Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as added by §
11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, proscribes
federal employment discrimination and establishes an administrative
and judicial enforcement system. The statute provides that
personnel actions affecting federal employees or job applicants
"shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin," § 717(a); delegates
enforcement authority to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), §
717(b); and permits an aggrieved employee to file a civil action in
a federal district court for review of his claim of employment
discrimination. After first seeking relief from the agency
allegedly guilty of discrimination, he may seek further review from
the CSC, or, alternatively, within 30 days of receipt of notice of
the agency's final decision, file suit in federal district court
without appealing to the CSC. If he appeals to the CSC, he may file
suit within 30 days of the CSC's final decision. In any event, he
may file a civil action if, after 180 days from the filing of the
charge or appeal, the agency or the CSC has not taken final action.
§ 717(c). Petitioner, a Negro, who claimed that respondent
agency (GSA) had racially discriminated against him by not
promoting him to a higher grade, filed a complaint with the GSA.
After an adverse decision, he was accorded a hearing by a CSC
complaints examiner, who, in February, 1973, found that there was
no discrimination, and, in March, 1973, the GSA rendered its final
decision upholding the examiner. Petitioner was advised of that
decision and of the further procedure available to him. Forty-two
days later, he brought suit in the District Court, alleging
jurisdiction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "with
particular reference to" § 717. He also alleged jurisdiction
under the general federal question statute, the Declaratory
Judgment Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The District Court granted
respondents' motion to dismiss made on the ground that petitioner
had not filed the complaint within the 30-day period specified by
§ 717(c), and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: Section 717 provides the exclusive
Page 425 U. S. 821
judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal
employment, and, since petitioner failed to file a timely complaint
under § 717(c), the District Court properly dismissed his
complaint. Pp.
425 U. S.
824-835.
(a) The legislative history indicates that Congress, which was
persuaded that federal employees who were treated discriminatorily
had no effective judicial remedy, intended by the 1972 legislation
to create an exclusive, preemptive administrative scheme for the
redress of federal employment discrimination. Pp.
425 U. S.
824-829.
(b) The balance, completeness, and structural integrity of
§ 717 are inconsistent with petitioner's contention that the
judicial remedy of § 717(c) was designed merely to supplement
other putative judicial remedies.
Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U. S. 454,
distinguished. Pp.
425 U. S.
832-8:34.
(c) A precisely drawn, detailed statute preempts more general
remedies.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.
S. 475. Pp.
425 U. S.
834-835.
507 F.2d 1300, affirmed.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN,
J., joined,
post, p.
425 U. S. 835.
MARSHALL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question presented by this case is whether §
717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the exclusive judicial
remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.
Page 425 U. S. 822
The petitioner, Clarence Brown, is a Negro who has been employed
by the General Services Administration since 1957. [
Footnote 1] He is currently classified in
grade GS-7, and has not been promoted since 1966. In December,
1970, Brown was referred, along with two white colleagues, for
promotion to grade GS-9 by his supervisors. All three were rated
"highly qualified," and the promotion was given to one of the white
candidates for the position. Brown filed a complaint with the GSA
Equal Employment Opportunity Office alleging that racial
discrimination had biased the selection process. That complaint was
withdrawn when Brown was told that other GS-9 positions would soon
be available.
Another GS-9 position did become vacant in June, 1971, for which
the petitioner along with two others was recommended as "highly
qualified." Again, a white applicant was chosen. Brown filed a
second administrative complaint with the GSA Equal Employment
Opportunity Office. After preparation and review of an
investigative report, the GSA Regional Administrator notified the
petitioner that there was no evidence that race had played a part
in the promotion. Brown requested a hearing, and one was held
before a complaints examiner of the Civil Service Commission. In
February, 1973, the examiner issued his findings and recommended
decision. He found no evidence of racial discrimination; rather, he
determined that Brown had not been advanced because he had not been
"fully cooperative."
