1, 1975, Presidential Proclamation No. 4377, 3A CFR
53 (1975), it was never increased to $3. Indeed, on January 3,
1976, President Ford eliminated the $2 fee. Presidential
Proclamation No. 4412, 3 CFR 3 (1977).
See n 8,
infra.
[
Footnote 6]
The States joining in the suit together with their Governors
were Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The State of Minnesota
intervened as a plaintiff after the complaint was filed, and is
also a respondent here.
[
Footnote 7]
The 10 utility companies are Algonquin SNG, Inc., New England
Power Co., New Bedford Gas and Edison Light Co., Cambridge Electric
Light Co., Canal Electric Co., Montaup Electric Co., Connecticut
Light and Power Co., Hartford Electric Light Co., Western
Massachusetts Electric Light Co., and Holyoke Water Power Co.
[
Footnote 8]
Subsequent to our granting certiorari, the President signed the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6201
et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. V). That Act is aimed
at encouraging domestic oil production by gradually decontrolling
the price of domestically produced crude oil. On January 3, 1976,
indicating that "the purposes of the supplemental [oil import
license] fee" will be served by the Act, the President announced
the elimination of the supplemental fees imposed by Presidential
Proclamation No. 4341, 3A CFR 2 (1975). Presidential Proclamation
No. 4412, 3 CFR 3 (1977). He did not, however, eliminate the
"first-tier" fees originally imposed by Presidential Proclamation
No. 4210, 3 CFR 31 (1974). Since respondents seek to enjoin the
first-tier as well as the supplemental fees, the question here
whether § 232(b) grants the President authority to impose
license fees remains a live controversy.
[
Footnote 9]
Respondents' suits are not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26
U.S.C. § 7421(a), which, in relevant part, provides that "no
suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person. . . ." The
Anti-Injunction Act applies to suits brought to restrain assessment
of taxes assessable under the Internal Revenue Codes of 1954 and
1939. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7421(a), 7851(a)(6)(A),
7851(a)(6)(C)(iv). The license fees in this case are assessed under
neither Code, but rather under the authority conferred on the
President by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended by the
Trade Act of 1974. The fees are therefore not "taxes" within the
scope of the Anti-Injunction Act.
[
Footnote 10]
Respondents rely on our decision in
National Cable
Television Assn. v. United States, 415 U.
S. 336 (1974), to support their delegation doctrine
argument. But we find that case clearly distinguishable from the
one before us today. In
National Cable Television, we held
that the fees to be imposed on community antenna television systems
should be measured by the "value to the recipient" even though the
language of the general statute allowing fee setting by federal
agencies, 31 U.S.C. § 483a, permits consideration not only of
"value to the recipient," but also of "public policy or interest
served and other pertinent facts." The Court's conclusion that the
words of the last-quoted phrase were not relevant to the CATV
situation was apparently motivated by a desire to avoid any
delegation doctrine problem that might have been presented by a
contrary conclusion. 415 U.S. at
415 U. S. 342.
But what might be considered the open-ended nature of the phrase
"public policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts"
stands in contrast to § 232(b)'s more limited authorization of
the President to act only to the extent necessary to eliminate a
threat of impairment to the national security, and § 232(c)'s
articulation of standards to guide the President in making the
decision whether to act.
See n 1,
supra.
[
Footnote 11]
The amount of oil exempted from the "first-tier" license fees,
see supra at
426 U. S. 553,
imposed in 1973 varies among five geographical districts within the
Nation.
See Presidential Proclamation No. 4341, 3A CFR 2
(1975); Presidential Proclamation No. 4210, 3 CFR 31 (1974).
Respondents seize on this fact to argue that the "first-tier" fee
schedule contravenes Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, of the Constitution
which requires that import duties be uniform throughout the United
States. But that issue is not properly before the Court. Sustaining
respondents' Uniformity Clause argument would call not for
invalidation of the entire license fee scheme, but only for
elimination of the geographical differences in the exemptions
allowed under it. This would represent not an affirmance of the
judgments below, which effectively invalidated the entire scheme
and its implementing regulations, but rather a modification of
those judgments. But since respondents filed no cross-petition for
certiorari, they are at this point precluded from seeking such
modification.
