Where it is unclear whether the New York State courts will
construe a New York prejudgment attachment statute so as to remove
any federal constitutional problems, it is improper for a
three-judge District Court to address the question of the statute's
constitutionality or to interfere with its enforcement. The
judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its
enforcement is therefore vacated and the cases are remanded to the
District Court with directions to abstain from a decision of the
federal constitutional issues until the parties have had an
opportunity to obtain a construction of the New York law from the
New York state courts.
383 F.
Supp. 643, vacated and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from the judgment of a three-judge federal
court declaring unconstitutional and enjoining
Page 425 U. S. 74
enforcement of certain statutes of the State of New York which
provide for prejudgment attachment of a defendant's assets. On
April 13, 1973, appellant Curtis Circulation Co. (Curtis) filed a
suit against appellees Sugar and Wrestling Revue, Inc. (Wrestling),
and Champion Sports Publications, Inc. (Champion), in a New York
state court. The complaint alleged that Curtis had advanced over
$100,000 -- of which $28,588.08 remained unpaid -- to Champion
under a contract with Champion pursuant to which Champion had
agreed to permit Curtis to market certain identified sports
magazines. It further alleged that Sugar, who owned and operated
Champion, had caused title to the magazines to be transferred to
Wrestling, another company owned and operated by Sugar, and had
caused Wrestling to transfer the magazines to National Sports
Publishing Corp. (National), a corporation not controlled by Sugar,
for sale to the public. The consequence was that Champion had been
stripped of its assets and that the magazines -- out of the sales
of which Curtis was to recoup its advance to Champion -- had been
sold instead by National. The complaint, containing several counts
alleging fraud on the part of each defendant, sought a judgment for
the $28,588.08 of Curtis' advances which remained unrepaid. At the
same time, Curtis sought to attach the debt owed by National to
Wrestling for the magazines which National had sold and for which
it had not yet paid Wrestling. New York Civil Practice Laws and
Rules (CPLR) § 6201 (Supp. 1975-1976) [
Footnote 1] provides for attachment
Page 425 U. S. 75
on various grounds. The order of attachment may be granted in
favor of a plaintiff by a judge, upon
ex parte motion at
any time before judgment, § 6211; and must be supported
"by affidavit and such other written evidence as may be
submitted, [showing] that there is a cause of action and the one or
more grounds for attachment . . . that exist and the amount
demanded from the defendant above all counterclaims known to the
plaintiff."
§ 6212(a). In addition, the plaintiff will be ordered by
the judge to give an undertaking in an amount fixed by the court
out of which the defendant will be paid legal costs and damages
resulting from the attachment if the defendant prevails in the
underlying lawsuit. § 6212(b).
Pursuant to these procedures, Curtis filed a detailed affidavit
alleging that it had a cause of action against appellees and
Champion for fraud justifying a recovery of $28,588.08, and seeking
an order of attachment under CPLR §§ 6201(4), (5), and
(8) (Supp. 1975-1976).
On April 13, 1973, New York Supreme Court Justice Fine granted
the motion conditioned on Curtis' providing a $10,000 undertaking,
$8,570 of which was for the purpose of holding the defendants
harmless should they prevail in the underlying suit. The
undertaking was provided by Curtis and the order of attachment
issued. The sheriff then levied on the debt owed by National to
Wrestling, and money in the total amount of $24,324.17
Page 425 U. S. 76
was paid to the sheriff by National in April and May, 1973, and
in April, June, and July, 1974.
Under CPLR, a defendant may discharge an attachment by giving an
undertaking in an amount equal to the value of the property
attached, § 6222, or by successfully moving to vacate the
attachment under § 6223. That section provides:
"Prior to the application of property or debt to the
satisfaction of a judgment, the defendant, the garnishee or any
person having an interest in the property or debt may move, on
notice to each party and the sheriff, for an order vacating or
modifying the order of attachment. Upon the motion, the court shall
give the plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to correct any defect.
If, after the defendant has appeared in the action, the court
determines that the attachment is unnecessary to the security of
the plaintiff, it shall vacate the order of attachment. Such a
motion shall not of itself constitute an appearance in the
action."
Appellees neither gave an undertaking nor moved to vacate the
attachment under § 6223. Instead, they waited nine months
until January, 1974, and filed the instant action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York naming as defendants the sheriff, Judge Fine,
the Attorney General, the Governor of New York, and the plaintiffs
in the state action. Alleging that the temporary loss, pending
decision on the merits of the underlying complaint, of the money
owed them by National was injuring them irreparably, they sought a
declaration that the attachment provisions of CPLR were
unconstitutional, an order enjoining their further enforcement, and
an order directing that the attachment of National's debt to
Wrestling be vacated. Appellees
Page 425 U. S. 77
asked that a three-judge court be convened under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2281 and 2284.