The GSA rendered its final decision in March, 1973. The agency's
Director of Civil Rights informed Brown
Page 425 U. S. 823
by letter of his conclusion that considerations of race had not
entered the promotional process. The Director's letter told Brown
that, if he chose, he might carry the administrative process
further by lodging an appeal with the Board of Appeals and Review
of the Civil Service Commission, and that, alternatively, he could
file suit within 30 days in federal district court. [
Footnote 2]
Forty-two days later, Brown filed suit in a Federal District
Court. The complaint alleged jurisdiction under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e
et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), "with particular
reference to" § 717; under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (general
federal question jurisdiction); under the Declaratory Judgment Act,
28
Page 425 U. S. 824
U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202; and under the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. [
Footnote 3]
The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that Brown had not filed
the complaint within 30 days of final agency action as required by
§ 717(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16(c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The District Court granted the
motion.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
judgment of dismissal. 507 F.2d 1300 (1974). It held, first, that
the § 717 remedy for federal employment discrimination was
retroactively available to any employee, such as the petitioner,
whose administrative complaint was pending at the time § 717
became effective on March 24, 1972. [
Footnote 4] The appellate court held, second, that §
717 provides the exclusive judicial remedy for federal employment
discrimination, and that the complaint had not been timely filed
under that statute. Finally, the court ruled that, if § 717
did not preempt other remedies, then the petitioner's complaint was
still properly dismissed because of his failure to exhaust
available administrative remedies. We granted certiorari, 421 U.S.
987 (1975), to consider the important issues of federal law
presented by this case.
The primary question in this litigation is not difficult to
state: is § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as added by
§ 11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1970 ed., Supp. IV),
Page 425 U. S. 825
the exclusive individual remedy available to a federal employee
complaining of job-related racial discrimination? But the question
is easier to state than it is to resolve. Congress simply failed
explicitly to describe § 717's position in the constellation
of antidiscrimination law. We must, therefore, infer congressional
intent in less obvious ways. As Mr. Chief Justice Marshall once
wrote for the Court: "Where the mind labours to discover the design
of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be
derived. . . ."
United States v.
Fisher, 2 Cranch 358,
6 U. S. 386
(1805).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1970 ed. and Supp.
IV). Until it was amended in 1972 by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act, however, Title VII did not protect federal
employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Although federal employment
discrimination clearly violated both the Constitution,
Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497
(1954), and statutory law, 5 U.S.C. § 7151, before passage of
the 1972 Act, the effective availability of either administrative
or judicial relief was far from sure. Charges of racial
discrimination were handled parochially within each federal agency.
A hearing examiner might come from outside the agency, but he had
no authority to conduct an independent examination, and his
conclusions and findings were in the nature. of recommendations
that the agency was free to accept or reject. [
Footnote 5] Although review lay in the Board of
Appeals and Review of the Civil Service Commission, Congress found
"skepticism" among federal employees
"regarding the Commission's record in obtaining just resolutions
of complaints and adequate remedies. This has, in turn, discouraged
persons from filing complaints with the Commission
Page 425 U. S. 826
for fear that doing so will only result in antagonizing their
supervisors and impairing any future hope of advancement. [
Footnote 6]"
If administrative remedies were ineffective, judicial relief
from federal employment discrimination was even more problematic
before 1972. Although an action seeking to enjoin unconstitutional
agency conduct would lie, [
Footnote
7] it was doubtful that backpay or other compensatory relief
for employment discrimination was available at the time that
Congress was considering the 1972 Act. For example, in
Gnotta
v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit had held in 1969 that there was no jurisdictional
basis to support the plaintiff's suit alleging that the Corps of
Engineers had discriminatorily refused to promote him. Damages for
alleged discrimination were held beyond the scope of the Tucker
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, since no express or implied contract
was involved. 415 F.2d at 1278. And the plaintiff's cause of action
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§
701-706, and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, was held to
be barred by sovereign immunity, since his claims for promotion
would necessarily involve claims against the Treasury:
"A suit against an officer of the United States is one against
the United States itself 'if the decree would operate against' the
sovereign;
Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S.
57,
373 U. S. 58 . . . (1963)[,]
or if 'the judgment sought would expend itself on the public
treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,'
Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731,
330 U. S.
738, . . . (1947); or if the effect of the judgment
would be
Page 425 U. S. 827
'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to
act,'
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U. S.
682,
337 U. S. 704, . . .
(1949)."