See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U. S. 375,
396 U. S. 381
n. 4 (1970).
[
Footnote 12]
See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 1 before the House
Committee on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1006
(analytical balance industry), 1264 (petroleum industry) (1955);
Hearings on H.R. 1 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess., 602 (lead and zinc mining industry), 721 (coal
mining industry) (1955).
[
Footnote 13]
The Symington Amendment is currently codified in somewhat
modified form at 19 U.S.C. § 1862(a).
[
Footnote 14]
In contrast to the Senate Committee on Finance, the House
Committee on Ways and Means concluded that the Symington Amendment
was adequate to deal with any potential threats to the national
security posed by foreign imports. H.R.Rep. No. 50, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess., 44 (1955).
[
Footnote 15]
A separate portion of the Neely Amendment would have placed
quotas on petroleum imports.
[
Footnote 16]
Unlike the Neely Amendment,
see n 15,
supra, the Byrd-Millikin
Amendment did not single out any named industries for protection by
quotas.
[
Footnote 17]
Differing with the Court of Appeals, we do not believe that the
fact that Senator Millikin represented a State that might have
benefited from an expansive reading of the statute "blur[s] [the]
probative value," 171 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 120, 518 F.2d 1051, 1058
(1975), of his explanation. Many, if not most, pieces of
legislation are sponsored by Members of Congress whose constituents
have a special interest in their passage, but we have never let
this fact diminish the weight we give a sponsor's statements.
[
Footnote 18]
Moreover, Senator Byrd's reference in the above-quoted exchange
to the power of the President under the Amendment "to impose a
quota or to reduce the imports," 101 Cong.Rec. 5297 (1955), also
suggests that he understood that power to extend beyond the
imposition of quotas.
See Note, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 432, 435 n.
31 (1975).
[
Footnote 19]
The Court of Appeals characterized Senator Bennett's remarks as
going to "the entire bill and other existing laws." 171
U.S.App.D.C. at 119, 518 F.2d at 1057. Our examination of the
context of his remarks persuades us, however, that they were more
probably made with specific reference to the Byrd-Millikin
Amendment.
[
Footnote 20]
A copy of the Morgan letter was also sent to Senator Byrd,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance.
See 101
Cong.Rec. 8162 (1955).
[
Footnote 21]
As finally enacted the Amendment provided:
"In order to further the policy and purpose of this section,
whenever the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization has
reason to believe that any article is being imported into the
United States in such quantities as to threaten to impair the
national security, he shall so advise the President, and if the
President agrees that there is reason for such belief, the
President shall cause an immediate investigation to be made to
determine the facts. If, on the basis of such investigation, and
the report to him of the findings and recommendations made in
connection therewith, the President finds that the article is being
imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten
to impair the national security, he shall take such action as he
deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article to a level
that will not threaten to impair the national security."
[
Footnote 22]
We are not unmindful that, as respondents point out, much of the
congressional debate referred to the Byrd-Millikin Amendment in the
context of giving the President the power to impose import quotas.
See, e.g., 101 Cong.Rec. 5572 (1955) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey);
id. at 5582, 5584 (remarks of Sen. Douglas);
id. at 5593 (remarks of Sen. Monroney). But nowhere do the
congressional debates reflect an understanding that, under the
Amendment, the President's authority was to be limited to the
imposition of quotas. In light of this fact, we feel fortified in
attaching substantial weight to the positive indications discussed
above that the authority was not so limited.
[
Footnote 23]
Foreign Trade Policy, Compendium of Papers on United States
Foreign Trade Policy Collected by the Staff for the Subcommittee on
Foreign Trade Policy of the House Ways and Means Committee 643
(1958).
[
Footnote 24]
Indeed, while, under the 1955 provision, the President was
authorized to act only on a finding that "quantities" of imports
threatened to impair the national security, the 1958 provision also
authorized Presidential action on a finding that an article is
being imported "under such circumstances" as to threaten to impair
the national security. 72 Stat. 678.
See supra at
426 U. S.
561.