On June 17, 1974, the single-judge court rejected appellants'
claim that it should abstain from deciding the constitutional
issue, and a three-judge court was convened. On November 6, 1974,
the three-judge court granted the requested relief "until and
unless a meaningful opportunity to vacate an attachment is provided
under CPLR [§] 6223 or by the [c]ourts of the State of New
York." The judgment was stayed, however, pending appeal to this
Court.
As we understand it, the District Court found the New York
prejudgment attachment provisions unconstitutional because it
concluded that the opportunity to vacate the attachment provided by
CPLR § 6223 was inadequate, under this Court's cases, to
justify the property deprivation involved. In its view, the hearing
available on a motion to vacate the attachment was inadequate
principally because the hearing would only be concerned with the
question whether the "attachment is unnecessary to the security of
the plaintiff," § 6223, and would not require the plaintiff to
litigate the question of the likelihood that it would ultimately
prevail on the merits. [
Footnote
2]
It may be that the three-judge District Court below was correct
in its "forecast,"
see Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U. S. 496,
312 U. S. 499
(1941), that, even in light of recent cases in this Court,
see,
e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U. S. 601
(1975);
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.
S. 600 (1974);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S.
67 (1972), the New York courts will construe CPLR §
6223 to preclude an adequate preliminary
Page 425 U. S. 78
inquiry into the merits of a plaintiff's underlying claim.
Cf. Boehning v. Indiana Employees Assn., 423 U. S.
6,
423 U. S. 7-8, n.
(1975). On the other had, as the order of the three-judge court
itself recognized, the New York courts could conclude otherwise.
The New York Court of Appeals has already held that an attachment
may be vacated if it "clearly" appears "that the plaintiffs must
ultimately fail" on the merits.
Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist
Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 377, 138 N.E. 24, 26
(1923).
See also Maitrejean v. Levon Properties, 45
App.Div.2d 1020, 358 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1974);
Richman v.
Richman, 41 App Div.2d 993, 344 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1973);
Martin
Enterprises, Inc. v. M. S. Kaplan Co., 45 App.Div.2d 883, 358
N.Y.S.2d 160 (1974). The precise nature of any inquiry into the
merits which will be made by the New York courts under this rubric
is unclear, but an inquiry consistent with the constitutional
standard is by no means automatically precluded. Indeed, two New
York trial courts have expressly held, subsequent to the decision
below, that, where fact issues are raised, on a motion to vacate an
attachment, with respect to the merits of the underlying claim, a
preliminary hearing will be held on those issues.
Regnell v.
Page, 82 Misc.2d 506, 369 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1975);
New York
Auction Co v. Belt, 81 Misc.2d 1032, 368 N.Y.S.2d 98
(1975).
Under these circumstances, it would be unwise for this Court to
address the constitutionality of the New York attachment statutes,
for decision on that issue may be rendered unnecessary by a
decision of the New York courts as a matter of state law.
City
of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.
S. 639,
358 U. S. 640
(1959);
Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S.
82 (1970);
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.
S. 528 (1965);
Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co.,
400 U. S. 41
(1970);
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
Page 425 U. S. 79
supra. The court below has declared unconstitutional
the statute of a State the continued utilization of which is
undoubtedly of importance to that State; if the State construes its
statute so as to remove any constitutional problems, friction with
the State will have been avoided.
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., supra at
312 U. S.
500-501. Finally, injunctive relief against the state
officials who were defendants below appears particularly
inappropriate in light of the fact that these officials contended
below and continue to contend here that New York law does provide
an opportunity for a preliminary hearing on the merits of a
plaintiff's underlying claim.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment below and remand these cases
to the three-judge court and direct it to abstain from a decision
of the federal constitutional issues until the parties have had an
opportunity to obtain a construction of New York law from the New
York state courts.
So ordered.
* Together with No. 7859,
Curtis Circulation Co. et al. v.
Sugar et al., also on appeal from the same court.
[
Footnote 1]
"An order of attachment may be granted in any action, except a
matrimonial action, where the plaintiff has demanded and would be
entitled, in whole or in part, or in the alternative, to a money
judgment against one or more defendants, when:"
"
* * * *"
"4. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors, has
assigned, disposed of or secreted property, or removed it from the
state or is about to do any of these acts; or"
"5. the defendant, in an action upon a contract, express or
implied, has been guilty of a fraud in contracting or incurring the
liability; or"
"
* * * *"
"8. there is a cause of action to recover damages for the
conversion of personal property, or for fraud or deceit."
[
Footnote 2]
The court also concluded that the burden of proof at the hearing
would be on the defendant, and noted that the plaintiff, unlike the
plaintiff in
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.
S. 600 (1974), had no special property interest in the
property attached.