415 F.2d at 1277. [
Footnote
8]
See also Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (CA5 1971)
(no jurisdiction over suit by a Negro alleging wrongful discharge
from Corps of Engineers). [
Footnote
9]
Concern was evinced during the hearings before the committees of
both Houses over the apparent inability of federal employees to
engage the judicial machinery in cases of alleged employment
discrimination.
See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2515
et
al. before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 296, 301, 308,
318 (1971); Hearings on H.R. 1746 before the General Subcommittee
on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., 32, 322, 385-386, 391-392 (1971). Although there was
considerable disagreement over whether a civil action would lie to
remedy agency discrimination, the committees ultimately concluded
that judicial review was not available at all or, if available,
that some forms of relief were foreclosed. Thus, the Senate Report
observed:
"The testimony of the Civil Service Commission notwithstanding,
the committee found that an aggrieved Federal employee does not
have access to the courts. In many cases, the employee must
overcome a U.S. Government defense of sovereign immunity or failure
to exhaust administrative remedies
Page 425 U. S. 828
with no certainty as to the steps required to exhaust such
remedies. Moreover, the remedial authority of the Commission and
the courts has also been in doubt."
S.Rep. No. 92-415, p. 16 (1971). Similarly, the House Committee
stated:
"There is serious doubt that court review is available to the
aggrieved Federal employee. Monetary restitution or back pay is not
attainable. In promotion situations, a critical area of
discrimination, the promotion is often no longer available."
H.R.Rep. No. 92-238, p. 25 (1971).
The conclusion of the committees was reiterated during floor
debate. Senator Cranston, coauthor of the amendment relating to
federal employment, asserted that it would, "[f]or the first time,
permit Federal employees to sue the Federal Government in
discrimination cases. . . ." 118 Cong.Rec. 4929 (1972). Senator
Williams, sponsor and floor manager of the bill, stated that it
"provides, for the first time, to my knowledge, for the right of an
individual to take his complaint to court."
Id. at
4922.
The legislative history thus leaves little doubt that Congress
was persuaded that federal employees who were treated
discriminatorily had no effective judicial remedy. And the case law
suggests that that conclusion was entirely reasonable. Whether that
understanding of Congress was in some ultimate sense incorrect is
not what is important in determining the legislative intent in
amending the 1964 Civil Rights Act to cover federal employees. For
the relevant inquiry is not whether Congress correctly perceived
the then state of the law, but rather what its perception of the
state of the law was. [
Footnote
10]
This unambiguous congressional perception seems to
Page 425 U. S. 829
indicate that the congressional intent in 1972 was to create an
exclusive, preemptive administrative and judicial scheme for the
redress of federal employment discrimination. We need not, however,
rest our decision upon this inference alone. For the structure of
the 1972 amendment itself fully confirms the conclusion that
Congress intended it to be exclusive and preemptive.
Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-16 (1970 ed., Supp IV), proscribes federal employment
discrimination and establishes an administrative and judicial
enforcement system. [
Footnote
11] Section 717(a) provides that all personnel actions
affecting federal employees
Page 425 U. S. 830
and applicants for federal employment "shall be made free from
any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."
Page 425 U. S. 831
Sections 717(b) and (c) establish complementary administrative
and judicial enforcement mechanisms designed to eradicate federal
employment discrimination. Subsection (b) delegates to the Civil
Service Commission full authority to enforce the provisions of
subsection (a)
Page 425 U. S. 832
"through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring
of employees with or without back pay," to issue "rules,
regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary and
appropriate" to carry out its responsibilities under the Act, and
to review equal employment opportunity plans that are annually
submitted to it by each agency and department.
Section 717(c) permits an aggrieved employee to file a civil
action in a federal district court to review his claim of
employment discrimination. Attached to that right, however, are
certain preconditions. Initially, the complainant must seek relief
in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him. He then
may seek further administrative review with the Civil Service
Commission or, alternatively, he may, within 30 days of receipt of
notice of the agency's final decision, file suit in federal
district court without appealing to the Civil Service Commission.
If he does appeal to the Commission, he may file suit within 30
days of the Commission's final decision. In any event, the
complainant may file a civil action if, after 180 days from the
filing of the charge or the appeal, the agency or Civil Service
Commission has not taken final action.
Sections 706(f) through(k), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)
through 2000e-5(k) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), which are incorporated
"as applicable" by § 717(d), govern such issues as venue, the
appointment of attorneys, attorneys' fees, and the scope of relief.
Section 717(e), finally, retains within each governmental agency
"primary responsibility to assure nondiscrimination in employment .
. . ."
The balance, completeness, and structural integrity of §
717 are inconsistent with the petitioner's contention that the
judicial remedy afforded by § 717(c) was designed merely to
supplement other putative judicial relief. His view fails, in our
estimation, to accord due
Page 425 U. S. 833
weight to the fact that unlike these other supposed remedies,
[
Footnote 12] § 717
does not contemplate merely judicial relief. Rather, it provides
for a careful blend of administrative and judicial enforcement
powers. Under the petitioner's theory, by perverse operation of a
type of Gresham's law, § 717, with its rigorous administrative
exhaustion requirements and time limitations, would be driven out
of currency were immediate access to the courts under other, less
demanding statutes permissible. The crucial administrative role
that each agency together with the Civil Service Commission was
given by Congress in the eradication of employment discrimination
would be eliminated "by the simple expedient of putting a different
label on [the] pleadings."
Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U. S. 475,
411 U. S.
489-490 (1973). It would require the suspension of
disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its careful
and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented by artful
pleading.
The petitioner relies upon our decision in
Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454
(1975), for the proposition that Title VII did not repeal
preexisting remedies for employment discrimination. In
Johnson, the Court held that, in the context of private
employment, Title VII did not preempt other remedies. But that
decision is inapposite here. In the first place, there were no
problems of sovereign immunity in the context of the
Johnson case. Second, the holding in
Johnson
rested upon the explicit legislative history of the 1964 Act
which
"'manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to
pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other
applicable state and federal statutes.'"
421 U.S. at
421 U. S. 459,
quoting
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36,
415 U. S. 48
(1974). Congress made clear
"'that the remedies available to the individual
Page 425 U. S. 834
under Title VII are coextensive with the indiv[i]dual's right to
sue under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, and that the two procedures augment each other and are
not mutually exclusive.'"
421 U.S. at
421 U. S. 459,
quoting H.R.Rep. No. 92-238, p. 19 (1971).
See also Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409,
392 U. S.
415-417 (1968). There is no such legislative history
behind the 1972 amendments. Indeed, as indicated above, the
congressional understanding was precisely to the contrary.
In a variety of contexts, the Court has held that a precisely
drawn, detailed statute preempts more general remedies. In
Preiser v. Rodriguez, supra, for example, state prisoners
whose good time credits had been canceled for disciplinary reasons
brought suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, in conjunction with a habeas corpus action.
Although acknowledging that the civil rights statute was, by its
terms, literally applicable, we held that challenges to the fact or
duration of imprisonment appropriately lie only under habeas
corpus, the "more specific act." Permitting such challenges to be
brought under the general, civil rights statute, where exhaustion
is not required, would undermine the "strong policy requiring
exhaustion of state remedies" when prisoners challenge the length
of their confinement. 411 U.S. at
411 U. S.
488-490. The Court has reached similar results in cases
in which injured federal employees have claimed the right to
proceed under facially applicable tort recovery statutes.
E.g.,
United States v. Demko, 385 U. S. 149
(1966) (18 U.S.C. § 4126; Federal Tort Claims Act);
Patterson v. United States, 359 U.
S. 495 (1959) (Federal Employees' Compensation Act;
Suits in Admiralty Act);
Johansen v. United States,
343 U. S. 427
(1952) (Federal Employees' Compensation Act; Public Vessels Act).
We have consistently
Page 425 U. S. 835
held that a narrowly tailored employee compensation scheme
preempts the more general tort recovery statutes.
See also
Forco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.
S. 222 (1957);
Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd
Co., 315 U. S. 561
(1942) (in patent cases, venue is governed exclusively by statute
dealing specifically with patent cases; general venue statute held
inapplicable).
In the case at bar, as in
Preiser and the other cases
cited above, the established principle leads unerringly to the
conclusion that § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of
discrimination in federal employment.
We hold, therefore, that, since Brown failed to file a timely
complaint under § 717(c), the District Court properly
dismissed the case. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
After the petition for writ of certiorari was filed, the
petitioner was laterally transferred to another Government agency.
That transfer does not affect his claim for backpay or for
equitable relief. The petitioner is still classified as a GS-7, and
still wants the specific GS-9 position in the GSA for which he
applied in 1971.
[
Footnote 2]
The letter stated in part:
"Therefore, based upon my findings, I am rendering the final
agency decision on the complaint as follows:"
"That the evidence in the case does not support the complaint of
racial discrimination for promotion against you, but that you
should receive career and performance counseling from your
immediate supervisor to help you formulate plans to receive
appropriate training and to correct your deficiencies as noted by
management."
"If this decision does not meet with your satisfaction, you may
file an appeal in writing either in person or by mail, with the
Board of Appeals and Review, U.S. Civil Service Commission,
Washington, DC 20415. The Board's decision is the final
administrative appeal. This appeal must be filed within 15 calendar
days of receipt of this letter."
"If you choose to appeal to the Board of Appeals and Review, you
retain the right to file a civil action in Federal district court
within 30 calendar days after receipt of the Board's final decision
on your appeal. You also have the right to file a civil action in
Federal district court within 30 calendar days of receipt of this
letter or 180 days after filing an appeal with the Board of Appeals
and Review if no decision has been made."
[
Footnote 3]
Brown later moved for leave to amend his complaint to allege
additional grounds of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4)
and the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) and (b), and to
allege that more than $10,000 was in controversy. The District
Court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals did not review
that order of denial.
[
Footnote 4]
The parties have apparently acquiesced in this holding by the
Court of Appeals, and we have no occasion to disturb it.
[
Footnote 5]
S.Rep. No. 92-415, p. 14 (1971).
[
Footnote 6]
Ibid.; see H.R.Rep. No. 92-238, p. 24 (1971).
[
Footnote 7]
See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.
S. 497 (1954);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579
(1952).
[
Footnote 8]
By parity of reasoning, sovereign immunity would, of course,
also bar claims against federal agencies for damages and promotion
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, and under the general federal question jurisdictional
grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
[
Footnote 9]
But see DeLong v. Hampton, 422 F.2d 21 (CA3 1970)
(jurisdiction in district court to review determination by the
Civil Service Commission that plaintiff was properly
dismissed).
[
Footnote 10]
The petitioner maintains that, in 1972, despite adverse court
decisions, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361; the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346; 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (general federal question jurisdiction); and the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, all conferred
jurisdiction on the federal courts in federal employment
discrimination cases.
[
Footnote 11]
Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1970 ed., Supp. IV) reads in
full:
"(a) Discriminatory practices prohibited; employees or
applicants for employment subject to coverage."
"All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for
employment (except with regard to aliens employed outside the
limits of the United States) in military departments as defined in
section 102 of Title 5, in executive agencies (other than the
General Accounting Office) as defined in section 105 of Title 5
(including employees and applicants for employment who are paid
from nonappropriated funds), in the United States Postal Service
and the Postal Rate Commission, in those units of the Government of
the District of Columbia having positions in the competitive
service, and in those units of the legislative and judicial
branches of the Federal Government having positions in the
competitive service, and in the Library of Congress shall be made
free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin."
"(b) Civil Service Commission; enforcement powers; issuance of
rules, regulations, etc.; annual review and approval of national
and regional equal employment opportunity plans; review and
evaluation of equal employment opportunity programs and publication
of progress reports; consultations with interested parties;
compliance with rules, regulations, etc.; contents of national and
regional equal employment opportunity plans; authority of Librarian
of Congress."
"Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the Civil
Service Commission shall have authority to enforce the provisions
of subsection (a) of this section through appropriate remedies,
including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back
pay, as will effectuate the policies of this section, and shall
issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems
necessary and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities under
this section. The Civil Service Commission shall -- "
"(1) be responsible for the annual review and approval of a
national and regional equal employment opportunity plan which each
department and agency and each appropriate unit referred to in
subsection (a) of this section shall submit in order to maintain an
affirmative program of equal employment opportunity for all such
employees and applicants for employment;"
"(2) be responsible for the review and evaluation of the
operation of all agency equal employment opportunity programs,
periodically obtaining and publishing (on at least a semiannual
basis) progress reports from each such department, agency, or unit;
and"
"(3) consult with and solicit the recommendations of interested
individuals, groups, and organizations relating to equal employment
opportunity."
"The head of each such department, agency, or unit shall comply
with such rules, regulations, orders, and instructions which shall
include a provision that an employee or applicant for employment
shall be notified of any final action taken on any complaint of
discrimination filed by him thereunder. The plan submitted by each
department, agency, and unit shall include, but not be limited to
-- "
"(1) provision for the establishment of training and education
programs designed to provide a maximum opportunity for employees to
advance so as to perform at their highest potential; and"
"(2) a description of the qualifications in terms of training
and experience relating to equal employment opportunity for the
principal and operating officials of each such department, agency,
or unit responsible for carrying out the equal employment
opportunity program and of the allocation of personnel and
resources proposed by such department, agency, or unit to carry out
its equal employment opportunity program."
"With respect to employment in the Library of Congress,
authorities granted in this subsection to the Civil Service
Commission shall be exercised by the Librarian of Congress."
"(c) Civil action by employee or applicant for employment for
redress of grievances; time for bringing of action; head of
department, agency, or unit as defendant."
"Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken
by a department, agency, or unit referred to in subsection (a) of
this section, or by the Civil Service Commission upon an appeal
from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit on a
complaint of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or
national origin, brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section, Executive Order 11478 or any succeeding Executive orders,
or after one hundred and eighty days from the filing of the initial
charge with the department, agency, or unit or with the Civil
Service Commission on appeal from a decision or order of such
department, agency, or unit until such time as final action may be
taken by a department, agency, or unit, an employee or applicant
for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his
complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint,
may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this
title, in which civil action the head of the department, agency, or
unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant."
"(d) Section 2000e-5(f) through(k) of this title applicable to
civil actions."
"The provisions of section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of this title,
as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder."
"(e) Government agency or official not relieved of
responsibility to assure nondiscrimination in employment or equal
employment opportunity."
"Nothing contained in this Act shall relieve any Government
agency or official of its or his primary responsibility to assure
nondiscrimination in employment as required by the Constitution and
statutes or of its or his responsibilities under Executive Order
11478 relating to equal employment opportunity in the Federal
Government."
[
Footnote 12]
See n 10,
supra.
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.
Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there
was uncertainty as to what federal judicial remedies, if any, were
available to persons injured by racially discriminatory employment
practices in the private sector. [
Footnote 2/1] Against that background of uncertainty,
Congress enacted a comprehensive remedial statute which did not
expressly state whether it was exclusive of, or supplementary to,
whatever other remedies might exist.
Page 425 U. S. 836
In 1972, when Congress amended the statute to cover federal
employees, there was similar uncertainty about what remedies were
available to such employees. Since both the 1964 statute and the
1972 amendment were enacted in comparable settings, and since both
pieces of legislation implement precisely the same important
national interests, it is reasonable to infer that Congress
intended to resolve the question of exclusivity in the same way at
both times.
As the legislative history discussed in
Chandler v.
Roudebush, post, p.
425 U. S. 840,
demonstrates, Congress intended federal employees to have the same
rights available to remedy racial discrimination as employees in
the private sector. [
Footnote 2/2]
Since the law is now well settled that victims of racial
discrimination in the private sector have a choice of remedies and
are not limited to Title VII, [
Footnote
2/3] federal employees should enjoy parallel rights.
Page 425 U. S. 837
The reasoning which governed the decisions in
Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U. S. 454, and
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36, applies with equal force to federal employees. There
is no evidence, either in the statute itself or in its history,
that Congress intended the 1972 amendment to be construed
differently from the basic statute.
The fact that Congress incorrectly assumed that federal
employees would have no judicial remedy if § 717 had not been
enacted [
Footnote 2/4] undermines,
rather than supports,
Page 425 U. S. 838
the Court's conclusion that Congress intended to repeal or amend
laws that it did not think applicable. Indeed, the General
Subcommittee on Labor of he House Committee on Education and Labor
rejected an amendment which would have explicitly provided that
§ 717 would be the exclusive remedy for federal employees.
[
Footnote 2/5] In sum, the
legislative history of § 717 discloses a clear intent to
provide federal employees with rights that parallel those available
to employees in the private sector, no evidence of an intention to
make the remedy exclusive, and the rejection of an amendment which
would have so provided. [
Footnote
2/6]
The burden of persuading us that we should interpolate such an
important provision into a complex, carefully drafted statute is a
heavy one. Since that burden has not been met, I would simply read
the statute as Congress wrote it.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S.
36, and
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U. S. 454,
were not decided until 1974 and 1975, respectively.
[
Footnote 2/2]
In 1972, Congress extended the protection of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e
et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), to employees
of the Federal Government. A principal goal of the amending
legislation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L.
92-261, 86 Stat. 103, was to eradicate "entrenched discrimination
in the Federal service,"
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.
S. 535,
417 U. S. 547,
by strengthening internal safeguards and by according "[a]ggrieved
[federal] employees or applicants . . . the full rights available
in the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector
under title VII."
Chandler v. Roudebush, post at
425 U. S.
841.
[
Footnote 2/3]
In
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra, at
415 U. S. 47-49,
MR. JUSTICE POWELL for a unanimous Court stated:
"[L]egislative enactments in this area have long evinced a
general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against
discrimination. In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000a
et seq., Congress indicated that it considered the
policy against discrimination to be of the 'highest priority.'
Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, [
390 U.S.
400,]
390 U. S. 402. Consistent
with this view, Title VII provides for consideration of employment
discrimination clams in several forums.
See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (EEOC); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(c) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (state and local agencies); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (federal courts).
And, in general, submission of a claim to one forum does not
preclude a later submission to another. Moreover, the legislative
history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an
individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII
and other applicable state and federal statutes. The clear
inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than
supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination."
In
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, at
421 U. S. 459,
it was noted:
"Despite Title VII's range and its design as a comprehensive
solution for the problem of invidious discrimination in employment,
the aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived of other remedies
he possesses, and is not limited to Title VII in his search for
relief. . . . In particular, Congress noted 'that the remedies
available to the individual under Title VII are coextensive with
the indiv[i]dual's right to sue under the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and that the two
procedures augment each other and are not mutually exclusive.'
H.R.Rep. No. 92-238, p. 19 (1971).
See also S.Rep. No.
92-415, p. 24 (1971). Later, in considering the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, the Senate rejected an amendment that
would have deprived a claimant of any right to sue under §
1981. 118 Cong.Rec. 3371-3373 (1972)."
[
Footnote 2/4]
Since the Court does not question the proposition that other
remedies would have been available if not foreclosed by its
exclusive reading of § 717, no purpose would be served by
discussing the status of any alternative remedy. In view of the
Court's holding, it is equally pointless to discuss the
respondents' contention that the action is barred by petitioner's
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In this connection,
however, the discussion in
Johnson, supra at
421 U. S. 461,
is instructive.
[
Footnote 2/5]
The minority of the Committee in stating its views on H.R. 1746
in the final Committee report included the following paragraph:
"Failure to Make Title VII an Exclusive Federal Remedy. Despite
the enactment of title VII of the Civil Rights Act, charges of
discriminatory employment conditions may still be brought under
prior existing federal statutes such as the National Labor
Relations Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In view of the
comprehensive prohibitions against discrimination contained in
title VII, and the intent of the Committee bill to consolidate
procedures and remedies under one agency, it would be consistent to
make title VII the exclusive remedy. No public interest is served
in continuing to permit a multiplicity of statutes or forums to
deal with discrimination in employment. However, our attempt to
amend the Committee bill to make title VII an exclusive remedy
(except for pattern or practice suits) was rejected. In our view,
the failure to make this an exclusive remedy merely encourages an
individual who has lost his case in one forum under one statute to
relitigate his case in still another forum under another federal
statute."
H.R.Rep. No. 92-238, p. 66 (1971).
[
Footnote 2/6]
To the extent that multiple remedies may impose an undesirable
burden on employers, it seems to me that the problem is most apt to
be redressed in an impartial manner by assuming that Congress
intended to subject -- and will continue to subject -- public and
private employers to similar rules.